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This thesis argues that Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) agreements, no matter how 
fair and equitable, ultimately help to destroy traditional knowledge rather than protect 
it. ABS agreements are promoted and implemented as one of the key mechanisms for 
the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  from  illegitimate  appropriation  by 
pharmaceutical companies or other actors. However, because they dominantly treat 
traditional  knowledge  as  intellectual  property  in  need  of  protection  from 
misappropriation,  they have the effect of expanding capital  into a previously non-
capitalist  domain.  The  thesis  argues  that  it  is  in  the  domain  of  subsistence  that 
traditional knowledge is developed and reproduced; but the expansion of capitalism 
destroys people’s autonomous subsistence and thus the very foundations of traditional 
knowledge. In order to make this argument, the thesis combines two main strategies. 
First,  a critical understanding of Karl Polanyi’s notion of the double movement of 
capital is integrated with the autonomist Marxist idea of capital as value practice, and 
the concomitant understanding that alternative value practices constitute an ‘outside’ 
of capitalism. This theoretical framework guides discussion of the way in which the 
protection of traditional knowledge constitutes a form of capital expansion. Second, a 
detailed  ethnographic  presentation  of  a  bioprospecting  project  and  its  ABS 
negotiations  in  the  Ecuadorian  Amazon  is  considered  in  political  and  historical 
context. This reveals the way in which traditional knowledge protection introduces 
market valuations into an area of life which had theretofore been oriented by different 
values.  In  conclusion,  the  thesis  points  to  the  importance  of  engaging  in  value 
practices which create and re-create the ‘outside’ of capitalism as a counter-hegemonic 
form of traditional knowledge protection which actually safeguards the conditions in 
which traditional knowledge can flourish. 
Keywords: Access and Benefit Sharing, bioprospecting, capital, critical ethnography,  
double movement, Ecuador, indigenous movement, Napo, subsistence perspective,  
traditional knowledge, value struggle.
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“Antes los gringos decían que somos estúpidos,
ahora quieren llevarse nuestro conocimiento...” 
(Kichwa grandmother)
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Figure 1: Map of Ecuador.
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0 Introduction.
The second time I had to enter the Amazon rainforest from the Ecuadorian capital of 
Quito, I was in a hurry. It was the occasion of my first extended fieldwork stay in the 
country,  and as part  of my research,  I  was supposed to  attend a capacity-building 
course of a German bioprospecting project as a participant observer. The course was 
due to start in a couple of days, and I still had to find a place to live in Tena, the small 
capital of the Napo province with a distinct frontier town feel which was to become 
my temporary home. To my distress, the whole of the Napo province was on strike. 
“No, no buses at all” confirmed the ticket clerk at Quito’s bustling bus station “not 
today and not tomorrow and probably not for the rest of the week.” – “They are on 
strike,  paro,  paro!” somebody else gesticulated to me. All roads into the province 
were blockaded. “They don’t let anyone pass.” – “But I have to go” I insisted, feeling 
queasy at  the thought  I  might  miss my first  real  life performance as ethnographic 
researcher. It slowly transpired that I could catch a bus to Puyo, the capital of the 
neighbouring Pastaza province, about 50 km South of Tena. From there, I could try to 
make my way on a mud road into Napo and to Tena by car –  maybe. I bought the 
ticket, and six hours later, after a spectacular descent from the high Andes through the 
mid-altitude cloudforest into the Eastern margins of the Amazon rainforest, I found 
myself in steaming heat and in Puyo, a growing market town amidst sugar cane and 
cocoa plantations. There were indeed cars offering lifts along the Puyo-Tena road – 
but only until the next roadblock. “You can cross it by foot, and catch another car on 
the other side, that is what I will do, I live in Santa Clara [about half way to Tena]” 
explained a fellow passenger to me. So we rode in cars and pick-up trucks through 
mud and potholes from roadblock to roadblock. Each roadside settlement had their 
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very own blockade: burning tyres, rocks, tree trunks, sometimes almost a kilometre 
long. Whole communities seemed to gather around the smouldering rubber, sharing 
meals. Kids were waving at us, shouting “Viva el paro!” as we walked in groups of 
varying sizes  past  their  fires and homes,  lugging backpacks,  suitcases,  and thirsty 
chickens in plastic carrier bags. I arrived in Tena after nightfall, not much wiser about 
the reasons for the strike – or was it an uprising? – despite my relentless questioning 
along  the  way.  Everybody  seemed  to  have  their  own  opinions  on  why  a  whole 
province was in protest.
The next day I presented myself proudly at the offices of FONAKIN (Federación de 
la Nacionalidad Kichwa del  Napo, see Fig. 2 below), the indigenous federation of 
Kichwa  communities,  with  the  Council  of  which  I  had  previously  arranged  to 
collaborate as a student researcher and independent adviser regarding the protection of 
traditional  knowledge.  “Oh,  you are here already!” one of the  dirigentes (Council 
members) exclaimed, “We are on strike. Come along, we are leaving in half an hour,  
we are going to Baeza, things are getting hot there, they need our support.” I was 
confused: what about the capacity-building course, my research, the original plan? 
“Oh, the Germans [leading the course] won’t be here for another week or two! We 
have postponed the course.” He emphasised again: “We are on strike.” It dawned on 
me that it was of course unlikely that a group of German professionals would feel the 
same need that I had felt to make it ‘at all cost’ and through all road blockades to  
Tena. Moreover, it was even less likely that any of the would-be participants would 
make it  to  the first  course module,  given that their  whole province was staging a 
traffic-arresting strike. So I was whisked into a bus, and, along with a jolly group of 
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people of all ages, transported to Baeza, a small mountain town, over half way back to 
Quito (along the road I had originally intended to travel). Once there, we were fed rice 
and canned sardines along with probably a few thousand others and sent a small walk 
down the tarmacked highway E45, which was filled with people and free of vehicles. 
At the bottom of the hill, about 500 metres away from us, oil drums were burning, and 
a group of people were throwing what looked like rocks. Further below, the highway 
filled up with a line of lorries, buses and cars that stretched until the horizon through 
an awe-inspiring landscape of green, descending hills. A moment later, there were gun 
shots, and people were running in our direction. “Live bullets,” somebody said next to 
me “already several people in hospital.” Then there was an explosion. More shots, 
more explosions. A very old, very small lady came happily walking up the hill “Did 
you see me throw the dynamite?!” she gleefully pronounced. In the meantime, I had 
spotted the soldiers blocking the road further  down in an attempt to break up the 
striker’s blockade with firearms. “Oh, we can just go home” joked somebody “[the 
soldiers] are blocking the road for us!” People laughed and continued to stand about 
and chat. Every now and again, some would join the frontline, set another tyre alight,  
or shout abuse at the soldiers.
The strike had been called for by the provincial government, after their negotiations 
with the national government regarding more financial support for the province had 
failed. Blocking all roads was bound to force some concessions from Quito, as most of 
the oil produced in the Amazon – the nation’s primary export good – is transported 
through Napo. As a consequence of their  call,  the provincial  governor and several 
mayors  were  arrested,  and a  state  of  emergency pronounced for  the  whole of  the 
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province.  A curfew  was  enforced  from nightfall  and  the  military  had  free  reign. 
Witnessing several similar strikes over the period of my fieldwork (22 months over 
three years), I came to understand that these are not rare occurrences, neither in the 
Amazon region nor in Ecuador as a whole. 
Figure 2: FONAKIN headquarters, Tena 2007.
Most of the people whom I asked about the reasons for the strike spoke of the need for 
better roads and an international airport in Tena. I was stunned: was I really supporting 
some kind of pro-developmentalist agenda by my presence, potentially running the 
risk of catching a live bullet in the process? FONAKIN members were more nuanced 
in  their  demands,  emphasising  better  healthcare  and  educational  facilities.  More 
money for the province was the bottom line; how exactly such money would be spent 
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was,  at  this  stage,  secondary.  “Well,  well” I  concluded  not  without  some 
disappointment in my notebook that day “it is your own fault for assuming indigenous  
organisations are all radical anti-road protesters! Everywhere everyone just wants a  
piece of the pie...”
Nonetheless, over time I came to realise that this early conclusion of mine was too 
facile a conclusion.  People’s desires and motivations are complex,  and ‘wanting a 
piece of the pie’ is sometimes simply the most feasible aspiration. At the same time, 
however, it easily obscures the variety of demands and hopes which people express 
and harbour, by reducing this variety to the lowest common denominator. In a world 
in which profit constitutes the ultimate value, and in which practically everything has 
a price-tag, it is often easier (and more effective?) to frame one’s needs, wants and 
requests  in  the  idiom of  the  market  and economic  development.  Indeed,  it  might 
sometimes seem that  there  is  no other  idiom to  speak in,  no other  vocabulary to 
mobilise, no other discourse to deploy.  Scratching at the surface, however, one will 
soon find a diversity of values and meanings,  embedded in a variety of languages 
which people use to make sense of their world, and their requirements and desires 
within it. Indeed, social movements often express their demands through a plurality of 
values  which  transcends simple  market  rationalities  of  cost-benefit  (see  especially 
Martinez-Alier 2002). However, far too often, such a plurality of values, even where 
forcefully voiced, gets subsumed and co-opted by the logic of capital, or might serve 
to  constrain  the  excesses  of  capital  in  a  way that  ultimately  reinforces  long-term 
market expansion. 
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In  this  thesis,  I  explore  this  tension  field  between  capital  expansion,  alternative 
valuations, and people’s wants and needs in the context of the endeavour to protect 
traditional knowledge. My early adventure of the Napo paro is partly responsible for 
setting me off in this direction.
~ ~ ~
The protection of traditional knowledge, a critique of which is the objective of this 
thesis,  is  by  now  undeniably  a  ‘global’ endeavour.  Defined  as  the  protection  of 
“knowledge,  innovations  and  practices  of  indigenous  and  local  communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles” by the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD)1, it 
is  more or  less directly addressed by the World  Intellectual  Property Organisation 
(WIPO)2,  the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Doha Development Agenda3,  the 
International  Treaty  on  Plant  Genetic  Resources  of  the  Food  and  Agriculture 
Organisation  (FAO)4,  the  United  Nations  Declaration  on the  Rights  of  Indigenous 
1 This definition is to be found in the CBD’s Article 8(j), available online, e.g., at:
http://www.cbd.int/traditional/
2 Especially through WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (the IGC).
3 The  Doha  Development  Agenda’s  paragraph  19  concerns  TRIPS,  biological  diversity  and 
traditional knowledge. Available online at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#par19
4 The International Treaty’s objectives are the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from 
their use, in harmony with the CBD. The centrepiece of the Treaty is a ‘multilateral system for  
access and benefit-sharing’ which for certain categories of plant genetic resources guarantees 
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Peoples5,  as  well  as  by  a  host  of  ethical  guidelines  and  codes  of  conduct  of 
professional  societies,  such  as  the  Natural  Stewardship  Circle  for  the  Beauty, 
Cosmetics,  Fragrance,  and  Flavor  Industries6.  The  creation  of  a  legally  binding 
international regime is being debated in several fora. Moreover, various countries have 
enacted  special  laws,  or  established  regulatory  frameworks  for  the  protection  of 
traditional knowledge at the national level, while indigenous peoples and subsistence 
farmers organisations continue to fight for the recognition of their rights in this regard 
at all scales. Large amounts of resources continue to be mobilised for conferences, ad 
hoc meetings, fact finding missions, capacity building, and report writing in order to 
facilitate decision-making about protective mechanisms and their implementation.
While  the need to protect  traditional  knowledge is  sometimes presented as arising 
from the erosion of traditional ways of life, its internationally dominant expression is 
in terms of illegitimate appropriation. This is to say that the protection of traditional 
knowledge is generally seen as required due to the threat of ‘biopiracy’. Biopiracy is 
cast  as the undue appropriation of,  and exclusive commercial  gain from plant and 
animal resources of traditional use in indigenous and farming communities, and its 
most infamous perpetrators are pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies (Shiva 
facilitated  access  in  return  for  benefit-sharing.  In  respect  of  traditional  knowledge,  the  key 
provision of the Treaty is its recognition of ‘farmers’ rights’ through its  Article 9. Available 
online at:
http://www.planttreaty.org/texts_en.htm
5 I discuss the Declaration in more detail in Chapter 2 below. Its full text is available online at:
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html




1997; Mooney 2000). In this way, traditional knowledge is construed as a kind of 
(intellectual) property of indigenous and farming peoples, implying the latter’s rights 
to  control  access  to  and to  benefit  economically from their  traditional  knowledge. 
Traditional knowledge is thus understood as in need of the same kind of protection as 
other  forms  of  (private,  intellectual)  property.  Legislation  and soft  law  guidelines 
regarding  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing  (ABS)  are  currently  wielded  as  main 
mechanisms for the protection of traditional knowledge.
This thesis aims to contribute to the destabilisation of the hegemonic construction of 
the protection of traditional knowledge as a form of intellectual property protection. I 
argue that  the protection of  traditional  knowledge is  best  understood as  a  field  of  
struggle over  both  meanings  and  resources,  and  with  implications  beyond  the 
particular details of a protective legal regime. More specifically, I argue that this field 
of struggle comprises movements towards market expansion, countermovements to 
constrain and regulate this expansion, as well as contests over hegemonic values, and 
over  the  meanings  of  such  key  terms  as  knowledge,  property,  culture,  and  self-
determination.
The thesis unfolds in five chapters. Chapter 1 ‘Bioprospecting and the War Against  
Subsistence’ provides the theoretical and methodological antecedents necessary for the 
analysis  of  subsequent  chapters.  I  here  argue  that  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge as it is performed in and through bioprospecting projects and Access and 
Benefit Sharing (ABS) agreements furthers what Ivan Illich (1981) has called ‘the war 
against  subsistence’.  The  destruction  of  the  conditions  for  people’s  autonomous 
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subsistence is one of the fundamental effects of the expansion of capital and its mode 
of production, and I argue that the dominant form of traditional knowledge protection 
contributes to this destruction. Traditional knowledge is the knowledge that has been 
developed  over  generations  through  subsistence  practices;  as  capital  destroys 
subsistence,  it  destroys  the  conditions  for  the  continuous  creation  of  traditional 
knowledge. As the dominant form of traditional knowledge protection contributes to 
the expansion of capital, it also contributes to the destruction of the very foundations 
of traditional knowledge.
After examining bioprospecting and ABS agreements as mechanisms for traditional 
knowledge protection in Section 1.1., I discuss the war against subsistence in Section 
1.2.: how enclosures separate people from their access to the means of subsistence, 
and how wage labour and its obscure twin ‘shadow work’ (Illich 1980; 1981) destroy 
and colonise the ability of a household to fulfil its basic needs for itself. In Section 
1.3. I present a view on capital and its contradictions which is inspired by autonomist 
and radical feminist elaborations of the traditional Marxist account and has recently 
been lucidly synthesised by Massimo De Angelis (2007). On this view, there is an 
‘outside’ of capital which is constituted in and through practices which embody values 
other than those of the market economy. Many indigenous people’s lives reproduce 
this  ‘outside’ every  day,  and  it  is  within  these  alternative  ‘value  practices’ that 
traditional  knowledge  is  kept  alive.  Subsistence  practices,  on  this  account,  are 
quintessentially ‘other’ than capital.  After a discussion of capital’s contradiction of 
‘overaccumulation’, as well as capital’s tendency to undermine its own conditions of 
production and its  need for ‘fictitious commodities’,  I  elaborate  on Karl Polanyi’s 
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notion of the ‘double movement’ (1944 [1967]) in Section 1.4. According to this, the 
capitalist market economy is characterised by movements towards market expansion 
and  countermovements  which  arise  to  protect  society  from  the  most  destructive 
ravages  of  capital  expansion.  I  argue  that  this  ‘double  movement’ is  the  dynamic 
through which the capitalist mode of production’s long-term survival and reproduction 
is assured, and any attempt at overcoming capitalism has to take this dynamic into 
account.  Section 1.5. brings the protection of traditional knowledge to bear on the 
preceding discussion. I argue that the protection of traditional knowledge is a field of 
struggle  characterised  by  movements  towards  market  expansion  and 
countermovements aimed at ‘protecting’ social and environmental interests. While the 
hegemonic construction of traditional knowledge protection as a form of intellectual 
property protection undeniably undergirds the long-term reproduction of capital, and 
while it supports the latter’s destruction of those practices which create an ‘outside’ to 
capital, the development of other, counter-hegemonic constructions is nonetheless still 
possible on this battlefield. Section 1.6. explains why the methodological approach of 
‘critical  ethnography’,  which  combines  ethnographic study with  political  economy 
analysis, is appropriate for the arguments I am making in this thesis. In particular, I 
point out that the protection of traditional knowledge is best understood as existing 
only in and through its particular manifestations. That is, in order to understand the 
protection of traditional knowledge, a study of the actual realisation of policies, laws 
and  guidelines  addressing  the  matter  is  in  order.  My ethnographic  account  of  an 
attempt at negotiating a fair and equitable Access and Benefit Sharing agreement in 
the  Ecuadorian  Amazon  province  of  Napo  should  hence  be  understood  as  a  step 
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toward understanding the phenomenon of the protection of traditional knowledge and 
its double movement dynamic more generally. 
I begin my critical ethnography of the protection of traditional knowledge in Chapter 
2 ‘From Fields of Struggle’ by outlining multiple forces that have converged and are 
converging in a series of fields which together constitute the origins of traditional 
knowledge protection. I argue that without the histories of political struggle which 
constitute the five fields of  (i) International Law and the Politics of Indigeneity, (ii) 
Conservation of Biological Resources, (iii) Intellectual Property, (iv) Safeguarding of 
Cultural Heritage, and (v) Public Participation in Development and Governance, the 
protection of traditional knowledge would not be an international imperative with the 
particular shape which it has today. Sections 2.1. – 2.5. address each of these fields 
and their particular trajectories in turn. I show how each one is itself characterised by 
the  double  movement  dynamic  of  market  expansion,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
countermovements protecting social and environmental interests, on the other. In this 
way, the theoretical discussion of Chapter 1 regarding the double movement is given a 
grounding in  historical  events  and  trajectories.  I  emphasise  that  in  the  context  of 
sustainable development as well as participatory development, the double movement 
dynamic collapses into a singular movement of market expansion, which has already 
incorporated – and thereby disarmed – its countermovements. Understanding each 
of   these   five   fields   and   trajectories   and   their   complex   conjunction   in   the 




Chapter 3 ‘Living in Napo’ is a brief political economy of extraction and colonisation 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon. It contextualises my fieldwork in the Napo region, as well 
as the key focus of my research, the participatory bioprospecting project ProBenefit – 
which I present and discuss in Chapter 4 – historically and politically. Approaching 
the protection of traditional knowledge from a critical perspective, which aims to take 
into  account  the  views  of  the  so-called  knowledge-holders  themselves,  requires  a 
historical view that sees bioprospecting as one of a wider set of activities impinging 
on people’s lives. This chapter equips the reader with the necessary background for 
such  a  historical  view.  The  chapter  divides  into  ten  sections,  following  a  largely 
chronological structure. I start with a brief introduction to the language, culture and 
ethnicity  of  the  Napo  Runa,  literally  the  ‘people  of  the  Napo’,  the  indigenous 
inhabitants of the area. I then begin an account of the historical trajectory of the area 
with  the  Conquest  of  the  Napo  region  and  the  subsequent  300  years  of  colonial 
administration.  I  focus  attention  on  the  rubber  boom,  increasing  colonisation,  the 
economy of debt-peonage, which had indigenous families bonded through enforced 
debt  to  European  colonisers,  gold  panning,  and  oil  exploration.  With  the  oil 
companies, wage labour entered the area, changing the traditional power structures, 
and familiarising Napo Runa with proletarianisation as a new form of exploitation. 
From the 1960s onwards, indigenous communities increasingly formed organisations 
and federations which began to voice political demands and fight for the recognition 
of land claims. In this context, I introduce the indigenous federation FONAKIN with 
which I was affiliated as part of my fieldwork. A short account of the 1970s oil boom 
and consequent debt crisis and structural adjustments which provoked frequent and 
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widespread indigenous uprisings and catapulted the Ecuadorian indigenous movement 
into  a  politically  relatively  powerful  position  will  serve  as  useful  background  to 
understanding the situation into which the ProBenefit project entered in 2003, with its 
proposal  of  facilitating  a  participatory  process  for  the  negotiation  of  a  fair  and 
equitable  Access  and Benefit  Sharing  agreement  with  the  German  pharmaceutical 
company Schwabe Ltd.
Chapter  4  ‘Negotiating  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing  in  Napo’ is  an  ethnographic 
account and discussion of the misunderstandings, frictions and value clashes which 
characterised  the  German  government-funded  ProBenefit  bioprospecting  initiative 
during its engagement with the Kichwa people of Amazonian Ecuador represented by 
FONAKIN.  ProBenefit  was  divided  into  two  phases,  yet  failed  to  successfully 
complete  its  first  phase  which  aimed  at  the  development  of  a  fair  and  equitable 
agreement  regarding  access  to  natural  resources  in  the  Napo  region.  Indigenous 
participation  stalled  and  made timely negotiation  of  an  ABS proposal  impossible; 
neither  consent  to  nor  a  clear  rejection  of  bioprospecting  in  Napo  was  therefore 
obtained. I discuss the frictions which culminated in this ‘failure’ in detail, and argue 
that  the  problems  ProBenefit  had  to  face  were  rooted  in  ProBenefit’s  structural 
inability to question some of its own fundamental assumptions regarding the value of 
traditional  knowledge,  the  threats  it  faces,  and  the  most  adequate  strategies  of 
protection. This inability – to do with project time frame, obligations to funders, and 
deep-seated cultural  assumptions  – also led to  the (inadvertent)  eclipsing  of  other 
understanding of what was at stake, even those that were clearly voiced during the 
capacity  building  course  which  constituted  one  of  ProBenefit’s  key  engagement 
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strategies. In this chapter, I make my case over eight sections. Section 4.1. and 4.2. 
provide  an  overview  over  project  organisation,  time  frame,  funding,  aims  and 
objectives, and envisioned challenges. In Sections 4.3 – 4.6. I discuss what I believe to 
be the core underlying problems of the entire endeavour. Using examples from the 
capacity  building  course  and  other  occasions,  I  comment  on  the  disparity  in 
expectations regarding the partnership, as well as on the way in which the relevance of 
equitable Access and Benefit Sharing to the lives of indigenous people was assumed 
and, ultimately, imposed rather than discovered as an actual priority of people. I also 
discuss how the messiness of real public participation conflicted with the requirements 
of public legitimation which assumes a more ideal version of participation. I argue 
that  the  myth  of  a  level  playing  field  and  what  we  might  call  the  the  historical 
‘naivety’  of  the  ProBenefit  team  members  has  complicated  an  already  difficult 
situation and troubled an incipient ‘partnership’. Section 4.7. is a detailed account of 
the aftermath of the capacity building course, during which indigenous participation 
ebbed and misunderstandings grew. In Section 4.8. I conclude the chapter with a brief 
discussion  of  the  way in  which  alternative  visions  of  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge were eclipsed during ProBenefit project activities. This leads us to the next 
chapter in which I illustrate and discuss such alternative visions.
Chapter  5  ‘The  Hidden  Variety  of  Protection’ addresses  the  variety  of  views  on 
traditional knowledge, its value and need for protection that I was confronted with 
during my fieldwork. I present and discuss a series of conversations and events at 
which  traditional  knowledge  protection  figured  in  ways  very  different  to  its 
hegemonic  construal  as  intellectual  property  protection.  ‘Protection  of  traditional 
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knowledge’ is understood and used by the people whom I met in the Amazon in ways 
and to ends that sometimes overlap with, yet in many ways differ from the schemes 
and  objectives  pursued  by  ProBenefit,  and  other  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing 
endeavours. I argue that the dominant discourse of protection – the one developed and 
employed in national and international policy making settings and which animates 
projects such as ProBenefit – colonises our understanding of what is at stake in the 
protection  of  traditional  knowledge,  and  perpetuates  background  assumptions 
ultimately instrumental to the continued expansion of capital. In Section 5.1. I clarify 
the obvious, yet crucial point that the solutions we develop depend on the problems 
we perceive. The way in which we construe traditional knowledge, and the threats 
which it  faces will  hence determine the kind of protection which we develop and 
perform. In Section 5.2. I present a number of interactions which took place during the 
capacity-building  course  of  ProBenefit  and  which  highlight  the  ways  in  which 
dominant understandings of traditional knowledge, and the issue of its protection were 
perpetuated, while alternative understandings of what was at stake were disregarded 
and subdued. This is meant to show that ProBenefit, despite best intentions, imposed a 
value system and world view on its indigenous participants. In Section 5.3. I present a 
series of conversations and encounters which I was part of outside of the ProBenefit 
setting. These make even clearer that projects such as ProBenefit, and the discourses 
which they introduce and perpetuate, veil the plural understandings and valuations of 
knowledge and people’s concerns in this regard. I show how traditional knowledge 
was variously construed as spiritual power, cultural practices, intimate acquaintance 
with the immediate landscape and its inhabitants, and ethical conduct amongst other 
things. Each of these was perceived of as threatened in their own specific ways, and 
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protection  from  this  threat  was  understood  respectively  in  very  specific,  even 
surprising, ways. Section 5.4. addresses in some more detail the hegemonic construal 
of  traditional  knowledge  as  intellectual  property  which  dominates  most 
understandings of the matter – especially in policy-making arenas. I argue that the 
focus on the threat of misappropriation (i.e. on a kind of theft) obscures the way in 
which traditional knowledge is also threatened by loss and erosion, as well as the way 
in  which  such  loss  might  have  a  very  different  meaning  in  and  to  indigenous 
communities than most commentators on the issue can imagine. Borrowing from Joan 
Martinez-Alier  (2002),  I  conclude  that  the  struggle  surrounding  the  protection  of 
traditional knowledge is not only a struggle regarding access over resources, but also a 
struggle over meanings and values. I urge that the idioms in which these struggles are 
carried out continue to (or begin to) transcend the language of market valuation, in 
order to keep alive the plurality of values through which people make sense of and 
give meaning to their worlds.
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1 Bioprospecting and the War Against Subsistence: theoretical and 
methodological antecedents.
This chapter lays the theoretical and methodological foundations for the rest of the 
thesis. I make the case that the protection of traditional knowledge, as it manifests in 
bioprospecting  projects  based on Access  and Benefit  Sharing agreements,  actually 
contributes  to  a  world-wide  erosion  of  the  conditions  for  people’s  autonomous 
subsistence. By doing so, the drive to protect traditional knowledge undermines the 
foundations for the creation and reproduction of traditional knowledge. We may hence 
ask what exactly does the protection of traditional knowledge actually protect? In this 
way, this chapter also serves as an initial normative framing of the analysis I develop 
more fully over subsequent chapters.
I argue, with Ivan Illich (1980) and others, that the expansion of capital is also a war 
against subsistence and the domain of the vernacular – which, according to its Latin 
roots in vernaculum is the domain of that which is homebred, homespun, homegrown, 
homemade,  as  opposed to  that  which  is  obtained through formal  exchange (Illich 
1980: 57). From the “subsistence perspective” (Bennholdt-Thomsen & Mies 1999), 
the perspective which I espouse in this thesis, resistance to capital is vital. Yet, as the 
reader is likely to be aware, resistance to capital is not a straightforward, let alone easy 
affair.  In this chapter, I present a view of capital’s continuous survival and overall  
expansion, as well as of potential avenues for its overcoming, that is inspired by Karl 
Polanyi’s account of capital’s double movement (1944 [1967]), as well as autonomist 
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Marxist and radical feminist perspectives that have recently been best synthesised by 
Massimo  De  Angelis  (2007).  Based  on  this  view,  I  argue  that  the  protection  of 
traditional  knowledge  is  a  field  of  struggle  characterised  by  double  movement 
dynamics, and that it thus currently plays a role in the reproduction of capital and the  
destruction  of  subsistence.  Protecting  traditional  knowledge  is  hence  in  important 
ways  contra the  very  interests  of  those  whose  rights  it  purports  to  protect.  By 
destroying subsistence, the  protection of traditional knowledge  destroys rather than 
protects  the  foundations  of  traditional  knowledge.  It  is  only  once  the  hegemonic 
construction  of  what  ‘protecting  traditional  knowledge’ means  is  destabilised  that 
emancipatory avenues might open up through this field of struggle.
1.1 Equitable ABS-bioprospecting as protection of traditional knowledge.
Bioprospecting is a relatively new term for a relatively old endeavour: it refers to the 
(usually corporate) development of (marketable) products based on research into and 
subsequent  appropriation  of  the  (commercially  useful)  properties  of  biological 
resources.7 Bioprospecting  most  often  aims  at  developing  pharmaceutical, 
nutraceutical and cosmetic products for the markets of the industrialised world, and 
the research phase is often aided by indigenous people and traditional farmers whose 
knowledge of the local biosphere is in many cases extensive and detailed. What is new 
about  this  particular  practice of  resource acquisition is  that,  due to  the intensified 
dynamics  of biogenetic resource politics over the last  few decades (see Chapter 2 
7 For  early  literature  on  bioprospecting,  see  especially  Reid  1993;  Svarstad  1995;  Balick, 
Elisabetsky & Laird 1996; Shiva 1997.
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below), it has turned into an increasingly regulated activity. The guidelines elaborated 
under the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) with regard to the 
“access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out 
of their utilization”8 are the most influential of the internationally defined parameters 
within which bioprospecting endeavours have to unfold if they are to remain within 
the bounds of legality.
Bioprospecting is generally presented in one of two ways. It is presented either as a 
legitimate, even important scientific phase of the research and development of new 
pharmaceutical,  agrochemical,  cosmetic  or  other  products,  that  propels  sustainable 
development  and,  when  executed  in  accordance  with  ethical  guidelines,  also 
constitutes a “giving back” (Hayden 2003b), that is, it constitutes a mechanism for 
distributive justice with regard to indigenous and peasant peoples through the sharing 
of the benefits arising (e.g. Reid 1993). Or it is presented as biopiracy9 (e.g. Shiva 
1997; 2007; Mooney 2000).
Some hold that the distinction depends on whether or not an equitable Access and 
Benefit-Sharing (ABS) agreement has been reached between the researchers and the 
affected local  communities,  and that  hence sometimes bioprospecting is  legitimate 
8 This  is  the  full-length  official  phrase  of  what  is  usually abbreviated  to  ‘access  and  benefit 
sharing’ or simply ABS. It is used in CBD documentation, such as online at:
http://www.cbd.int/abs/intro.shtml.
9 More correctly biopiracy ought probably to be called bio-privateering. Piracy implies theft, that 
is the taking of someone’s private property. Privateering, on the other hand, implies privatising 
what was hitherto not privately owned. However, to my knowledge, this more apt term has only 
been used by Richard Stallman (1997).
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research benefiting all stakeholders, and sometimes it is biopiracy (e.g. Svarstad 1995; 
Balick, Elisabetsky & Laird 1996; Schuler 2004), others consider it to  always be an 
instance of biopiracy simply because under current global socio-economic conditions 
no ABS agreement could ever be equitable (e.g. Shiva 2007; Mooney 2000; Takeshita 
2000; 2001).
Underlying the discussions about bioprospecting is the question of control power over 
access to and rights to income from traditional knowledge. Who can access and use 
traditional knowledge, and who has the right to the economic benefits, i.e. the income 
which flows from such use? These are questions with regard to the property relations10 
that  characterise  traditional  knowledge.  This  is  to  say  that  in  the  context  of 
bioprospecting, and in the context of ABS agreements, the question of the protection 
of traditional knowledge is a question of how best to configure property rights over 
traditional  knowledge.  This  perspective,  of  traditional  knowledge  protection  as  at 
bottom a protection from the threat of undue appropriation, is the dominant view of 
the  matter  at  the  international  policy-making  level,  as  well  as  being  widespread 
amongst  non-governmental  organisations  and  social  movements  supporting  the 
indigenous cause. The hegemonic construction of traditional knowledge is hence as a 
form  of  intellectual  property  requiring  similar  strategies  of  protection  as  other 
intellectual properties do.
10 For an extensive jurisprudential treatment of property in terms of control powers, use privileges, 
and exchange rights (rights to income), see especially Christman 1994, and Harris 1996. 
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Bioprospecting projects and ABS agreements – no matter how fair and equitable – 
enact or  perform  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  as  pseudo-intellectual 
property protection. By doing so, they hide from view, and indeed erode other possible 
understandings of traditional knowledge and its need for protection. In Chapter 4 I 
provide  an  ethnographic  account  of  the  ProBenefit  bioprospecting  project  which 
focuses on the way in which the silencing and erosion of alternative understandings of 
traditional knowledge protection occurred in practice. I then present and discuss some 
such alternative understandings in Chapter 5: the Napo Runa with whom I worked 
voiced a series of views in which traditional knowledge protection figured in different, 
sometimes surprising ways.
In the present chapter, I situate bioprospecting projects, ABS agreements and their 
hegemonic construction of traditional knowledge protection in the wider context of 
capital expansion. I identify the destruction of subsistence as a vital aspect of capital 
expansion, and argue that the protection of traditional knowledge in its dominant form 
participates in this destruction.
1.2 The war against subsistence.
The  fundamental  war  of  capital,  argues  Ivan  Illich  (1981)  is  the  ‘war  against 
subsistence’ and against  what  he calls  ‘vernacular  values’.  This  war,  according to 
Illich is more fundamental to capital expansion than the war against trade unions and 
their wage demands. In this section, I elaborate on this point, and argue with Illich 
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(and of course Marx11) that the expansion of capital destroys subsistence, and indeed 
that in order to expand, capital has to destroy subsistence, and colonise the everyday 
reproductive needs of human beings with market values and mechanisms.
Capital expansion eradicates people’s autonomous subsistence in a variety of ways. It 
makes access to land and use of natural resources impossible for the majority through 
privatisation and enclosure. It destroys the fertility of the land and the quality of water 
through the industrial  triplets  of pollution,  monoculture,  and asphaltation.  It  forces 
people into towns and wage labour – partly of course due to enclosures of land. It 
replaces autonomous subsistence activities with ‘shadow work’ (Illich 1980; 1981), 
which I explicate below. It destroys the ‘vernacular values’ which animate the non-
market related actions of people contributing to the everyday satisfaction of human 
needs,  by  replacing  them with  market  values,  the  profit  motive,  and  cost-benefit 
calculations.  
1.2.1 Subsistence.
From the subsistence perspective (Bennholdt-Thomsen & Mies 1999), what is most 
important,  what  is  most  valuable  is  that  which  contributes  to  an  autonomous 
11 Marx wrote in his Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie “since the real … labour of appropriating 
the  natural  elements  for  satisfying  human  needs  is  the  activity  through  which  the  material  
exchange between the human and nature is mediated, the labour power which is denuded of the 
means of  production,  the objective conditions of appropriating the natural  elements through 
labour, is also denuded of the means of subsistence. Therefore the labour power denuded of the 
means of production and of the means of subsistence is the absolute poverty as such and the  
labourer is its personification” (1976: 35; emphasis in original).
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subsistence12.  The  reproduction  of  life  –  human  and  non-human  –  replaces  the 
accumulation of profit as final value. This is a perspective that probably still orients 
the majority of the world’s population, even if not those with the greatest agenda-
setting power. It clearly oriented many of the people whom I met and with whom I 
worked in Ecuador and Peru. I present some of their voices in Chapter 5.
The view of subsistence builds on the understanding that there is no ‘trickle-down 
effect’ in any significant sense of the term and that the privileges of the middle- and 
upper classes of all countries are only possible at the expense of the majority of the  
world; the privileges of the few are dependent upon the exploitation of the many, and 
of non-human nature. Michael Perelman has forcefully shown that this dependence of 
the capitalist market economy on the existence of mass poverty was well-known and 
supported as ‘inevitable’ by early free market proponents, such as James Steuart and 
Adam Smith, who wrote in little known letters to friends and in newspaper articles of 
the need for a destitute class (Perelman 1984; 2000; 2006).
The subsistence perspective also builds on the insights  of Rosa Luxemburg (1913 
[1951]) that capitalism requires ‘non-capitalist classes’, societies and dimensions in 
order to continuously expand. German feminists Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, Maria 
Mies, Claudia von Werlhof and others have argued since the 1970s that Luxemburg’s 
12 Autonmous  subsistence  here  refers  to  the  self-sufficiency,  or  near  self-sufficiency  of  the 
household. That is, the household is able to produce most of what it needs for basic survival and 
more without relying on production taking place elsewhere. Autonomy in this sense is always 
relative, but there is a clear scale from greater independence to greater dependence on external 
input (such as through wage labour and commodity consumption).
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arguments  pertain  not  only  to  the  traditional  subsistence  economies  of  European 
colonies, but in the same way to housework and the labour of marginalised people in 
the so-called informal sector in the industrial core countries (e.g. von Werlhof 1978; 
Bennholdt-Thomsen 1979, 1984; Mies 1982; Dalla Costa and James 1972).
As a growing body of literature in the field of social history shows, the organisation of 
labour as commodity was possible only once people had been separated from their 
means of autonomous subsistence. The enclosure of common land was an important 
mechanism of such separation (see, inter alia, Thompson 1963; 1991; Federici 2004; 
De Angelis 2007), and Karl Polanyi (1967) emphasises in particular the destruction of 
non-contractual  social  relations,  such  as  “kinship,  neighbourhood,  profession,  and 
creed”, in favour of individual freedom of contract.
In many, if not most, pre- or non-capitalist social formations, the individual is only 
threatened by starvation  if  the  community of  which  she  is  a  part  faces  the  same 
predicament,  as many historical and anthropological studies have shown (see,  e.g., 
Bennholdt-Thomsen & Mies 1999; Herskovits 1940; Polanyi 1967). 
“Ironically, the white man’s initial contribution to the black man’s world 
mainly consisted in introducing him to the scourge of hunger. Thus the 
colonists may decide to cut the breadfruit trees down in order to create an 
artificial food scarcity or may impose a hut tax on the native to force him 
to barter away his labor. In either case the effect is similar to that of Tudor 
enclosures with their wake of vagrant hordes” (Polanyi 1967: 164).
33
All  over  the  world ‘willing  workers’ had to  be  made,  they had to  be  forced  into 
existence, with corporeal violence, socio-legal mechanisms, and, according to Polanyi, 
“nature’s penalty”: the threat of hunger. “In order to release it,  it was necessary to 
liquidate organic society, which refused to let the individual starve” (Polanyi 1967: 
165). Notwithstanding Polanyi’s problematic use of ‘society’ as organic and unitary, 
which he carries over into other contexts, when social relations are such that each 
person’s basic subsistence is guaranteed in and through a web of ties, alliances and 
obligations, individual starvation13 is a rare threat.
Ongoing  enclosure  –  forcible  acquisition,  expropriation,  privatisation  –  is  the 
precondition  for  capitalist  economic  growth.  Usually Marx’s  ‘primitive’,  or  (more 
correctly14) ‘original accumulation’, is seen to occur before the rise of capitalism and 
to be irrelevant for the analysis of the logic of capital once capitalism is in place. 
However, capital is dependent on ongoing expropriation – continuous ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ as Harvey (2003) calls it15. Enclosure is hence not at all confined to 
13 By individual starvation I mean a single individual starving without her whole community also 
struggling with famine.
14 The  German  “ursprüngliche  Akkumulation”  translates  most  directly  into  “original 
accumulation”. “Primary accumulation” is also sometimes used.
15 Harvey’s continuous accumulation by dispossession (first developed in Harvey 2003), includes 
“the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations 
(as in Mexico and India in recent times); conversion of various forms of property rights (e.g. 
common, collective, state) into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the 
commons; commodification of  labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) 
forms  of  production  and  consumption;  colonial,  neocolonial  and  imperial  processes  of 
appropriation of assets (including natural  resources);  monetization of exchange and taxation, 
particularly of land; the slavetrade (which continues particularly in the sex industry); and usury, 
the national debt and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as radical means of 
primitive accumulation” (2006: 153).
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capitalism’s bloody pre-history, but is its continuous condition (see also De Angelis 
2001; 2007). Communities of indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian Amazon, where I 
did my fieldwork, are on the contemporary frontiers of capitalism. That is, they are 
currently targets of the continuous character of enclosure, their lands as well as their 
knowledge is threatened by dispossession through capital accumulation.
The enclosure of access to land and natural resources, above all else, deprives people 
of the potential for autonomous subsistence. Yet subsistence work, as every housewife 
knows, is the very basis of individual and collective life, and it is hence the very basis 
of industrial society and generalised commodity production just as it is the basis of 
any other past or existing or indeed imaginable society and economy. After all, there is 
no  economy  without  people,  and  there  would  be  no  people  without  their  daily 
reproduction: the making and eating of food, the keeping healthy and making healthy 
of  bodies,  the  lifting  of  spirits,  the  repose.  “Without  subsistence  production,  no 
commodity  production:  but  without  commodity  production,  definitely,  subsistence 
production” (Bennholdt-Thomsen & Mies 1999: 20; see also Mies 1983).
Profit is underpinned by labour-power, and the value of labour-power is underpinned 
by worker’s subsistence. Marx maintained that “the daily sustenance of labour-power 
costs only half a day’s labour”, but that once so sustained, “the very same labour-
power can work during a whole day”16 (Das Kapital chapter 7). Notwithstanding his 
16 That the value of labour power is half a day’s work is of course an illustration rather than  an 
exact measurement. The actual value of labour power  is changeable and dependent on many 
factors.  The reference to Marx in this context is  mainly to  undergird the obvious point  that 
labour power needs sustenance.
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disregard of women’s reproductive labour enabling this sustenance, the point is that 
labour-power creates  surplus  value,  but  that  to  do so it  needs  to  be sustained (or 
sustain itself). This sustenance is the work of reproduction or subsistence.
“[T]he socially reproductive labours of mothers, wives, housekeepers, or 
slaves, continue to be an essential backup to factory production. At further 
remove in the global economic gestalt, are those colonised others, whose 
labours and lands generate the resource surplus from which First World 
citizens draw leisured hours for speculation and such. Whether domestic 
care givers or peasant farmers, these meta-industrial workers have hands-
on  knowledge  of  sustaining  labours  in  a  remarkable  metabolism with 
nature” (Salleh 2000: 31).
Women’s unpaid housework guarantees the reproduction of the workforce, and keeps 
it cheap; the capitalist  economy free-rides on this  subsistence labour. The work of 
peasants  in  the Third World (also often guaranteed by women’s unpaid household 
labour within a patriarchal social structure) contributes essential foodstuffs and other 
commodifiables (such as medicinal knowledge) at throwaway prices to the capitalist 
economy  which  free-rides  on  their  subsistence  work  just  as  it  free-rides  on  the 
productivity of nature. It is in this way that capital colonises and plunders subsistence 
work and nature, extracting their value for its own ends. We might say that indigenous 
knowledge practices are for big pharma what housework is for the capitalist mode of 
production as a whole. The ‘added value’ both kinds of practices create is appropriated 
by capital at no or marginal cost.
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We can of course see moves to commodify subsistence work: housework amongst the 
middle classes is outsourced to domestic workers, often from developing countries; 
privatisation of services and utilities such as water and waste disposal take over some 
of  the  subsistence  work  necessary  for  daily  reproduction;  and  payments  for 
environmental services aim to put a price tag on certain ecological processes in order 
to  ‘internalise  negative externalities’ and ostensibly green the economy.  Moreover, 
there is  another  way in which capital  comes to  colonise and exploit  the everyday 
needs of human reproduction, and Illich aimed to explain this mechanism in terms of 
the concept of ‘shadow work’.
1.2.2 Shadow work.
The expansion of capital is predicated on human effort, wage labour being the obvious 
yet not even the primary instance. Unpaid work, that is, women’s reproductive work 
above all but also such seemingly unconnected efforts as are involved in commuting 
to  and from the workplace,  homework and exam revision for  school,  activities of 
consumption  more  generally,  and  many  other  activities  assumed  as  routine  in 
industrialised societies, all feed the formal economy and enable its continuity – and 
arguably to a greater extent than wage labour does (Illich 1980).
These efforts are necessarily complementary to wage labour, and Ivan Illich calls them 
‘shadow  work’  (Illich  1980;  1981).  Shadow  work  is  necessary  for  survival  in 
advanced capitalist societies, for wage labour is not enough for anyone to survive. 
Survival (let alone leading a joyful, interesting existence) necessitates acting towards 
that end: it is hardly news that human beings need to eat, drink, defecate, and rest 
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(both physically and emotionally) as an absolutely basic precondition for their very 
existence. A salary does not in and of itself contribute to this end. Livelihoods include 
all so-called reproductive activities that one either has to engage in oneself or that one 
needs to have someone perform on one’s behalf in order to live a life at all. Given that 
the  capitalist  economy (or,  more  correctly,  the  capitalists’ capacity  to  accumulate 
profit) is dependent on the availability of living, at least marginally healthy human 
beings to produce and consume commodities, reproductive activities are as basic a 
necessity for the survival of capitalism as they are for the survival of a person. 
Having a job will require that we turn up. It also will require that we are fed enough, 
rested enough, healthy enough to turn up. The activities that keep us fed (acquiring, 
preparing and eating food, disposing of the leftovers), rested (a balance of convivial 
interaction with others, exercise, sleep and general physical and emotional comfort), 
and healthy (preventing and curing physical and mental dis-ease) are all activities that 
require a considerable amount of unpaid effort to be exerted either by oneself or by 
someone else on one’s behalf – often primarily a wife or other housekeeper. Moreover, 
there is an important sense in which an at least minimally bearable existence involves 
the participation in social networks and cultural activities beyond the boundaries of 
one’s  household.  Such  participation  is  often  tied  to  different  kinds  of  ‘social 
pressures’: to wear the rights kinds of clothes and accessories, display ownership of 
the right kinds of objects, know the right kinds of things to converse about. As such, 
both basic reproduction and social participation – the taken for granted background 
‘conditions  of  production’ (a  concept  to  which  I  turn  again  below)  –  require,  in 
capitalist  societies,  the  consumption  of  commodities.  It  is  in  this  way that  capital 
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expands into the realm of reproduction, colonising, and indeed destroying everyday 
subsistence.
Reproductive activities are often equated with subsistence work, yet Illich insists that 
reproduction under capitalism takes on forms that are very different from, and indeed 
should  be  understood as  undermining subsistence  work.  Subsistence  activities,  for 
Illich, maintain and regenerate the autonomous social subsistence of the household: it 
is the male and female members of the household who together create most of what 
the household needs to exist. Subsistence activities are often supplemented by paid 
labour or the income gained from selling products, but autonomous subsistence will 
predominantly  rely  on  the  creative  efforts  of  men,  women  and  children  in 
collaboration with the natural resources that they have direct access to. Shadow work, 
by contrast, is that “form of unpaid work which an industrial society demands as a 
necessary complement to the production of goods and services” (Illich 1980: 1).
Reproductive activities are part of both subsistence and the wage-labour-shadow-work 
nexus, yet subsistence aims at the largely self-sufficient creation and maintenance of 
life and its  cycles at  the level of the household.  Wage-labour-shadow-work on the 
other hand, while forcibly being the only practicable strategy open to most people in 
capitalist  societies,  and  hence  arguably  constituting  a  special  form of  subsistence 
effort, crucially creates and perpetually maximises profit.
Shadow work is vital and ubiquitous, yet largely unrecognised and indeed un-named. 
It  is  likely  that  by  now  the  vast  majority  of  the  world’s  population  has  been 
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conscripted into producing value for the capitalist economic system in one way or the 
other. Replacing people’s sovereign subsistence activities with wage-labour-shadow-
work  is  one  of  the  primary forms  of  such  forced  conscription,  and  an  inevitable 
complement  of  aggressive  enclosures,  privatisation,  and  propaganda.  Replacing 
breastfeeding with the administration of  bottle  milk formulas  from such corporate 
giants  as  Nestlé  is  a  striking  example  of  this  process.  Even  more  relevant  to  the 
subject matter of this thesis is the example of deforestation as a form of expropriation 
of land, producing a resource squeeze and rushing people into the cash economy for 
want of subsistence possibilities. 
The concept of shadow work is useful insofar as it highlights the hidden productivity 
of ‘unproductive’ labour, as well as emphasising the way in which much reproductive 
activity under capitalism has been transformed from the self-sufficient, empowering 
efforts of subsistence to the alienating, personally disempowering yet economically 
effective shadow work.17 Shadow work is one way of capital expansion destroying 
subsistence. For the purposes of this thesis, the war against subsistence, that is, the 
war against  self-provisioning that  creates and maintains life  without  (or only with 
17 The  more  commodity-consumers  (shadow  workers)  capital  can  create,  the  more  likely  its 
growth. Those people who are unwilling or otherwise resistant to turn into consumers, or whose  
buying power is kept insignificant, need to be made economically effective in other ways. They 
can be made symbolically or discursively effective, such as the added value the image of the 
Amazonian  Kayapo  provides  to  Body Shop Brazil  nut  oil  products,  or  the  possibilities  for 
boosting  the  arms  and  defence  industry  the  image  of  the  Arab  terrorist  provides.  Non-  or  
minimally-consuming people can also be made more directly economically effective, such as 
through appropriation of their (commercially useful) knowledge. Moreover, the exploitation of 
the shadow worker’s labour can be made more efficient by a variety of ingenious means – such 
as  through  free  ‘immaterial’  labour  online  (Terranova  2000).  All  provide  accumulation 
opportunities: resources for capital to feed on and grow.
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marginal) reliance on the formal economy, forms the ever-present backdrop for the 
arguments I wish to make. We shall see in Chapter 4 how the bioprospecting project 
ProBenefit enrolled people into a form of labour that, while carrying the promise of a 
wage,  remained  unpaid.  This  work  contributed  to  the  achievements  of  (some  of) 
ProBenefit’s aims and objectives,  partly justifying the project’s  very existence,  yet 
from the indigenous participants’ perspective it was “all in all, a waste of time” as 
someone commented in retrospect. I argue that capital’s war against subsistence is not 
always as  crude and visible  as forced enclosures,  industrialisation or  urbanisation. 
Capital expansion also works in insidious ways through the spreading of particular 
kinds of values and particular kinds of practices such as those which were performed 
by ProBenefit.
In order to account for the continuous expansion of capital, and the capitalist mode of 
production’s long-term survival despite the contradiction and crises that are seen to lie 
at its very heart – and hence in order to account for the war against subsistence – I 
provide  in  subsequent  sections  an  overview  of  the  theoretical  orientations  that 
undergird  this  thesis  and  my  analysis  of  capital  expansion,  its  reproduction  and 
potential overcoming.
1.3 Capital and its contradictions.
In this section I very briefly discuss capital as self-valorising value and social force. 
Based on this, I offer an account of the capitalist mode of production as value practice, 
informed  by  Massimo  De  Angelis’s  recent  reflections  (2007).  This  will  clarify  – 
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against such accounts as, e.g. Hardt and Negri’s (2000) – that there is an ‘outside’ of 
capitalism which is constituted in and though practices embodying values other than 
those of the (commodity exchange) market. Many indigenous peoples’ lives reproduce 
this  ‘outside’  of  capitalism  through  their  everyday  interactions  and  subsistence 
practices.  On this  view,  the dominant  version  of  traditional  knowledge protection, 
which protects ‘traditional knowledge’ as a form of intellectual property, is a means by 
which this ‘outside’ can get subsumed, as market values encroach upon and colonise 
alternative  values  and  practices.  In  other  words,  traditional  knowledge  protection 
arguably reflects the continuous character of enclosure, about which more below.
In this section, I also very briefly discuss  two key contradictions of capital and the 
way in which these are understood to generate crises which need to be overcome if 
capital expansion is to continue. This is to lead us into the following section where I 
expound  on  Karl  Polanyi’s  concept  of  the  ‘double  movement’ –  the  movement 
towards  market  expansion  giving  rise  to  and  being  tempered  by  societal 
countermovements  aimed at  protecting  society from the  market’s  most  destructive 
ravages.  I  argue  that  it  is  through  the  double  movement  that  capital’s  long-term 
expansion and survival is assured, and that a sensitivity to double movement dynamics 
is hence crucial for a successful resistance to and overcoming of the capitalist mode of 
production and the values it promotes. I hold that indigenous and other movements 
guided by a subsistence perspective, including those struggling for counter-hegemonic 
ways of interpreting traditional knowledge protection, can be strengthened through an 
appreciation of the double movement and its effects.
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1.3.1 Capital as self-valorising value.
Capital  is  monetary  value  striving  to  valorise  itself,  that  is,  striving  to  grow and 
increase. The paradigm process through which capital expands was stylised by Marx 
as the circuit of capital in the following way: first, money capital is used to purchase 
the  materials,  means  of  production  and  labour  power  necessary  to  produce 
commodities  for  sale.  In  the  production process,  labour  power then creates  added 
value, which can finally be appropriated through the exchange of the produced goods 
at a profit (i.e. a greater value than the cost of production). This is shorthanded as ...
M – C … P … C’ – M’ 
… where M is money and credit, C is commodities, C’ is the increased amount of  
commodities  created  by  the  productivity  of  labour  (P),  and  M’ is  the  increased 
monetary value from the sale of the output. 
Capital  is  capital  when  this  process  (or  a  derivation  such  as  the  simpler,  more 
mercantile  and less  industrial  M –  C  –  M’ or  the  moneylender’s  M –  M’)  is  in  
operation. Value (of the monetary kind) ‘self-valorises’ as it passes through the circuit 
of  capital,  from one form to  the  other,  from money into  materials,  machines  and 
labour, into whatever is produced – the commodity – into money again, this time more 
money.  It  is  important  to  understand  that  the  source  of  added  value,  and  hence 
ultimately  profit,  in  the  circuit  of  capital  is  labour-power.  We  will  return  to  the 
significance of this shortly.
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Most often we think of capital in terms of money, things, machines, raw materials, but 
of course such things are  primarily just  material. They become part of the circuit of 
capital when they are or can be inserted into a set of relations and a series of activities 
that lead to the generation of profit. They help constitute capital when people use them 
or at least think of them as  generating profit. Money is capital when it will be put 
toward the acquisition of a few basics for setting up a business. It is not capital when it 
is burned or spent on, say, an ice cream – in the latter case it might become capital for  
someone else. The industrial ice cream maker in a dairy processing plant is capital. 
The cooking utensils in my kitchen are not capital, because they are not used as part of 
a process which creates profit.  Neither do I sell them, for their use value is much 
greater  to  me  than  their  exchange  value  could  ever  compensate,  nor  do  I  (at  the 
moment) use them to bake cakes or cook soups for sale with them (cf. De Angelis 
2007). Capital (as self-valorising value) only exists as part of a social process and 
social relation through which its continuous increase is realised. 
1.3.2 Capital as social force.
As capital circulates and accumulates, more and more people and resources are drawn 
into its dynamic. Yet most fundamentally, the circuiting only occurs because people 
widely accept the institution of money,  because people exchange and trade goods, 
because people (have no choice but to) sell their labour and engage in production. 
Human powers and capacities are interwoven and articulate with one another in such 
ways that capital becomes more than self-valorising value, it becomes a social force 
(cf. De Angelis 2007). But it should not be understood as an autonomous force in the 
world which orders things and relations independently of the participation of human 
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beings. Rather, it might be best seen as a kind of systemic imperative, the necessity 
and urgency of which emerges from conditions that were, and continue to be, violently 
imposed on non-capitalist worlds. 
The variety of  ways  in  which  people’s  lives  can  be lived  and reproduced is  only 
limited  by human ingenuity and the  elasticity  of  ecological  systems.  Nonetheless, 
despite very many people’s better judgement, against their own hopes and desires, and 
regardless of their struggles, however fierce, capitalism is regulated, preserved and 
extended in and through their own very actions. This is because in unquestionably 
crucial ways, wherever the system has taken a firm hold, people have very little choice 
than to act in accordance with its imperatives. Autonomous access to the means of 
subsistence, which usually entails use of a minimal amount of fertile land and a source 
of water,  is  a precondition for any significant,  and minimally dignified evasion of 
capital18 – and this is increasingly difficult in a world where growing amounts of land 
are asphalted, desertifying or privately owned by the few. People are hence forced to 
submit at least parts of their lives to the exigencies of the market, forced to pit their 
livelihoods against those of others, thereby acting out and reproducing capital over 
and over again.
“The aspiration of capital – generally referred to as the ‘profit motive’ – 
becomes  a  social  force  when  the  practices  of  a  multiplicity  of  social 
18 Of course we might argue that a scavenging and/or petty crime existence in urban areas might 
enable such evasion of capital. The cultural stigma and constant threat to integrity of one’s body 
and  mind in  such  situations,  however,  hardly make such  evasion  bearable.  Some squatters, 
nonetheless,  have  managed  to  create  subcultures  within  which  such  livelihoods  become 
practicable and enjoyable.
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subjects are interlaced … to give [this aspiration] concrete forms … It is 
irrelevant  here  whether  the  individual  singularities  (i.e.,  the  real  ‘body 
subjects’  or,  at  larger  scales,  groups  and  networks  of  individuals, 
communities,  organisations,  companies,  etc.)  share or do not  share this 
motive or aspiration. For capital to be constituted as a social force what 
matters is that the mental and manual activities of these singularities, their 
doing,  constituted  in  a  web  of  social  relations,  are  coupled  to  [this 
aspiration] so as to reproduce capital itself in its endless drive for self-
expansion” (De Angelis 2007: 38).
Importantly  then,  capital  is  a  force  that  is  brought  to  life  by  people  and  their 
interactions.  It is not autonomous nor external to human relations, but created and 
recreated  by  people’s  own  actions.  Nonetheless,  it  enthrals  us  as  if  it  was  an 
autonomous force, as it reifies and thus materialises in the vast majority of the things 
that  surround  us  (as  commodities),  and  in  factories,  warehouses,  shopping  malls, 
institutions and their buildings, as well as in certain people, industrialists, employers, 
investment bankers. 
1.3.3 Capital as value practice.
While  market  exchanges  might  constitute  an  increasing  part  of  the  totality  of 
exchanges on which the reproduction of people’s livelihoods depends, this totality can 
– even in so-called advanced capitalist societies – not be reduced solely to market  
exchanges and their corresponding social relations of production. Other relations and 
practices of social cooperation exist alongside (in harmony, in conflict or in a host-
parasite  relation  with)  capitalism.  The  totality  is  hence  not  capitalism;  rather, 
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capitalism is a subsystem of the whole which is constituted by a variety of dynamic,  
interacting, often mutually constitutive systems of relations.
Market rationalities – cost-benefit calculations, competitive pursuit of profit – animate 
particular  value  practices  (De  Angelis  2007).  Value  practices  are  practices  and 
activities which are both based on and reproduce and give rise to particular values, 
even entire value systems, and in this case, market values. 
To speak of value practices in this way is of course to deploy a concept of value 
distinct from its common Marxian usage. Following anthropologist David Graeber, we 
can understand value as “the meaning [that an object or a person] take on by being 
assigned a  place in some larger system of categories” (Graeber 2001: 41).  People 
pursue values, that is, they act in accordance with a system of meaning within which 
they  place  and  through  which  they  represent  the  importance  of  their  actions  to 
themselves  (Graeber  2001:  76,  fn  28  at  270).  Through  their  pursuit  of  particular 
values, people reproduce a particular system of meaning – a value system, a social 
system. 
To talk of  value  practices  hence emphasises  the value-based and meaning-making 
nature of social action and practice. On this view, value guides action, and endows it 
with particular meaning. Yet value and meaning are not prior to action,  but rather 
produced in  and through action – value and action,  meaning and practice  are  co-
emergent. This perspective also includes an understanding of the market as an ethical 
system, an acknowledgement that all market decisions are value judgements and an 
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expression of the market value system (McMurty 1998; Sayer 1997). As such, market 
values  and  their  concomitant  practices  are  neither  normatively  neutral  nor 
inevitabilities or facts of life; rather they are particular kinds of norms amongst many 
others kinds of norms which may also guide human action, and with which they may 
conflict. This also implies that “the study of how we reproduce the capitalist mode of 
production … is a study of how we pursue the values that are characteristic of it” (De 
Angelis 2007: 25).
Massimo De Angelis  understands the struggle against  capital  in terms of struggles 
between value practices: “clashes between modes of doing, relating, giving meaning 
and articulating social powers” (2007: 13). This understanding allows for an ‘outside 
of capitalism’ that is not spatially or materially determined, but rather embodied in 
particular kinds of practices and relationships. The outside of capitalism is hence cast 
as a dimension of everyday life  that is  organised on principles and constituted by 
practices and relationships that are radically different19 from the systemic ordering of 
capital which is “predicated on the enclosure of commons, pursuing ... accumulation, 
reproduced  through  pitting  livelihoods  against  each  other  and  resulting  in  the 
production of scarcity in the midst of plenty” (2007: 12). Value practices that give rise 
to and take place within the ‘outside’ of capitalism are based upon and reproduce 
19 This ‘outside’ of capitalism can be made radically visible in what Hakim Bey (1985) would have 
called “temporary autonomous zones” (“temporary space-time commons” for De Angelis), when 
these  ‘other’ value  practices  bring forth a  shared  experience of  a  space  organised on value 
practices other than and opposed to capital’s value practices. De Angelis cites the protest camp 
set  up as part  of the mobilisations against  the G8 meeting in Gleneagles in 2005 as such a  
commons (2007: 19-24).
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values different from the values of capital. Many indigenous relational modalities are, 
on this account, outside of capital. 
Distinct  from the claim that any ‘outside’ to capitalism has already be completely 
subsumed (Hardt and Negri 2000) and distinct from the claim that resistance always 
begins with a ‘negation’, a screaming  NO! (Holloway 2005), there is a tradition of 
(autonomist)  thought  that  holds  that  life,  in  all  its  complexity,  multiplicity,  and 
constitutive and generative power continuously creates practices and relations that are 
‘other than capital’, which constitute alternative value practices (e.g. De Angelis 2007
). Such value practices are inevitably threatened by capital which seeks to subsume 
them into its profit-seeking logic, or dissolve and destroy them through the techniques 
and mechanism which are at capital’s disposal, and which are often associated with 
state structures (Deleuze 1995; De Angelis 2005). 
The politics  of  capital,  and  in  particular  the  politics  of  neoliberal  capital,  on  this 
account, are about the imposition of particular values as measurements and objectives 
of all social practices. Alternative value practices constitute an ‘outside’ of capital, 
which, given its hegemonising drive, it will strive to subsume or articulate with. It is 
exactly  these  alternative  value  practices  in  which  the  key  to  transformation  and 
counterhegemonic pursuit of meaning lies. Firstly, they remind us that capitalist value 
practices are not irrevocable facts of life but rather historically contingent practices 
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that can be contested if not overturned20, and secondly, that these are not total, but 
constitute one (powerfully expansive) set of practices amongst many (possible) others.
The realm ‘outside of capitalism’ emerges when and where material and social life is 
reproduced through value practices other than those of capital. It is from that realm 
that  we  can  observe  and  evaluate  capital’s  values  and  social  relations  “from the 
vantage point of a refreshingly different bias” (2007: 31). It is in and through struggles 
against capital’s value practices that different values emerge: “[s]truggles bring values, 
their  tensions and boundary lines  to  the forefront,  and this  creates  the  outside [of 
capitalism] as an emergent property” (De Angelis 2007: 33).
Sometimes the non-capitalist is seen as that into which capital needs to expand (e.g. 
Luxemburg  1913  [1951]),  or  it  is  cast  as  that  which  is  emerging  from  people’s 
struggles against capital (e.g. Thompson 1991). De Angelis furthermore points out that 
“[s]ometimes we discover this other-than-capitalism as practice right at the heart of 
capital,  in  its  shopfloors  and  offices,  a  practice  of  gift,  mutual  aid  and  solidarity 
among  workers  themselves.  At  other  times  we  find  it  outside,  or  running  across 
capitalist organisations via circulation of struggles. Often this force of community and 
gift  is  a  social  force that  capitalist  firms must  be able  to  tap into for  competitive 
advantage over others” (2007: 35).
20 Capital  as  embodied force constrains people’s  capacity to engage in non- and anti-capitalist 
forms  of  social  production,  primarily  simply through  the  time  and  energy expended in  the 
service  of  capital.  However,  “[m]oney,  commodity,  capital  are modes of  existence  of  social 
relations, the forms in which social relations currently exist. These are the frozen or rigidified 
modes of existence of relations between people... but things-as-they-are are not eternal, they are 
just the historically congealed forms of social relations” (Holloway 2005: 51). Forms are thus 
neither unchangeable facts, nor are they illusions.
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This other dimension, this relational field that is other-than-capitalism, in which gift 
exchanges, family and kin relations, relations of solidarity and mutual aid, pursuits of 
conviviality interact and articulate to create meaning and value and to reproduce lives, 
has been theorised and documented increasingly over the last few decades.21 It needs 
to be pointed out however, that non-market relations of oppression such as patriarchy 
and racism can flourish in and amongst these non-market interactions just as much as 
(albeit  in  different  ways  than)  they  flourish  in  market  interactions.  Non-market 
relations are not in and of themselves free of oppression. But they are free of the 
particular oppression of capital. 
The perspective of value practices allows us to see that:
“The ultimate stakes of politics ... is not even the struggle to appropriate 
value; it is the struggle to establish what value is... Similarly, the ultimate 
freedom is not the freedom to create or accumulate value, but the freedom 
to decide, (collectively or individually) what it is that makes life worth 
living. In the end, then,  politics is about the meaning of life” (Graeber 
2001: 88).
21 Apart  from the  longer-standing discussions of  the  relationship  between capitalism and non-
capitalism (as in Rosa Luxemburg, especially 1913 [1951]), see Dalla Costa and James (1972) 
for a conceptualisation of non-market relations in terms of “unwaged labour”, Tronti (1973) for 
the  idea  of  the  “social  factory”,  Illich  (1981)  for  “shadow  work”  and  “the  vernacular”, 
Meillasoux (1981) for “domestic community”, Mattera (1985) for the “underground economy”, 
E.P. Thompson (1991) for the “moral economy”, and the various theorisations of the “informal 
economy”  (such  as  Portes,  Castells  and  Benton  1989;  Latouche  1993,  Sassen  1994).  Cf. 
Caffentzis (2002) and De Angelis (2007). We could also add Gibson-Graham (1996; 2006) to 
this list, even though her/their arguments emphasise that the triumph of capitalism over other 
forms of provisioning has been overstated both by capitalists and their critics.
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1.3.4 Contradictions of capital.
In the Marxist tradition, contradictions and crises are seen to lie at the very heart of 
the  capitalist  mode  of  production.  This  means  that  in  the  course  of  its  normal 
functioning,  capitalism  generates  barriers  to  its  own  further  development.  These 
barriers  take  on  the  form of  crises  that  have  the  potential  to  either  undermine  or 
strengthen  capitalism  as  a  whole,  depending  on  the  particular  historical  and 
geographical circumstances. 
This crisis-tendency of capitalism (amongst other things) implies that stable capital 
accumulation  is  improbable  without  a  political  regime  which  ensures  that  the 
economic and extra-economic conditions for accumulation are in place. Accumulation 
regimes  take  a  variety  of  forms,  and  are  historically  and  geographically  specific 
(Jessop 2002). Whether the crises that the contradictions of capital provoke resolve 
themselves as fundamental threats to any given accumulation regime, or whether they 
serve to discipline and renew it, is an open question. 
Regulation  of  some  kind  is  always  necessary  to  make  accumulation  possible.22 
Accumulation  hence  calls  for  what  Jessop  calls  ‘spatio-temporal  fixes’: 
institutionalised  compromises,  and  particular  social  formations  that  support  the 
22 In particular this is due to the reproduction of capital depending on extra-economic conditions: 
that  is,  capital  is  incapable  of  reproducing  itself  entirely  through  endless  circuits  of 
commodification. We have seen this already in the discussion of subsistence, and I return to this 
again below. See also Jessop (2002: 18-22) for an account of the “indeterminate but antagonistic 
nature of the capital relation and its dynamic”.
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provisional stabilisation of the circuit of capital within given time-space coordinates. 
Spatio-temporal fixes constitute particular solutions to the problem of the reproduction 
and stabilisation of capital. However, due to its antagonistic and crisis-prone nature, 
capitalism is  likely to  result  in  the  periodic  renewal  of  any particular  fix.  So far, 
capital accumulation has proven highly adaptable, and has transformed itself from the 
old liberal regime through Keynesianism to neoliberalism, surviving and extending its 
reach in somewhat altered but nonetheless clearly recognisable forms. For example, 
all  social  formations  that  capital  as  force  produces  are  undeniably  marked  by 
antagonisms – between the labouring class and the class of the owners of the means of 
production, but also within and cross-cutting classes as people compete for jobs and 
profits – as well as by the recurring crises produced by the structural contradictions 
inherent in the relations and processes that constitute capital. 
I turn now to an exposition of two contradictions of capital, firstly capital’s tendency 
to  overaccumulation,  and  corresponding  need  for  spatial  expansion,  and  secondly 
capital’s dependency on certain conditions of production.
1.3.5 The primary contradiction of capital and colonisation.
The primary contradiction of capitalism is generated by capital’s drive to expand. An 
obvious way to increase profits is to decrease the cost of production, to extract more 
labour from fewer workers, cut wages, or speed up work technologically. Yet workers’ 
loss in wages reduces the final demand for consumer commodities, and leads to the 
overall reduction of profits. In this way, this fundamental contradiction is expressed in 
capital’s tendency to overproduction and a consequent crisis of its realisation. It is 
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sometimes seen as a contradiction between the social nature of production and the 
private nature of appropriation.
It is this contradiction that is often understood as driving the processes of imperialist 
expansion of capitalism. As David Harvey explains
“To simplify,  we initially assume that  all  production and realization of 
interdependent  capitals  occurs  within  a  closed  region.  Accumulation 
proceeds within that region at rates dependent upon the local expansion of 
the proletariat, the state of the class struggle, the pace of innovation, the 
growth in aggregate effective demand, etc. But since capitalists will be 
capitalists,  overaccumulation  is  bound  to  arise.  The  threat  of  massive 
devaluation looms large and civil society appears destined to experience 
the  social  distress,  disruption  and  unrest  that  accompany  the  forcible 
restoration  of  conditions  favorable  to  accumulation.  This  is,  of  course, 
exactly  the  kind  of  ‘inner  dialectic’ that  forces  society  to  seek  relief 
through some sort of ‘spatial fix’. The frontiers of the region can be rolled 
back  or  relief  gained  by  exports  of  money  capital,  commodities  or 
productive capacities or imports of fresh labor powers from other regions. 
The  tendency  toward  overaccumulation  within  the  region  remains 
unchecked,  but  devaluation  is  avoided by successive  and ever  grander 
‘outer  transformations’.  This  process  can  presumably continue  until  all 
external possibilities are exhausted or because other regions resist being 
treated as mere convenient appendages” (Harvey 1982: 426-427).
Crises of overaccumulation are thus ‘solved’ by displacement, by export into other 
areas23. However, while this is undeniably part of the capital dynamic, it should be 
23 ‘Temporal  fixes’ are  also possible  solutions to  the  contradictions of  accumulation,  deferring 
problems into the future with the help of certain legal and/or financial mechanisms.
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noted that this dynamic itself developed through colonisation. That is, capitalism was 
from  its  very  beginnings  dependent  on  ‘outer  transformations’.  ‘Outer 
transformations’ are not just a strategy for resolving an ‘inner contradiction’, but have 
always been part of the preconditions enabling inner contradictions to arise in the first 
place. Walter Rodney remarks that 
“... most bourgeois scholars write about phenomena such as the industrial 
revolution in England without once mentioning the European slave trade 
as a factor of primary accumulation of capital...  But  even Marxists  (as 
prominent  as  Maurice  Dobb  and  E.J.  Hobsbawm)  for  many  years 
concentrated on examining the evolution of capitalism out of feudalism 
inside Europe, with only marginal reference to the massive exploitation of 
Africans, Asians and American Indians” (Rodney 1972: 101).
In her Caliban and the Witch, a ground-breaking study of the birth of the proletariat as 
inextricably intertwined with a violent subjugation of women and disciplining of the 
body in feudal Europe and its colonies, Silvia Federici argues that we can understand 
the waves of colonisation starting in the sixteenth century as part of and reaction to the 
accumulation crisis  which had beset the feudal economy “between 1350 and 1500 
[when] a major shift occurred in the power-relation between workers and masters. The 
real wage increased by 100%, prices declined by 33%, rents also declined, the length 
of the working-day decreased, and a tendency appeared towards local self-sufficiency” 
(2004:  62).  In  response  to  this  crisis  of  the  feudal  economy’s  reproduction,  the 
European ruling classes launched a “global offensive” that lay the bloody foundations 
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for a capitalist  world system in an unprecedented appropriation of new sources of 
wealth (Ibid.; see also Moore 2000).
It was  through this global predation, including the plantation system and the slave 
trade, that capitalism developed. This point has to be understood not only in terms of 
(the external) transatlantic trade constituting the primitive accumulation necessary for 
the concentration of capital to set off the (internal, European) circuit of capital. Rather, 
it was in and through the transatlantic trade circuit that capital began circuiting. And it  
was hence already at the capitalist mode of production’s earliest of origins that those 
peoples whose descendants we today call indigenous were tied into its circuit.
“After an initial period of direct predation of already produced luxuries, 
especially at the hands of the early Spanish conquistadores, the M-C-M’ 
circuits of the great merchants began therefore to be fed by the increasing 
supplies  of gold,  silver,  sugar  and cotton extracted by local  indigenous 
people forced to  work to  death in  mines  and plantations” (De Angelis 
2007: 47). 
However,  after  the  massive  decimation  of  the  indigenous  people  of  the  Americas 
through European violence and disease24,  “free labourers necessary to cultivate the 
staple crops of sugar, tobacco and cotton in the ‘New World’ could not have been 
supplied  in  quantities  adequate  to  permit  large-scale  production.  Slavery  was 
necessary  for  this”  (Williams  1964:  6).  A triangular  transatlantic  trade  developed 
24 See,  inter  alia,  Crosby (1972) and Denevan (1976) for reliable sources on the demographic 
collapse of the population of the Americas after 1492.
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between Europe, Africa and the Americas. From Europe, commodities produced in its 
budding industrial mills were moved to the west coast of Africa from which captured 
men, women and children were shipped to the Americas and Caribbean, to work as 
slaves in the colonial plantations and mines, the raw materials and staple crops of 
which were in turn sailed to Europe – both as inputs into industrial production and as 
exotic commodities for the social reproduction of the upper, middle, and increasingly 
even the working classes. 
Massimo De Angelis argues that capitalism has not been theorised and problematised 
sufficiently as a “global articulation of a multitude of techniques and strategies, from 
slavery to wage labour, from unwaged work of reproduction to post-Fordist temporary 
work, from unwaged third world petty commodity producers on the breadline to the 
highly skilled ‘systems analysts’ of high-tech capitalism, from Fordist sweatshops to 
cognitive precarious labour” (De Angelis 2007: 50, emphasis in original). Yet it is this 
articulation  of  different  moments  in  the  global  wage  hierarchy,  which  pits  co-
producing communities against each other on a global scale, that is constitutive of 
both contemporary capitalism and its earlier forms. What is more, an engagement with 
the indigenous condition, the enclosure of indigenous livelihoods, and the war against 
subsistence  more  broadly,  is  often  lacking  from  a  comprehensive  critique  of 
contemporary capitalism. In this thesis, I hope to contribute in small ways to remedy 
this lack.
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1.3.6 Conditions of production and fictitious commodities.
In his attempts to apply Marxist analysis to the ecological-environmental crisis, James 
O’Connor has been conceptualising a ‘second contradiction’ of capitalism. O’Connor 
bases  this  contradiction  on  the  notion  of  ‘conditions  of  production’.  According to 
O’Connor, Marx defined three kinds of production condition25: (i) the labour power of 
workers,  or the “personal conditions  of production”; (ii)  “external nature”,  that is, 
“external physical conditions or … natural elements”; and (iii) “the communal general 
conditions  of  production”  such as  means  of  communication,  transport,  and wider, 
especially urban infrastructures (O’Connor 1996: 200).
The  second  contradiction  of  capitalism is  a  contradiction  between  the  process  of 
accumulation and the conditions of production,  for the latter  are impaired or even 
destroyed by the former rather  than reproduced.  The idea is  that  the material  and 
social  conditions of production  of capital  are degraded through the cost-cutting of 
individual capitals, to the extent that their degradation will, over time, slow down or 
even halt production. 
I  will  leave  the  question  of  whether  or  not  it  is  useful  to  theorise  a  ‘second 
contradiction’ of capitalism – and whether or not it is usefully Marxist – for another 
occasion26.  The insight to be retained from O’Connor is  the dependence of capital 
25 Marx’s use of the term as a clear analytical category is disputed, however (e.g. Spence 2000).  
O’Connor himself acknowledges his debt to Polanyi’s notion of “fictitious commodities”,  to 
which I shall return in more detail below.
26 For  example,  while  it  is  certainly  undeniable  that  capitalism  undermines  its  own  ‘natural’ 
conditions of  production – the environment  and ecological  health on which production, and 
indeed human life is predicated – it is also important to remember that this is not solely a feature  
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accumulation  on  certain  conditions  of  production.  While  it  is  rather  obvious  that 
processes of accumulation do not happen in a vacuum, but in a context that is – largely 
– earth-bound, it is worth pointing out that this context is not entirely reproducible by 
the  circuiting  of  capital  itself.  The  conditions of  production  are  only  partially 
maintained by the actual processes of production – that is, the production conditions 
are in important respects prior to or outside of capital.
Polanyi’s concept of ‘fictitious commodities’ (1957) is an important elaboration of this 
point. Let me briefly expound on this idea here.
A capitalist market economy comprises all elements of industry within the mechanism 
of the market, extending the commodity form also to labour, land and money. Labour, 
land and money are essential  to  industrial  production,  and their  supply is  ensured 
through the  market27.  Indeed,  these  markets  form absolutely essential  parts  of  the 
of the capitalist mode of production. Other modes of production can and indeed have led to the 
deterioration  of  the  environment  to  such  an  extent  that  they undermined  their  own smooth 
continuation.  This  holds  for  both  previous  modes  of  production,  such  as  the  agricultural 
practices of the Roman Empire, and possibly even those of hunter-gatherer societies (cf. Spence 
2001), as well as for more contemporary, non-capitalist modes of production, such as in Soviet 
Russia.  Martin  Spence  has  found  other  problems  with  O’Connor’s  approach  to  a  ‘second 
contradiction’ of capitalism (Spence 2000).  See also Toledo (1996) and Lebowitz (1996) for 
critical commentaries on O’Connor.
27 Polanyi even seems to argue that this is necessarily so: since industrial production developed out  
of a mercantile society, he holds that the supply of labour, land and money “could be organized 
in  one  way  only:  by  being  made  available  for  purchase...  The  extension  of  the  market 
mechanism  to  the  elements  of  industry  –  labor,  land,  and  money  –  was  the  inevitable 
consequence of the introduction of the factory system in a commercial society” (Polanyi 1967: 
75). It was because the factory system had developed as part of a process of buying and selling , 
that labour, land, and money needed to be treated as commodities in order to keep the system 
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capitalist system. However, “labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; 
the postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is 
emphatically  untrue  in  regard  of  them”  (Polanyi  1967:  72).  While  they  are  not 
commodities  in  the  sense  of  having  been produced  for  sale,  they are  treated  like 
commodities; they are ‘fictitious commodities’.
We can understand fictitious commodities as vital inputs into production – into the 
circuit of capital – inputs without which the capitalist system would not function, yet 
which it is, if at all, only partially able to provide for itself. Even once a labour market 
has taken hold, labour power is (re)produced through non-market (as well as some 
market)  relations  and  practices.  The  reproduction  of  labour  power  is  one  of  the 
necessary conditions of production. Similarly, the productivity of the land can only be 
to a certain extent artificially induced – through industrially produced fertilisers, say – 
before it collapses. Land itself is generally given, and even if landscaping, the drying 
out of wetlands, the reclaiming of below-sea-level areas can ‘produce’ it in certain 
ways, these are clearly limited.
On Polanyi’s account, it is the tendency to treat land, labour and money as if they were 
real  commodities  that  constitutes  a  fundamental  source  of  contradiction  in  the 
capitalist system, and which, if left unchecked leads to “the demolition of society” 
(Polanyi 1967: 73). He explains: “[L]abor is the technical term used for human beings, 
in  so far  as  they are  not  employers  but  employed” (Polanyi  1967:  75).  And it  is  
because  there  is  a  human  being  “attached  to  [the]  tag”  labour  power,  that  this 
going. For our purposes, suffice it to recognise that they are treated as such.
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commodity  cannot  be  “shoved  about,  used  indiscriminately,  or  even  left  unused” 
without causing “acute social dislocation”; if treated in this way, nature, too, would be 
despoiled and polluted, “the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed”; and 
“shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and 
droughts in primitive [sic] society”. In short “no society could stand the effects of such 
a system of crude fictions even for the shortest stretch of time unless its human and 
natural  substance  as  well  as  its  business  organization  was  protected  against  the 
ravages of this satanic mill” (Polanyi 1944 [1957: 73]).
Hence, when such ‘fictitious’ commodification goes too far, Polanyi  argued, social 
forces adversely affected by the expansion of market relations into labour, land, and 
money will rise up to protect human beings and their environment. In this way, the 
market economy will be restrained in relation to fictitious commodities, even as it  
expands  in  relation  to  ‘genuine’ commodities.  This  is  what  the  notion  of  ‘double 
movement’ aims to grasp. 
1.4 Polanyi’s ‘Double Movement’: one hand taketh away, the other giveth  
back?
Karl  Polanyi’s  main  concern  in  The  Great  Transformation (1944)  was  with  the 
disastrous social effects of market forces dominating all social relations. He argued 
that while economies (in their broadest sense as human want-satisfying behaviour and 
general provisioninig) have always been embedded in social relations, with the rise of 
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capitalism  social  relations  have  come  to  be  embedded  in  the  economy  –  with 
catastrophic consequences for people, their relationships and environments.
It is the treatment of land, labour and money as (fictitious) commodities, as well as the 
separation of economic relations from social institutions which characterises capitalist 
as opposed to non-capitalist economic relations. However, since “a market economy 
can function only in a market society”, the mere separation of economic relations from 
non-economic social relations is not enough. Rather, “society must be shaped in such 
a manner as to allow [the economic] system to function according to its own law” 
(Polanyi 1944 [1957: 57]).
The  self-regulating  market,  according  to  Polanyi,  wreaks  havoc  in  society  as  it 
catapults  the  many into  poverty  and  a  precarious  existence,  pitting  social  classes 
against each other and threatening a “plunge into utter destruction”, a breakdown of 
social peace and order (Polanyi 1944 [1957: 156]). Polanyi argued that the extension 
of  the  commodity  form to  land,  labour  and  money  –  three  vital  inputs  into  the 
economic system that were not produced for sale yet subjected to the price-setting 
mechanisms of the market – has particularly destructive consequences. Bob Jessop 
(2007; 2008) has raised the question “whether the contemporary neo-liberal market 
economy has reinforced the role of a fourth fictitious commodity: knowledge” (Jessop 
2008: 340-341). I return to this question in Chapter 2.
Importantly, on Polanyi’s account, the dangers of a rampant market economy threaten 
not only a particular class, but by extension ‘society as a whole’. Polanyi writes of 
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“the dangers involved in the exploitation of the physical strength of the worker, the 
destruction  of  family  life,  the  devastation  of  neighbourhoods,  the  denudation  of 
forests, the pollution of rivers, the deterioration of craft standards, the disruption of 
folkways, and the general degradation of existence including housing and arts, as well 
as the innumerable forms of private and public life that do not affect profits” (Polanyi 
1944  [1957:  133]).  The  threats  that  an  unfettered  market  poses  provoke  a 
countermovement to protect society from the worst depredations.
Modern society, he argued, is characterised by the interplay of economic liberalism on 
the one hand, positing the self-regulating market,  laissez-fair  and free trade as the 
ultimate socio-economic organising mechanisms, and by  societal self-protection  on 
the other, a kind of instinctive or necessary reaction of society to preserve its order as  
well as its productive organisation through protective legislation, associations such as 
trade  unions,  welfare  institutions  and other  means.  This  is  Polanyi’s  thesis  of  the 
‘double movement’: the movement, on the one hand, to expand market relations, and 
society’s (parallel or subsequent) countermovement to protect itself from the effects of 
the very operation of this market, on the other.
It  is  important  to  understand  that  the  countermovement,  while  constraining  the 
destructive tendencies of the free market by subjecting it to extra-economic regulation 
and by softening its blows through welfare institutions, at the same time also supports 
and sustains capital accumulation. Without the countermovement to protect society, 
market  forces  are  likely  to  prove  self-destructive,  as  the  very  process  of 
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commodification  generates  contradictions  that  the  market  mechanism itself  cannot 
resolve. 
This resonates with a common account of the three functions of the capitalist state28 
(e.g. Scharpf 1998). Its first function is that of guarantor of social stability and the 
security of private property, both externally through territorial defence and internally 
through its police and justice systems. Its second function is that of facilitator for 
continued  capital  accumulation,  and  involves  the  creation  and  maintenance  of 
economic  policies,  and  infrastructures,  amongst  others.  Its  third  function,  and the 
function that we might understand as fulfilling an important ‘countermovement’ role, 
concerns  the  alleviation  of  the  negative  effects  of  capitalist  development  and free 
markets, the pacification of those adversely affected by it, and is often expressed in 
social welfare policies. While this third function is directly related to the amount of 
pressure exerted by social movements and trade unions, it would be wrong to see this 
function  as  merely a  response  to  such public  pressure.  The long-term stability  of 
capitalism is  dependent  on all  three functions  to  be fulfilled by the state,  and the 
alleviation of negative effects of the capitalist market is an important precondition for 
continual economic efficiency.
Polanyi was optimistic that “our age will be credited with having seen the end of the  
self-regulating market” (Polanyi 1944 [1957: 142]). Unfortunately, as we now know, 
he was more hopeful than prescient. Nonetheless, his thesis is still illuminating of the 
28 These regime imperatives can also be found in more elaborate description in Jessop 2002, as 
applying to both the capitalist type of state and other post-national competition regimes.
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dynamics  that  characterise  market  expansion  even  today.  The  labour-capital  and 
(developmentalist)  North-South  social  contracts  of  the  post-war  area  as  well  as 
ecological protection initiatives can be read as signs that market expansion is indeed 
accompanied by the countermovement to palliate its effects.
In order to clarify the notion of a double movement, I briefly address the nature of the 
movement  toward  market  expansion,  and  the  nature  of  the  countermovement  to 
protect society in turn.
1.4.1 Market expansion.
Polanyi argued that the industrial revolution in Britain, and the long-term investments 
it required, created the need for a relatively stable production process to make the 
risks  of  investments  bearable.  This  meant  that  the  inputs  required  by  industry, 
especially the fictitious commodities of labour, land, and money, be readily available 
for purchase. This need provided strong incentives for the establishment of a world 
market. Additionally, an ideological force propelled market expansion based on “the 
three classical tenets: that labor should find its price on the market; that the creation of 
money should be subject to an automatic mechanism; that goods should be free to 
flow from country to country without hindrance or preference; in short for a labor 
market, the gold standard, and free trade” (Polanyi 1944 [1957: 135]). These three 
measures  formed  “a  coherent  whole”  (Polanyi  1944  [1957:  138])  and  their 
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entrenchment was supported in Britain through the enactment of a flurry of laws in the 
1830s and 1840s29. 
Jessop (2001; 2008) has complemented Polanyi’s account of the double movement30, 
with  insights  from the  Parisian  regulation  approach to  the  study of  contemporary 
capitalism,  and  systems-theoretical  understandings  of  the  market  economy  as  an 
autopoietic  system.  In  doing so,  he  provides  a  fuller,  more  robust  analysis  of  the 
mechanism of the double movement,  and more generally of the dynamics through 
which  the  –  always  unstable  and contested  –  capitalist  system is  reproduced  and 
stabilised.
Jessop identifies four interrelated ways in which capital – as a social force – can come 
to  dominate  society:  first,  through  commodification  of  hitherto  non-commodified 
areas of life; second, through the extension of economic measurements (cost-benefit, 
profit-loss calculations) to hitherto non-commercial areas of decision-making; third, 
capital’s systemic capacity to protect itself from the influence of other systems with 
29 The legislation included the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 instituting a competitive labour 
market, Peel’s Bank Act of 1844 subjecting money circulation to the gold standard, and the Anti-
Corn Law Bill of 1846 which opened the British market to grain from the rest of the world 
(Silver and Arrighi 2003: 330).
30 Others have also complemented Polanyi’s account. For example, in their illuminating article on 
the  belles  époques  of  nineteenth-century British  and  late  twentieth  century U.S.  hegemony, 
Silver  and  Arrighi  (2003)  have  forcefully  shown  the  relevance  of  Polanyi’s  thought  to 
understanding the recent period of neoliberalisation, despite its important differences from the 
earlier British-dominated liberal crusade. Many others have also commented on “the remarkable 
growth of posthumous interest” in Polanyi’s work (Özveren 2007: 549), and on the import of 
Polanyi’s ideas for an understanding of the contemporary socio-economic condition (see also, 
for example, Stiglitz 2001; Block 2001; Hindess 2007).
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which it interacts and co-evolves reduces the possibility of its distinctive operational 
codes being eroded; fourth, capital’s systemic capacity to induce, provoke or force 
other  institutional  orders  to  operate  according to  its  logic  consolidates  the  market 
mechanism through time and space. When these four tendencies reinforce each other, 
capital has taken hold of society, which “means no less than the running of society as 
an adjunct  to  the market.  Instead of economy being embedded in social  relations, 
social relations are embedded in the economic system” (Polanyi 1944 [1957: 57]).
Polanyi himself was very clear about the fact that “the gearing of markets into a self-
regulating system of tremendous power was not the result of any inherent tendency of 
markets  towards  excrescence,  but  rather  the  effect  of  highly  artificial  stimulants 
administered to the body social” (Polanyi 1944 [1957: 57]). That is to say that the 
expansion of the “unregulated” market was, and continues to be, a highly regulated 
affair. As Jamie Peck has recently argued with regard to the wave of market expansion 
known as neoliberalisation: “There was nothing spontaneous about neoliberalism; it 
was speculatively planned, it was opportunistically built and it has been repeatedly 
reconstructed” (Peck 2008: 3).
1.4.2 The countermovement.
The notion of a countermovement to market expansion carries connotations of protest 
and social movement. However, Polanyi did not understand the countermovement as 
primarily  a  force  of  protest  from below.  Instead  he  believed  that  whether  or  not 
workers  and the unemployed had the  bargaining power  to  protect  themselves,  the 
unsustainability of an entirely self-regulating market would summon ‘agencies’ that 
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would ameliorate their conditions. In this way, in early nineteenth century Britain, 
according to Polanyi, it was the “enlightened reactionaries of the landed classes who 
spoke out on behalf of the emergent working class and fought for their protection31 
(Polanyi 1944 [1957: 165-166]).
Silver and Arrighi (2003) point out that these notions of class leadership have parallels 
in Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony as “intellectual and moral leadership”. But 
while  hegemony  for  Gramsci  is  accompanied  by  the  forcible  domination  of 
antagonistic  groups  by  the  ruling  group  (Gramsci  1971:  181-182),  Polanyi  de-
emphasises asymmetric power relations between classes and conceives of society in 
less antagonistic terms, arguing that because “different cross sections of the population 
[are]  threatened  by  the  market,  persons  belonging  to  various  economic  strata 
unconsciously [join] forces to meet the danger” (Polanyi 1944 [1957: 155-156]). This 
is not out of straightforward solidarity, but rather because the threat to social order of 
market expansion affects everyone. Civil unrest is rarely in anyone’s interest, which is 
why the  disenfranchised  are  likely to  be  protected  from the  most  harmful  market 
consequences by those in less precarious situations.
Michael  Burawoy  (2003)  has  argued  that  Polanyi’s  analysis  is  limited  by  a 
problematic conception of society, which lends itself to overly optimistic readings that 
misconstrue the double movement thesis according to what Gillian Hart has recently 
31 The ‘protection’ of the working class was also in the interest of the landed classes. After all, the  
latter were economically pitted against the rising bourgeoisie of factory owners.
68
called “a mechanistic  hydraulic  model”:  top-down market  expansion automatically 
resulting in bottom-up resistance (2010: 14).
The  regulationist  approach  promoted  by Jessop  (2001;  2008)  emphasises  that  the 
double movement should be understood less as a two-step process from unregulated to 
regulated  capitalism,  and  rather  as  a  movement,  propelled  by  crisis,  from  one 
regulated regime to another, each with its own particular dynamic, contradictions, and 
propensities  for  crisis.  The  systems  theoretical  analysis  of  autopoietic  systems 
emphasises  the  autopoiesis,  that  is  the  self-production,  self-creation,  and  self-
organisation of the market economy. This approach, by highlighting the co-evolution 
and inter-dependence of co-existing systems, shows that the market economy is by no 
means fully self-contained, yet that as an autopoietic system it is likely to transform 
and reorganise itself in response to outside pressure (or external management), if at 
all,  only  in  terms  of  its  own,  internal  operating  codes  (such  as  profit-and-loss 
calculations).
Polanyi’s account is refined by a regulationist sensitivity to the economic and extra-
economic conditions that contribute to the survival of the capitalist order, as well as by 
an understanding of the operation (reproduction and transformation)  of autopoietic 
systems. All three approaches recognise that capitalist  societies are not constituted 
solely by market relations, but importantly involve other forms of social relations, and 
indeed that a social world ruled fully by the logic of capital, the commodity form and 
cost-benefit  calculations,  could  prove  destructive  of  capital  itself:  “accumulation 
69
always and everywhere depends on a precarious balance between commodity relations 
and other forms of social organization” (Jessop 2008: 334).
Jessop  points  out  that  each  of  the  four  movements  of  market  expansion 
(commodification,  economic  measurements,  protection  and  imposition  of  capital’s 
logic) has its own limitations, its own countermovements and its own resistances. In 
this way, the move towards increased commodification, when excessive, can generate 
market failures which put the social reproduction of capital at risk, and provoke class 
struggles. The move towards the imposition of cost-benefit calculations and erosion of 
alternative institutional codes or modes of valuation leads to resistance to this market 
logic by the joining of social forces that are not necessarily class-based but aim to 
defend the  non-commercial  values  of  the  lifeworld.  With  regard  to  the  other  two 
movements toward the consolidation of  capital’s  logic,  a variety of struggles may 
occur “over the hegemonic worldviews and naturalized forms of ‘common sense’ that 
posit  capital  accumulation  as  the  desirable  and/or  necessary  condition  for 
accomplishing other social goals” (Jessop 2008: 336). 
These counter-hegemonic struggles, it is important to note, are diverse in their ethico-
political  vision  and  strategies  of  resistance  –  they  might  articulate  into  socialist, 
anarchist, or fascist projects, amongst many other possibilities. This point is important 
as it highlights that there is nothing inherently progressive or emancipatory about the 
countermovement. 
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Moreover, the double movement can also be used to explain reactionary projects of 
social containment. In this way, Porter and Craig argue that the social disruptions of 
market liberalisation are mollified by “giving [the market orientation] a human face or 
policy limit” (2004: 391). The countermovement, they argue, serves to appease social 
conflicts and instead of challenging the capitalist global order, rather re-entrenches it 
through legitimation and deflection of more radical critique.
By contrast, I argue that Polanyi’s countermovement is most fruitfully envisioned as 
consisting of a dynamic variety of forces in any particular space-time context. The 
drive to ‘protect society’, I argue, is both a top-down, as well as a bottom-up force 
which simultaneously challenges and contests as well as reproduces and legitimises 
capitalism. The countermovement is itself a field of struggle, and it is through close 
attention to the actual and ongoing processes of its constitution that we can learn most 
about the contradictory ways in which capitalism survives and reproduces itself, as 
well as about the cracks of capital and how to prise them open.
Nonetheless, it is crucial to understand the need for a countermovement. In order for 
capital not fully to destroy its own conditions of production, and thereby bring forth 
crisis and potentially its own demise, a reining in  of unfettered market expansion is 
necessary,  and countermovements  provide such reining in.  This resonates  with the 
insight discussed previously that accumulation can only occur under an accumulation 
regime  which  ensures  the  (extra-economic)  conditions  for  stable  and  continuous 
capital accumulation are in place.
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In  this  way,  the  double  movement  dynamic  raises  worrying  questions  about  the 
complicity of capital-restraining action with the system’s self-preservation strategies32. 
Hence  a  vital  question  is  how  we  disentangle  from  the  dialectic  of  the  double 
movement.  How  is  it  possible  for  countermovements  and  struggles  against  the 
imperatives of capital not to tie back into capital’s homeostatic self-preservation, but 
instead to become “a force for the social constitution of value practices that are ... 
independent from those of capital” (De Angelis 2007: 42)? 
1.4.3 Implications for transformative action:  the double movement and non-
reformist reforms.
André Gorz in his Strategy for Labour (1967) raised the question of the possibility of 
‘revolutionary  reforms’,  that  is,  reforms  of  and  within  the  capitalist  system  that 
ultimately undermine rather than strengthen it, reforms which make more acute and 
32 A drive for self-preservation, or  conatus, according to De Angelis, can be seen as inhering in 
social forces just as much as in living organisms. He speaks of this drive as homeostatic patterns 
made up of a multitude of interactions rather than the conscious planning and directing of a 
human  or  institutional  actor:  “On  the  one  hand,  social  forces  that  constitute  themselves  in 
opposition  to  capital  and  immediate  conditions  of  accumulation  (for  example,  struggles  for 
higher wages, for less work, for more stringent environmental regulations, for commons and 
entitlements) represent ‘life threats’ to conditions of profitability and therefore threaten capital’s 
immediate  conditions  of  existence.  On  the  other  hand  capital,  like  living  organisms  facing 
external dangers, must strive to adapt for the sake of its self-preservation. In this adaptation there 
emerge self-organising patterns that strive to capture this conflict, to co-opt it, to acknowledge 
some of its demands to the exclusion of others, to subsume them and make them the condition of  
a new round of accumulation, predicated on qualitatively new organisational forms of labour and 
social  cooperation,  but  reproducing  the  same basic  life  form for  the  social  body,  the  same 
relations of production, the same rat  race within the social body and artificial production of 
scarcity, that are fundamental in keeping mechanisms of homeostasis alive” (2007: 41).
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more visible the internal contradictions of the system and that would hence (gradually) 
lead to the overthrow of capitalism – and the rise of socialism. Are such reforms ever 
possible?
This question is particularly pertinent in those contexts (“richer societies”) in which 
“it is not so clear that the status quo represents the greatest possible evil” (Gorz 1967:  
3). When basic needs do not any longer assert themselves with great urgency, when 
“the  intolerability  of  the  capitalist  system has  become  relative”,  its  overthrow or 
radical transformation no longer appears as a “clear and vital necessity” (Gorz 1967: 
21). Gorz’s book addresses the questions of why and how to continue the struggle 
against  capital  despite  the  relatively  improved  situation  of  the  working  class  in 
‘mature capitalist societies’.
Gorz’s  distinction  between reformist  and non-reformist  reforms has  been  used  by 
generations of activists in order to make sense of the objectives and achievements of 
their  struggles.  Debates  about  what  constitute  successful  non-reformist  reform 
strategies  have  long  been  an  important  aspect  of  progressive  policy  discussions 
amongst NGOs, trade unions and social movements (Klees 2002).
Reformist reform ultimately reinforces structures of inequalities by “subordinat[ing] 
its  objectives to the criteria of rationality and practicability of a given system and 
policy”, whereas non-reformist reform cumulatively creates the conditions in which 
transformations of the existing system become possible by insisting on “what should 
be made possible in terms of human needs and demands” (Gorz 1967: 7, my emphasis
). 
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The  struggle  for  non-reformist,  ‘revolutionary’  or  ‘structural’  reforms  “creates 
possibilities which point beyond capitalism and which therefore render the status quo 
all  the  more  intolerable,  its  contradictions  and shortcomings  more  evident”  (Gorz 
1967: 60). Structural reforms are not the kinds of reforms that are the outcome of a 
compromise,  but  “should  rather  be  considered  as  cracks  created in  the  system by 
attacks on its weak points... To fight for alternative solutions and for structural reforms 
(that is to say,  for intermediate objectives) is not to fight for improvements in the 
capitalist  system; it  is  rather to break it  up,  to restrict  it,  to create counter-powers 
which, instead of creating a new equilibrium, undermine its very foundations” (Gorz 
1967: 181n).
Non-reformist  reforms  alter  the  terrain  on  which  future  struggles  will  be  waged, 
thereby expanding (or at least changing) what is feasible to be achieved. The hope is 
that over time radical transformation of deep-seated, unjust structures may become an 
actual possibility rather than a utopian ideal.
Erik Olin Wright defines non-reformist reforms as “social changes that are feasible in 
the world as it is (thus they are reforms), but which prefigure in important ways more 
emancipatory possibilities” (in Kirby 2001). Nancy Fraser has adopted the concept of 
non-reformist  reforms  as  a  via  media between  her  strategies  of  affirmation  and 
transformation (Fraser & Honneth 2003). She emphasises the double-sided nature of 
non-reformist reforms: “on the one hand, they engage people’s identities and satisfy 
some of  their  needs  as  interpreted  within  existing  frameworks  of  recognition  and 
distribution; on the other hand, they set in motion a trajectory of change in which 
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more radical reforms become practicable over time” (Fraser in Hrubec 2004: 881). For 
Fraser,  affirmation  aims  to  remedy  inequitable  outcomes  of  social  arrangements 
without touching upon the underlying social structures that generate them, whereas 
transformation  aims  to  address  unjust  outcomes  precisely  by  dismantling  or 
reconfiguring  the  underlying  generative  framework.  The  distinction  between 
affirmation  and  transformation  allows  Fraser  to  classify  and  evaluate  political 
strategies  in  both  dimensions  of  justice  to  which  she  has  drawn  attention: 
redistribution and recognition. Non-reformist reform is heralded in this context as a 
kind of “third way” strategy in both dimensions.
However, movements for particular non-reformist reforms run the risk of turning into 
toothless lobbying or electoral efforts aiming at adoption of a reformist reform, as the 
feasibility of their demands becomes the prime mobilising factor33. Gorz was of course 
aware of this risk of subordination, that is, the risk that the efforts of social movements 
may  be  co-opted,  subsumed  and  reabsorbed  within  the  capitalist  framework, 
subordinated to its functioning and hence serve to reinforce it. But he insisted that “the 
risk of subordination exists, but subordination is not inevitable. The risk must be run, 
for there is no other way” (Gorz 1967: 8, emphasis in original). His vision was one of 
incremental  change  in  the  short  and  intermediate  term,  leading  to  revolutionary 
socialism in the long term.
33 See Hart-Landsberg (2007) for an account of such a process in the U.S. movement for ‘a living 
wage’.
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An abstract evaluation of the double movement’s restraints, reforms, and facilitations 
of market expansion is impossible. We have to attend to the particularities of actually 
existing struggles in order to judge the reformist or revolutionary nature of any given 
countermovement. In this thesis I aim to begin such an evaluation with regard to the 
protection of traditional knowledge.
1.5 The role of traditional knowledge in the reproduction of capital.
I argue that the protection of traditional knowledge – as the endeavour expresses itself 
today – is a field of struggle characterised by movements towards market and colonial 
expansion  as  well  as  by  countermovements  aiming  to  ‘protect’  social  and 
environmental  interests.  Seen  from  the  perspective  of  the  double  movement,  the 
protection  of  traditional  knowledge  is  less  of  a  challenge  to  capital  than  it  is  an 
expression of capital’s adjusted entrenchment. 
It  is  important  to  understand the protection  of  traditional  knowledge as  a  field of 
struggle in which the clashing of forces can lead to unexpected results. Yet while the 
“messy actualities” (Larner 2000) of the operation and effects of capital leave many 
gaps  and  openings  in  and  through  which  surprising  and  disrupting  relations  and 
practices can arise, these do not necessarily confront or subvert capital (or if they do, 
they are likely to be forcibly dissolved relatively speedily).  It  is  hence at  least  as 
important to understand the existence of this field of struggle as a crucial legitimising 
resource shoring up market expansion. This means that while engaging in the struggle 
on this terrain might limit the most destructive effects of market expansion, this very 
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engagement itself might undergird rather than undermine capital.  This perspective is 
not supposed to draw an entirely dark picture in which no resistance to capital  is 
possible,  but  rather  highlight  the  need  for  a  radical  critique  of  the  activities  and 
discourses and contestations of the protection of traditional knowledge in order for 
radically transformative action to be taken on this terrain. 
Of course a subversion of capital might not be the objective of those struggling to 
shape, influence and give meaning to the protection of traditional knowledge, or to use 
its discourses for particular ends. A certain reining in of capital might be all that is 
aimed for, in order to soften its harshest consequences. I am in no way arguing that the 
indigenous movement as a whole has anti-capitalist ambitions. It has been a lesson 
from my fieldwork, however, that the indigenous movement is far from homogeneous. 
My normative standpoint of steadfast anti-capitalism is aligned with those parts of the 
movement  which  are  involved  in  the  direct  and  day-to-day  defence  of  their 
subsistence and land rights. Many of those that I am thinking of and referring to in this 
context will never be able to attend let alone be heard at the international fora in which 
the protection of traditional knowledge is debated and given a policy shape.
For  those  struggling  against  capital,  then,  an  understanding  of  the  protection  of 
traditional  knowledge  as  a  field  of  struggle  characterised  by  capital’s  double 
movement is vital. I maintain that it is the double movement that accounts for capital’s 
long term survival, and that it might hence be less the movement towards expansion 
and more the countermovement for protection that needs to be resisted in order to 
break  the  dynamic  that  has  provided  capital  with  its  adaptability  and  resilience. 
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Because the countermovement pacifies resistance to capital, we might say that it is at 
least as much a threat as capital itself. In fact, it might be a greater threat as it is, at 
bottom,  the  very  force  that  mitigates  the  internal  contradictions  of  capital.  While 
capital,  left  to  its  own  devices,  might  undermine  itself,  with  the  help  of  some 
democratic countermovement it is able to perform a bootstrapping feat of overcoming 
its own contradictions.
Yet,  as  André  Gorz  argued,  when  seizure  of  power  by insurrection  is  out  of  the 
question (or,  we might  want  to  add,  if  it  is  undesirable  as  in  Holloway’s  How to  
Change the World Without Taking Power), there is no other way than to run the risk of 
fighting  for  reforms  which  might  ultimately  destabilise  the  system  even  as  they 
temporarily  legitimate  it  (Gorz  1967).  But  what  are  non-reformist  reforms  in  the 
context of the protection of traditional knowledge? I argue that such revolutionary 
reforms  are  those  which  successfully  contest  the  hegemonic  constructions  of 
knowledge and property which are being perpetuated through the endeavour to protect 
traditional knowledge. Indigenous movements are in an ideal position to contest this 
hegemonic ‘common sense’ as they can make legitimate claims to ‘other cosmovisions
34 and world views’, thereby providing fresh ways of understanding what is at stake in 
the protection of traditional knowledge. It is in Chapter 5 that I discuss some such 
alternative visions in more detail.
34 ‘Cosmovision’ is  the  term  which  indigenous  peoples’ movements  often  prefer  to  the  more 
European ‘cosmology’.
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In what is first to follow, however,  I explain with the help of some historical and 
ethnographic examples the way in which I  understand the protection of traditional 
knowledge  to  be  a  field  of  struggle  characterised  by  the  double  movement.  A 
particular contribution of this study is the ethnographic account and discussion of the 
attempted negotiations for a fair and equitable Access and Benefit Sharing agreement 
by the ProBenefit project in the Napo region. Before I continue my arguments in the 
subsequent chapters, let me briefly address the methodological question of how such a 
particular account is able to make sense of a much wider issue.
1.6 Critical Ethnography as methodological approach.
Ethnographic  studies  of  particular  localities  or  events  are  of  more  than  merely 
parochial interest. After all, an ostensibly general process or structure, such as market 
expansion or race relations, is  replicated in concrete forms in particular historical-
geographical situations. However, the crucial question here concerns the meaning of 
replicated.  Eschewing  the  idea  of  a  pure,  ideal  or  representational  form of  (say) 
market expansion, particular manifestations of which are mere local aberrations of its 
general form based on the particular local ‘contingencies’ of a situation, I hold that an 
object  such  as  market  expansion  only  exists  in  and  through  its  particular 
manifestations.  It  is  through an acquaintance with the concrete  forms that  we can 
come  to  gain  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  process  or  structure  in  question,  the 
replication of which is less like an identical copy and more like a (Wittgensteinian) 
family resemblance.
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Similarly, it is my contention that the protection of traditional knowledge only exists 
in and through its particular manifestations. While in the case of traditional knowledge 
protection such manifestations could be particular policies, guidelines or laws, it is 
their concrete realisation that is of special interest35. My ethnographic account of an 
attempt at negotiating a fair and equitable Access and Benefit Sharing agreement in 
Napo, then, should be understood as a step toward understanding the phenomenon of 
the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  and  its  double  movement  dynamic  more 
generally. 
In choosing this approach, I am following what geographer Gillian Hart calls “critical 
ethnography” (Hart  2002;  2004;  2005).  Critical  ethnography is  set  apart  from the 
otherwise  similar  endeavour  of  global  ethnography (Burawoy et  al.  2000).  While 
Burawoy’s  project  of  global  ethnography  makes  the  differentiated  yet  connected 
experiences  of globalisation its main focus (cf. Hart 2004; Gille and O’Riain 2002), 
critical ethnography rather concentrates on the processes of mutual constitution of the 
local/global36, and the question of what globalisation actually means in its material 
actualities (Hart 2004: 98). 
Hart wants to overcome the notion of ‘case studies’ as concrete instances of more 
abstract processes and move instead towards a relational understanding of generality 
35 If  a law is only printed words on paper, it is not very much at all. It is its social and material  
effects that constitute its power and endow it with a more meaningful existence in the world.
36 In terms of place we may say that “the specificity of a place … arises from the particularity of  
interrelations with what lies beyond it, that come into conjuncture in specific ways” (Hart 2005: 
21). Places, then, are points of convergence of wider (‘global’) processes as well as arenas for 
practices: “a local articulation within a wider whole” (Massey 1994: 4, quoted in Hart 2005: 21).
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(as  in  Sayer  1991).  Relational  generality  eschews  representational  pretensions37: 
usually we think of the general as a representation of that which is shared amongst a  
set  of  discrete  entities,  that  which  typifies  them  and  groups  them  together 
taxonomically. Relational generality, however, is the relationship between a whole and 
its parts inasmuch as they presuppose each other. It expresses the notion that parts and 
wholes can be dialectically related, and that hence parts and wholes are constitutive 
parts of one another rather than the latter being a representation of the former and/or 
the former an instance of the latter.
In this way, I conceptualise my study in Napo as co-defining what the protection of 
traditional knowledge actually  is. Ultimately other studies of ABS negotiations and 
other forms of protecting traditional knowledge would have to be undertaken, their 
double  movement  dynamic  explored,  and  social  implications  assessed  in  order  to 
develop  a  fuller  picture  of  traditional  knowledge  as  a  field  of  struggle.  For  now, 
37 The representational general is a notion of the general as a kind of ideal type – the general as 
faithfully  representing  the  important  essence  of  the  particular.  In  this  way the  particular  is 
conceived of as an instance of the general, an example of it, which however does not tell us  
anything about the general: While the general defines and explains the particular, the particular 
is passive: it is defined and explained and categorised, but it has no such powers in and of itself. 
It  cannot define and explain and categorise, it  is incapable of agency in that sense.  We can, 
however,  understand  the  relationship  between the  general  and  the  particular  also  as  one  of 
mutual constitution. As such the general defines the particular as much as the particular defines 
the general.  This  understanding acknowledges  that  the general  definition of,  say,  tree  as  “a 
perennial  plant  having a self-supporting woody main stem ...  and growing to a considerable 
height and size” (OED) makes real, live, human sense only once we make acquaintance with one 
or  more  actual,  particular  trees.  Moreover,  our  understanding  of  tree  is  refined  the  more 
particular trees we come to know – redwoods, bonsais, bottle trees – and the more we come to 
know  about  their  particular  qualities  –  their  different  scents,  human  uses  and  ecological 
relations.
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however, even such a seemingly snippet-view of the global endeavour of traditional 
knowledge protection can provide an insight into its workings. This is because there is 
no global endeavour for the protection of traditional knowledge that exists apart from 
its actual and material realisations in such varied forms as negotiations in UN fora, 
practices in intellectual property offices, court cases, the creation of community data 
bases, and, as I will show, on-the-ground processes of ABS agreements.
Moreover, choosing critical ethnography as a methodological approach allows for a 
politically enabling ‘focus on the cracks’ of neoliberal capitalism.
1.6.1 A focus on the cracks.
“There is  a  crack in  everything/That’s how the light gets  in”  (Leonard 
Cohen, Anthem).
There is always the danger that a radical critique of capital power, especially when it  
focuses  on  the  latter’s  pervasiveness  and  inexorability,  freezes  one’s  capacity  to 
register, conceptualise and seize the openings and potentials for evasion, resistance, 
subversion,  and hence  that  it  discursively strengthens  the  very force  it  set  out  to 
undermine.
I  aim  to  avoid  conceptualising  capital  as  a  quasi-autonomous  global  force,  the 
dynamic action of which unilaterally affects passive localities and impotent people. 
Apart from simplifying and dichotomising a complex reality in unacceptable ways, 
such a perspective would moreover close down possibilities for radical transformation 
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by  deploring  the  inevitability  of  the  current  configuration  of  the  world  that  the 
neoliberal  ‘end of  history’ outlook celebrates.  Both  views  hence  contribute  to  the 
entrenchment of the attitude that capital and its social relations are inescapable.
An  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  capital  as  force  and  its  concrete 
manifestations in material actualities as one of co-constitution and co-production is 
not only more nuanced in its rendering of reality, but also opens up the imagination for 
visions  of  alternative  worlds,  echoing  the  alterglobalisation  insistence  that  ‘other 
worlds are possible’.  Moreover,  a focus on the  processes of  co-constitution would 
have to attend to the messiness of these, and hence allow for a theorisation of the 
contradictions inherent in them, enabling thereby the development of strategies for the 
creation (and not just the envisioning) of ‘other worlds’.
This kind of focus and attention can increasingly be found in critical social science 
literature (eg. Tsing 2005; Ong 2006; Hart 2002), and many ‘critical ethnographies’ 
(cf. Hart 2004) are particularly careful in pointing to the contradictions and slippages, 
to the always only partial achievements of totalising forces, to the “messy actualities” 
(Larner 2000), and the cracks and disjunctures.
Neoliberal  politics  relies  on  Margaret  Thatcher’s  famous  dictum that  “there  is  no 
alternative”.  It  is  thus  necessary  to  show  “the  multiple  and  porous  forms  of 
neoliberalism and the potent – if often compromised – material social practices of its 
‘subjects’”  (Katz  2005:  631)  in  order  to  destabilise  neoliberal  assumptions,  and 
thereby also their performative power.
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In  similar  vein,  Massimo  De  Angelis  insists  that  the  term  capitalism “projects 
coherence and closure into the world ... when in fact political thinking should be able 
to identify cracks and openings in any context and scale of social doing, those cracks 
and openings necessary to produce new commons” (2007: 36).
However, in taking pains to distance themselves from the rather discredited black-and-
white approach of ‘evil capitalism smothering the luscious lifeworld’ on the one hand, 
and the overly enthusiastic cultural-turn celebration of concerns of culture and identity 
eclipsing the politico-economic on the other, studies of processes of co-constitution 
can run the risk of overestimating the likelihood and ability of turning the possibilities 
for alternatives that reside in the cracks into actualities. If possibilities for change are 
held open through contradictions and cracks in actually existing capitalism, then these 
possibilities are open for emancipatory, empowering and life-enhancing trajectories as 
well as reactionary, restricting and life-stunting ones. We can thus not only theorise 
the spaces for the shaping of futures that exist in the messy actualities of the world, 
but also need to seize them – for progressive purposes.
As we saw, Hart calls for critical ethnographies that come to grips with and illuminate 
contemporary social  changes in ways that  are  “politically enabling” (2004:  91).  A 
critical  ethnography,  then,  has  to  make  salient  the  openings  for  resistance  to, 
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reworking  of,  and  resilience  under  neoliberalism38,  so  that  we  may  not  only 
understand but also contribute to these dynamics in emancipatory ways. 
Critical  ethnographies,  so  Hart,  engage  productively  with  “the  question  of  how 
multiple  forces  come  together  in  practice  to  produce  particular  dynamics  or 
trajectories, as well as possible alternatives” (2004: 97). As such, they elucidate the 
mutually  constitutive  processes  that  make  up  neoliberal  globalisation,  thereby 
providing inspiration for the reconfiguration of practices and relationships.
Yet critical ethnography is obviously not just a conceptual approach: the ethnographer 
spends  time  ‘in  the  field’ as  well  as  at  the  desk.  The  ‘participant  observer’ field 
technique  is  usually  taken  as  the  archetypal  form  of  research  employed  by 
ethnographers.  However, it  is  probably more  appropriately conceived of  less  as  a 
unitary research method and more as a research strategy, since it is always made up of 
a variety of methods (Davies 1999). The strategy derives from the insight that one 
achieves an understanding of a community’s values, structures and world views best 
from their observed daily lives and actions, rather than from their statements of what 
‘is’ or  ‘should  be’.  The  participant  observer  attempts  immersion  in  local  life  for 
usually  at  least  a  year  in  order  to  understand  the  cultural  meanings  and  social 
structures of the group and how these are interrelated. However, it should be noted 
that participation is almost definitely not the chief data-gathering technique. Rather, 
we  might  better  understand  participation  in  people’s  daily  lives  as  a  means  of 
38 See Katz 2004 for the distinctions between resistance, resilience and reworking. See Sparke 
2006  and  2008  for  a  valuable  appropriation  in  the  context  of  political  geographies  of 
globalization. 
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facilitating  observation  of  conduct  and  events  and  of  enabling  more  open  and 
meaningful  discussions  with  informants.  Major  use  will  often  be  made  of  the 
unstructured  interview,  and  biographies  are  frequently  collected,  photographs  and 
videos  taken,  surveys  carried  out.  In  this  way,  it  is  fundamentally  an  extractive 
intellectual  exercise,  which mostly leaves little of real value in the community on 
whose shoulders the researcher is taking essential steps towards her or his career.
The critical ethnographer has to be reflexive about her presence in and effect on other 
people’s  lives.  Conducting  research  across  any  cultural  context  requires  intense 
attention to ethics, but this situation might be exacerbated in the case of working with 
indigenous cultures. Such a cross-cultural research relationship involves a particular 
dynamic of power:  as  members of colonial  cultures,  researchers have traditionally 
held disproportionate power in forms of money, mobility and ‘expertise’ over their 
human subjects. This cross-cultural research relationship is imbued with its historical 
origins and warrants particular care with regards to issues of consent, control, research 
design, and data ownership.
It cannot be denied that the academic endeavour, despite its discursive ennoblement as 
humanity’s honourable quest for knowledge, is a vast industry necessarily concerned 
with the perpetuation of its own existence, which must thus remain largely acquiescent 
to whichever (socio-economic/political) system sustains it in its current form. Whether 
for this or any other reason, comparatively little effort is ever put into making the 
fruits of our mental labouring physically and intellectually accessible beyond the peer 
group, whose verdict alone is deemed significant to their evaluation. Yet in many, if 
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not  most  cases  –  especially  in  the  social  sciences  –  it  is  people,  communities, 
phenomena beyond the peer group that afford the substance for our essays, theses, 
books and articles, that is, for the vehicles of our careers. We trade in ‘the Other’. Our 
representations of the lives, deaths, joys, sorrows, everydays and extraordinaries of 
other people is the currency with which we acquire a name in print, a seat at the table, 
and a flight and hotel booking in the pocket. Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes of the trade 
in the Other: “it has no concern for the peoples who originally produced the ideas and 
images,  or  with how and why they produced those ways of  knowing. It  will  not, 
indeed, cannot, return the raw materials from which its products have been made” 
(Smith 1999: 89).
For  the  most  part,  indigenous  people  have  viewed  research  with  suspicion  and 
hostility  as  an  intrusive,  exploitative  activity.  Researchers  have  been  viewed  as 
intruders  and  predators  (Trimble  1977;  Maynard  1974)  inaccurately  representing 
indigenous ways of life. Thomas Peacock (1996) points out that a large proportion of 
indigenous culture and history consists of information recounted by researchers that is 
comprised  of  non-indigenous  perceptions  of  indigenous  people  and  culture.  This 
problem is  exacerbated  by the fact  that  indigenous people,  tired of  being  studied, 
passively  resisted  researchers  with  untruths  and  deliberately  fictitious  information 
(Sinclair 2003; Peacock 1996; Swisher 1993; Trimble 1977). Smith reveals about the 
Maori community in which she grew up: “Research was talked about both in terms of 
its absolute worthlessness to us, and its absolute usefulness to those who wielded it as 
an instrument. It told us things already known, suggested things that would not work, 
and made careers for people who already had jobs” (Smith 1999: 3). Resistance to it 
87
does thus not come from nowhere. Moreover, it is no secret that anthropology – and 
its ethnographic method – was used throughout the 19th and 20th centuries to aid in 
the management and incorporation of Aboriginal groups worldwide, that is, to aid to 
the processes of absorption and assimilation by which those groups would gradually 
become a part of the colonizer’s culture (Banerjee & Linstead 2004; Elkin 1944). The 
knee-jerk  negative  responses  to  research  inquiries  and  suspicion  with  which 
academics are often met should thus not come as a surprise.
However, to focus solely on the power of the researcher in the cross-cultural research 
encounter, is to deny the Other their agency – their own capacity to exert power. In all 
relationships dominance is inescapably at stake. In every instance of talk power is 
being negotiated, and the researcher-researched relationship is no different: sometimes 
power does not lie with the obvious person, i.e. the researcher, but rather moves and 
shifts  between researcher  and participant.  No researcher  is  only a  researcher,  and 
different subjective positions create multiple relations of power. A researcher is not 
necessarily always powerful, and other identities, such as gender, age and nationality, 
have to be considered when analysing power relations (see for example Riley et al. 
2003; Finlay 2002; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000). Being a relatively young, childless 
woman meant that my opinions were not taken seriously in all settings. This, however, 
is not a situation that is unique to ‘fieldwork’ at all, but part of my particular living in 
the world in general. Moreover, it has certain advantages, as it can enable participation 
in activities in which a more authoritative person would be perceived as threatening. 
Nonetheless,  the vulnerability  of  the  researcher  should  not  be  overstated:  her 
opportunities  to  extricate  herself  from the  fetters  of  the  field  are  greater:  she can 
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simply return to her original life, and will after all have gained some credentials from 
her  (possibly  painful)  adventure.  Unless  the  research  project  has  some  clearly 
beneficial outcome beyond a printed monograph, the ‘researched’ indigenous person 
might be left with little more than frustration. Moreover, the researcher’s images of 
the encounter  will  circulate  among  and inform not  only a  potentially much larger 
audience than the indigenous person’s account ever can, but also, more importantly, an 
audience whose access to resources and influence  in policy making is incomparably 
more extensive.
I tried to overcome the problems of power differentials and the asymmetric usefulness 
of  my  research  by  ensuring  that  at  least  my  presence  (if  not  my  research)  were 
enjoyable and useful to the people with whom I worked. As I will illustrate in later 
chapters,  I  took on a  variety of  supportive roles  in  the indigenous organisations  I 
affiliated with, and participated in people’s everyday and family lives whenever I was 
invited to do so, and I remain in touch with most of my closest relations to this day. 
It is difficult to assess whether it was sheer luck or some particular attitude or action 
on my  (or anyone else’s)  part that made my research period in South America the 
relatively unproblematic experience which it was. I was asked to return soon every 
time  I  left,  and  have  felt  deep friendship  with  many of  the  people  with  whom I 
worked. In this context, I cannot help but recall the Aboriginal Australian activist Lilla 
Watson’s words “If you have come here to help me, you are wasting your time, but if  
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you come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together”39. 
These  words  have  always  supported  my belief  in  the  possibility  of  ‘collaborative 
emancipation’,  even  across  vast  cultural  distances,  on  the  basis  of  sharing  the 
experience of being subject to similar forms of structural disempowerment. Maybe an 
exploration of the ways in which the emancipation of all research project participants 
is intimately (even if not obviously) entwined can provide the most fertile ground for 
an  equitable  research  relationship.  And maybe the  sincere  interest  with  which  the 
people whom I met and I approached this question facilitated such positive relations 
as I was able to experience ‘in the field’.
I begin my critical ethnography of the protection of traditional knowledge in the next 
chapter  by outlining  multiple  forces  that  have  converged and are  converging in  a 
series  of  fields  to  produce  the  particular  trajectory  that  characterises  traditional 
knowledge protection today, and that has shaped the processes and experiences of the 
ProBenefit ABS negotiations which I discuss in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. In between, 
Chapter 3 will situate ProBenefit within a historical political economy of Napo, an 
area  characterised  since  the  16th century  by  forceful  resource  extraction  and 
colonisation  which  has  been  formative  of  its  indigenous  inhabitants’ identity  and 
experience. 
Through the discussions in the present chapter, I have aimed to lay the foundations for 
the key argument  of  this  thesis  that  the hegemonic form of  traditional  knowledge 
39 This  quote  can  be  found  in  various  places  on  the  world  wide  web,  for  example  here:  
www.antimedia.net/nooneisillegal/DirectAction.htm
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protection  which  protects  traditional  knowledge  as  a  kind  of  intellectual  property 
plays a role in the expansion and reproduction of capital, thereby contributing to the 
destruction of people’s autonomous subsistence. By doing so, it also undermines the 
very basis for the continuous creation and indeed relevance of traditional knowledge: 
people’s everyday interactions that are not oriented by formal market exchange, and 
constitute a source of meaning and value beyond profit maximisation. But let us now 
turn to the five fields – each of them characterised by double movement dynamics – 
from which the protection of traditional knowledge as a possibility and imperative 
springs.
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2 From Fields of Struggle: on the origins of traditional knowledge 
protection.
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  illustrate  an  array  of  multiple  forces  that  have 
converged and are converging in a series of five fields which together constitute the 
origins  of  traditional  knowledge  protection.  I  argue  that  without  the  histories  of 
political struggle which constitute these fields, the protection of traditional knowledge 
would not be an international imperative with the particular shape which it has today. 
The  five  fields  are:  (i)  International  Law  and  the  Politics  of  Indigeneity;  (ii) 
Conservation of Biological Resources; (iii) Intellectual Property; (iv) Safeguarding of 
Cultural  Heritage;  (v)  Public  Participation  in  Development  and  Governance.  The 
different political and historical trajectories of these fields  combine to establish the 
current sites of struggle that inform and shape the protection of traditional knowledge. 
Needless to say, the world did not suddenly awake to CBD guidelines on Access and 
Benefit  Sharing,  or  the  UN  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples: 
movements towards colonial and market expansion, countermovements to restrain and 
regulate these, as well as subsistence struggles, have shaped the historical and political 
conditions in and through which such policies and declarations have been brought into 
being.  The  five  fields  and  their  trajectories  that  I  present  in  this  chapter  form a 
hegemonic  underpinning  to  endeavours  to  protect  traditional  knowledge.  Capital’s 
double movement characterises all of them. 
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I will not be able to do justice to the complex histories of these five fields. Each of 
them have,  in  turn,  their  own genealogies  and  origins  in  other  fields,  discourses, 
practices, and states of affairs. All I can do, for reasons of space and focus in this 
thesis,  is  to point the reader towards the connections between these fields and the 
protection of traditional knowledge. This is by no means an exhaustive exercise, but it 
serves to provide the reader with the first outlines of what we might call a genealogy 
of  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge.  A clear  vision  of  these  genealogical 
connections  is,  I  believe,  indispensable  to  an  understanding  of  the  protection  of 
traditional knowledge as a field of struggle. It is moreover informative for analyses 
and strategic contemplation of the organisation of the subsistence struggles that are 
based on value practices other than those of capital, and which are not commensurable 
with the double movement that characterises the reproduction of capital. Indeed, from 
the subaltern, indigenous perspective, understanding each of these five trajectories and 
their  complex conjunction in  the mainstream practices and theories with regard to 
traditional  knowledge  protection  is  crucial  in  order  to  identify  the  ambiguous 
problems of capital expansion and to illuminate the cracks through which some anti-
capitalist light can find its way.
It is through these five fields, which I address in turn in sections 2.1. – 2.5 below, that 
we can come to understand the protection of traditional knowledge as characterised by 
the  movements  of  and  countermovements  to  colonialism  and  capital  expansion. 
Caught,  even  strangled  within  the  complicit  nature  of  the  double  movement, 
traditional knowledge, the people who practice it, and their artefacts are destined to 
become entries in museum catalogues or other databases. What is needed is hence a 
93
radicalisation  of  the  countermovements  which  focus  on  traditional  knowledge 
protection. To this end, it is crucial to contest the hegemonic construction of what it  
means to protect traditional knowledge, and to strengthen the subsistence struggles 
that continue to be fought all over the world. With this thesis, I aim to contribute to the 
destabilisation  of  the  hegemonic  understanding  of  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge. As part of this overall aim, this chapter addresses the question of  how 
come that the protection of traditional knowledge has taken the particular form which 
it has today, namely as a form of intellectual property protection realised primarily 
through Access and Benefit Sharing agreements?
2.1 International Law and the Politics of Indigeneity.
The first of the five fields through the trajectory of which we must understand the 
prominence of the protection of traditional knowledge in international negotiations is 
the rise of ‘indigenous peoples’ as legitimate subjects of international law. This will 
uncover  a  history  of  violent  conquests  as  initial  movements  of  the  expansion  of 
European  kingdoms  and  their  accompanying  countermovements,  which  actually 
resulted in the inclusion of indigenous peoples as bona fide citizens able to enter into 
contractual relations with the colonisers,  thereby turning them into a class not too 
dissimilar to the proletariat of those colonisers’ home countries.
While the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ only developed in the mid-20th century (see, 
e.g., Niezen 2003), European nation states and earlier social formations were actively 
involved  not  only  in  the  brutal  decimation  and  plunder  of  the  societies  they 
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encountered in the ‘New World’ from the time of the Conquest onwards, but also in 
the conceptualisation of their (moral) status. Were these new-found ‘Others’ human 
beings  at  all?  Did  they  constitute  nations  with  territorial  rights?  Could  they 
collectively enter treaties? Was there a moral obligation to respect such treaties? These 
were questions increasingly asked (see, e.g., Pagden 1986; 1993).
In  this  section,  then,  I  present  a  brief  overview  of  this  shifting  relationship, 
highlighting  its  ‘double  movement’ tendencies,  as  developed  in  Chapter  1.  The 
narrative will unfold largely chronologically from the conquest of the ‘New World’, 
through the development of positivist law and sovereign nations, to the nineteenth 
century  ‘trusteeship  doctrine’ and  ‘civilising  mission’,  and  finally  the  rise  of  the 
discourse of ‘partnership’.  Each moment of the relationship between the European 
powers (and later also non-European nation states), on the one hand, and ‘indigenous’ 
societies on the other, can also be understood as a moment in the double movement 
dynamic, moving from capital and colonial expansion with devastating consequences, 
to a more restrained expansion, controlled through ‘countermovements’. The narrative 
illustrates  that  these  countermovements  are  not  always  bottom-up  movements  of 
resistance, but rather constitute a confluence of reactions from different social strata to 
the  socially  (and  environmentally)  detrimental  effects  of  capital  and  colonial 
expansion,  which simultaneously challenges and contests as well as reproduces and 
legitimises  the  latter.  As we shall  see,  the trajectory of  this  field provides  crucial 
background for understanding Access and Benefit Sharing agreements today.
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2.1.1 New World Lands and Souls: a papal gift of terror.
The devastation and terror that the early transatlantic contact brought to the peoples of 
(what we now know as) North and South America has been documented extensively, 
and  I  assume  the  reader’s  general  familiarity  with  the  broad  outlines  of  the 
enslavements40, massacres, pillaging, deadly epidemics and ethnocides of those times 
(for reliable sources, see Crosby 1972; Denevan 1976; Pagden 1993). 
While  I  want  to  avoid  the  stereotypical  imagery  of  victimisation  –  indigenous 
inhabitants of any colony are very much active agents of history in their resistance to, 
engagement with, and manipulation of the colonising forces – it is nonetheless crucial 
to  remember  that  no  matter  how varied  and  complex  relations  were  between  the 
European seafarers and the old inhabitants of the ‘New World’, the violence of the 
Conquest  is  hard  to  overestimate,  and constitutes  a  central  piece  of  the  historical 
background to the questions, events and arguments with which I deal in this thesis.
Even though the actual  death toll  of disease and violence is  highly contested,  the 
lowest estimates  suggest  a  decimation  of  the  population  of  both  Americas  by  a 
staggering 80% by the end of the 16th century41. Tragically this number seems to repeat 
itself until this very day: since the discovery of oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon in the 
1970s in the territories that the Huaorani people have inhabited for many  hundred 
40 The recent work of Marcus Rediker,  The Slave Ship: A Human History (2009), is particularly 
informative with respect to the gruesome, slave based origins of the transatlantic trade upon 
which modern Europe and all its ‘civilised’ societies are built.
41 See  Thornton  1987;  Ramenofsky  1988;  Jennings  1993;  Stannard  1993;  Rummel  1994;  and 
Shoemaker 1999 for numbers. See Henige 1998; and Royal 1992 for an overview of the heated 
debate over the right numbers and methodological concerns over their exact determination.
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years, only 10% of the Huaorani people remain today (Enström 2007). Of those who 
remain, many suffer from cancer, birth defects and lack of access to resources; some 
work for the oil companies as a last resort or as a way to enter what increasingly 
seems  inevitable:  the  cash  economy.  A divided,  nearly  extinct  people,  they  now 
‘enjoy’ a mythical status as the last proper forest dwellers of the region (Rival 2002; 
Ziegler-Otero 2004). The plight of the Huaorani in the last thirty years reflects the 
history of the last half millennia in the region: annihilation or conversion (to either 
Christianity and/or capitalism).
The story of  conquest  began,  in  a  legal  sense,  when in 1493 Pope Alexander  VI 
granted the Spanish monarchs all territories their envoys might discover that were not 
heretofore under the jurisdiction of Christian rulers (e.g. McAlister 1984; Green & 
Dickason  1989).  This  papal  donation  was  considered  by  the  Spanish  crown  to 
establish its  legal title to the lands of the ‘New World’,  as well  as conferring the 
mission and authority to convert ‘idolatrous Indians’ to Christianity.  The ‘religion of 
the slaves’ (Engels 1894) had come full circle, soon supplying slaves for the early 
movements of capital expansion (see especially Todorov 1984).
The brutality of the conquistadores and the subsequent colonial administrations did 
not  pass  uncontested,  however,  and a  movement  to  counter  the  extremely violent 
nature  of  the conquest  began to emerge (see,  e.g.,  Pagden 1993).  The Dominican 
priest  Bartolomé de  las  Casas  (1474 –  1566)  is  the  most  prominent  of  the  early 
missionaries who denounced the genocidal treatment of the original inhabitants of the 
Western Hemisphere at the hand of the Spaniards. His Apologetic History of the Indies  
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details  the  atrocities  perpetrated  through  the  encomienda system,  which  granted 
Spanish colonists pieces of land and the rights to the labour of those ‘Indians’ living 
on  them.  Another  Dominican  cleric,  Francisco  de  Vitoria  (1486  –  1547),  also 
expounded normative and legal parameters for the relationship between Spaniards and 
Indians  (Anaya  2004).  Countering  the  extreme  violence,  but  not  the  underlying 
principle and objective of conquest as such, we can see de las Casas and Vitoria as two 
of the first notable and historically best preserved specimens of Polanyi’s ‘enlightened 
classes’ that  demanded  restraint  after  the  ravages  of  unfettered  colonisation  had 
become impossible to ignore. A double movement dynamic hence consolidated the 
conquest of the New Worlds and its extraction of wealth.
2.1.2 Sovereign Nations and Positivist Law.
The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Year War and the political 
hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church, is usually seen as marking the beginning of 
the era of the sovereign nation state.42 The rise of the modern state is accompanied by 
an important intellectual transformation: natural law as a framework for a universal 
moral code for humankind evolved to comprise natural rights of individuals on the 
one hand and the natural rights of states on the other (Damerow 1978, cited in Anaya 
2004: 20) – the ‘law of nations’ as a discrete body of law developed.43 The idea of a 
nation-state makes it  largely impossible for indigenous peoples to qualify as such, 
42 However,  see Croxton 1999, and Krasner 2001 for  different  views.  The exact  origin of  the 
sovereign nation state is not important for our discussion.
43 Emmerich  De Vattel’s 1758 treatise  The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law 
elaborated   the   natural   law   framework   of   Thomas   Hobbes,   Samuel   Pufendorf   and 
Christian Wolff in this way. See, e.g., Anaya 2004.
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after all the concept is based on models of European social and political organisation 
which  are  characterised  by  territorial  dominion,  and  centralised,  hierarchical 
government structures (Hall 1984; Vincent 1987), which would apply, if at all, only to 
such empires as those of the Aztecs and Incas.
In his treatise Elements of International Law (1846), the U.S. Supreme Court reporter 
Wheaton expressed what was to become the dominant political and jurisprudential 
tendency  to  exclude  (what  would  now  be  called)  ‘indigenous  peoples’ from  the 
legitimate subjects of international law, and hence to deny them the group rights and 
protection  such  law affords,  unless  their  socio-political  organisation  and  land  use 
mirrored those of the European nation-state. He writes: “The legal idea of the state 
necessarily implies that of the habitual obedience of its members to those persons in 
whom superiority is vested, and a fixed abode, and definite territory belonging to the 
people  by  whom  it  is  occupied”,  and  hence  excludes  any  “unsettled  horde  of 
wandering savages not yet formed into civil society” (Wheaton 1866: 50-51). 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century positivist school of international law 
came to overpower the previous jurisprudential framework of natural law by insisting 
that international law is between states, that is, it is based in their consent and not in 
transcendental right. Through this development the idea that indigenous peoples might 
be political  bodies  with rights  under international  law was completely abandoned. 
Jurisprudence yielded “to the forces of colonization and empire as Western colonizers 
consolidated indigenous lands with their respective spheres of political hegemony and 
control” (Anaya 2004: 26).
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Under  the  positivist  conception,  discovery  and  conquest  came  to  be  viewed  as 
endowing  rights  superior  to  those  of  first  possession  or  occupancy,  further 
undermining  any  possibility  for  the  recognition  of  indigenous  peoples'  collective 
rights (See, for example, Kent 1896; for cases in US courts see Anaya 2004). In fact, 
positivists even came to deny that European states had  ever  considered indigenous 
peoples as nations and capable of possessing rights in the international realm (e.g. 
Hyde 1922; Snow 1918), thereby precluding them from formal international relations 
and affairs through denial of their status as nation-states.44 The positivist framework 
operated to consolidate the sovereignty built through colonialism at the expense of the 
sovereignty  of  indigenous  peoples,  and  its  dominance  is  particularly  obvious  in 
international arbitrations of the 1920s and 1930s45. The law of nations was turned into 
a  legitimising  force  for  colonisation  and  empire-building,  elevating  the  colonising 
forces above the primitive other in moral and political terms.
However, emerging counter movements began to let their effects be felt: indigenous 
peoples  were  to  be  integrated,  civilized  and  raised  above  their  miserable  station 
through  trustee-  and  guardianship  provided  by  the  enlightened.  A next  stage  of 
44 Anaya (2004: 29­30) writes: “the positivist doctrine of effective occupation of territory 
and   recognition   of   such   occupation   by   the   “Family   of  Nations”   provided   the   legal 
mechanism   for   consolidating   territorial   sovereignty   over   indigenous   lands   by   the 
colonizing states” (see also Alfredsson 1982).




colonial  mastery  and  resource  exploitation  was  hence  carried  out  legally  and  in 
accordance with the moral zeitgeist.
2.1.3 The trusteeship doctrine: to guard and civilise.
From (at least) the nineteenth century onwards, notions of trustee- and guardianship 
started to increasingly permeate the official discourse of the home countries regarding 
the indigenous populations of their colonies (e.g. Pagden 1986; 1993). Although the 
trusteeship  doctrine  displayed  elements  of  humanistic  thought,  insisting  on  the 
common humanity of all people, it was deeply rooted in the view that non-European 
peoples and their cultures were inferior to the European ones. The rights of colonised 
peoples were thus conceptualised as a parallel to the kinds of rights that were seen to 
apply to ‘undeveloped individuals’. Pseudo-scientific arguments of the 19th century 
bolstered this perspective (Curtin 1971; Cowen & Shenton 1996). 
The  trusteeship  doctrine  had  as  its  objective  to  ‘civilise’ indigenous  peoples,  and 
change their ‘backward’ ways, and has thus to be understood as rooted in a negative 
regard for other cultures and lifeways. Ideas of trusteeship can be found in virtually all 






The 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations adopted at the end of World War I also  
commits  all  its  members  to  “undertake  to  secure  the  just  treatment  of  the  native 
inhabitants of territories under their control” (Art. 23a). Article 22 reads: “To those 
colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be 
under  the sovereignty of the States  which formerly governed them and which are 
inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous 
conditions  of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the  principle  that  the 
wellbeing and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that 
securities for the formance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant”. Hence, 
as Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations indicates, international law 
adopted the norms of colonialism and continued to serve the goals of the colonisers 
(Niezen 2003).
Notions  of  trusteeship,  while  ostensibly  motivated  by  a  concern  for  indigenous 
peoples’ well  being,  ultimately  translated  into  a  justification  for  colonisation  and 
continued colonial  control,  rather  than a  defence against them (Cowen & Shenton 
1996). Current UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues, James Anaya argues that 
“whether through the doctrine of trusteeship or the positivist legal construction that 
denied  sovereign  status  to  indigenous  peoples,  international  legal  discourse  and 
related  decision  making  processes  developed  historically  to  support  the  forces  of 
colonization and empire” (Anaya 2004: 34). International law developed in complicity 
with the brutality of colonialism. 
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However,  Anaya  maintains  that  the  contemporary  international  legal  system  has 
moved away from state-centred positivism to a concern with world peace and human 
rights of both individuals and groups, opening up possibilities for indigenous peoples 
to be recognised once again, and this time more firmly, as autonomous communities 
and rights-holding political bodies. In other words, yet another countermovement has 
come to characterise international relations with indigenous peoples. It is on the basis 
of the historical trajectory presented here, as well as in the remaining four sections 
that make up this genealogy of the protection of traditional knowledge, that we must 
understand contemporary efforts to ‘protect’ indigenous peoples. There are two sides 
to  the  contemporary  politics  of  indigeneity,  and  Anaya’s  vision  of  increasing 
recognition and partnership fails to grasp the ways in which protective inclusion of the 
potentially  revolting  margins  is  an  indispensable  aspect  of  capital  expansion  – 
notwithstanding the difficulties involved on part of the activists who have struggled 
and continue to struggle for the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples.
2.1.4 From trustee- to ‘partnership’.
The  human  rights  frame  of  contemporary international  law has  made  possible  an 
impressive mobilisation of social forces for the development of rights of indigenous 
peoples  qua peoples.  The  recently  adopted  UN  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of 
Indigenous  Peoples  (more  on  which  below)  is  the  culmination  of  a  struggle 
challenging the state-centred structures and precepts of the international legal system 
and global organisation that lasted several decades, and which involved indigenous 
representatives  as  key  actors  for  change  within  and  without  United  Nations’ 
institutions. Anaya writes:
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“Within the past decades ... there have been significant advancements in 
the  structure  of  world  organization  and  shifts  in  attendant  normative 
assumptions.  These  changes  have  engendered  a  reformed  system  of 
international law, and the reformed system, in turn, has provided fertile 
ground for social forces to further alter, and eventually reverse in many 
ways, the direction of international law where it concerns the indigenous 
peoples of today” (2004: 49).
While  fraught  with  tensions  and  complicated  questions  regarding  representation 
(Brysk 2000; Muehlebach 2003), “[t]his movement … has resulted in a heightened 
international concern over indigenous peoples and a constellation of internationally 
accepted  norms  generally  in  line  with  indigenous  peoples’  own  demands  and 
aspirations” (Anaya 2004: 72). 
While I do not intend to downplay the very important concessions that have been 
achieved at  the  international  level,  I  argue  that  a  sensitivity  to  double  movement 
dynamics – and their historical manifestations – allows us to view these advances as 
necessary aspects of capital’s continued colonial expansion. 
In the remaining part of this section I provide a short overview of the development of 
international norms with regard to indigenous peoples, as reflected in the International 
Labour Organisation’s treatment of the question of ‘native labour’ and conclude with 
notes on the rocky road to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. I 
focus in particular on the double movement dynamic of this development.
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2.1.4.a The International Labour Organisation.
The Versailles  Treaty – which in  order  to  dampen public  support  for communism 
included clauses for the protection of workers’ rights (Leffler 1994) – established the 
International  Labour  Organization  (ILO).  The  original  remit  of  the  ILO  was  to 
promote  “the  regulation  of  the  hours  of  work,  including  the  establishment  of  a 
maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention 
of unemployment,  the provision of an adequate living wage,  the protection of  the 
worker  against  sickness,  disease  and  injury  arising  out  of  his  employment,  the 
protection of children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, 
protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their 
own,  recognition  of  the  principle  of  freedom  of  association,  the  organization  of 
vocational and technical education and other measures” (Treaty of Versailles, Part XIII
). The words of its Constitution “there can be no lasting peace without social justice” 
reflect the ILO’s main objective of assuring peace and social stability.
The ILO47 engaged with issues of ‘native workers’ in the overseas colonies of the 
European powers relatively soon after its establishment, in the early 1920s – usually in 
the  context  of  ‘natives’ being  displaced  from their  ancestral  territories  to  become 
seasonal, migrant, bonded or domestic labourers, and hence becoming subject to the 
forms of labour exploitation covered by the ILO mandate. The ‘native labour code’ as 




the conventions and recommendations of the 1920s and 30s were called, lay down the 
conditions under which ‘natives’ could be made to work and limits on how they could 
be exploited (Swepston n.d.). In 1939 at an American Regional Conference, several by 
then  independent  Latin  American  countries  began  asking  questions  about  their 
‘indigenous’ populations48 which the ILO adopted alongside the idea of the ‘natives’ 
of Europe’s colonies. However, while its own publications tout its foresight and equal 
concern  for  workers  of  all  skin  colours  (see  website,  note  45  above),  other 
commentators are more cautious: 
“Of the major international organisations, the ILO has consistently been 
the  first  to  get  involved  in  ‘native’  or  ‘indigenous’  issues.  But  this 
pioneering spirit has with equal consistency been offset by the inevitably 
disappointing results of early efforts... The ILO exercised its jurisdiction 
over native labor, for example, with ILO Legislative Ordinance No. 52 of 
November 7, 1924, conferring upon colonial ‘Residents’ of Burundi the 
‘power to compel natives to perform work in connection with plantations 
and  other  undertakings  carried  on  for  profit’.  The  supposedly 
compassionate  goal  of  this  ordinance  was  to  moderate  the  extreme 
punishments meted out in the course of forced labor:  ‘Any native who 
fails to carry out work in connection which he is required to perform... or 
who is guilty of negligence in the performance thereof, shall be punished 
by not more than seven days' penal servitude and a fine of 200 francs, or 
by one or other of these penalties’” (Niezen 2003: 36f, quoting a League 
of Nations document).
48 National Indian agencies were formed throughout the Americas as part of the decisions taken at 
the  1940  conference  establishing  the  Organization  of  American  States  Inter-American 
Indigenous Institute.
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With the demise of the League of Nations and the creation of the United Nations (UN) 
in 1945, the ILO became a Specialised Agency of the UN. From its inception, the UN 
promulgated decolonisation and nation-building, and the sovereignty of nation states 
as  means  to  world  peace  and  prosperity.  Yet  within  many former  colonies,  there 
remained groups of people with languages and cultures distinctively different from the 
dominant  society,  which  in  most  cases  was  a  hybridised  one  made  up  of  former 
colonisers, local elites, and mestizos. Often, and usually due to their ethnic differences 
and distinct ways of life, subaltern cultural groups (indigenous peoples) were not only 
perceived as incapable of self-government, but also as a hindrance to the processes of 
nation-state building (Popova-Gosart 2009).
An ostensibly ‘humanitarian’ concern regarding such groups’ economic and social 
‘backwardness’ soon took the form of an international developmental regime, led by 
UN agencies, to support governments in integrating and acculturating their indigenous 
populations,  perceived as  obstacles  to  modernization  and progress  (Popova-Gosart 
2009). A 1946 ILO study laments that “the aboriginal groups in many regions stagnate 
in  conditions  of  economic  destitution  and  pronounced  cultural  and  technical 
backwardness, which severely limit their productive and consumptive conditions. This 
is due to the primitive conditions in which they are obliged to earn their living, to the 
lack of educational stimuli and opportunities and to the almost complete absence, in 
some areas, of welfare services and measures for social and labour protection” (quoted 
in Tennant 1994: 14). 
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Throughout the 1950s, the ILO commissioned studies on the ‘indigenous problem’, 
initiated  an  inter-agency,  multidisciplinary  development  programme,  the  Andean 
Indian  Programme49,  and  worked  on  the  Convention  on  Indigenous  and  Tribal  
Populations  (No. 107), which was adopted in 195750. Convention No. 107 was the 
first international treaty regarding the rights of indigenous peoples. 
Article  2  of  Convention  107 asserts  the  primary responsibility  of  governments  to 
develop  “co-ordinated  and  systematic  action  for  the  protection  of  the  populations 
concerned and their progressive integration into the life of their respective countries, 
in order to foster individual dignity, and the advancement of individual usefulness and 
initiative”.  Niezen  (2003:  38)  comments  that  “the  first  piece  of  international 
legislation  to  specifically  address  indigenous  peoples  thus  reflects  the  prevailing 
political and philanthropic attitudes of the time, in which assimilation of ‘backward’ 
societies into a nation state was seen as the first necessary step for the prosperity and 
liberation of their individual members”.
With  the  rise  of  the  increasingly  vocal  organisation  of  indigenous  peoples  at  the 
national and international level during the 1960s and 1970s, calls were made to revise 
49 The Andean Indian Programme (or Misión Andina) provided training and tools for new kinds of 
production, as well as a health and leadership training to the rural population in the Andes. As  
such it helped to bring people from often isolated communities together, and promoted local  
organising  and  leadership  skills,  even  though  it  also  helped  proletarianise  indigenous 
communities (Barsky 1984; Yashar 2005). It concluded in 1972.
50 It was eventually ratified by 27 countries, mostly in the Americas, but also in South Asia and in 
several African and European countries. 
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Convention 10751. In June 1989, the  Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples  
(No. 169) was adopted accordingly52. It was based on the perspective that the cultures 
and ways of life of indigenous and tribal peoples ought to survive, as they constitute 
crucial parts in the world’s cultural diversity. The Convention, still applicable today, 
recognises  the  right  of  indigenous  peoples  to  define  their  own  priorities  for 
development,  as well  as their  right to be consulted about and to participate in the 
planning  and  implementation  of  the  measures  taken  to  realise  the  Convention. 
Notably, more so than for the sake of the indigenous peoples themselves, these efforts 
to protect  indigenous peoples stress the value of cultural  diversity that  indigenous 
peoples happen to represent for the rest of the world.
Convention  169 also  changed  the  terminology of  its  predecessor  from indigenous 
populations to indigenous peoples,  an apparently small  change that took, however, 
three years of debate because of its implications for the right to self-determination 
(and hence  independent  state-hood) under  international  law (Swepston 1990:  228; 
Anaya 2004: 109). Despite its final adoption, the term ‘peoples’ is qualified in Article 
1.3: “The use of the term ‘peoples’ in this Convention shall not be construed as having 
any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international 
law”.
51 For the rise of the international  indigenous movement see Brysk 1996 and 2000; Warren & 
Jackson 2002.
52 Ecuador ratified ILO 169 in 1998. The recognition of collective rights in its Constitution of the 
same year  echoes  the  provisions of  the  ILO Convention.  Implementation of  those  rights  in 
Ecuador, especially in its oil producing areas, has lagged however (Yashar 2005).
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As a  consequence  of  this  countermovement,  therefore,  indigenous  peoples  finally 
became a pseudo-people: somewhat recognised, yet not deemed worthy of the full set 
of  entitlements  that  other,  ‘more  developed  and  civilized  peoples’ enjoy  within 
international  law.  However,  the  ILO Convention  169 was a  decisive  step  towards 
(once again) recognising indigenous collectivities as entities capable of entering into 
contractual  agreements.  It  is  no longer  possible,  according to  various international 
guidelines, regional agreements and national laws, to legally extract resources from 
indigenous  territories  without  standing  in  a  clear  contractual  relationship  with  an 
indigenous group. The requirement of obtaining ‘Prior Informed Consent’ is key here 
as a defensive protection irrespective of the type of extractive activity pursued. In the 
case  of  knowledge  and  genetic  resources,  this  contractual  relation  is  increasingly 
embodied in the pursuit of Access and Benefit Sharing agreements, to which I return 
in Section 2.2. 
2.1.4.b The rise of the international indigenous movement and the rocky road to  
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The critical situation of indigenous communities in Brazil and other Latin American 
countries in the late 1960s, involving forced acculturation and evidence of genocide 
(e.g.  Grünberg  & Fuerst  1969;  Jaulin  1972)  led  to  the  formation  of  a  number  of 
international organisations concerned with the protection of ethnic minorities (Wright 
1988). Many of these53 were founded and staffed by European anthropologists, who 
had become increasingly vocal regarding the need for indigenous advocacy to redeem 
53 Such as the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Survival International, 
and Cultural Survival. 
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their  discipline54.  The  1970s  witnessed  a  further  flourishing  of  indigenous  and 
advocacy groups, as well as numerous regional and international meetings to elaborate 
the discourse and praxis of the budding global indigenous movement. Crucial to the 
articulation of indigenous (cultural) politics were indigenous intellectuals, especially 
from Latin America, who formulated what it meant to be Indian (Wright 1988; Varese 
1996; Muehlebach 2001).
In 1982 the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), tasked with developing human 
rights standards that would protect indigenous peoples. This was a result of increasing 
pressure on the UN, due to the rise of organisations concerned with indigenous issues, 
as  well  as  the  growing  representation  of  indigenous  peoples  themselves  at  UN 
conferences (Muehlebach 2001). The establishement of WGIP was also recommended 
in  the  monumental  study  by  Special  Rapporteur  José  R.  Martínez  Cobo  on  the 
problem of discrimination faced by indigenous populations, which took over a decade 
to complete55. 
The WGIP began the drafting of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
as early as 1985. Yet it was finally adopted by the UN General Assembly only on 
54 Calls for a new anthropology became particularly apparent in the Declaration of Barbados for 
the Liberation of the Indian redacted as part of the Symposium on Inter-Ethnic Contact in South 
America organised by the World Council of Churches and ethnologists from the University of 
Berne in 1971.




September 13, 200756. The protracted process of drafting and adoption stalled due to 
concerns regarding some key provisions of the Declaration, such as lack of a clear 
definition of the term indigenous, as well as states’ worries regarding the meaning of 
an  indigenous  peoples’  right  to  self-determination,  or  the  control  over  natural 
resources existing on indigenous peoples’ traditional lands (Oldham & Frank 2008). It 
was  feared  that  a  strong  interpretation  of  self-determination  would  open  up 
possibilities of secession, or otherwise undermine the sovereignty of existing nation 
states. In other words, states needed to ensure that the developments were contained 
within the double movement dynamic by preventing a potential exit from state control  
and capital gain.
Indigenous activism in UN human rights fora – such as the second World Conference 
on Human Rights, Vienna, 1993 – ultimately led to the establishment of the United 
Nations’  Permanent  Forum  on  Indigenous  Issues  (UNPFII)  in  July  200057.  Its 
establishment was seen as a breakthrough achievement for indigenous peoples in their 
struggle for access to the international community – the forum is unique not only in 
formally including indigenous peoples into the UN structure at a high level, but it also 
“marks the first time in history that representatives of states and non-state actors have 
56 The vote was 143 countries in favour, four against, and 11 abstaining. The four member states 
that voted against were Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. The abstaining 
countries were Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine; another 34 member states were absent from the vote.
57 As a subsidiary organ to ECOSOC, UNPFII was given the mandate to “discuss indigenous 
issues within the mandate of the Council relating to economic and social development, 




been accorded parity in a high level body within the United Nations” (IWGIA 2002: 
444; see also Muehlebach 2001; Niezen 2003).
Collective rights – rights of human groupings other than nation states – are articulated 
in  and through  the  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples  to  an  extent 
unprecedented in international human rights law. The adoption of this instrument is 
seen by many as  a  clear  indication  that  the international  community is  willing to 
uphold and protect the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples, and no 
other United Nations document has ever  been elaborated with the same degree of 
participation  of  all  parties  concerned  (IWGIA 2008).  Special  Rapporteur  Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen  stated  that  even  though  it  remains  a  non-binding  instrument,  “the 
Declaration reflects a growing international consensus concerning the content of the 
rights of indigenous peoples, as they have been progressively affirmed in domestic 
legislation,  in international instruments,  and in the practice of international  human 
rights bodies”58.
The  Permanent  Forum  considers  the  Declaration  “an  important  standard  for  the 
treatment of indigenous peoples that will undoubtedly be a significant tool towards 
eliminating human rights violations against the planet’s 370 million indigenous people 
and assisting them in combating discrimination and marginalisation” (UNPFII n.d.). 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described the adoption as a “historic moment 
when UN Member States and indigenous peoples have reconciled with their painful 
58 Quoted  in  UN  Press  Release  September  14,  2007;  available  online  at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/2F9532F220D85BD1C125735600493F0B?
opendocument Last accessed 14 October 2009.
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histories  and are resolved to move forward together  on the path of  human rights, 
justice and development for all”59. The High Commissioner of Human Rights Louise 
Arbour hailed it “a triumph for justice and human dignity”60. 
It is important to note, however, that the Declaration does not create any new rights, 
but rather interprets and elaborates upon existing international human rights norms as 
they apply to indigenous peoples (Human Rights Council 2008: paragraph 40). The 
Declaration is based upon the principles of partnership, consultation and cooperation 
between  indigenous  peoples  and  nation  states.  In  his  statement  to  the  General 
Assembly,  the  Chair  of  the  Global  Indigenous  Peoples’  Caucus,  Les  Malezer, 
welcomed the adoption of the Declaration: “The Declaration does not represent solely 
the viewpoint of the United Nations, nor does it represent solely the viewpoint of the 
Indigenous Peoples. It is a Declaration which combines our views and interests and 
which sets the framework for the future. It is a tool for peace and justice, based upon 
mutual recognition and mutual respect”61. Partnership is also the theme of the Second 
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People (Partnership for Action and 
Dignity 2005-2015).
59 Quoted in UN Press Release September 13, 2007, available online at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23794&Cr=indigenous&Cr1 Last accessed 14 
October 2009.
60 Quoted in UN Press Release September 13, 2007, available online at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm Last accessed 14 October 
2009.
61 Statement available online at http://iwgia.synkron.com/graphics/Synkron-
Library/Documents/InternationalProcesses/DraftDeclaration/07-09-
13IPCaucusStatementAdoptionDeclaration%20.pdf Last accessed 14 October 2009.
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To look at the development of indigenous rights and the rise of the global indigenous 
movement purely as a success story is, however, to misunderstand the ways in which 
this  story  is  also  one  of  co-optation  and  subsumption.  Radical  social  movements 
always run the risk of being either oppressed or destroyed by counter-forces, or their 
demands  disarmed  and  subsumed  under  a  more  reformist  agenda.  While  a  UN 
partnership with indigenous peoples means “making place” (Muehlebach 2001) for 
indigenous representatives at negotiating tables, it also implies the necessity for these 
representatives to ‘play by the rules’ of UN institutions. Entering into a partnership 
with a much stronger counter-part obviously entails the risk of the weaker partner not 
being able  to  stand their  ground. I  return to  this  and related questions concerning 
(neoliberal) partnerships in Section 2.5.
Moreover,  these  countermovement  processes  of  partnership  development  have 
fostered the creation of new class divisions. A global indigenous elite has emerged, 
able  to  travel  from  one  international  meeting  to  the  next  across  the  continents 
(Friedman 1999).62 The representativeness of these indigenous representatives is far 
from  obvious,  and  is  vehemently  questioned  and  fiercely  debated  at  the  rural 
community level, a lesson from my field work to which I return in Chapters 3 and 4. 
What  is  more,  as  Elizabeth Rata  (2003) has  shown for  the  New Zealand context, 
‘neotraditionalist’ indigenous movements can intertwine with and become supportive 
of  late  capitalist  accumulation,  thereby  introducing,  entrenching  and  perpetuating 
(capitalist) class divisions within indigenous communities. We will return to this issue 
62 In order to keep statements about elites in perspective, however, it has to be pointed out that  
some globally mobile  representatives  nonetheless  while  their  time in YMCA hostels  during 
international conferences (Paul Oldham, personal communication).
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of  problematic  representation  and  class  asymmetry at  other  points  throughout  the 
thesis. 
‘Partnership’ and ‘participation’ has to be understood as (at least running the risk of) 
constituting a new form of subsumption of indigenous lives into the overall circuit of 
capital. From exploitation and enslavement to trusteeship forms of national integration 
and  now  ‘partnership’,  the  powers  of  capital  have  found  different,  zeitgeist-
appropriate ways of making indigenous peoples economically effective. In the period 
of  ‘partnership’,  culture  (including,  of  course,  traditional  knowledge)  becomes  a 
commercial asset through which indigenous peoples become included in the global 
capitalist economy as market actors.
2.2 Conservation of Biological Resources.
In this section, I address the importance of biological resources, and the concomitant 
need for their conservation. It is in and through the particular trajectory of the field of 
conservation, combined with the other four fields which this chapter addresses, that 
the protection of traditional knowledge has gained its particular shape.
Biological resources have always been of vital importance to human life and hence 
any social formation at all.  Industrial destruction of the natural productivity of the 
landscape is  hence a  threat  not  just  to  the survival  of  other  living species,  but  to 
human beings  and hence the capitalist  economy itself.  From the point  of view of 
capital,  the  continuous,  long-term supply of  biological  resources  thus  needs  to  be 
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assured – without, however, hampering capital’s ability to expand. One attempt to do 
so is to capitalise the conservation of biological resources by redefining nature as a 
capital  asset,  internalising  previous  externalities  (M.  O’Connor  1994).  The 
clarification of property relations with regard to biological and biogenetic resources 
(‘who owns what?’) thus becomes crucial. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) partly addresses this issue. ‘Sustainable development’ and ‘green capitalism’ 
are  discourses  and  practices  through  which  the  double  movement  of  capitalism 
combine  in  one  singular  movement  of  capital  expansion  which  has  already 
incorporated its countermovement – and thereby also disarmed it. Through Access and 
Benefit Sharing agreements, the protection of traditional knowledge is so disarmed.
Before discussing biogenetic resource politics and the CBD, I argue that conservation 
and enclosure have entangled origins, and that mainstreaming the environmentalism 
of  ‘eco-efficiency’ and  ‘sustainable  yield’ is  the  clearest  example  of  the  double 
movement working to undergird the survival of capital.
2.2.1 Conservation and Ecological Conflicts.
Conservation of biological resources typically becomes an issue when the latter are or 
are perceived to be becoming increasingly scarce or in the danger of extinction. In a 
situation of abundance, certain spiritual or moral views might guide human behaviour 
with regard to the living things that surround them, but an attitude of conservation, in 
the way that we understand the concept today, only emerges when the experience of 
lack  or  threatened  lack  becomes  predominant.  Scarcity,  of  course,  is  not  always 
absolute. Conflicts over access to and control over resources can give rise to a kind of 
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artificial scarcity: if the lord prohibits access to the forest, wood for fuel will become 
scarce for the peasant, despite its actual abundance in the forest.63
In  the  fourteenth  century,  France  introduced  a  Forest  Code.  This  code  and  the 
subsequent generalised forest ordinance of 166964, ensured a steady supply of timber 
to the navy by regulating wood production, a safe haven for game in royal domains, 
and a consolidation of the power of the state (Ford 2004; Guha 2000). These laws, and 
similar ones in other European countries, served in particular to curb the peasantry’s 
customary use of forests, especially as the effects of deforestation – increased flooding 
and  soil  erosion  –  became  obvious. Conservation  and  enclosure,  therefore,  have 
entangled  origins.  The  contribution  of  the  navy  and  other  military  institutions, 
however, had a much more serious impact on deforestation than the small scale use of 
the rural population (albeit growing) ever could (Ibid.).
Through the  quantitative  methods  developed in  Prussian  Germany to  estimate  the 
availability  of  wood  on  any  given  area,  and  its  annual  growth,  German  forestry 
emerged  as  the  fore-runner  in  the  field  by  the  eighteenth  century65,  and  German 
foresters  soon  thereafter  travelled  abroad  to  promote  their  scientific  methods 
63 I am not using the term ‘artificial scarcity’ in its usual economic sense which is often applied to 
the  creation  of  scarcity  with  regard  to  otherwise  non-rival  goods  through  such  economic 
mechanisms  as  intellectual  property  protection,  about  which  more  in  Section  2.3.  below. 
However, the link should be obvious. 
64 The ordinance disappeared with the French Revolution, but a new forest code was introduced in 
1827 (Ford 2004).
65 Japanese scientists and government officials had developed and successfully applied methods of 
forest regeneration previously (Totman 1989).
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throughout Europe, Russia, and in their own and other powers’ colonies, setting up 
forest  schools  and  departments  (Guha  2000:  33-38).  German-style  forest 
administration which took over the world was characterised by “the reservation of 
forest  areas  to  the state,  by curtailing or  extinguishing rights  exercised  by village 
communities;  dividing  up  these  reserves  into  territories  controlled  by  individual 
officers;  identifying  valuable  species  and  studying  their  growth  curves;  and  … 
establishing schools and laboratories for furthering research and education” (Ibid.: 34
). In the colonies,  the conservationists condemned both the pioneer settler  and the 
indigenous  farmer  for  their  ostensibly  destructive  agricultural  practices,  failing  to 
distinguish  between  the  many  varieties  of  pastoralism  and  cultivation  that  were 
practised in the colonies at that time. Miguel Angel de Quevedo, the Mexican forestry 
pioneer and “apostle of the tree” (Simonian 1995) was one of the many vociferous in 
his hostility towards peasants on whom he blamed the deterioration of his country’s 
forests. Competition for control over resources and territory lies at the heart of the 
(early)  foresters’ and  conservation  scientists’ fierce  condemnation  of  peasants  and 
settlers,  who vied for access to the same landscapes as the conservationists, under 
state auspices, did (e.g. Peluso 1992; Grove 1994; Rangarajan 1996).
It cannot be underestimated how vital forests, water, and other natural resources are to 
the social and economic life of any human social formation (and, for that matter, life 
in general). The creation of government controlled reserves and hence restriction of 
access to the vital resources which had for centuries been used by the human beings 
living near them for their basic subsistence inevitably led to conflicts between forest 
departments and resident communities. It matters little whether one’s access to wood 
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for fuel and building, grass for livestock, herbs for medicines, and fruit and game for 
food is  restricted by a private landlord or a governmental body, the experience of 
enclosure remains substantially the same for the excluded.66 
Conflicts over access to and use of forests and other lands, often leading to violent 
uprisings and brutal repression, continue to this day. Increasingly, these conflicts are 
also about the degradation and pollution of resources upon which human lives depend 
(for examples, see Martinez-Alier 2002; see also Guha 2000). This ‘environmentalism 
of the poor’ (Martinez-Alier 2002) is about the health of ecosystems for the benefit of 
life, rather than the bottom line. It is hence radically at odds with private enterprise 
and  conservation  through  market  mechanisms.  It  is  often  also  at  odds  with  state 
control,  due to the governmental institutions’ proclivity to yield benefits and tailor 
practices  to  the  most  influential  stakeholders  –  i.e.  big  business  or  economically 
powerful conservation organisations pursuing their own particular agendas, such as 
Conservation International67.
The dominant contemporary form of environmentalism and its ubiquitous presence in 
socio-political and economic discourses, however, is entwined with indelible visions 
of  continued economic  growth.  Joan Martinez-Alier  has  insightfully  discussed  the 
66 At  the  time,  peasants  and  commoners  in  the  home countries  were  perceived  as  indigenous 
people also are, and hence seen as backwards and uncivilized, which justified the expropriation 
of their customary and hard-won rights (see, e.g. Linebaugh 2009).
67 This  is  not  to  say  that  states  will  always  favour  business  interests.  State  institutions  are 
battlegrounds, and outcomes are always contingent (see Jessop 2002). However, it is important 
to  remember  that  one  of  the  core  imperatives  of  the  capitalist  state  is  to  ensure  continued 
accumulation and economic growth.
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“cult  of wilderness” and the “gospel of eco-efficiency” as two powerful, historical 
currents  of  environmentalism,  which,  despite  their  philosophical  differences, 
“sometimes become bedfellows” (2002: 10). The proponents of the ‘gospel of eco-
efficiency’  promoted  the  ideal  of  ‘sustained  yield’  centuries  before  the  1987 
Brundtland Report pushed the term ‘sustainable development’ into common parlance 
(see also Guha 2000).68
It is the utilitarian conservationist ethic of sustained yield (utility with added temporal 
dimension as expressed in the well known Gifford Pinchot quote “the greatest good 
for the greatest  number  for the longest time”) that predominates  in  discourses and 
practices today. It is minimally disruptive to the circuit of capital, and, indeed, enables 
its long-term survival by ensuring the long-term availability of capital’s ‘conditions of 
production’ (see Chapter  1 above).  A precondition for an environmentalism which 
benefits capital, of course, is that it is severed from its radical roots, from its grass-
roots movements (such as ‘the environmentalism of the poor’) and from the roots of 
real trees. In the next section we look at environmentalism’s uprooting.
68 Ramachandra Guha (2000) explores three discursive strands of the environmental movement, all 
of which emerged as responses to the changes brought on by the rise of industrial society. He 
identifies the forceful moral and cultural critique of the Industrial Revolution with its strong 
“back-to-the-land” ethic which was articulated by the romantic poets and others as one of the 
tropes  of  environmentalism.  The  other  two,  scientific  conservation,  and  the  preservation  of  
wilderness coincide  with  Martinez-Alier’s  distinction,  who  of  course  famously  added  the 
environmentalism of the poor as a third, increasingly vocal current.
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2.2.2 Mainstreaming Environmentalism.
Ecology  started  to  turn  from  a  marginal  and  internally  split  discipline69 into  a 
politically  influential  science  when,  shortly  after  the  Second World  War,  the  U.S. 
Nuclear Energy Commission included in its budget a sizeable amount of funding for 
studies of the impacts of nuclear weapon use, testing and production (Worster 1977; 
Hagen 1992).
The radical politics of the times took aim at the entire scientific-industrial complex of 
the  technocratic  and  consumer-oriented  Euro-American  civilisation,  incorporating 
ecological concerns into their discourses. Herbert Marcuse, for one, added fuel to the 
New Left fire by claiming that “authentic ecology flows into a militant struggle for a 
socialist  politics  which must  attack the system at  its  roots,  both in  the process  of 
production and in the mutilated consciousness of individuals” (Marcuse 2005: 176). 
But this ‘radical ecology’ ebbed fast in the early 1970s. Indeed, some argue it was 
incorporated  into  the  prevailing  commercial-technocratic  discourses  in  ways  that 
disarmed  its  most  important  realisations  and  demands70 (e.g.  Gottlieb  1993). 
69 Ecology’s  relationship to  conservation was  fraught  with conflict  and disagreement  from the 
beginning. Many ecologists were trying to establish ecology as a basic science, rigorous and 
quantitative, with the repute necessary to make inroads into prestigious schools and faculties. 
Applied ecology, occupied with the problematic environments that were disturbed and altered by 
humans, was seen as an inferior concern. The potent view that humans are not a part of nature, 
and hence our influence not a legitimate concern of a natural science, obviously played a role in 
these tensions (Thomas 1956; Coker 1991).
70 Of course radical environmentalism never completely disappeared, and found one of its most 
creative  expressions  in  the  English road  protest  throughout  the  1990s.  Direct  action groups 
continue to sabotage the workings of coal-fired power stations, genetically modified crops test 
fields, supermarkets and other agents seen as harmful to the environment on a regular basis.
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Marcuse’s essay on ‘Ecology and Revolution’ (1972) bemoaned the co-optation of the 
ecology movement by capitalism.
Rachel  Carson’s  1962  hallmark  publication  Silent  Spring catapulted  ecosystem 
science into the awareness of a wider public. During the 1960s and 1970s, applied 
ecology  came  to  dominate  the  International  Biological  Program,  boosting  the 
discipline with more financial  resources and prestige (Dritschilo 2006; Kwa 1987; 
Blair 1977). Indeed, ecologists’ advice was increasingly sought at government level, 
and the 1970 US National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) fully “legitimized 
ecology” (Curlin  1972),  and was called  “an ecological  ‘Magna Carta’”  (Auerbach 
1972). Increasingly, environmentalism became a matter of political consensus across 
many of  the  usual  divides.  And while  academic  ecology certainly became one of 
environmentalism’s  conceptual  cornerstones,  it  was  not  a  subversive  ecology  that 
questioned  the  fundamental  values  of  economics  and  techno-scientific  control. 
Mainstream environmentalism rather represented an engineering mentality in which 
problems of waste, pollution, over-consumption, and biodiversity loss could be solved 
through technology and, progressively, the market – a fix for a failing system.
The  realisation  that  there  are  ecological  “limits  to  growth”71 –  that  is,  limits  to 
exponential  growth  in  a  world  of  finite  resources  –  is  vital  to  continued  capital 
accumulation, as broached in Chapter 1 above. Without such a realisation feeding into 
its  homeostatic  processes,  capital  would  soon  undermine  its  own  conditions  of 
production,  and thereby its  own basis  for  continued circuiting.  Mainstreaming the 
71 The realisation manifested, of course, most explicitly in the 1972 report of the Club of Rome.
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environmentalism of ‘eco-efficiency’ and ‘sustainable yield’ is the clearest example of 
the double movement working to undergird the survival of capital.72
2.2.3 Biogenetic Resource Politics.
While an international consensus was forming amongst scientists and policy makers 
that  biological  diversity73 was  facing  a  largely unprecedented crisis  due  to  human 
action, control over biogenetic resources, especially seeds, became a highly politicised 
issue in  the international  arena.  Especially the unfettered expansion of intellectual 
property  rights  into  the  domains  of  plants  and  other  lifeforms  was  vociferously 
attacked by activists (e.g. Mooney 1979). Within a very short time the conservation of 
biological  diversity  became a  battleground,  on  which  developing  countries  fought 
developed countries, and indigenous peoples and their allies fought big business and 
governments.  Graham  Dutfield  (2004:  4-5)  suggests  that  the  most  plausible 
explanation  for  the  heated  debates  at  the  time  relates  to  the  then  widespread 
perception that biogenetic resources were ‘the new gold’, due to the advancements of 
the biotechnology sciences.
Hegemonic environmentalist discourse today goes further than the ‘received wisdom’ 
that a healthy environment – a resilient network of ecosystems – is critical  to the 
survival of humanity,  yet more threatened than ever.  Biological resources are now 
72 See also the growing critiques of ‘green capitalism’ and the ‘Green New Deal’, e.g. Green 1999; 
Rogers 2010.
73 The term ‘biological diversity’ was coined in the early 1980s (Takacs 1996). See also Wilson 
1988.
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seen as “vital to humanity’s economic and social development”, and their diversity as 
“a global asset of tremendous value to present and future generations”, yet “species 
extinction caused by human activities continues at an alarming rate”.74
Many  of  the  most  diverse  biological  habitats  are  located  in  the  territories  of 
developing  nation-states,  the  economic  situation  of  which  is  usually  presented  as 
putting  particular  pressures  on  these  ecosystems  (e.g.  Dobson  1992).  Long-term 
conservation  objectives  are  rarely  a  priority  given  the  need  of  short-term  cash 
generation  due  to  the  pressures  of  the  globalising  economy  on  most  developing 
countries.  The  Preamble  to  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  (CBD)  itself 
recognizes “that economic and social  development and poverty eradication are the 
first  and  overriding  priorities  of  developing  countries”.  Moreover,  even  if  these 
priorities were reversed, it is generally thought that “poorer” countries do not have the 
scientific and technological capacity to allocate appropriately what are in any case 
scarce and insufficient resources in pursuit of conservation (e.g. Coughlin 1993). The 
question  whether  environmental  protection  and  economic  development  were 
antithetical or combinable had reached international import, and found its relatively 
uncontested international answer in 1987, when the Brundtland Report Our Common 
Future of the World Commission on Environment and Development proclaimed the 
necessity and practicability of ‘sustainable development’.75
74 Quotes  from  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  (CBD)  website  –  online  at 
http://www.cbd.int/history/ Last accessed 15 June 2009.
75 The  report  defined  the  term  famously  as  development  “meeting  the  needs  of  the  present 
generation  without  compromising  the  needs  of  future  generations”,  that  is,  economic 
development that does not consume natural resources at a rate faster than regeneration of those 
resources is possible. Capitalism with a long-term vision.
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Soon thereafter, at  the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio 
‘Earth  Summit’),  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  (CBD)  was  opened  for 
signature. It commits its signatories76 in particular to three obligations: to conserve, 
and to sustainably use biological diversity, as well as to share the benefits arising from 
the  utilisation  of  genetic  resources.  The  CBD explicitly  upholds  the  UN General 
Assembly principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,77 confirming a 
state’s sovereign rights over the biogenetic resources within their territory. However, 
through  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing  (ABS)  Agreements,  states  can  make  their 
biogenetic  resources  available  to  foreign  enterprise  or  scientific  institutions  in 
exchange for monetary or other benefits. In this way, the CBD is meant to protect 
developing  countries’  interests  without  locking  down  innovation,  and  product 
development based on research into biogenetic resources.
Even though indigenous delegates attended CBD’s Conferences of the Parties (COPs) 
from the beginning, it was only at the first Workshop on Traditional Knowledge and 
Article 8 (j), taking place in 1997, that indigenous organisations had been given the 
76 It was signed at the Summit by 153 nations and the European Community. The United States  
was criticised considerably for being the only nation attending the Earth Summit not to sign 
(Porter  1992).  The Bush Administration cited dissatisfaction over what  it  saw as  vague and 
ambiguous wording of some of the convention's main provisions, which it feared would leave 
the  U.S.  biotechnology  industry  without  adequate  intellectual  property  protection  and  the 
government without control over its financial contributions to the cause of conservation (Porter 
1992; Coughlin 1993). Although the Clinton Administration signed the Convention on the last 
day it was open for signature, almost a year after the Earth Summit, the CBD has still not been 
ratified by the United States to date.
77 Confirmed in Resolution No. 1803 of 1962.
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opportunity to express their positions and points of view on a par with government 
representatives – they were not relegated to the back seats, for example, and could 
address  the  Chair  under  the  same conditions  as  government  representatives  (CBD 
2004: 17).  It  is  through the CBD that  much of the discourse on the protection of 
traditional knowledge has found its current shape. ABS Agreements are one of the key 
mechanisms  through  which  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  is  seen  to  be 
effected:  by  requiring  the  involvement  of  indigenous  peoples  and  peasant 
communities in ABS Agreements that regard biological resources of traditional use, 
the CBD is in line with the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The 
Declaration maintains the right of indigenous peoples to make their own decision with 
regard  to  their  knowledge and related  resources  (Art.  31 and Art.  32),  and hence 
requires states to obtain their free and informed consent with regard to any third party 
use of the latter. 
The Declaration allows for an impoverished interpretation of self-determination as the 
right to be consulted and to give or withhold consent. Whether indigenous peoples 
will be able to challenge such a narrow conception will depend on the creativity with 
which they put the Declaration to use – in practice and in discourse – and the force 
with which they will insist on a wider understanding of this basic right. Contesting the 
hegemonic  construction  of  traditional  knowledge  protection  as  realisable  simply 
through Access and Benefit Sharing agreements is a crucial aspect of challenging the 
narrow interpretations of the Declaration. One of the key issues in this struggle is the 
concept of intellectual property to which I now turn. The importance of intellectual 
property in this context is in no small part due to the importance for clear property 
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relations  with  regard  to  biogenetic  resources:  the  economically  most  interesting 
biogenetic resources are often  informational in kind, as it is the genetic information 
contained within biological organisms that has a potentially high economic value (see 
Parry 2004). Who holds (intellectual) property rights over this information is hence a 
crucial question.
2.3 Intellectual Property: knowledge as a fictitious commodity.
Intellectual property is one of the key tools with which to frame the protection of 
traditional  knowledge.  I  argue  that  this  is  in  large  part  so,  because  the  kind  of 
protection  that  private  property  forms  necessitate  is  a  protection  which  does  not 
constrain, but supports the capitalist mode of production. Capital accumulation is only 
possible through the mechanism of private property. At the end of this section, I ask 
whether there is scope to contest the hegemonic construction of property as private, 
primarily commercially-oriented property. First, however, I illustrate the workings of 
the double movement in this field by discussing intellectual property as a form of 
market expansion, and a countermovement to this expansion which expresses itself in 
the  claims  of  indigenous  peoples  which  have  insisted  on  reinvigorating  the 
interpretation of intellectual property as a human right. 
2.3.1 Intellectual property as form of market expansion.
As discussed in Chapter 1, land, labour and money are basic inputs into production 
processes, and their distribution is governed by market mechanisms. They are treated 
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as if they were commodities, yet they are themselves not produced for sale. They are 
fictitious commodities. We have seen that their treatment as commodities requires a 
fundamental reorganisation of society, a subordination of society to the market.
Jessop  (2007;  2008)  suggests  that  under  contemporary  neoliberalism,  with  its 
emphasis on knowledge-intensive products as increasingly economically important, 
knowledge  is  in  effect  a  fourth  fictitious  commodity.  Insofar  as  knowledge  is  an 
attribute  of  human existence that  is  collectively maintained and developed,  and is 
inherently non-rivalrous  – that  is  it  can  be  simultaneously used and employed by 
different actors in different locations – it acquires a commodity form only when it is 
made artificially scarce (and hence rivalrous), and when access is granted or withheld 
based on the payment of rent.  The construal of (certain) knowledge as intellectual 
property, and the protection of the ‘owners’ interest, i.e. their rights of income from 
their property, through an intricate system of legal-economic mechanisms is a way to 
create and police artificial  scarcity with regard to knowledge.  Intellectual property 
protection is the most obvious example of the commodification of knowledge, and the 
most relevant to this thesis. We will hence not focus on the other forms of knowledge 
commodification that have been identified.78
78 Jessop identifies the following phenomena: “(a) the primitive accumulation of capital through 
the ‘enclosure’ of  the intellectual  commons inherited  from the past  –  biopiracy is  the  most 
notorious example but there are many others; (b) the divorce of intellectual labour from control 
over  the  means  of  production  that  it  deploys  –  achieved  through  its  formalization  and 
codification in  smart  machines  and  expert  systems – and  the  resulting appropriation  of  the 
knowledge of the collective worker; (c) creeping extension of the limited nature of copyright 
into broader forms of property right with a consequent erosion of any residual public interest; (d) 
the dynamics of technological rents generated by new knowledge and their disappearance once 
the new knowledge … become[s] generalized and monopoly profits are competed away – such 
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Knowledge  commodification  requires  a  social  reorganisation  of  knowledge  and 
human relations  with regard to  it.  Jessop helpfully identifies three aspects  to such 
reorganisation: 
“First,  as opposed to  being an organic and inseparable part  of creative 
labor in general, knowledge is codified, detached from manual labour, and 
disentangled from material products to acquire independent form in expert 
systems,  intelligent  machines,  or  immaterial  products  and  services. 
Second, by analogy with the disembedding of economic activities from 
their  wider  social  contexts,  knowledge  is  disembedded  from its  social 
roots  and integrated  into  extra-economic  institutional  orders,  functional 
systems, and the lifeworld and made subject to creeping commodification 
so that the primary code governing its use is profitable/unprofitable rather 
than  true/false,  sacred/profane,  health/disease,  et  cetera.  And,  third, 
knowledge no longer circulates in closed economic units (householding), 
through  reciprocity,  or  through  redistribution  but  is  allocated  through 
profit-oriented markets” (Jessop 2007: 120).
that  the knowledge-based economy is subject  to ever increasing pressure to innovate and to 
protect  vulnerable  monopolies  in  knowledge-intensive  products  by  embedding  them  in 
technology, standards, tacit knowledge, or legally entrenched intellectual property rights; (e) the 
contradiction that  each capital  wishes  to  pay nothing for  its  knowledge inputs  but wants  to 
charge a high price for its intellectual output; and (e) the dependence of continuing high profits 
in knowledge-, design-, or creativity-intensive sectors … on uneven development, on unequal 
exchange, and on downward pressure on the incomes of the surplus population, the unskilled, 
and producers of commoditized goods and services” (2008: 341-342; cf. Jessop 2007).
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We  can  thus  speak  of  knowledge  commodification  as  a  threefold  process  of  (i) 
disembodiment; (ii) imposition of market logic with regard to its evaluation and use; 
and (iii) imposition of market logic with regard to its transmission.
Intellectual property protection, it is well known, has intensified internationally: the 
scope and level of protection in intellectual property law has dramatically increased 
over  recent  decades  and  gained  significance  in  the  global  political  economy and, 
hence, international relations (May 2000; 2010).  Protectable subject matter is being 
widened, protection terms are being expanded, new rights are being created, the ease 
with which protections are granted is growing, and intellectual property standards are 
being harmonized throughout the world (Fisher III 1999). While intellectual property 
rights have never been more economically and politically significant than they are in 
the current so-called ‘knowledge-based economy’, they have also never been more 
controversial (Dutfield 2003). Information and knowledge today are crucial market 
commodities, and are priced accordingly. In this way, the benefits of the ‘knowledge-
based economy’ or ‘information society’ flow “to those who own the information and 
knowledge resources which have been rendered as intellectual property rather than 
those whose need for such information and/or knowledge might be greatest” (May 
2000:1).
Intellectual property law must be divided into several distinct areas. Copyright law 
protects ‘original forms of expression’ – ‘Mr. Tambourine Man’, ‘Star Wars’, ‘1984’. 
Patent law protects inventions – snowboards, microchips, genetically engineered rice. 
Trademark law protects words and symbols that identify goods and services – ‘Coca-
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Cola’, the Mercedes-Benz star. Trade-secret law protects information that a company 
has tried but failed to conceal from competitors – for example, secret formulas for soft 
drinks, or confidential marketing strategies. Plant breeders’ rights protect new plant 
varieties.79 Of  these,  copyrights,  patents,  and  trademarks  are  arguably  the  most 
economically significant. Despite differences in origin and development, expansion is 
a trend common to all of them: with rare exceptions, the set of entitlements created by 
each of the doctrines has grown persistently and dramatically from the 18th century to 
the present (Fisher III, 1999). This relentless expansion of intellectual property claims 
and  protection  is  provoking  new (forms  of  old)  battles  on  a  multitude  of  fronts. 
Important  questions  in  such  areas  as  public  health,  food  security,  education, 
technology transfer,  and scientific  research  are  today all  intimately entwined with 
developments  in  intellectual  property  law.  In  some  cases  the  answers  to  these 
questions are a matter of life and death. Alongside these developments, the steady rise 
and increasing sophistication of indigenous rights movements which we discussed in 
Section  2.1.  has  meant  that  the  continuing  exploitation  and  marginalisation  of 
indigenous communities is today denounced more forcefully than ever. Relatedly, the 
defence of indigenous rights now often includes claims to intangible cultural property.
Over the years, indigenous communities have more and more vocally condemned the 
unauthorised  reproduction  of  such  cultural  expression  as  their  artistic  works, 
handicrafts, designs, dances, and musical and dramatic performances. Moreover, the 
practice  of  extracting  from  communities  traditional  knowledge  of  particular 
79 There are other, more obscure rights that fall under the intellectual property category: e.g. the  
rights  to  layout  designs  of  integrated  circuits,  or  the  “right  of  publicity”  which  protects 
celebrities’ presumed interests in their images and identities.
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commercial  interest  to  outsiders  (that  is,  above  all,  knowledge  related  to  local 
biological resources such as medicinal plants) in order to market new products based 
on such knowledge, has been decried as ‘biopiracy’ and attacked as an extension of 
the  centuries-long colonial  exploitation  of  indigenous  labour  force,  territories,  and 
natural  resources  (e.g.  Shiva  1997;  Mooney 2000;  Ramos  2000).  Yet  it  has  been 
difficult  to  prevent  these  practices  of  unapproved  appropriation  and  subsequent 
commercial exploitation of indigenous cultural expression and traditional knowledge. 
This has raised the question of whether intellectual property rights, such as copyright, 
patents and trademarks can be used for the protection of traditional cultural knowledge 
and expression. Opinions vary widely.
Intellectual property protection, at least in its conventional form, is a form of quasi-
commodification80.  The  question,  then,  is  whether  indigenous  peoples  will  benefit 
from such quasi-commodification of their  knowledge, or,  conversely,  whether their 
struggles  can  challenge  and  redefine  the  conventional  conception  of  intellectual 
property, undoing some of its commodity elements. Changing the intellectual property 
regime  continues  to  be  a  high  priority  of  indigenous  peoples’  struggles  at  the 
international level. It is important to understand, however, that these changes sought, 
and the protection of traditional knowledge fought for, are inextricably linked to much 
bigger  issues  like  territorial  sovereignty,  cultural  continuity,  food  security, 
80 Quasi-commodities have a price but otherwise fail to meet one or more of the criteria for a full  
capitalist commodity, for example they are not produced in order to be sold (Schaniel and Neale 
1999).  Intellectual  property  protection  turns  particular  items  of  knowledge,  information,  or 
know-how into an entity, the rights to which can be alienated on the market.
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conservation of biodiversity, autonomous development, health policy and the use of 
biotechnology.
2.3.2 Intellectual property as human right.
As part of these struggles, indigenous groups have generated a number of declarations 
condemning prevailing intellectual  property systems as,  for example,  “colonialist”, 
“racist” and “usurpatory” (COICA 1994). Peter Drahos clarifies that such declarations
“...  do  not,  however,  abandon  the  concept  of  intellectual  property 
altogether. Instead they assert and call for the recognition of indigenous 
intellectual property rights.  Indigenous peoples, it  seems are seeking to 
make intellectual property serve a function beyond that of appropriation of 
value. They want property to function in a way that allows them to control 
the use of cultural information which in some deep sense is part of them, 
to which they are attached, cultural information they do not necessarily 
want to become the subject of global processes of commodification and 
appropriation.  For  them, intellectual  property should first  and foremost 
function to preserve their way of life” (Drahos 1999: 365).
As part of this strategy, indigenous movements and their allies have been calling for a 
recognition of intellectual property rights as human rights. After all, they are already 
enshrined as such: Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [sic] 
is the author”. This has been refined and enshrined in the International Covenant on 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) as one of four cultural rights referred 
to in its Article 15 (emphasis is mine):
“1.  The  States  Parties  to  the  present  Covenant  recognize  the  right  of 
everyone: (a)  To take part  in cultural  life;  (b) To enjoy the benefits  of 
scientific progress and its applications; (c)  To benefit from the protection  
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary  
or artistic production of which he is the author.”
While the case could thus be made that intellectual property rights are, in important 
ways,  primarily  human  rights  (see  Coombe  1998),  the  Committee  on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, a body of independent experts monitoring implementation 
of the Covenant and interpreting its provisions, upholds a clear distinction between the 
two, in its general comment no. 17 (2005)81:
“Whereas the human right to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material  interests  resulting  from  one’s  scientific,  literary  and  artistic 
productions  safeguards  the  personal  link  between  authors  and  their 
creations ... as well as their basic material interests ... to enable authors to 
enjoy  an  adequate  standard  of  living,  intellectual  property  regimes 
primarily  protect  business  and  corporate  interests  and  investments” 
(paragraph 2).
81 UNHCHR Document E/C.12/GC/17
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Juridical persons – such as corporations – are included among the potential holders of 
intellectual  property  rights  under  existing  international  treaty  protection  regimes, 
however, the Committee underlines that “their entitlements ... are not protected at the 
level  of  human  rights”  (paragraph  7).  Unfortunately,  human  rights  lack  effective 
enforcement mechanisms, making juridical persons and their economic interests often 
much ‘better protected’ than flesh and blood human beings (Chapman 2002).
Intellectual property as a human right primarily protects an author’s so-called moral 
rights, that is, their right to be recognised as the creator of a work, as well as their 
right  to  “object  to  any  distortion,  mutilation  or  other  modification  of,  or  other 
derogatory action in relation to, such productions, which would be prejudicial to their 
honour and reputation” (paragraph 13). This right is understood to be based on the 
“intrinsically personal character of every creation of the human mind and the ensuing 
durable link between creators and their creations” (paragraph 12), as well as the idea 
of creations being “expressions of the personality of their creator” (paragraph 14). 
The ideology of expression of personality, and emphasis on the author obfuscates the 
way  in  which  creativity  is  also  collective  and  anonymous,  spontaneous  and 
involuntary,  seeking  rather  than  expressing.  The  same  ideology  underlies  the 
indigenous  movements’ discourse  of  traditional  knowledge  as  property  due  to  its 
intrinsic expression of identity. I argue that its predominance, if left unquestioned, can 
easily support rather than challenge the entrenchment of capital. Due to the scope of 
this  thesis,  however,  I  am  unable  to  discuss  these  elements  further  and  want  to 
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conclude here with a perspective that pertains not only to intellectual property, but to 
property in general.
2.3.3 Challenging the hegemonic construction of property as private property.
Property,  it  has  repeatedly  been  argued,  is  best  understood  as  a  relation  between 
people  with  regard  to  things  (Pedersen  2010).  Private  property  is  just  one 
configuration of property relations amongst many possible (and, indeed historically 
existing) others (Ibid.). Private property distributes decision-making power over and 
use privileges to a given object or resource to individuals or quasi-individuals (such as 
firms). Capitalist private property is one particular configuration of private property 
that characteristically collocates exclusive control rights over an object or resource 
with rights to  the alienability on the market  and wealth effects  –  that  is  rights to 
receive an income through the sale or rent of the thing in question (Berle and Means 
1932; Christman 1996; Holderness 2003).
This collocation is at the core of the privatising forces of the capitalist economy. It 
“provides both the incentive and the feasibility for value-enhancing transfers. Berle 
and Means ... appropriately call collocation the ‘atom of property’ and view it as ‘the 
very foundation on which the economic order of the past three centuries has rested’” 
(Holderness 2003: 77).
The crucial question in this context is:  will the capitalist idea of property determine 
traditional  knowledge or can traditional knowledge challenge the capitalist  idea of 
property? Pedersen (2010) has convincingly argued – in the context of Free Culture 
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and Free Software politics – that new relational modalities, or property relations, that 
have emerged in cyberspace have the potential to reanimate debate about property in 
general.  This is  necessary because the “impoverished concept of property that  has 
dominated our political discourse in the twentieth century” (Mossof 2005: 38) is one 
in which property in general (which can take any form, as property relations are social 
relations based on conventions or agreements, although often imposed by a central 
authority) is conflated with  property in particular, i.e. exclusive capitalist property 
rights. Current debate in the context of indigenous peoples’ struggles reflects the same 
problem,  revealing,  indeed  emphasising  the  need  to  reinvigorate  informed  and 
informative debate on property. It has been argued In Defense of Property that there is 
an:
“...emerging view, in scholarship and popular society, that it is normatively 
undesirable to employ property law as a means of protecting indigenous 
cultural  heritage.  Recent  critiques  suggest  that  propertizing  culture 
impedes the free flow of ideas, speech, and perhaps culture itself. In our 
view,  these  critiques  arise  largely  because  commentators  associate 
“property”  with  a  narrow  model  of  individual  ownership  that  reflects 
neither  the  substance  of  indigenous  cultural  property claims  nor  major 
theoretical developments in the broader field of property law” (Carpenter, 
Katyal and Riley 2009: 100).
In parallel to Pedersen’s argument, the relational modalities of indigenous peoples, 
that is  their  particular property relations – which are often incommensurable with 
market relations – constitute social  dynamics that can enrich our understanding of 
property in general. Given that the majority of the world’s resources and the means of 
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production  are  controlled  through  property  relations,  and  given  that  the  primary 
threats to indigenous culture and access to land and resources arise from this particular 
form  of  ownership  (and  its  need  to  expand),  it  is  of  great  potential  benefit  for 
indigenous struggles to adopt the language of property in general and enrich it with 
their particular relational modalities. In this way it becomes possible to speak the same 
language as capital, but with a different inflection capable of articulating alternative 
forms of social relations with regard to resources. The potential promise here, then, is 
that indigenous ways of relating can be mapped back onto the domains of land, its 
resources and the means of production, thus contributing to a reconfiguration of the 
property relations that threaten indigenous livelihoods and lifeworlds.
There is  an alternative to  the commercial  orientation of  ‘property’ in  international 
discourse, and that is  heritage. The concept of heritage has been picked up by some 
indigenous  movements  in  order  to  re-frame  the  question  of  the  protection  of 
traditional knowledge. Collective bio-cultural heritage, for example, has been coined 
by prominent indigenous activists in Peru in their collaborations with the International 
Institute  for  Environment  and  Development  (Swiderska  2006),  and  orients  the 
activities of the communities of the Potato Park82, a ‘collective biocultural heritage 
conservation area’ practising  in situ conservation of over one thousand varieties of 
potato in the Peruvian Andes. I turn to an examination of the field of cultural heritage 
in the following section.
82 More information on the Potato Park can be found online at http://www.parquedelapapa.org/ 
Last accessed 23 March 2010.
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2.4 The Safeguarding of Cultural Heritage.
As a response to industrial destruction, societal countermovements arose to protect 
what was called cultural heritage for the benefit of their nation, or later humankind. 
At  first,  such  heritage  was  tangible:  referring  to  such  things  as  monuments  and 
landscapes.  It  carried  connotations  of  responsibility  to  safeguard  for  future 
generations. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the notion of intangible cultural  
heritage was promulgated at the international level. I argue that this was not in some 
kind of opposition or as an alternative to intellectual property, but rather a means by 
which  collective  and  perpetual  (quasi-property)  rights  could  be  claimed  over 
intangible cultural items, or what used to be called folklore. Nonetheless, the field of 
cultural  heritage  might  provide  some  scope  for  the  contestation  of  commercial 
interpretations of ‘culture’ as intellectual property. Yet the power differential at the 
international level between the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and 
the United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and 
hence  between  their  respective  conceptions  of  ‘culture’ indicates  that  overcoming 
fundamental ideas of private property and commodification will remain a difficult task 
in this context.
2.4.1 Development and the Protection of Tangible Heritage.
In the mid 1950s, Egypt decided to build the Aswan High Dam on the Nile, a mega 
development with foreign financial support. This construction was set to flood a valley 
containing  the  Abu  Simble  and  Philae  temples,  and  hence  raised  grave  concerns 
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amongst  archaeologists  and  others.  On  the  appeal  of  the  Egyptian  and  Sudanese 
governments,  a  worldwide  fundraising  and  rescue  campaign  was  launched  by 
UNESCO, the temples taken apart and put back together again piece by piece at a 
higher location, or granted to countries who had supported the work – hence we find 
some of these temples now in Madrid and New York. The project was deemed very 
successful and led to further safeguarding campaigns, as well as the drafting of a UN 
convention to protect the common cultural heritage of humanity.
The discourse of heritage is a long-standing one, and was applied to both cultural and 
natural ‘monuments’. One of the German forestry missionaries of whom we learned 
previously made lavish use of this  discourse when he addressed the Technological 
Museum in Melbourne in 1871, urging that the forest be understood “as a heritage 
given to us by nature, not for spoil or to devastate, but to be wisely used, reverently 
honoured, and carefully maintained. I regard the forest as a gift, entrusted to any of us 
only for transient care during a short space of time, to be surrendered to posterity 
again as an unimpaired property, with increased riches and augmented blessings, to 
pass as a sacred patrimony from generation to generation.” (Ferdinand Müller, quoted 
in Guha 2000: 35).
From  the  end  of  19th century  onwards,  the  French  bourgeoisie  called  for  the 
preservation of landscapes as an aesthetic refuge and mnemonic device to recall the 
country’s rich past. The forest came to be valued as an expression of history, and for 
the Parisian public, it became a haven from the social strife and vicissitudes of the 
city. Aesthetic and nationalist concerns came to dominate the movement for landscape 
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protection  in  France,  which  harked  back  to  protections  of  architectural  and 
monumental heritage (patrimoine) from the French Revolution onwards (Ford 2004).
The  idea  of  combining  cultural  conservation  with  nature  conservation  as  an 
international responsibility  was  first  formally  aired  in  1965  at  a  White  House 
Conference  in  Washington,  D.C.,  where  participants  called  for  a  “World  Heritage 
Trust” to stimulate international cooperation for the protection of “the world’s superb 
natural and scenic areas and historic sites for the present and the future of the entire 
world citizenry”. The Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage was adopted in Paris on 16 November 1972. Upon adoption, several 
UNESCO Member States stated their interest in the importance of safeguarding what 
was later to be called intangible heritage.
The principle of common heritage is an important norm in international law governing 
the access to and use of certain resources. Birnie and Boyle (2002) point out that all  
members of the international community have an equal duty to protect and conserve 
as  well  as  an  equal  right  to  benefit  from the  use  of  resources  declared  ‘common 
heritage’ (see  also  Joyner  1986;  Dutfield  2004).  The  high  seas,  Antarctica  and 
extraterrestial resources are common heritage par excellence83.
And while heritage usually implies a notion of responsibility and stewardship in order 





‘heritage’, it is also often invoked as a justification for open, unregulated access. In 
this way, appeals to common heritage were often used to justify bioprospecting and 
subsequent  patenting  of  commercially  useful  biogenetic  elements  –  after  all  these 
resources, and traditional knowledge relating to them could easily be described as not 
‘owned’ by anyone and freely accessible to all. This however, is a misuse of the notion 
of common heritage. For common heritage areas and resources cannot be subject to 
‘appropriation’ of any kind, either public or private, national or corporate, that is it 
cannot be made subject to these forms of ownership (Joyner 1986).
It is the biogenetic resource conflicts over recent decades that have led to increasing 
pressure at the international level to codify who can make rightful claims to what. 
These are struggles about property relations: their meanings and definitions, and hence 
distributive potentials. Negotiations increasingly concern ‘knowledge’ and ‘culture’, 
too.
2.4.2 The Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage.
In 1973, Bolivia proposed to the Director-General of UNESCO to add a protocol for 
the protection of folklore to the Universal Copyright Convention. This concurred with 
the release of pop singer Paul Simon’s recording of ‘El Condor Pasa’, a song soon 
thereafter  identified as  a  Bolivian  folk song.  The publication  brought  the  ‘author’ 
considerable revenue, an income that Bolivia felt it  was being deprived of without 
legal protection of its folk traditions (Honko 2001).  Opposing Paul Simon making a 
profit on the folk tune by arguing for a cut of the action (in this and in future instances 
of  other  cultural  ‘products’)  is  an  example  of  a  countermovement  that  serves  the 
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expansion of capital, rather than delimiting it: a “non-reformist reform” (cf. Gorz 1967
) would aim at the dissolution of exclusive rights and corporate or state control over 
cultural expressions, in order that these may flow freely outside of capital. On this 
level it is important to understand not only the double movement, but also the nature 
and function of exclusive private property rights, the legal mechanism at the very core 
of capital and its expansion. From enclosures to patents on living things and scientific 
processes, private property underpins capital expansion and a non-reformist reform 
must seek alternative configurations of property relations (cf. Pedersen 2010).
However, it was not only economic considerations that prompted the demand for the 
protection of folklore in many developing countries from that time onwards. Concern 
was  also  expressed  over  the  exportation  of  traditional  culture  and  its  potentially 
offensive presentation in different contexts. Slowly the term ‘folklore’ was discarded 
in  favour  of  ‘traditional  culture’ or  ‘cultural  heritage’,  because  of  the  former’s 
disparaging Western overtones (Honko 2001).
In 1996 the World Commission for Culture and Development published its report ‘Our 
Creative  Diversity’,  which  notes,  amongst  other  things,  that  the  1972 Convention 
Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage is not adequate for 
the protection of cultural expressions such as dance or oral traditions. The following 
years saw a multiplication of meetings, conferences, consultations and programmes, 
leading to  the adoption of the Universal  Declaration on Cultural  Diversity and its 
action plan in October 2001, in the wake of the events of September 11, and billed as a 
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re-affirmation  of  intercultural  dialogue  and  cooperation  as  the  best  guarantee  for 
peace.
Earlier that year, UNESCO conducted a survey among States and NGOs to draw up an 
operational  definition  of  intangible  cultural  heritage.  The  Roundtable  of  Experts 
which  met  in  Turin,  Italy,  recommended  to  UNESCO to  prepare  an  international 
normative instrument on the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage in order to 
preserve  and  recognise  human  creations  in  danger  of  disappearance,  strengthen 
cultural identities and assure historical continuity, promote the creative diversity of 
humanity and facilitate  access  to  it.84 The Convention for  the Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage was adopted in October 2003.
The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage considers the 
importance of safeguarding intangible cultural heritage to be based on its “invaluable 
role … as a factor in bringing human beings closer together and ensuring exchange 
and understanding among them”, its contribution to the realisation of human rights, 
and  refers  in  its  preamble  to  existing  international  human  rights  instruments. 
Communities,  “in  particular  indigenous  communities”  are  recognised  as  enriching 
cultural  diversity  in  their  role  as  producers  and  stewards  of  intangible  cultural 
heritage.
84 The Final Report of the Roundtable is available online at 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/src/00077-EN.pdf Last accessed 25 September 2009.
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Rosemary Coombe (1998) points out that the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO)  and  UNESCO  are  the  institutional  embodiments  of  the  two  sides  of  a 
conceptual  division  of  culture.  WIPO  views  culture  as  the  ‘accumulated  cultural 
capital’ of a given society or humankind as a whole. ‘Cultural development’ in this 
sense means encouraging more cultural products, more literary, artistic, and musical 
works,  and  more  technological  innovations,  and  hence  more  items  for  potential 
commodification  through  intellectual  property. As  already  suggested,  this  hardly 
safeguards  culture  from  capital’s  expansion,  but  indeed  integrates  it  into  this 
expansion through the commodity form.  UNESCO, on the other hand, understands 
culture  more  anthropologically  as  “the  material  and  spiritual  activities,  products, 
meanings and values of a given social group that distinguish it from other groups”, 
which implies that the right of a group to maintain its cultural integrity might trump 
the rights of cultural creators in the wider society, and “the group might choose to 
restrict access to and use of elements of its cultural heritage ... if doing so was deemed 
necessary to preserve the group’s identity” (Coombe 1998: 74).  In this way,  WIPO 
underscores  individual  creation  and  public  diffusion,  UNESCO  emphasises  the 
collective aspect of culture, stressing the need for sharing and cooperation.  Coombe 
hypothesises that this “international division of labour” may account for “the failure to 
consider  measures  necessary to  balance  rights  to  individual  intellectual  properties, 
rights to public diffusion, and rights to the preservation of cultural identity” (1998: 76) 
–  a  failure  that  has  relegated  indigenous  communities  to  a  particularly 
disadvantageous position  with  respect  to  the  struggle  for  the  preservation  of  their 
cultural integrity. The ‘protection of culture’, therefore, is an international battlefield 
with  commercial  interpretations  competing  with  more  ‘anthropological’ ones.  This 
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battle reflects the totalising vision of private property as the only form of property, 
thus  perpetuating  the  conflation  between  property  in  general  and  property  in 
particular.
In 2005 another UNESCO Convention was adopted, the Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This Convention calls for the 
recognition of the “dual economic and cultural nature of cultural activities, goods and 
services, which convey and transmit cultural expressions and, in so doing, constitute 
vehicles  of  identity,  values  and  meaning,  irrespective  of  their  commercial  value” 
(UNESCO 2007: 3).
It must be pointed out that in the context of this convention ‘protection’ refers to the 
adoption of measures aimed at preservation, safeguarding and enhancement – as can 
be gleaned from its use in the various UNESCO Conventions concerned with heritage. 
In UNESCO terminology, ‘protection’ has no directly commercial connotations. When 
used  in  conjunction  with  the  term ‘promotion’,  it  implies  the  need  to  keep  alive 
cultural expressions threatened by the rapid changes which (economic) globalization 
causes. Similarly, ‘promotion’ calls for continuous making and re-making of cultural 
expressions “to ensure that they are not confined to museums, ‘folklorized’ or reified” 
(Ibid.: 5).
The future development of this trajectory remains uncertain, of course, and whether it 
will succeed in contesting the imaginary of commercial property orienting activity in 
this field will depend, so I maintain, on a thorough understanding and appreciation of 
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the  double  movements  and  the  associated,  or  indeed  consequent  need  for  non-
reformist reforms.
Finally, the ability to take a critical stance in these processes is rapidly undermined as 
civil  society  actors,  publics  and  communities  all  over  the  world,  not  just  of  the 
subaltern  kind,  are  enrolled  into  and  hence  integrated  into  the  decision-making 
processes. In the following section I argue that public participation in development 
and governance,  which constitutes  the fifth  and final  trajectory that  underpins  the 
current politics of protection of traditional knowledge, is a neoliberal movement to 
outsource decision-making as well as undermine post-procedural critique, since who 
can be taken seriously when they criticise a decision that they participated in making? 
To be clear, I do of course in no way question the value of people participating in 
decision-making which affect their lives, rather I highlight the worrying way in which 
such participation is being co-opted to capital’s ends.
2.5 Public Participation in Development and Governance. 
In this  section,  I  discuss  participation  as  it  developed as  a  response  to  unfettered 
capital  expansion  in  the  form of  ‘developmentalism’,  and  yet  was  co-opted  as  a 
‘technical fix’ to improve the outcomes of development interventions. However, these 
improved outcomes were not necessarily improvements for the so-called beneficiaries 
of the programmes. Moreover, participation plays an important role in the neoliberal 
restructuring of governance processes. For these reasons, reviewing the trajectory of 
participatory  approaches  to  development  against  the  backdrop  of  the  double 
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movement is necessary for the realisation of the emancipatory potential inherent in 
participation.  I  argue  that  in  and  through  processes  of  participatory  development, 
capitalism’s  double  movement becomes  a  singular  movement of  capital  expansion 
which has already incorporated – and hence disarmed – its own countermovement. In 
this, neoliberal participatory processes resemble processes of sustainable development 
(see Section 2.2. above): both seem to collapse the movement(s) of market expansion 
and  its  countermovement(s)  into  a  unified  movement  of  apparently  conditional 
expansion – development only if it is sustainable and only if it is participatory. I think 
of such a ‘collapse’ not as an overcoming of the double movement dynamic which 
Polanyi identified, but rather as one of its possible expressions. It might be that this 
particular ‘unified’ motion of the double movement is a characteristic expression of 
the double movement under neoliberalisation,  but more analysis  than I  am able to 
offer in this thesis would be needed to support such a claim.
2.5.1 Participation as response to the crisis of developmentalism.
The  ideology  of  developmentalism  assumes  linear  forms  of  social  progress,  and 
indeed the universality of such forms (Bodenheimer 1971; Chalmers 1972; Norgaard 
1994). In Mark Duffield’s words “[d]evelopment is [seen as] a normative process of 
becoming:  a  series  of  interconnecting  movements  leading  from  poverty  and 
vulnerability to security and well-being” (1994: 44), and this process is understood as 
universally  shared.  Moreover,  developmentalism  can  be  understood  as  the 
depoliticised approach to development, which sees the latter as a technocratic process 
to  be  designed  and  implemented  by  expert  agents  of  development  rather  than 
“negotiated with and contested by its subjects” (Hickey and Mohan 2004b: 10). This 
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modernist  paradigm  has  dominated  national  development  strategies  and  the 
international  aid  apparatus  particularly  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War. 
However, it  found itself increasingly unable to comprehend let alone deal with the 
ecological  consequences  of  unfettered  growth  coupled  with  unprecedented  global 
inequalities.  Beginning  a  few  decades  earlier,  but  culminating  in  the  1990s, 
developmentalism was widely declared to be in crisis (e.g. Pieterse 1991; Watts 1995).
Critiques  of  the  dominant  development  approaches  as  well  as  proposals  for 
alternatives entered the stage. An insistence on the greater participation of the people 
affected by development – its so-called beneficiaries – was common to all of them. 
Participation refers to “the exercise of popular agency in relation to development” and 
contemporary development policy would be unthinkable without at least a lip-service 
paid to  the virtues  of  participation and a  recognition of  “people as  active  claims-
making agents” (Hickey and Mohan 2004b: 3).
The ‘Alternative Development’ approach of the Dag Hammerskjold Conference 1974, 
for example, critiqued ‘mainstream’ development as exclusionary, impoverishing and 
homogenising,  and  proposed  more  participatory  alternatives  aimed  at  developing 
equitable  citizenship in  pluralist  societies,  as  well  as economic and environmental 
sustainability (Hickey and Mohan 2004b: 6-8). The ‘populist’ form of ‘participation in 
development’ emerged  in  the  1980s  as  a  response  to  the  failures  of  mainstream 
developmentalism. It placed local realities at the heart of development interventions 
and insisted  on facilitators  and enablers  rather  than  directive  experts  as  agents  of 
development,  as well  as on the participation of the subjects of development  at  all 
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stages of the intervention. Yet this approach has failed to engage with the underlying, 
structural  processes  of  development  as  historical  social  change taking place under 
particular socio-political and economic conditions, and has hence been the focus of a 
backlash against “participation” in the 1990s (Hickey and Mohan 2004b: 11).
While  it  is  in  particular  the  mainstreaming  of  the  ‘participation  in  development’ 
approach that has been celebrated and criticised in the literature more recently, ideas 
and  discourses  of  participation  have  periodically  emerged  in  the  history  of 
development practice and theory, and the diversity of participatory approaches should 
not be overlooked. For example, ‘community development’ in both the colonial and 
post-colonial periods of the twentieth century focussed on participation in political 
processes as an obligation of citizenship, which was needed in order to (re)produce 
stable rural communities, develop colonial and later state hegemony in remote and 
isolated areas, and to counteract radical socio-political change. The control of rural 
populations  was  central  to  this  approach  to  participation,  and  adult  education, 
leadership training and institution building were its main vehicles (Hickey and Mohan 
2004b 6-8). Modernisation theory of the 1960s advocated participation in the political 
system –  through voting,  party membership,  and campaigning  –  as  crucial  in  the 
attempt to secure political stability and legitimacy for emerging nation states (Ibid.). 
Liberation theology and the ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ (Freire 1970) in the 1960s 
and  1970s  promoted  participation  as  a  right  of  citizenship  that  could  challenge 
subordination,  marginalisation  and  structures  of  oppression  in  socio-political  and 
economic processes. Popular education and awareness raising constituted the core of 
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these interventions aimed at empowering the excluded to participate in and above all 
challenge the political systems by which they were marginalised (Ibid.). 
2.5.2 Participatory development as ‘technical fix’.
Beginning  in  the  mid-1990s,  participatory  approaches  to  development  have  been 
criticised severely for not living up to their promises of empowerment, emancipation, 
and  progressive  transformation  for  the  poor  and  the  marginalised.  Instead, 
participation has become a technical approach to development aimed at containing, 
channelling and controlling popular agency, rather than engaging with issues of power 
and politics (See Cooke and Kothari 2004 for the most prominent of such critiques, 
though its focus was particularly the practice of participatory rural appraisal).
As part of its critique, participation has been charged with achieving little more than 
the  softening  of  the  harsh  blows  of  neoliberalism,  stabilising  and  strengthening 
neoliberalism and the agenda-setting power of international financial institutions and 
other development agencies in the process (cf. Bebbington 2004). The key criticisms 
of  participatory development  were levelled  at  its  obsession  with the ‘local’ at  the 
expense of a serious engagement with wider structures of injustice and oppression 
(Mohan and Stokke 2000); at its inadequate analysis with regard to what constitutes 
power, and how empowerment may occur (Mosse 1994; Kothari 2001); at its lack of 
understanding of the respective roles that structure and agency play in social change 
(Cleaver 1999); and at the tendency of certain agents of participatory development to 
“treat participation as a technical method of project work rather than as a political  
method of empowerment” (Hickey and Mohan 2004b:  11;  see also Carmen 1996; 
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Cleaver 1999; Rahman 1995). Participation was hence criticised for having been used 
as a technique in order to ‘fix’ the problems of previous development approaches, 
rather than redefining the purposes and goals of development.
Without  a  well-developed  dimension  of  political  economic  context  and  structure, 
theories and case studies of participation, as well as the strategies for social change 
based  on  these,  will  lack  the  analytical  clarity  of  what  participatory  social 
transformation can or ought to aim at, and which factors might determine when its 
aims have been reached.
An important conclusion of the critiques of participation is that participation events, 
such as participatory research projects, consultations or interventions, should not be 
considered without considering the ‘structural’ or ‘immanent’ conditions under which 
they are performed and take place.  Ethnographies of participation as it  is  actually 
practised in development projects can hence be of great value in throwing light on the 
power  dynamics  that  are  at  play  in  such  interventions,  the  ways  in  which  it 
includes/excludes, and whom (Cornwall 2004). It is such an ethnography that is at 
centre  stage in  this  thesis,  especially when I  focus on the actual  unfolding of the 
participatory ProBenefit project in Chapter 4.
2.5.3 Neoliberalisation and Partnerships.
Neoliberalism is  usually  understood  as  the  preference  for  market  mechanisms  to 
organise social relations. It is much less a monolithic project that can be abstractly 
comprehended as it is multiple enactments and trajectories that need to be understood 
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in their “messy actualities” (Larner 2000). In this way, I understand neoliberalisation 
as the regulatory restructuring that, while developing unevenly and diversely across 
the  globe,  is  nonetheless  primarily  concerned  with  imposing,  extending  or 
consolidating market discipline (Brenner et al. 2010a; 2010b). 
Often, neoliberalisation85 is seen as a “rolling back” of the state, or even the death of 
the  state  as  new  forms  of  horizontally  networked  institutional  arrangements  at 
multiple scales emerge and consolidate as  governance beyond the state. Attention to 
these novel arrangements and modes of governing has increasingly been paid (see, 
e.g. Rose and Miller 1992; Jessop 1998; Hajer 2003), and also made increasingly clear 
that these political transformations bear less witness to the waning of the state than to 
a reconfiguration of its particular role and power, what Erik Swyngedouw has called 
an “ambiguous shift from government to a hybrid form of government/governance” 
(2005: 2003).
Processes of neoliberalisation include the gradual supplanting of the top-down power 
traditionally exercised by the state by horizontal, iterative, and participatory network 
forms  of  governance.  Three  aspects  in  particular  characterise  the  neoliberal 
transformation  of  the  state-private-civic  articulation  (Swyngedouw  1997,  2005; 
85 Of course,  “[f]rom the perspective of Latin America … not very much about neoliberalism is 
particularly ‘neo’: the continuities with colonial coercion being especially obvious in countries 
such as Chile where the murder of Allende and other socialists after the 9/11 coup revealed the 
ways  in  which  Friedman’s  Chicago  boys  depended  on  hidden  fists  ahead  of  introducing 
neoliberal  governance  through marketized  hidden  hands”  (Sparke  2006:  361-362;  cf.  Petras 
2004). David Harvey holds that Pinochet’s coup enabled “[t]he first experiment with neoliberal 
state formation” (2005: 7).
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Brenner 2004).  First,  the outsourcing (externalisation) of traditional state functions 
through  mechanisms  such  as  privatisation  and  deregulation,  involving  a  growing 
number of market and civil society actors in the organisation and regulation of ever 
more areas of societal life. Second, the delegation of organisational and regulatory 
tasks to supra-national levels of governance, such as to regional constellations (e.g. 
the EU or the  Comunidad Andina) or to transnational institutions or processes (e.g. 
WTO, IMF, CBD negotiations). Third, the delegation of organisational and regulatory 
tasks to sub-national levels of governance through processes of decentralisation meant 
to  foster  local  differentiation and autonomy without  diminishing national  unity by 
facilitating an equilibrium between the “centripetal and centrifugal forces” of society 
(Kauzya  2005).  Externalisation,  up-scaling  and  down-scaling  of  governance  gives 
shape to governance beyond the state that redefines but does not break its relationship 
to the market and to civil society.
In the process of such redefinition, as new spaces for the exercise of power open up, it  
is the ability to seize these spaces which will determine who is ultimately part of the  
networked  decision-making  and  agenda-setting,  and  partakes  of  their  benefits. 
Certainly, social actors that were hitherto excluded from processes of decision-making 
might  in  the  reconfiguration of  governance find  ways to  participate  and influence 
outcomes, however, they (or others) very well might not. Erik Swyngedouw argues 
that 
“[t]he new ‘gestalt of scale’ of governance has undoubtedly given a greater 
voice and power to some organisations (of a particular kind – i.e. those 
who accept playing according to the rules set from within the leading élite 
networks). However, it has also consolidated and enhanced the power of 
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groups associated with the drive towards marketisation and has diminished 
the  participatory  status  of  groups  associated  with  democratic  or  anti-
privatisation strategies” (2005: 2003). 
These new “inclusive” forms of governance,  Swyngedouw maintains,  are beset by 
contradictions and tensions. While the externalisation, up-scaling and down-scaling of 
government  functions  promise  “enhanced  democratisation  through  participatory 
governance”, in reality they give rise to “non-representational forms of autocratic élite 
technocracy”.  Moreover,  while  the novel  governance forms extend participation to 
some  stakeholders  on  the  one  hand,  they  consolidate  “beyond-the-state  arenas  of 
power-based  interest  intermediation”  on  the  other.  Finally,  while  horizontally 
articulated networks profess “improved transparency”,  actually existing governance 
associations are often characterised by diffuse and opaque systems of representation 
which obscure lineages of accountability (Swyngedouw 2005: 2003). Cindi Katz has 
also raised concerns about, amongst others, “the defanging of oppositional practices 
and positions” as well as the masking of the degradations of neoliberalism (or even the 
creation  of  an  alibi  therefor)  through  the  rhetoric  and  practices  of  neoliberal 
‘partnerships’ (Katz 2005: 623). Partnerships create vectors for the infiltration of the 
neoliberal ideology into all levels of society. Swyngedouw warns that they might just 
turn out to be “the Trojan Horse that diffuses and consolidates the ‘market’ as the 
principal institutional form” (2005: 2003).
Partnership is also the recurring theme of the United Nations’ International Decades of 
the World’s Indigenous Peoples – the first “Partnership in Action” (1995-2004) and 
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the current “Partnership for Action and Dignity” (2005-2015) – warranting, we might 
submit,  an  investigation  of  the  practices  of  partnership  these  decadal  programmes 
promote and comprise.
Wendy Larner and David Craig (2005) show in their study of local partnerships in 
Aotearoa New Zealand that the neoliberal drive towards partnerships in governance 
assimilates  community activists  and their  oppositional  agendas  into  the  variegated 
projects  of  neoliberalism.  On this  account,  partnerships  can  easily dilute  activists’ 
demands by “professionalizing” them through training and credentials which shape 
their political subjectivities, as well as by re-routing their efforts towards fairly pre-set 
possibilities  for  action.  Partnerships  also  have  an  inbuilt  process  of  selection  that 
forces activists to engage in mutually respectful interactions and ‘equal’ relationships 
in order to be considered worthy partners in the first place. It is hardly possible to not 
lose one’s ‘critical edge’ in this competitive situation which pits activist group against 
activist group in their bid for potential influence.
The accumulating critique of participation as a set of practices by state and corporate 
actors, reformist NGOs and social movements unaware of the problems and pitfalls 
that the strong criticisms outline, however, should not be seen as amounting to the 
necessity of discarding participation by communities. Instead, what is needed is for 
the participating actors to be indeed in charge of the process in order for the outcome, 
the decisions that are made, to be representative of their community wishes and made 
on  an  informed  basis.  I  present  my  ethnographic  study  of  such  a  ‘participatory 
process’ in Chapter 4, but before doing so it is pertinent to provide the reader with a 
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background of the colonial history and political economy of the Ecuadorian region of 
Napo in which my field work took place.
The aim of the present chapter has been to introduce the reader to the movements of 
market  expansion  and  countermovements  for  social  and  environmental  protection 
which  characterise  the  political  tension  fields  through  which  the  protection  of 
traditional knowledge has gained the particular shape which it has today. In doing so, I 
hope  to  have  illustrated  the  different  ways  in  which  the  double  movement  of 
capitalism comes to express itself in different contexts. These incipient outlines for a 
genealogy  of  traditional  knowledge  protection  are  also  meant  to  contribute  to  a 
destabilisation  of  the  hegemonic  construction  of  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge by pointing towards the struggles which constitute it. 
To conclude this chapter, a summary of the double movement dynamics I explored 
above  will  make  explicit  the  ways  in  which  market  expansion  in  the  context  of 
traditional  knowledge  has  been  met  by  a  series  of  countermoves  to  rein  in  this 
expansion in order to avert the most harmful of its effects. 
As I have argued in Chapter 1, the countermovements to capital and market expansion 
are best understood not as class action by the most disadvantaged but as a diversity of 
societal forces, which restrain and regulate market expansion. This understanding is 
faithful to Polanyi’s own conceptualisation of the  countermovement, which he says: 
“was spontaneous, undirected by opinion and actuated by a purely pragmatic spirit” 
(Polanyi 1944 [1957: 141]). He elaborates: “the great variety of forms in which the ... 
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countermovement  appeared  was  not  due  to  any  preference  for  socialism  or 
nationalism on the part of concerted interests, but exclusively to the broader range of 
the vital social interests affected by the expanding market mechanism” (Ibid.:  145); 
and  “[a]t  innumerable  disconnected  points  it  set  in  without  any  traceable  links 
between the interests directly affected or any ideological conformity between them” 
(Ibid:  149).  “For  if  market  economy  was  a  threat  to  the  human  and  natural 
components of the social fabric … what else would one expect than an urge on the 
part of a great variety of people to press for some sort of protection?” (Ibid.: 150).
What Polanyi failed to see, or was unable to see at the time, was the way in which the 
double  movement  can  and  does  sometimes  collapse  into  a  singular  movement  of 
already-restrained  market  expansion  – for  example  in  the  case  of  sustainable  or 
participatory development.  In such cases, in which both mechanisms have fused, the 
more radical  or transformative strands of the countermovement principle  are more 
easily  subdued  and  sidelined.  While  market  expansion  might  in  this  manner be 
controlled in ways that avoid the devastations of a completely unfettered market, its 
expansion  per  se is  actively  supported,  and  the  possibility  for  a  systemic 
transformation becomes more difficult to realise. As already broached, I think of such 
a  ‘collapse’  of  the  double  movement  into  a  unified  movement  of  ‘conditional’ 
expansion  not  as an overcoming of  the double movement dynamic which Polanyi 
identified, but rather as one of its possible expressions.
Polanyi’s  analysis  in  The Great  Transformation  shows that  market  expansion  has 
never and probably could never proceed without significant extra-economic action to 
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control its harmful, and indeed ultimately market-undermining effects. I have touched 
upon these issues in Chapter 1. My aim was, amongst other things, to point towards 
the utility of the countermovement principle for capital expansion in general: without 
a regulating, restraining, and contesting mechanism, capital would be more likely to 
undermine its own vital conditions.
The double movement dynamic is, of course, a societal one. Different social forces 
will at different times (or sometimes simultaneously) be working to institute (in the 
broadest sense of the word) particular practices in particular social formations. Such 
institution  happens  most  obviously  through  legislation  or  the  establishment  of 
organisations, but also less formally through the change of customs, traditions, values. 
While Polanyi’s analysis focused on the double movement at the national scale, it is 
important  to  note  that  contemporary  movements  for  market  expansion  and  their 
concomitant  countermovements  are  not  exclusively  located  at  that scale.  My 
illustrations  in  this  chapter  should  have  made  obvious  the  extent  to  which 
contemporary countermovements work at  multiple scales.  They do not spring only 
from  the  necessity  of  maintaining  a  functioning,  if  not  harmonious,  national 
community (though this motive should not be underestimated) but also to a significant 
degree from the increasing necessity to maintain functioning transnational networks 
and relations. After all, the circuit of capital and its expansion are nowadays – if they 
have not always been – a global affair: depending on and affecting national as well as 
transnational  social  and  technological  networks.  In  this  way,  the  harmonious 
functioning  of  social  formations  at  national  or  sub-national  scales is  increasingly 
dependent  on  transnational  and even  global  relations;  as  this  realisation  grows  in 
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society,  social movements and institutions addressing issues of transnational concern 
emerge.  Moreover, issues whose relevance seems primarily national or sub-national 
might under certain circumstances generate a more effective response if raised at other 
scales. Hence, in order to defend their interests, actors might at different times, or 
simultaneously,  address themselves to institutions,  organisations, authorities,  and/or 
peers located at a variety of scales – from local via national and regional to global – 
depending on  where they are able to find access,  where their concerns are likely to 
generate the most useful response, or where they are able to mobilise.
In the context of traditional knowledge, the following dynamic can be observed. After 
a period of  market expansion aided by traditional knowledge as cost-free input into 
(especially  pharmaceutical  and  agricultural)  commodity  production,  that  is  after  a 
period of accumulation by dispossession, a series of countermoves were and are being 
undertaken, especially at the international level, in order to regulate such activities of 
accumulation. Commodification of traditional knowledge  is not  to be stopped in its 
entirety, but it  is to be restrained,  in particular by means of the requirement of Prior 
Informed  Consent  on  part  of  the  knowledge-holding  communities  which  is  now 
central  to  any  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing  contract.  We  encountered the  key 
movements which synergetically achieved such restraint in the present Chapter. I will 
briefly list them here again: the establishment and influence of international NGOs 
(such  as  IWGIA,  Survival  International  etc.);  the  increasing  vociferousness  of 
indigenous  intellectuals  in  the  1950s  and  1960s;  the  ILO’s  Convention  169  on 
Indigenous  and  Tribal  Peoples;  the  formation  of  ECOSOC’s  Working  Group  on 
Indigenous  Populations,  and  the  development  of  the  international  indigenous 
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movement  more  generally  –  including the  UN’s Permanent  Forum  on Indigenous 
Issues, and UN legislation such as the recently adopted Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples; UNESCO’s Safeguarding of (tangible and intangible) Heritage 
legislation;  conservationist  and  other  environmentalist  movements,  including  the 
development of the  CBD; the rise of No Patents on  Life campaigns (and other anti-
intellectual property activism); plus, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the consolidation of 
local,  regional  and  national  indigenous  movements  (e.g.  in  Ecuador)  to  protect 
indigenous communities from the destructive effects of accumulation by dispossession 
in the context of land as well as knowledge.
These  organisations,  movements,  people  and  legislations  together  manifest  the 
countermovement principle in the context of traditional knowledge. Up to now, what 
this countermovement has achieved is  to give shape to  a particular configuration of 
property rights with regard to traditional knowledge: traditional knowledge is not ‘free 
for the taking’ any longer, but the knowledge-holding communities (in itself of course 
a vague term) do now possess decision-making power over and above all rights to the 
income  flowing  from  the  use  of  traditional  knowledge,  both  key  aspects  of  the 
capitalist conception of private property. Market expansion with regard to traditional 
knowledge has hence not been curtailed, but it has, in Polanyi’s words been checked 
“in definite  directions” (Ibid.:  130).  Such regulation,  no matter  how important  we 
deem  it  to  be,  has  also  meant  the  disregarding  if  not  silencing  of  the 
countermovement’s more critical voices. It is part of the aim of this thesis to highlight 
the existence and importance of the latter. But let us finally move into the Napo region 
of the Ecuadorian Amazon and meet its ‘traditional-knowledge-holding’ inhabitants.
162
163
3 Living  in  Napo:  a  brief  political  economy  of  extraction  and 
colonisation in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the Napo region of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon and its inhabitants by way of a – necessarily limited – historical political 
economy of the area. Its purpose is to illuminate the context in which my field work 
took  place  and,  relatedly,  to  paint  a  picture  of  the  historical,  political,  economic, 
cultural  and  local  specificities  in  which  both  the  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing 
negotiations of the ProBenefit project (see Chapter 4 below) and the struggles of the 
people with whom I worked unfolded.
Approaching  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  from  a  critical  perspective, 
which  aims  to  take  into  account  the  views  of  the  so-called  knowledge-holders 
themselves, requires a historical view that sees bioprospecting as one of a wider set of 
activities impinging on people’s lives. This chapter reveals bioprospecting, the search 
for commercially valuable lifeforms and their  ingredients,  as one amongst a long-
standing series of extractive activities in the Amazon forest: rubber, gold, timber, oil, 
and now traditional  knowledge. As part  of these processes,  Europeans continue to 
compete  with  each  other  over  the  control  of  indigenous  labour  indispensable  for 
survival in, let alone exploitation of, the rainforest. Violence, or threats thereof, have 
been used alongside bribery, trade, ideological conviction and later wages in order to 
extract time, energy and skills from the people of the forest, largely for the benefit of  
European and mestizo colonisers (traders, missionaries, administrators). Nonetheless, 
indigenous inhabitants of Napo were by no means passive victims of exploitation. 
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They  rose  in  rebellions,  learned  how  to  play  the  colonial  actors  out  against  one 
another, found ways to raise their own and their family’s status in the new layouts of 
social configuration, or migrated deeper into the forests to escape them. However, the 
genocidal and ethnocidal violence perpetrated upon them cannot be diminished simply 
by a better understanding of their active resistance and creative adaptation. Numbers 
suggest consistently that the indigenous population dwindled by ninety percent in the 
first 50 years of contact.86
The rapid colonisation of the Ecuadorian Amazon which occurred in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, and which was enabled by and in turn fuelled oil exploration 
and extraction, spawned a more organised indigenous resistance initially supported by 
sympathetic  missionaries  (see  Section  3.7.  below).  The  rise  of  this  indigenous 
movement is a clear example of a counter movement rising in response to increasing 
colonisation and market expansion with the aim to protect (some parts  of)  society 
from the detrimental effects of accumulation by dispossession. Ethnocide in Ecuador 
has led to ethnogenesis (Whitten 1976; Hill 1996) and the ‘scaling up’ of identity: the 
formation of clearly demarcated indigenous nationalities as well as a pan-indigenous 
identity. In this context, I introduce the indigenous federation FONAKIN with which I 
was affiliated as part of my fieldwork. A short account of the 1970s oil boom and 
consequent  debt  crisis  and  structural  adjustments  which  provoked  frequent  and 
widespread indigenous uprisings and catapulted the Ecuadorian indigenous movement 
86 As already mentioned in Chapter 2, Thornton 1987; Ramenofsky 1988; Jennings 1993; Stannard 
1993; Rummel 1994; and Shoemaker 1999 are useful references for numbers. See Henige 1998; 
and Royal 1992 for an overview of the heated debate over the right numbers and methodological 
concerns over their exact determination.
165
into a politically relatively powerful position (see Sections 3.8. and 3.9. below) will  
serve as useful background to understanding the situation into which the ProBenefit 
project entered in 2004, with its proposal of facilitating a participatory process for the 
negotiation of a fair and equitable Access and Benefit Sharing agreement with the 
German pharmaceutical company Schwabe Ltd. From the time of the Conquest via the 
rubber boom to mass colonisation and oil exploitation, the indigenous inhabitants of 
the Napo region have experienced a variety of ways in which their labour, skills and 
knowledge have been used in order to serve other (usually white) people’s ends and to 
further those people’s profit at the indigenous inhabitants’ expense. Nonetheless, as we 
shall see in Chapter 4, the ProBenefit project’s design and execution failed to take this 
context into account, making smooth completion impossible. First, however, let me 
introduce you to the Napo Runa.
3.1 Napo Runa: Ethnicity, Language, Culture.
Much of the fieldwork which informs this thesis took place on the fringe of the North-
Western  Amazon  region,  in  the  Andean-Amazonian  nation  of  Ecuador.  Ecuador’s 
population is probably almost one third indigenous87, and many indigenous nations (as 
87 The 2001 census names only 10 percent of the total Ecuadorian population as indigenous (INEC 
2001).  Zamosc (2004) holds that while the census was restrictive with regard to ethnic self-
identification,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Indian  population  exceeds  15-20  percent.  Many  other 
sources, however, gauge the number at about 25-30 percent or more (e.g. CONAIE n.d.; Macas 
1993; King 1999; see also CIA Factbook available online at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html).
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they  currently prefer  to  be  called)  share  dialects  of  Kichwa88,  that  is,  variants  of 
Quechua,  the  Andean  political  language  of  the  imperial  Inca.  When  the  Spanish 
conquered the Central and Northern Andes in 1532, civil war was already raging in 
the heartlands of the Inca Empire from Quito, now Ecuador’s capital, to Cusco in Peru 
(Hemming 1970). How the Kichwa-speaking populations of the Ecuadorian Amazon 
acquired their  language is  unclear,  but the process is  said to have clearly entailed 
socio-economic  relationships  between  Andean  and  Amazonian,  as  well  as  coastal 
peoples prior to and outside of the processes of Inca or Spanish conquest (Whitten & 
Whitten 2008).
In  most  of  the  ethnohistorical  and  ethnographic  literature,  a  distinction  is  made 
between  the  lowland  Kichwa-speaking  population  of  the  Puyo-Pastaza  region 
(Canelos Kichwa) and the Kichwa-speakers of the Tena-Archidona region, including 
those who live all  along the lower Napo River  into Peru,  as  well  as those of the 
somewhat higher-lying areas in the cloudforest towards the town of Baeza (Quijos 
Kichwa,  or  Napo  Runa)  (see  Oberem  1963;  Whitten  1975;  Macdonald  1979; 
Muratorio 1991; Uzendoski 2005). This distinction is upheld in order to account for 
the particularities of the Canelos Kichwa who engage in important ways, including 
marriage  and  bilingualism,  with  Jivaroan  Achuar  and  various  Zaparoan  cultural 
groups (e.g. Whitten & Whitten 2008).
88 I am going to use the spelling Kichwa instead of  the Anglicised “Quichua” throughout this 
thesis. It is the currently most widely used spelling amongst Kichwa peoples in Ecuador.
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Figure 3: Family dwelling along the Napo River.
This  section  is  a  brief  introduction to  Napo Runa ethnicity,  language and culture. 
Firstly, runa means people, person, human being in Kichwa. Napo Runa are hence the 
people of the Napo. The Napo is a river which begins its course in the Ecuadorian 
Oriente,  as  the  Ecuadorian  Amazon  region  is  called  in  Ecuador  itself  due  to  its  
location in the East of the country, in what is today the town of Puerto Napo, about 
five miles from Tena, and continues into Peru, merging with the Ucayali river in the 
city of Iquitos to continue as the Amazon River through Brazil and to the Atlantic 
Ocean. Tena is the capital of the Napo province, and the base location of my field 
research.  Several  indigenous organisations  of  the area,  including FONAKIN, have 
their offices in Tena. Archidona, also about five miles from Tena, is another important 
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urban centre in the region, and was the seat of an influential Jesuit mission in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century.
The Napo Runa, with whom I worked, are a tropical-forest-dwelling people who live 
in and have participated in shaping the modern Andean republic of Ecuador. While 
detailed cultural ethnographies and cosmological studies of Napo Runa life can be 
found elsewhere (Uzendoski 2005; Foletti-Castegnario 1993; Hudleson 1981; Kohn 
2002; Macdonald 1999; Muratorio 1991; Reeve 1985; Santos Ortíz de Villalba 1993), 
a few pointers will serve here as orientation in order to make better sense of the Napo 
Runa values and understandings that I contrast with the more dominant visions of the 
protection of traditional knowledge in Chapters 4 and 5.
I understand Napo Runa ‘culture’ - like all other ‘cultures’ - as a social process of 
“transculturation” (Oberem 1980; Uzendoski 2005) whereby identity and difference is 
formed, performed, reworked and shifted through cumulative everyday, material and 
symbolic interactions between people of different cultural backgrounds. Throughout 
centuries  of  cross-cultural  exchanges,  both violent  and amicable,  certain  practices, 
proclivities, and understandings seem to have remained characteristic of Napo Runa 
sociality – several of these are shared with Amazonian peoples more widely, and are 
surely at least in part due to the particular ecological conditions in which their lives 
unfold.89 Even though many Napo Runa today engage in wage labour relations, most 
families’ livelihoods are still primarily based on subsistence horticulture, usually with 
89 See especially Overing & Passes 2000, and Overing 2003 for a good introduction to Amazonian 
sociality and everyday life.
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added small scale production of cash crops, such as cacao or coffee for the market. 
Collaboration and reciprocity figure prominently in social  relations,  at  least  as the 
normative  standard,  and  many  communities  still  practice  the  tradition  of  regular, 
collective  work  parties  (minga)  to  which  each  household  contributes  at  least  one 
person to clear a field, build a house, level the football pitch, or whatever else it might 
be in common with other community members.  Mingas are seen as signs of a still 
cohesive community and form part of the identity of many Andean and Amazonian 
peoples. Hospitality is also crucial, and several Napo Runa myths and legends tell of 
punishments for those who do not heed this special moral obligation (Goldáraz 2004).
Traditionally, the fundamental building block of Napo Runa society is the ayllu – the 
extended family. Ayllu does not necessarily convey a fixed social grouping. Rather, the 
notion is fluid, constantly shape-shifting as new ties are made through marriage and 
compadrazgo (god parent relations) and always dependent on performative acts  of 
affectivity (Uzendoski  2005).  Ayllu is  applied  widely to  indicate  a  relationship  of 
intimacy among people, usually but not always directly of kinship (Whitten 1976). 
Kinship  is  understood amongst  Napo Runa not  only as  the  sharing  of  a  common 
substance (such as blood) between people but also a common trajectory that requires 
the sharing of material things and experiences (Uzendoski 2005).
Even today, the  yachak (‘the one who knows’) occupies an important role in Napo 
Runa imagination and everyday community life. While they are predominantly male, I 
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have been told that “many of the the best  yachaks90 are female”, but such opinions 
vary widely91. The yachak is what anthropologists usually call a shaman. He or she is 
a powerful healer of illness, and protector of the ayllu. He or she can mediate between 
the spirit world and the world of human beings, an important skill to ensure balance 
and harmony in everyday life. A good yachak, for example, is said to ensure that the 
river is full of fish and when the rivers run low it might mean that no  yachak lives 
nearby, or that he or she has lost her power92. The  yachak is also a diviner, able to 
make  predictions  about  the  future,  advise  people  during  interpersonal  conflicts  or 
other hardships. He or she will also take on an important role in the counselling of 
young people, helping to shape them into ethical beings. However, nowadays, not all 
communities have a  yachak. Especially in the more explicitly catholic or protestant 
communities, this role has usually been taken on, or is at least contested by the priests 
or pastors. Indeed, in some places  yachaks are feared and have since the early days 
(mid-15th century)  of  the  Spanish  conquest  been  persecuted  for  “talking  with  the 
90 The correct (Kichwa) plural of  yachak is  yachakuna, but for simplicity’s sake I here use the 
Anglicised version yachaks.
91 A curious  perspective  conveyed  to  me  by Domingo,  whose  stories  I  present  in  Chapter  5, 
explains how a female  yachak is by definition stronger than a male  yachak: “Everyone has a 
companion spirit. A woman has a male companion spirit and a man has a female companion  
spirit, who guide them in the spirit world. Because a male spirit is stronger than a female spirit, a 
female  yachak is  spiritually  stronger.”  Although  it  is  a  perspective  that  could  attract  some 
feminist  criticism,  the  female  yachak nevertheless  is  by  definition,  according  to  Domingo, 
stronger in spiritual terms.   
92 In that way the cosmovision of the Napo Runa accounts for the decline of rivers and climatic 
changes – as melting glaciers, deforestation and the disappearance of yachaks go hand in hand – 
in a manner that, to the European observer, might seem to reverse cause and effect.
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devil”  –  some argue  that  such demonisation  occurred  in  order  to  divide  and thus 
conquer local socio-cultural structures (e.g. Sharon 1972; Schultes 1998)93.
The official communities in and through which Napo Runa have been settled since 
white people first appeared in the rainforest do not always overlap with the ayllu. The 
community, or associations of communities  such  as agricultural cooperatives, hence 
constitute  a  newer,  yet  no  less  important  social  grouping  structuring  Napo  Runa 
society today (cf. Oberem 1980; Perreault 2002; Woerrle 2005). Communities today 
possess  a  president,  a  secretary and a  treasurer  who take  on certain  –  often  very 
informally  defined  –  roles  in  a  community  for  a  couple  of  years  at  a  time,  as 
leadership rotates.  This set  up allows for the community to be incorporated as an 
indigenous organisation, then able to affiliate with other organisations into what is 
called  ‘second  degree’  organisations  and  then  federations  (‘first  degree’),  and 
confederations.  The  ‘organisational  life’ has  influenced  many Napo Runa,  formed 
93 Salomon (1983) provides an account of “Shamanism and Politics in Late-Colonial  Ecuador” 
which adds a degree of complexity to the relations between the colonial powers and shamanic 
culture that is beyond the scope of this thesis.  He argues that  when “...  local  crises became 
visible to them, state functionaries became aware that de facto power flowed through legally 
invisible channels. Within imperial belief systems, the effects were eminently interpretable as 
magical.  By  trying  offending  shaman-politicians  for  demonological,  not  political,  crimes, 
colonial  magistrates  accredited  shamanic  powers  as  real  and  efficacious.  But  the  effort  to 
remove individual shamans was not efficacious in shoring up weak colonial institutions of native 
governance;  the  net  effect  was  to  reinforce  shamanism as  a  technique  for  acquiring office” 
(1983: 414). As I was told by many of the people whom I met, the practice of vilifying natural 
healers and undermining their credibility continues to reverberate throughout the Amazon and 
the Andes especially in times of crisis. When the oil boom in the 1970s (see Section 1.8. below) 
was resisted by communities often led by  yachaks, a new round of  witch hunts began. The 
Association of  Healers,  ASHIN, about  which I  report  more in Chapter  5 was founded as  a  
response to this renewed demonisation.
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their  opinions  and understandings and offers usually the most direct  way to voice 
political grievances and collectively act upon them. However, I have repeatedly heard 
the complaint that the larger federations increasingly fail to address community-level 
problems and concerns as federations use up a growing amount of their  funds for 
overheads,  travels  and events  that  many communities  feel  do not  actually end up 
serving them.
But let me begin the Napo Runa story with the Conquest of the Amazon.
3.2 Conquest of the Upper Napo and 300 years of colonial domination.
After destroying and pillaging the Aztec Empire, Spanish explorers moved south, and 
soon discovered another great empire filled with gold. In 1531, an expedition led by 
Francisco Pizarro headed towards the Inca Empire, located mainly in present day Peru 
and Ecuador. The Inca emperor Huayna Capac and his successor had both died of 
smallpox before the Spanish even reached their territories. As a result, a succession 
dispute  arose  and  Huayna  Capac’s  two  surviving  sons,  Atahuallpa  and  Huascar 
attempted to share power, an arrangement which soon dissolved into civil war, which 
was manipulated by Pizarro and the conquistadores to their benefit (Hemming 1970).
In 1534, the Spanish defeated the Inca leader Rumiñahui, conquering Quito. For about 
300 years, Quito was the seat of the Royal Audience of Quito, an administrative unit of 
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the  Spanish   Empire94.  “Obsessed”  (Hanbury-Tenison  2006:  105)  with  the  idea  of 
finding El Dorado and the Land of Cinnamon, the Spaniards led by Francisco Pizarro, 
embarked on several expeditions into the Amazon lowlands, which they entered from 
Quito via the Quijos region, the cloudforest  region between the highlands and the 
Amazon rainforest. The Quijos Indians pushed back the first expedition, but could not 
defeat  Gonzalo  Pizarro,  dispatched by his  brother  Francisco,  who led  an  army of 
forcefully recruited highland Indians into the Oriente in 1541. Pizarro was followed 
by Francisco de Orellana who continued his journey until he discovered the Amazon 
River for Spanish America a year later. The town of San Juan de los Dos Ríos de Tena 
was founded by the Spaniards in 1560, and together with the towns of Baeza, Avila, 
and Archidona, formed the network for the colonial administration of what was then 
known as the Governorship of  Quijos,  Sumaco y La Canela  (Means 1934; Reeve 
1993; Newson 1996; G. De Angelis 2000; Manning 2000; Nishi 2000; Cleary 2001; 
Ingram 2002; Ramen 2004; Meltzer 2004; Hanbury-Tenison 2006).
Dominance over the Indian groups of the area was established through encomiendas, 
repartos,  doctrinas,  and  reducciones  (Muratorio  1991).  The  encomiendas were 
allocations of control over territory and Indian labour granted by the Spanish crown to 
Spaniards  as  rewards  for  their  services.  The  repartos was  a  system  of  forced 
apportionment of goods to the Indians, usually cotton cloth, threads and needles, and 






(a valuable agave fibre). Goods were at times literally dumped near someone’s house, 
and the debt forcefully collected over time. In order to facilitate control of labour and 
Christian indoctrination by way of the missionary strategies called doctrinas, Indians 
were  forced  to  live  in  reducciones,  small  village-like  settlements,  often  around  a 
central square or opening, which became the main vectors for the spread of disease 
and epidemics.
The conquistadores faced two major Indian uprisings in 1562 and 1578-79, which, 
compounded by smallpox and measles  epidemics,  as well  as retreat  into the more 
remote forest, led to a severe depopulation of the area. Ortegón (1973: 26) states that 
the total native population of Archidona numbered 2,376 in 1577. This population had 
dwindled to 237 by 1608 (Lemus 1965: 83). Estimates for the entire Governorship of 
Quijos indicate a decrease in the population from the original 30,000 in 1559 to 2,829 
people  in  1608 (Lemus  1965:  77-78)95.  Depopulation  increased in  the  seventeenth 
century,  and  it  cannot  be  denied  that  “the  process  of  conquest  and  initial 
evangelization  brought  about  an  ‘ethnocidal  simplification’ of  the  Amazon’s  rich 
ethnic variety” (Muratorio 1991: 42). 
The Oriente has for centuries been a stage for conflictual encounters between colonial 
traders  and administrators  (encomenderos),  missionaries,  and  Indians,  representing 
respectively the  three  types  of  economy (extractive,  agricultural,  and hunting  and 
swidden horticulture) that held sway in the region, and which conditioned local power 
relations and class conflict.
95 Figures cited in Muratorio 1991: 41.
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“Until well into the twentieth century, the social and political history of 
the northern Oriente reflected the life of a frontier area, characterized by 
an extractive economy and a society of gold seekers and rubber tappers, of 
adventurers, soldiers of fortune, and missionaries protected by the weak 
presence of the state, which only intervened to foil the exploitation of the 
natives  when  the  latter  threatened  the  peace  of  civilian  society  or  the 
church.  The  forms  taken  by  social  relations  in  this  area  must  be 
understood, on the one hand, within the framework of these predominant 
power structures  and processes,  and on the  other,  within  the particular 
conditions  of  the  tropical  forest  ecology and  the  economic  and  social 
organization  of  the  Napo  Runa.  Both  enabled  these  Indians  to  escape 
oppression and to confront it  under arrangements significantly different 
from  those  used  by  the  highland  Indians,  who  were  faced  with  a 
landowning aristocracy and a more powerful presence of the state. In the 
Sierra as well as the Oriente, however, the class experience was lived as 
part  of  the  ethnic  conflict  that  subjected  the  Indians  to  conditions  of 
cultural and social subordination” (Muratorio 1991: 3-4).
The Jesuits, who established an important mission in Archidona in the seventeenth 
century and exerted a certain amount of control over the area until the banishment of 
all Jesuits from the Americas in 176896, competed with the encomenderos and traders 
for Napo Runa labour.
“At the ideological level, the white traders shared the Jesuit conception of 
the Indians as ‘lacking civilisation and discipline’.  Unlike the highland 
96 The Jesuits returned in the nineteenth century and established a mission that was to last another 
thirty years.
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landowners, however, the traders did not require the church to ensure such 
qualities of civilization and discipline in an Indian labor force used mainly 
in a gold and pita extraction economy. In the Oriente, it was precisely the 
Napo Runa’s ‘savagery’ and ‘unfettered freedom’ that allowed them to go 
deep into the forest to secure those products. The traders, cum authorities, 
resorted to the missionaries  as ‘educators and civilizers of the Indians’ 
only when the latter rebelled against the traders’ self-interests, and later 
when the economy of the region required a more settled and regular labor 
force” (Muratorio 1991: 88).
State-building, the integration of national territory, and in particular the enforcement 
of  borders  became a  crucial  and notoriously difficult  project  in  the  remote  forest 
region when Ecuador became an independent Republic in 183097.
Throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  mirroring  the  trusteeship  doctrine  practised  in 
European  colonies  worldwide  and  which  characterised  international  law  and 
jurisprudence at the time (see Chapter 2 above), the Jesuits busied themselves with 
civilising the unruly Napo Runa. They focussed their  energy,  often in the form of 
harsh corporeal punishment, on converting the hunting and gathering people of the 
Napo, whom they viewed as ‘lazy and idle’, into a European-style peasantry, settled, 
hard-working, and God-fearing (Muratorio 1991: 78-81).
97 Ecuador  and Peru fought three wars during the twentieth century all  in part  sparked off  by 
border disputes that date back to the Republic of Gran Colombia. In the 1941 war, Ecuador lost a 
large part of its Amazonian territory. The 1981 war ended in a ceasefire, and the 1995 war led to 
peace negotiations and the signing of a definitive peace agreement in 1998, putting an end to one 
of the longest territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere (St. John 1999).
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“Assuming  many of  the  responsibilities  and  rights  associated  with  the 
modern state, the Catholic [and later] Protestant missions tried to create 
nucleated  communities  or  families.  By building  churches,  schools,  and 
health  facilities,  the  churches  attempted  to  lure  indigenous  families  to 
settle in these church-designated centers. Once families and communities 
settled  in  these  areas,  they  developed  an  increasingly  dependent 
relationship on these missions for resources and norms” (Yashar 2005: 118
).
Throughout  the  colonial  and  post-colonial  periods,  indigenous  resistance  to 
exploitation remained widespread, taking such forms as flight, sabotage, theft (and 
other  “weapons  of  the  weak” (cf.  Scott  1985))  and assassinations  of  patrons,  and 
historical documents reveal a general fear amongst the white population of an Indian 
uprising (Muratorio 1991: 119-120).
3.3 Liberalism and the rubber boom.
Things seemed to change for indigenous peoples in the Amazon and elsewhere in 
Ecuador by the end of the nineteenth century when the liberal Eloy Alfaro came to 
power through military action and popular support in 1895. His administration aimed 
at modernisation and was closely allied to the coastal entrepreneurial class (Clark & 
Becker 2007). It broke with the ideological control of the church by proclaiming the 
separation  between  the  church  and  the  state  and  passing  decrees  aimed  at 
depoliticising  the  clergy.  The  decrees  also  recognised  the  citizenship  of  Indians, 
entitling  them  to  education  and  judicial  protection,  and  the  Special  Law  for  the 
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Oriente of 1899 prohibited the  repartos and other injustices, including some of the 
labour services to which indigenous people were subject on the highland haciendas. It 
has been suggested that these legal changes had the objective of creating a modern 
proletarian labour force to work on the coastal plantations (Baud 2007; Mora 1984; 
Schaefer 2009), initiatives later reflected in the work of the ILO as we saw in the end 
of Section 2.1. above.  Alfaro’s employment of radical indigenista rhetoric, however, 
provided “discursive instruments by which indigenous peasants could formulate their 
grievances and political struggles” (Baud 2007: 80). The indigenous struggle for land 
and freedom (especially in the highlands) was hence cast in the ideological framework 
of modernist nationalism (Schaefer 2009) in a period in which the trusteeship doctrine 
(see Section 2.1.) provided stability to emerging nation states in crisis: the freedom of 
the ‘Indians’ at that time was hence framed in terms of a quasi-citizenship that made it  
possible for them to enter into (highly exploitative) wage labour relations.
As  foreign  industrial  demand  for  rubber  grew,  however,  “[n]o  amount  of  well-
meaning liberal bureaucrats ... could put a stop to the greed and violence generated by 
the  rubber  boom,  nor  enforce  the  new  legislation  with  a  moderate  degree  of 
efficiency” (Muratorio 1991: 100). The production of rubber was vital to industrial 
growth in Europe and North America from 1822 onwards, and Amazonia remained its 
only source until 1911. The so-called ‘rubber boom’ (1880 – 1914) was actually rather 
the end phase of an almost century-long industry which increased output annually 
until it was truncated by the introduction of plantation rubber from South-East Asia 
(Nugent 2000; Dean 1987). 
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Industrial capitalism, then, penetrated the Amazon in the form of the rubber economy. 
By the 1890s, the Oriente economy was dictated by exports of rubber to New York via 
the Peruvian port of Iquitos on the Amazon River98. Rubber stations of traders from a 
variety of nationalities sprung up on Ecuadorian soil, dealing increasingly with British 
trading companies  operating  from Iquitos.  Amazonian  rubber  merchants  employed 
whichever strategy necessary to achieve access to and control over the needed Indian 
labour  force,  including  debt  peonage,  torture  and  slavery,  as  is  documented  in 
numerous  sources  from  that  period  (Hardenburg  1912;  Casement  1912)99.  It  was 
during this time that the economic and political integration of the inaccessible Oriente 
region became particularly crucial for the national government of Ecuador, primarily 
in  order  to  prevent  the  encroachment  onto  its  territory  by  Peru.  The  Liberal 
administration under Alfaro tried to accomplish this by encouraging private enterprise, 
and by facilitating the extraction of the economically most significant resources of the 
time  (rubber,  gold,  cinchona  bark100,  and  tagua101),  but  it  remained  impossible  to 
impose a degree of bureaucratic order on the economic chaos of the rubber boom 
years. In particular this was due to confrontations over rubber and mining concessions 
in the border areas with Peru, exacerbated by clashes of the military trying to settle the 
border disputes (Muratorio 1991: 101).
98 See archival document from the Archivo de la Gobernación de Napo (AGN), 10 February 1892, 
cited in Muratorio 1991: 100.
99 See also AGN documents from 1880s-early 1900s, cited in Muratorio 1991: 100.
100 Bark from the quinine containing tree, chinchona officinalis, the wonder remedy against malaria, 
named after the Countess of Chinchon who is said to have been cured with its help from a fever 
attack in 1638.
101 Tagua  is  also  callled  ‘ivory nut’ or  ‘plant  ivory’ and  is  still  sought  out  for  its  ornamental 
qualities.
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Given  the  total  lack  of  infrastructure,  resources  and  personnel  required  to 
appropriately govern Ecuador’s frontiers, the state missed out on any fiscal benefits of 
the export  of its  natural resources.  Rubber and human beings were smuggled into 
Peru, resulting in increased depopulation as well as the loss of fiscal revenue for the 
Ecuadorian Treasury. Due to its weak presence in frontier areas, the government also 
lost tax income for imports of necessities for rubber traders into the Oriente. Public 
institutions were in chaos all over the Oriente due to the nonexistence of bureaucratic 
infrastructure and the erratic character of communication networks (mail took several 
months to reach remote parishes from Quito). Military detachments tasked with the 
defence of national sovereignty usually spent long periods without medicines, food 
supplies,  or  ammunition  (Bravo 1920).  What  is  more,  because  the  exploitation  of 
rubber was managed unsustainably, depleting the resource by destroying the trees in 
order to extract the latex more quickly,  it  led to continuous migration (forced and 
voluntary) in search of new trees, making it impossible to maintain, let alone increase, 
the populated centres  so urgently needed for  administrative control  and continuity 
(Muratorio 1991: 105). As a result of these particular dynamics and circumstances, the 
rubber boom in the Oriente enriched only a small group of national and foreign rubber 
barons102.
The access to and control of Indian labour in the Ecuadorian Amazon did not require 
the same amount of systematic terror as was the case in relation to the Huitotos in the 
102 By contrast, the cacao boom at the coast created a powerful national bourgeoisie, generating 
much more wealth for the government (Muratorio 1991: 106).
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Putumayo  (Colombia)  described in  Taussig’s  well-known studies  (1984;  1987),  as 
many Ecuadorian Indian groups had been accustomed to debt-peonage for generations 
(I discuss debt-peonage below). Nonetheless, abuses and violence were widespread, as 
were raids to enslave or punish.103 In the Tena and Archidona cantons, Napo Runa 
were, ironically, ‘protected’ from the more violent abuses and displacements of the 
rubber  boom through  the  exploitation  of  their  labour  for  the  local  governmental 
administration and the missions, whose connection to Quito was stronger due to the 
relative accessibility of the area compared to other areas of the Oriente at the time. 
This form of ‘protection’, however, was violent in a different way.
“Despite the enormous administrative difficulties to regulate and legislate 
an  almost  unmanageable  economic  situation  in  the  Oriente  region,  the 
Liberal government tried – as the Jesuits had before – to settle and retain 
the  native  labor  force...  an  effort  [was  made]  to  rationalize  trade,  to 
regulate labor relations, and to discipline indigenous labor through secular 
education” (Muratorio 1991: 112). 
“Forced boarding” was recommended as the “only system” that will  “civilise” the 
Indians by Carlos A. Rivadeneyra, the political chief of the Napo canton in his annual 
report  of  1909.  Under  this  system,  Indian  children  were  obliged  to  remain  in  a 
boarding school “until they have become civilized and acquired a trade and a rational 
knowledge of agriculture, and until they have forgotten the vices and superstitions that 
prevent the improvement of their race” (Rivadeneyra 1909, cited in Muratorio 1991: 
113).
103 Muratorio (1991) provides detailed historical evidence for this claim (especially pp. 99-121).
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Despite all this, evidence shows that the Napo Runa of the Tena-Archidona area “were 
quite  aware  of  the  change  in  political  climate  brought  about  by  the  Liberal 
administration, and that … they took advantage of the ‘new sympathy’ expressed by 
Eloy  Alfaro’s  government  for  the  Indian  cause”  (Muratorio  1991:  118).  They 
increasingly presented their grievances to the authorities and insisted on being paid in 
advance  to  the  point  that  local  officials,  dependent  on  Indian  labour  for  the 
discharging of their administrative duties, had to urge the Ministry of the Oriente to 
speed up the delivery of money and cotton cloth.
Radical Liberalism ended with Eloy Alfaro’s assassination in 1912, after which the 
less  anti-clerical  governments  that  followed  re-established  collaboration  with  the 
missionaries with the aim of integrating the Oriente more fully into the economic and 
political life of the nation state (Clark & Becker 2007).
3.4 Early colonisation and the Josephine Mission in Tena.
From 1894, under article 5 of the Law of the Oriente, ‘fallow’ or ‘vacant’ land – lands 
not already occupied by Indians – could be adjudicated to agricultural settlers. A lot of 
land that had been in use by indigenous families for centuries was soon adjudicated to 
European colonists in this way. After all, once the Amazonian rubber boom was over,
104 the traders and rubber patrons had to ensure their subsistence by other means. Many 
104 Natural rubber is still indispensable for certain industrial production, and continues to occupy 
one third of the world market today (Dean 1987).
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returned,  with  their  peons,  to  the  Tena-Archidona  area  to  settle  there  on  a  more 
permanent basis due to its pleasant climate. “Thus, this period marks the beginning of 
the haciendas in this region and the colonising settlers’ involvement in cattle raising 
and commercial farming on a more regular basis” (Muratorio 1991: 142). The white 
settlers encroaching on Indian ancestral lands cultivated cash crops, such as cotton, 
coffee, rice, and sugar cane for liquor. 
A governmental decree from 1921 enabled foreign private companies to start official 
settlements (colonias) in the Oriente, which led to such situations as the following 
described by Muratorio (1991: 143): “In 1926 ... the Colonia Oriental Development 
Company awarded thousands of  hectares  to  one  patron  for  the  settlement  of  fifty 
colonists. Actually, the patron settled his own Indian peons from Archidona, Tena and 
Puerto Napo there, passing them off as colonists in order to gain access to the land and 
convert the colony into a hacienda. Soon after, he became a manager of that same 
company,  which  expanded  to  include  a  three-hacienda  complex,  all  with  ‘debtor 
peons’”. The enclosures, we may say, had come to the Amazon, revealing its near-
universal contours.105
105 E.P.  Thompson has  systematically  revealed  the  contours  of  enclosure  in  eighteenth  century 
England  and  thus  the  origins  and  character  of  capitalist  democracy:  “For  example,  in  the 
enclosure of Barton-on-Humber, where attention was paid to common rights, we find that out of 
nearly 6,000 acres, 63% (3,733 acres) was divided between three people, while fifty-one people 
were awarded between one and three acres: or, broken down another way, ten owners accounted 
for 81% of the land enclosed, while the remaining 19% was divided between 116 people. The 
average rental value of the arable land enclosed rose in five years (1794-9) from 6s. 6d. To 20s. 
an  acre;  and  average  rentals  in  the  parish  were  more  than  trebled”  (Thompson 1966:  217; 
emphasis added).
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In  1922,  the  Josephine  mission  accepted  the  role  of  administering  an  Apostolic 
Vicariate  and  entered  the  upper  Napo  on  the  trail  that  the  Leonard  Exploration 
Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, had blazed after having gained a concession 
from the Ecuadorian government to explore part of the Oriente in search of oil. While 
Leonard’s  geologists  left  with  inconclusive  results,  the  relationship  between  the 
missions  and  the  oil  companies  remained  one  of  mutual  convenience  and 
collaboration  ever  since  (Spiller  1974).  The  Josephines’  apostolic  jurisdiction 
encompassed initially 70,000 square kilometres. Their evangelizing ideology aimed at 
an  economic  integration  of  the  indigenous  individual into  national  development 
through  productive labour. They prepared the labour force needed to transform the 
regional economy by establishing schools and colleges in which Indian children were 
–  and  still  are  to  this  day  –  trained  in  mechanics,  carpentry,  and  other  crafts, 
emphasising  such  values  as  individualism,  competition  and  entrepreneurship, 
alongside the more obvious religious subordination (ibid.).
“[T]he  Josephines  actively promoted non-Indian  colonization  and,  with 
the  support  and  blessing  of  the  state,  they  became  the  bastion  of 
nationalism and the  defenders  of  the  national  frontiers  in  the  Oriente” 
(Muratorio 1991: 163).
Moreover,  they  systematically  promoted  progress  and  technological  development, 
pushing for communication infrastructures to be established to facilitate exploitation 
of the economically valuable resources of the rainforest, such as timber, minerals and 
petroleum (Spiller 1974: 96).
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The  Josephine  mission  was  soon  to  compete  with  the  Evangelical  missions  that 
arrived in the Tena-Archidona area in the late 1920s, but while the latter began to 
question their evangelization ideology and development practices with regard to the 
indigenous Amazonian peoples, reverting their schools to the state and their churches 
to Indian pastors, the Josephines have continued their nineteenth-century ways until 
this very day. I witnessed myself how the mission had an extra wall built to curtail a  
traditional right of way in 2007, forcing their Runa neighbours to walk a detour of 
about a mile from Tena town centre to their homes for no apparent reason other than 
to limit Runa presence near the entrance to the mission. I was told by many of the 
people whom I met in Tena of Josephine usurpation of their ancestral lands and the 
severe physical and mental abuses of children who entered Josephine schools.
3.5 Debt-Peonage.
As a result of the Liberal legislation, the repartos and forced labour were replaced by 
what Eric Wolf calls the mode of production of “commodity peonage”: “surplus was 
not extracted as surplus value but through unequal exchange within the framework of 
monopolistic  and  quasi-tributary  relations”  (1982:  86-87).  This  was  based  on  the 
exchange of goods highly valued on the national and international markets for goods 
of highly inflated price that were of value only to the Indians.
Indians were divided into “debtors” (indebted to a patron), “freemen” (under authority 
of  the  European  authorities  through  the  varas system,  made  to  work  on  any job 
required  by  the  government),  and  “salvajizados”  (those  who  had  returned  to 
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savageness  by  eluding  control  of  both  patrons  and  authorities,  feared  for  their 
readiness  to  kill).  Because  the  Liberal  legislation  replaced  the  forced  repartos of 
goods,  and instituted cash payments  for  labour  employed,  the  ‘freemen’ lost  their 
direct access to such things as salt, tools and cotton cloth to which they had became 
habituated and which they now considered indispensable for their lives. This meant 
that many of the ‘free Indians’ became indebted to patrons nonetheless, as a means to 
pay for the (overpriced)  commodities  they felt  they required.  This  situation led to 
fierce competition between the white patrons and the governmental authorities over 
access to and control of Indian labour. Patrons opposed the  varas system of native 
authorities, and government officials would threaten patrons (and more directly their 
peons)  with  use  of  legal  and  military  force  whenever  necessary.  While  the  local 
administrators offered advance cash payments, patrons lured Indians with their trade 
goods and liquor.  This competition lasted until  better  roads started to alleviate the 
need for native mail and cargo bearers in the 1940s (Muratorio 1991: 146-148).
Blanca Muratorio emphasises that Napo Runa mostly got into debt voluntarily, as a 
means to access those commodities (salt, machetes, cotton cloth, shotguns, beads, axes
) that had over time become understood as essential to their subsistence and culture. 
While the tools made their  working lives,  hunting and horticulture easier,  salt  and 
cotton cloth had become a matter of habit, status and religion – and had been adopted 
as important signifiers of their identity, distinguishing them from the aucas (or more 
“primitive”  forest  dwellers)  (1991:  151).  Ceremonial  occasions,  such as  marriage, 
required great expenditure on such goods, too (see also Uzendoski 2005).
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Nominal  wages,  not  more  than  a  mere  formality,  and  massive  trading  price 
differentials explain why debtors could never pay off their debts. A colonising family 
in Tena is said to have been able to build an entire house, with five rooms and two 
storeys, for about 200 sucres in the 1920s, whereas an Indian would be charged 220 
sucres for a shotgun (Dickey 1924: 598-599).
3.6 Gold, early oil and wage labour.
While the Great Depression had a serious impact on the Ecuadorian economy, it also 
increased  the  commercial  price  of  gold,  provoking  a  gold  rush  in  the  Oriente. 
Everybody turned to  panning gold,  and competition  over  Indian  labour  rose once 
more, while agriculture was virtually abandoned, leading to food shortages in some 
areas (Uquillas 1984). During World War II, demand for rubber briefly increased, and 
many Indians tapped rubber again during the five years from 1940-1945 (Muratorio 
1991).
This era also witnessed a rise in more overt forms of resistance from the Napo Runa, 
flight and refusal to work being the most frequent ones. As a patron explained his 
concern over these “acts of rebellion” to a political officer: “The Indians must be kept 
continuously  indebted  and  they  should  never  be  raised  above  their  own  level, 
otherwise, the day may come when they will rise against the white man”106. A female 
106 Letter  from political  chief to commander of the 4th Department,  AGN document 31 January 
1938, cited in Muratorio 1991: 161-162. See also Porras (1979) for further documentation of the 
extremely  condescending  view  colonisers  had  of  ‘the  Indians’,  which,  as  I  repeatedly 
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patron wrote to the governor in the same period: “You must see to it that the Indians  
are fearful and obey what they are ordered to do... I don't know where all this will lead 
to! The day they disobeyed me I would have smashed their jaws, but I have decided to 
appeal to the authorities instead, for otherwise I will be left with no personnel...”107.
In  1937,  Ecuador  under  the  dictator  Federico  Páez,  transferred  the  oil  concession 
previously granted to Leonard Exploration to Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, a “fictitious 
front”  of  Royal  Dutch  Shell,  granting  exclusive  rights  of  oil  exploration  and 
exploitation  for  forty  years  over  an  area  extending  to  10,000,000  hectares  in  the 
Oriente  (Martz  1987:  48).  Shell  immediately  built  a  landing  strip,  set  up  several 
camps,  drilled  several  wells,  brought  technicians  from  England,  North  America, 
Holland and Switzerland to the area, and set up a police force. The government sent 
the military as support to the Shell camps in order to better safeguard this important 
national resource (Martz 1987; see also Tschopp 1953).
Relations  between Runa and  ‘the  Company’ changed relations  between Runa and 
‘white’ settlers  (blancos) more widely. Indians working in the oil camps had much 
better  labour  conditions  than  those  still  working  for  patrons.  Food,  housing, 
transportation,  and cash-in-hand wages  paid  directly to  each worker,  as  well  as  a 
generally  more  egalitarian  treatment  due  to  the  high  presence  of  Protestant 
experienced,  continues  to  this  day:  “They are  lazy”  –  “They  are  no  good”  were  common 
comments  even  among  Tena  residents  who  described  themselves  as  socialists  or 
environmentalists
107 Letter from Doña Juana Arteaga to governor of Napo AGN document 4 October 1941, cited in 
Muratorio 1991: 162.
189
missionaries108 in the camps meant that some were able to experience a certain amount 
of freedom as part of their time working for ‘the Company’ (la Compañía).
Blomberg (1956: 151) cites the complaint of a veteran white settler: 
“Things are going to hell with these new methods ... I don’t know what’s 
spoiled the Indians more, if Shell or the Protestant missionaries. Shell with 
its high salaries, eight-hour working days, and all that foolishness, and the 
missionaries with their damn flattening ways. We’re no longer the ones 
who dominate the Indians, they dominate us. Insolent and disrespectful, 
that’s what they’ve become”.
The Napo Runa and other Indian groups worked for Shell as guides, supplying forest 
game,  clearing  the  forest,  opening  up  trails,  building  landing  strips,  and  carrying 
heavy equipment. Some had direct contracts with the company, others were hired out 
under a contract that their patron had with the company, remaining locked into debt-
peonage.  Others,  previously  free,  were  lured  into  debt  by  the  goods  that  patrons 
brought to the oil camps.
Indian proletarisation was seen at the time by the more liberal state officials as the 
solution to the ‘Indian problem’ and its debt-servitude and bonded labour, and there 
were hopes that Shell would employ workers on a permanent basis. Yet a report of 
108 Protestant missionaries preached and acted upon their conviction of the egalitarian ‘brotherhood 
of Christ’ (Muratorio 1991: 167).
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1945 by the governor of Napo-Pastaza to the Special Commission on the Oriente of 
the Constitutional Assembly reads: 
“At Shell I encountered a serious problem: all the patrons who claim to be 
owners of Indians, have turned to the comfortable occupation of renting 
out the Indians to Shell as if they were beasts of burden. They charge five 
sucres  for  each  Indian  recruit  and on top,  they get  a  daily  wage  as  a 
foreman. As a result, agriculture is abandoned and these white bosses are 
given to idleness and to the most vicious exploitation of the Indians.  I 
believe  that  the  Assembly  should  intervene  decisively,  order  a  general 
settlement of the Indians’ accounts and seek a way to set the Indians free. 
There is no room for slavery in our times”109.
Even though Shell  never offered any permanent positions, the experience of wage 
labour with the oil company familiarised many Indians with a free-market economy, 
enabling them to sell their labour in other areas of the country. Unsurprisingly it was 
during the time of Shell that Napo Runa started to consider each other as either ‘rich’ 
or  ‘poor’,  and  that  certain  class  distinctions  began  to  arise  amongst  the  Runa 
communities themselves.
Inferring from the extensive interviews recorded in Muratorio (1991), Napo Runa felt 
that “they ‘sold’ their strength to carry loads, their deep knowledge of the forest, their 
hunting and fishing  skills,  their  courage to travel through Huaorani lands,  ...  their 
cunning and  talent in  detecting  Huaorani  tactics,  in  order  to  avoid  confrontation” 
109 AGN document 22 January 1945, cited in Muratorio 1991: 168.
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(Muratorio 1991: 170, emphasis in original). Selling these attributes, they of course 
also used and thereby honed them, and this strengthened positive aspects of Napo 
Runa identity and self-esteem. There is a clear parallel here with the issue of ‘selling’ 
traditional knowledge as part of bioprospecting projects that I will be picking up again 
in due course.
In the same time period, education crystallised, for the younger generation, as one of 
the best ways out of the oppressive debt system ruled by patrons.
“Even if eventually the elders turned out to be right in their assessment of 
missionary education as the course of acculturation, at that early stage the 
younger Indians were faced with few alternatives. Either they continued to 
suffer under the traditional patron system, or they sought independence 
through the opportunities offered by the mission schools, despite all their 
limitations” (Muratorio 1991: 172).
At the national level, a stronger awareness of Indian rights formed at this time, too. 
However, the need to colonise the frontiers in the Oriente became painfully clear after 
the  1941  war  with  Peru,110 and  the  ‘pioneer  colonist’ was  glorified  nationally  as 
performing a patriotic mission and deserving encouragement and support. But since 
such  support  at  bottom  consisted  of  the  provision  of  cheap  Indian  labour,  the 
110 Beyond the scope of this thesis, nevertheless suggestive of the power of petroleum companies in  
the region, Martz (1987: 49) notes that the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador in 1941 
was a proxy war between International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Rockefeller-
owned Standard Oil, who controlled oil reserves in Northern Peru, and Royal Dutch Shell with  
its interests in Ecuador.
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administration found itself in a conflict with its parallel goal to liberate the Indian 
from the  abuses  of  the  patron  system.  The  ‘solution’ to  this  conflict  came when 
increasing numbers of highland merchants settled in the Tena area upon completion of 
the  motor  road.  The  new traders  broke  up  the  monopoly on  manufactured  goods 
traditionally held by the patrons. As a result, the latter lost their most effective means 
of  controlling  Indian  labour,  and  had  to  resort  to  paying  in  cash.  However,  the 
improved road network, land shortages in the highlands compounded by droughts in 
different parts of the country, and the 1964 and 1973 Agrarian Reform Laws, as well 
as the 1977 Law of Colonisation of the Amazon Region led to mass colonisation of 
the Oriente and continuous conflicts over access to land. Forested land was declared 
‘fallow’ and opened up to appropriation by those willing to clear, farm and/or graze 
the rainforest. Both previously landless small farmers and agriculturalists, as well as 
wealthy landowners and cattle ranchers claimed, logged and worked untitled lands, 
displacing indigenous peoples ever more from their traditional hunting and gathering 
territories.
Colonisation  was  rapid  and  extensive  –  Yashar  (2005:  113)  cites  that  2,500,000 
hectares were distributed to 55,000 families between 1964 and 1985 – and politicised 
the affected indigenous people. During this time, the population of the Napo province 
is said to have quadrupled from 25,582 (in 1962) to 115,118 inhabitants (in 1982) 
(CONAIE 1989; Yashar 2005). The town of Tena grew from 1,029 inhabitants in 1962 
to  5,457  inhabitants  in  1982,  and  is  now said  to  have  15,661 inhabitants111.  This 
111 The first two figures are taken from census reports from  Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y  
Censos. The figure for today is taken directly from the municipal government of Tena, and is  
said to be up to date in 2010.
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colonisation in conjunction with the establishment of a functioning communications 
infrastructure, an increased military presence, and the support of foreign and domestic 
capital led to an explosion of industrial-scale exploitation of not only oil, but timber, 
mining resources, and African palm (Elaeis guineensis) plantations (for palm oil and 
more  recently  for  biofuels),  and  concomitantly,  irreversible  deforestation  and 
pollution. Moreover, even though the new merchant bourgeoisie and the traditional 
patrons competed initially, they formed close alliances in politics, and came to share 
an ideology of white superiority (while many traders are of Indian origin themselves, 
it  needs to be remembered that whiteness is predominantly a social  and not racial 
category, e.g. Whitten 1976). 
While many Napo Runa continue to temporarily hire themselves out to ‘the Company’ 
– whichever particular one it may be at any given time or place (cf. Muratorio 1991: 
179) – most  have  resisted  complete  proletarisation,  maintaining  subsistence 
horticulture  despite  the  radical  reduction  of  land  available  to  them.  Today,  most 
indigenous families also engage in small scale agricultural production and livestock 
raising,  as  well  as  independent  gold  panning  for  the  market.  Universal  access  to 
primary and secondary education has enabled some to become teachers  and to  be 
employed  in  the  public  administration.  Let  me  briefly  illustrate  the  contemporary 
context for indigenous economic activities with an anecdote. Isabella, the wife of a 
yachak with whom I worked closely, regularly traveled about 7 miles to Tena town 
centre to sell  yuca (cassava root) and other produce. One day, I met Isabella as she 
was making her way home. She smiled: “All  yuca gone now, but a very long day”, 
and I replied, naïvely, that at least she had some cash now. She smiled again in this 
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knowing way that always confirms that you are indeed the ignorant, if welcome and 
friendly outsider: “No”, she said with a sparkle in her eye, “but I have a little salt,  
some soap and just enough to catch the bus home”. By the time Isabella returned to 
her home, she had spent more than ten hours to sell  yuca that she had grown in her 
garden. The result, apart from an excursion to the urban scenery, was a little bag of 
salt and a soap bar. By the time I left Tena in 2008, a gentrification programme was 
cleaning up the town, replacing the chaotic, plastic-sheet-covered market with a flash 
new building. All stalls now had to pay a prohibitively expensive fee and all  ad hoc 
stalls around the market, along the road past the bus station, and all the way into the 
centre of town, would be prohibited. Soon Isabella would no longer be able to sell her 
yucca for money to buy salt and soap without a license which she cannot afford, let  
alone even apply for without help, for Isabella cannot read and write. This well sums 
up the political economy of life at the frontiers of capitalism for the subaltern.
However, Runa families also still engage in traditional practices of hunting and fishing 
whenever they can gain access to areas in which this is still possible, and continue to 
practise  purina, the long distance walking to  tambus (secondary plots with shelters 
and gardens deeper in the forest).
So far, the incentives of the modern state have failed to achieve what had already 
previously been attempted with force and the persuasive strategies of the missionaries: 
to  settle  the  indigenous  Amazonians  as  peasants  (Muratorio  1991:  180).  While 
subsistence  relations  are  increasingly threatened,  ‘the  savage Indian’ has  not  been 
fully integrated into  the civilized  cash economy.  This  is  arguably in  great  part  so 
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because indigenous peoples have organised in order to protect their livelihoods, values 
and  knowledge  systems.  I  now  turn  to  a  brief  history  of  the  rise  of  indigenous 
organisations in Ecuador.
3.7 The Rise of Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations.
The first rural union in Ecuador was arguably the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios  
(the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians, FEI), an essentially Marxist organisation tied to 
the  Communist  Party  which  sought  to  awaken  a  class  consciousness  amongst 
indigenous  highland  peasants  as  semi-proletarianised  rural  workers  from  the  mid 
1940s. While it was instrumental in creating important links between communities and 
thus  facilitating  exchange  and  building  solidarity,  FEI  declined  in  importance 
following the first land reform, titled the Land Reform, Idle Lands, and Settlement 
Act, enacted in 1964 (Yashar 2005; CONAIE 1989).
The  Catholic  Church  promoted  the  Federación  Nacional  de  Organizaciones 
Campesinas112 (National  Federation  of  Peasant  Organizations,  FENOC)  as  an 
alternative to the Leftist FEI in the 1960s. The post-Vatican II Catholic Church also 
had an important impact on the networking possibilities between rural communities, 
taking up the role of mediator and replacing the work of the Communist Party and FEI 
112 FENOC  was  institutionally  tied  to  the  Confederación  Ecuatoriana  de  Obreros  Católicos 
(Ecudorian  Confederation  of  Catholic  Workers,  CEDOC)  which  was  later  renamed  Central 
Ecuatoriana  de  Organizaciones  Clasistas  (Ecuadorian  Centre  for  Class-based  Organizations, 
CEDOC) when both organisations stepped away from their Catholic roots to embrace a more  
explicitly class-based agenda.
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by,  for example,  funding rural  capacity-building through such organisations as the 
Fondo Ecuatoriano  Popularum Progressio  (Ecuadorian  Fund for  Popular  Progress, 
FEPP) (CONAIE 1989; Yashar 2005). Yashar confirms: 
“In most interviews with indigenous leaders, the church was described as a 
kind of catalyst for them – either because a progressive priest encouraged 
them and supported  them in  educational  pursuits;  or  because  churches 
organized schools where they developed skills and contacts” (2005: 104).
Radio programs developed by the church, such as the Escuelas Radiofónicas of the 
1960s, which taught basic literacy in Spanish and Kichwa, mathematics, agricultural 
techniques, health and hygiene, and which were broadcast over large areas, also had 
the effect of raising awareness amongst rural indigenous communities about shared 
conditions, promoting rural organising – as a probably rather unintended side effect 
(Preston 1985; Yashar 2005).
In the Amazon, the mass colonisation of the 1960s and 1970s politicised indigenous 
communities. This was reinforced by the implementation of state security measures as 
part of Ecuador's membership in OPEC (1973-1992) which included the appointment 
of  state  officers  –  administrators,  police,  military  and  judges  –  to  the  Oriente, 
encroaching not only on their territories, but also on the traditional ways of decision-
making  of  indigenous  communities  (Sawyer  2004).  Accordingly,  “[i]ndigenous 
organizations emerged to combat what was seen as predatory and environmentally 
destructive  land-grabbing”  (Yashar  2005:  116).  Collective  land  titling  and 
representation vis-a-vis the state required indigenous groups to incorporate legally as 
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associations, comunas, cooperatives or centres, and hence it was through these state-
defined  categories  that  indigenous  organisations  began  to  define  their  collective 
identities and push for the recognition of communal lands.
The Shuar, until then a semi-nomadic tribe of hunters and horticulturalists (Harner 
1984),  were  the  first  to  organise  along  explicitly  indigenous  lines  –  both  in  the 
Amazon and in Latin America as a whole (Salazar 1981). With the help of Salesian 
missionaries who had entered their territories in 1894, the Shuar formed a series of 
nucleated centres, connected these via radio, set up small schools and clinics, founded 
the Fedéración de Centros Shuar (in 1964), and used the new colonisation laws to 
secure  collective  land  titles  (there  is  disagreement  over  whether  it  was  the 
missionaries who pushed for the titling of collective lands or the Shuar Federation 
itself) (Yashar 2005: 119-120).
“The act of defending...  transformed the political,  social,  and economic 
organisation of  the  Shuar.  The titling of  land and formation of  centers 
presumed a more settled and nucleated social life. Cattle grazing changed 
the  economy from one  that  had  primarily  focused  on  horticulture  and 
fishing. And, the Shuar became increasingly dependent on the organization 
to provide social, economic and political services” (Yashar 2005: 120-121, 
citing Hendricks 1996).
In the Andes, ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui: Kichwa for ‘the 
awakening of the Indians of Ecuador’) was founded in 1972. The first communities 
that  organised  themselves  and  then  joined  ECUARUNARI  were  parishes  with 
198
progressive priests, taking over the role of prime rural organiser from FEI and its 
connections  to  the  Communist  Party  (CONAIE  1989;  Yashar  2005).  Over  time, 
however, indigenous leaders from the Andes as well as the Amazon insisted on the 
need  for  greater  autonomy from the  church,  and  began  a  process  of  independent 
identity formation, alternating emphases between the dual goals of ethnic and class-
based empowerment.
“Despite  its  almost  exclusively  campesinista  rhetoric,  after  1977 
ECUARUNARI was actually conducting a dual strategy: to the left and 
popular sectors, the organization was the voice of the highland peasant, 
whereas with lowland organizations and state actors, organization activists 
were negotiating positions as Indians” (Pallares 1997: 252-253, quoted in 
Yashar 2005: 108).
In Napo, the Josephine missionaries supported the establishment of a peasant union in 
the late 1950s, amongst other things with a view to legalise landholdings, and hence 
also settle the Napo Runa more ‘properly’ (CONAIE 1989; Yashar 2005). Although 
these early efforts did not result in a lasting organisation, a decade later a group of 
indigenous  teachers,  all  of  whom  had  been  educated  by  either  Josephines  or 
evangelical  missionaries,  founded  the  Federación  Provincial  de  Organizaciones  
Campesinas  de  Napo (Provincial  Federation  of  Peasant  Organizations  of  Napo, 
FEPOCAN) (Yashar 2005; Perreault 2001). I focus in the rest of this section on the 
history  of  FEPOCAN,  not  only  in  order  to  illustrate  the  rise  of  the  indigenous 
movement  qua indigenous movement (rather  than as a  peasant  movement without 
ethnic emphasis), but also because FEPOCAN later became FONAKIN, the federation 
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of Kichwa organisations of the Napo region with whom I worked during my field 
research, and who will feature more prominently again in Chapters 4 and 5 as the 
indigenous counterpart of the bioprospecting project ProBenefit.
Despite its name implying an institutional reach covering the whole of the province, 
FEPOCAN’s original membership comprised only a small number of communities in 
the  Tena  area.  While  these  were  all  indigenous  communities,  the  federation  was 
explicitly  class-based  rather  than  ethnically  based  in  its  orientation,  and  it  was 
supported financially by the national peasant federation FENOC and the confederation 
of class-based organisations CEDOC (Perreault 2001). Despite the benefits that the 
new  indigenous  leaders  had  received  through  the  training  and  education  of  the 
missions, they remained highly critical of the latter, due to the missions' proselytising, 
their appropriation of large tracts of lands, and insistence on the Indians’ submission.
113 FEPOCAN’s early work focused on organising base communities114 in the Tena-
Archidona area, and on building a political voice for the indigenous inhabitants of the 
region vis-a-vis the state in its local and national guises. The federation served as a 
legal  and  political  advocate  for  its  base  communities  by  redressing  civil  rights 
violations and insisting on full citizenship rights for indigenous people. Class-based 
and ethnic discourse were used by FEPOCAN in equal measures during the early 
1970s,  as  it  referred  “to  itself  and  its  constituency  as  the  ‘indigenous  class’, 
demanding respect for [Kichwa] language and cultural traditions while at the same 
113 Enlightening in  this  context  are the interviews with indigenous  leaders  replicated in  Yashar 
2005: 122-123.
114 An indigenous federation’s base communities are the community organisations which make up 
the federation.
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time advocating economic and political modernization along vaguely Marxist lines” 
(Perreault 2001: 389).
As it became clear that the concerns of its constituent members were in many ways 
inimical  to  the  interests  of  peasant  colonists,  the  federation  changed  its  name  to 
Federación  de  Organizaciones  Indígenas  de  Napo (Federation  of  Indigenous 
Organisations of Napo, FOIN) in 1973,115 as a way to identify itself as an explicitly 
ethnically  based  organisation  and  to  emphasise  the  problems  that  were  unique  to 
indigenous  communities  in  the  area.  But  while  the  federation  actively  sought  to 
represent  expressly  indigenous  interests,  it  never  ceased  to  voice  solidarity  with 
working-class  struggles  and  maintained  its  close  relationship  with  FENOC  and 
CEDOC  throughout  the  1970s.  Due  to  the  particular  concerns  of  the  Indian 
communities  regarding  colonist  encroachments  of  their  ancestral  lands,  the 
legalisation of land claims became one of FEPOCAN’s primary objectives, as it was 
for the majority of emerging indigenous organisations in Latin America. In this way, 
the  federation  worked  with  the  governmental  Instituto  Ecuatoriano  de  Reforma 
Agraria y Colonización (Ecuadorian Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization, 
IERAC),  throughout  the  1970s  and  into  the  1990s.  FEPOCAN  also  received 
assistance from the Catholic-church-aligned NGO FEPP, whose country-wide work 
focussed  in  particular  on  the  legalisation  of  title  to  indigenous  communal  lands, 
foregrounding the needs of entire communities over those of individuals. Moreover, 
the  federation  received  considerable  development  aid  for  agricultural,  health,  and 
training projects from its inception. These projects were mostly designed to propel 
115 The name change was formally instituted only in 1978.
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agricultural  modernisation  and  included  assistance  for  cattle  production  and  the 
marketing of non-traditional crops such as coffee. This was of course in line with the 
wider emphasis of the military government at the time (1972-1979) on modernisation 
and development of the Oriente as a means to national integration and progress, which 
is similar  to  the emphasis  of current  Ecuadorian government  of  Rafael  Correa,  to 
which I turn in Section 3.10. below. Perreault (2001: 391) quotes a 1974 letter to the 
ministry of agriculture which optimistically discusses a proposed development project 
involving  FOIN,  describing  how  the  project  will  “accelerate  the  process  of 
transformation of the virgin jungle into cultured lands, orderly reforested with selected 
species”.
During the latter half of the 1980s, the orientation of the federation shifted in response 
to  new  social  and  political  openings,  including  a  growing  discourse  of  ethnic 
revalorisation in the country from which emerged and which in turn was strengthened 
by, new regional and national indigenous organisations, such as the the Confederación 
de  Nacionalidades  Indígenas  de  la  Amazonía  Ecuatoriana (Confederation  of 
Indigenous  Nationalities  of  the  Ecuadorian  Amazon,  CONFENIAE),  and  the 
Confederación  de  Nacionalidades  Indígenas  del  Ecuador (Confederation  of 
Indigenous  Nationalities  of  Ecuador,  CONAIE),  today one  of  the  most  influential 
indigenous organisations of any Latin American country (Perreault 2001). This shift 
coincided  with  the  environment  generally  and  the  predicament  of  rainforests  and 
indigenous  peoples  in  particular  gaining  increasing  popular  attention  in  other 
countries,  particularly in  the  industrialised  West,  and  an  increased  focus  on  these 
concerns  by  national  and  international  NGOs  and  funding  agencies.  Indigenous 
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organisations  in  Ecuador  have  always  been  dependent  on  outside  funds,  or  what 
Alison Brysk calls “foreign aid as a counterweight” (2000: 120). The Danish NGO 
IBIS, for example, provided $1 million dollars in such counterweight to CONAIE for 
bilingual education programs, as well as $35,000 annually for its operating budget 
(Brysk 2000: 121). Indigenous organisations in the Amazon Basin, triggering suitable 
imagery of the ecological rainforest Indian under threat, rapidly “became the foci of 
development interventions on the part of international organizations such as Cultural 
Survival  and  the  World  Wildlife  Fund,  as  well  as  national  organizations  such  as 
Fundación Natura” (Perreault 2001: 392). The shift also coincided with the world-
wide rise in neoliberal restructuring.  The new civilian administrations of the 1980s 
replaced  the  corporatist  regime,  its  institutions  and  redistributive  policies,  with  a 
neoliberal one.  The whole of Latin America saw a decline in state services in the 
1980s and 1990s with soaring debts and structural adjustment programmes, as well as 
a rise in state repression to subdue resistance and protest. Agricultural prices declined 
severely and the crisis brutally hit indigenous peasants of the highlands in particular 
(Yashar 2005). Draconian government measures of the Conservative administration of 
Léon Febres Cordero (1984-1988) “sought to eliminate stimulus programs, abolish 
protection and subsidies, reduce price controls, promote exports, open up the economy 
to the international market reduce public spending, devalue the currency, and foster 
increases in interest rates” (Zamosc 1994: 51) and had market-oriented peasants “[c]
aught  in  the  crunch  of  inflationary increases  in  the  price  of  all  basic  necessities, 
reduced opportunities for obtaining credit, exorbitant interest rates, and contraction of 
state supports and services” (Ibid. 52).
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“With the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, the need to defend and legalize 
access  to  lands  became  all  the  more  compelling.  And  those  Andean 
leaders...  who  had  initially  seen  land  as  a  largely  productive  material 
resource were convinced by their peers [from the Amazon] that land was 
also a cultural and political basis for indigenous survival... Land reforms 
have come to represent, therefore, a defense of the very space in which 
indigenous people define and govern themselves” (Yashar 2005: 139-140).
Neoliberalisation,  while  suppressing and curtailing possibilities  for  more explicitly 
class-based politics of  redistribution,  opened new political  spaces  for a  politics  of 
ethnicity.  The shift towards a discourse of ethnic emphasis amongst the indigenous 
federations is reflected in their reworked demands with regard to education, land and 
collective rights for indigenous peoples.  In this way, the federation’s insistence on 
bilingual  education  shifted  from  one  that  was  based  on  demands  for  access  to 
educational opportunities equal to that of the dominant mestizo majority, to one of the 
revalorisation of Runa culture (Perreault 2001). This must have been at least in part 
due to the increased availability of Spanish state education, which compounded with 
the  growing  experiences  of  pervasive  racism that  the  colonisation  of  the  Oriente 
brought into Kichwa communities, meant that fewer and fewer Runa children were 
learning  Kichwa as  a  first  language.  Moreover,  the  federation  started  to  place  an 
emphasis on territorial rights over and above rights to land as a base for subsistence. 
In the notion of territory, land as a productive resource and as a source of identity, 
governance and the future were combined. Rights to territory comprised collective 
claims to social and political self-determination over more extensive tracts of land, 
and were foregrounded especially during a dispute between the Huaorani people of the 
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Cononaco region, south-east of Tena, and foreign oil companies who had entered their 
ancestral lands. A Catholic bishop and nun were speared to death when they attempted 
to make contact with a group of Huaroani in order to solve the conflict peacefully. 
Following this widely publicised event, CONFENIAE mounted a campaign in defence 
of Huaorani territorial rights (CONFENIAE 1988; Perreault 2001).116
The concept of ethnic nationalities also emerged during the 1980s. However, it gained 
particular salience with the emergence of the Pachakutik movement, the political arm 
of CONAIE, in 1996, and the latter’s involvement in the 1997-1998 Constitutional 
Assembly  that  rewrote  Ecuador's  constitution  to  include,  amongst  other  things, 
extensive collective rights for indigenous communities. One of Pachakutik’s primary 
demands continues to be the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state, granting 
territorial rights and a degree of political autonomy to each of its ethnic nationalities,  
and while Pachakutik did not succeed to introduce the concept of  plurinacionalidad 
into the language of the constitution, it nonetheless placed it firmly into the national 
debate (Perreault 2001; Zamosc 2004). In line with this new regional and national 
discourse  of  plurinacionalidad,  FOIN  changed  its  name  to  the  Federación  de  
Organizaciones de la Nacionalidad Kichwa de Napo (Federation of Organizations of 
the Kichwa Nationality of Napo, FONAKIN), reflecting and strengthening its shift of 
116 Granting  legal  land  titles  to  entire  indigenous  peoples  (i.e.  rights  to  territory)  began 
systematically only in 1990s. Moreover, even when territorial claims are legalised, ownership of 
subsoil resources remains with the state. Collective legal titles typically provide that indigenous 
peoples may not “impede” or “obstruct” oil development or mining operations in their lands 
(see,  e.g.,  Ecuadorian Institute for  Agrarian Reform (IERAC),  Providencia  No.900001772, 3 
April 1990, which adjudicates legal title to 612,560 hectares of ancestral lands to the Huaorani;  
in Kimerling 2006).
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orientation “from a regional indigenous organization which technically could include 
any indigenous group in western Napo province to an explicitly ethnic organization 
which represents the [Kichwa] nationality” (Perreault 2001: 393). 
As the local and provincial organising spread through the Amazon in the 1970s and 
1980s, and especially with the end of the Ecuadorian military regime in 1979, when 
the new administrations began to voice a more open cultural policy toward Indians 
(Yashar  2005:  140-144),  the  leaders  of  several  indigenous  organisations  began  to 
discuss the possibility of forming a regional federation representing all of the different 
indigenous  groups  of  the  Ecuadorian  Oriente.  In  1980,  the  Confederación  de  
Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon, CONFENIAE) was founded. CONFENIAE 
has been beset with internal battles and splitting during much of its lifetime, including 
the parallel existence of two sets of dirigencias (boards of directors) during part of my 
fieldwork  (2006-2007).  Very  often  such  internal  factionalism  resulted  from 
disagreements  over  the  stance  with  regard  to  the  oil  companies,  with  parts  of 
CONFENIAE and its leadership demanding a share of the proceeds of oil production, 
and even contemplating the establishment of an entirely indigenous oil company, and 
the other part being radically opposed to the presence of oil companies in indigenous 
territories at all. Despite such difficulties, however, CONFENIAE played a key role in 
the  formation  of  Ecuador's  prominent  national  indigenous  organisation  the 
Confederación  de  Nacionalidades  Indígenas  del  Ecuador (Confederation  of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE).
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Leaders from the Andean ECUARUNARI and the Amazonian CONFENIAE began 
conversations regarding the possibility of a national federation probably around the 
time of the 1977 First Conference of Indigenous Peoples in Sucúa in the southern 
Oriente (Pallares 1997: 241, quoted in Yashar 2005: note 88 at 130), and founded the 
Consejo de Coordinación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas (The Coordinating Council 
of Indigenous Nationalities, CONACNIE) in 1980, and later CONAIE in 1986. This 
process of ‘scaling up’ of identity was not necessarily straightforward:
“To forge a national indigenous organization required the adoption of a 
shared identity that did not naturally exist. Indigenous leaders needed to 
find a common denominator that would encompass the otherwise distinct 
and  diverse  cultural,  historical,  and  social  traditions  between  regions. 
Some Andeans felt little affinity with Amazonian Indians (who had been 
portrayed  as  “savages”  in  national  Ecuadorian  imagery)  and  therefore 
wanted ECUARUNARI to emerge as the national federation (rather than 
forge  a  new  national  organization).  Some  Amazonians  felt  that  their 
Andean  counterparts  had  lost  much  of  their  indigenous  heritage  and 
cultural  identification.  In  other  words,  not  all  communities  naturally 
wanted to take part in a national indigenous federation. In this context, the 
role of networks and shared leadership proved essential in creating the ties 
among communities, scaling up identities, and creating a baseline of trust 
(or at least familiarity) within a broader movement” (Yashar 2005: 131).
Yashar  adds  that  the  regional  organisations  ended  up  referring  to  themselves  as 
“indigenous  nationalities”  to  highlight  their  cultural  diversity,  yet  historical 
commonalities (see also Lucero 2003).
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3.8 Oil boom, debt crisis and neoliberalism.
Despite  the  sporadic  activity  and  oil  explorations,  the  coastal  banana  plantations 
producing for export were Ecuador’s economic axis for most of the twentieth century. 
This only changed with the oil boom of the early 1970s. In 1967, a consortium of 
foreign oil companies (Texaco and Gulf, both now part of ChevronTexaco) discovered 
commercial quantities of oil in the reserves of the Northern Oriente, which ignited an 
oil rush celebrated as the salvation of Ecuador’s economy and end of the country’s 
chronic ‘underdevelopment’.  The discovery of these large reserves of ‘black gold’ 
made the full integration of the Amazon region a national imperative – and for the first 
time a real possibility, due to the increased expenditure on infrastructure in the region. 
Political regimes have always changed with considerable frequency in Ecuador, and 
turnover at high levels and shifting alliances within and between parties make politics 
volatile  (Martz  1987:  5-6).  When  Texaco  discovered  oil  in  1967,  Ecuador  was 
governed by an interim president, replaced a year later by the veteran  caudillo José 
Velasco  Ibarra  through  democratic  elections.  Velasco  Ibarra  had  been  president 
already five times, and this time, disbanding congress and suspending the constitution, 
he assumed dictatorial power in 1970. He was removed by a military coup in 1972 
amidst  waves  of  popular  protest  against  the  president,  continuing  what  political 
scientist  John Martz  has aptly named the country’s  “historic  pattern of  ineffective 
government giving way beneath the burdens of economic adversity and diminishing 
political legitimacy” (Martz 1987: 66; Kimerling 2006).
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The new ‘revolutionary nationalist’ Government of the Armed Forces, led by General 
Guillermo Rodríguez Lara promoted a program of modernisation for the benefit of all 
Ecuadorians based on ‘black gold’. Belonging as it did to the state, oil was viewed as 
enriching  everyone  in  contrast  to  the  bananas,  cacao  and  coffee  which  benefited 
almost exclusively the coastal elites who owned the plantations (Kimerling 2006). In 
1972 Texaco completed the construction of a 313-mile pipeline for the transportation 
of  crude  oil  from  the  Amazon  region  to  the  Pacific  Coast,  crossing  the  Andes 
Mountains, and began its export.  “The ‘first barrel’ of Amazon crude was paraded 
through the streets of the capital, Quito, like a hero” (Kimerling 2006: 415).
The military government began its ambitious restructuring with the ‘Comprehensive 
Plan  for  Transformation  and  Development  1973-1977’,  which  set  forth  concrete 
policies to achieve three fundamental objectives: national integration, improved living 
conditions, and strengthened economic output through the more rational use of natural 
resources. Unsurprisingly, the Plan disquieted traditional elites. In order to fend off 
these  unfavourable  policies  and  the  threatening  nationalisation  of  oil  extraction, 
Texaco  together  with  other  international  companies  and  supported  by  traditional 
national elites launched a counter-offensive. Rodríguez Lara was removed from power 
in 1976 and replaced by a three-man junta, the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno, which 
promoted conservative economic policies in favour of the status quo, and saw the 
country return to civilian rule in 1979 (Kimerling 2006; Martz 1987). By that time, 
alarms over the impending depletion of oil reserves grew, as did calls for renewed 
foreign investments in order to develop new fields, helping to shift the balance of 
power  firmly  back  to  the  international  oil  companies.  As  Martz  concludes:  “[o]
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ccasional  spurts  of  more  independent  and  nationalistic  petroleum policy were  not 
sufficient to vitiate the multinationals’ superiority” (Martz 1987: 391-392). The health 
of the oil industry has been a central concern of the state since the oil boom began,  
and almost all economic policies and national development plans of the governments 
since are linked with petroleum policy (Kimerling 2006; Martz 1987). The industry is 
the primary source of state revenue, accounting for almost half of export earnings and 
one-third of tax income.117 But as Ecuador is a relatively small oil producer on the 
world  stage,  its  petroleum  policy  does  not  influence  the  international  industry 
significantly, making Ecuador and its oil industry vulnerable to global market forces 
and pressures.  Moreover,  “[b]ecause  of  its  oil  reserves,  Ecuador  has  been able  to 
secure massive loans for its size and has accumulated a staggering foreign debt over 
the years” (Kimerling 2006: 423). What is more, distribution of the economic benefits 
has been very asymmetric and poverty levels remain high, while the gap between rich 
and poor has recently still been on the increase (e.g. World Bank 2004).
The economic growth of the initial oil bonanza that boosted Ecuador’s gross national 
product (GNP) to $5.9 billion in 1977 from $2.2 billion in 1971 (Martz 1987: 4), 
could  only be  sustained  through  increased  foreign  borrowing which,  compounded 
with inflation, culminated in a serious debt crisis in 1982. As international economic 
realities asserted themselves in this way, Ecuador finally yielded to the pressures by 
aiming to attract renewed foreign investment through an overhaul of its hydrocarbon 
and tax laws (Kimerling 2006). Judith Kimerling emphasises that even today, “[n]
117 Figures taken from U.S. Energy Information Administration, Ecuador Country Analysis Brief 
(2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Ecuador/pdf.pdf Last accessed 6 January 2010.
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early four decades after the oil rush began, Ecuador continues to rely primarily on 
foreign  companies  to  finance  costly  exploration  and  production  activities  and  to 
transfer new technology. This economic and technological dependency, coupled with 
the importance of oil revenues and investment to the economy, give foreign companies 
enormous power in their relations with the government” (2006: 426). This dependence 
on foreign oil companies has marked Ecuador’s policies with regard to indigenous 
peoples  and  the  environment  until  this  very  day.  Even  current  president  Rafael 
Correa’s  pseudo-nationalisation  has  turned  out  to  merely  replace  some  foreign 
companies with others, moving the focus of oil relations away from the United States 
to China and other Latin American countries. 
While there have been several laws regulating environmental pollution since the early 
1970s already118, in practice foreign oil companies have ignored these laws and the 
government has failed to implement and enforce them with devastating consequences 
for  Amazonian  forest  dwellers.  The  frequent  oil  spills  were  never  treated  as 
environmental  or  human  health  issues,  but  strictly  as  economic  concerns.  The 
company never developed policies regarding the mitigation of environmental damage 
and clean-up of oil spills,  and neither were measures taken to provide clean water 
supplies to communities whose local waters were polluted, or to compensate them for 
the damage to crops and natural resources (Sawyer 2004; Kimerling 2006). What is 
more,
118 1971  Law  of  Hydrocarbons,  1972  Law  of  Waters,  1974  Law  of  Fishing  and  Fishing 
Development,  1976  Law  for  the  Prevention  and  Control  of  Environmental  Contamination 
(copied almost verbatim from a Mexican law).
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“Texaco did  not  instruct  its  Ecuadorian  personnel  about  environmental 
precautions or monitoring, and oil field workers— who had been trained 
by Texaco—were so unaware of the hazards of crude oil during the 1970s 
and 1980s that they applied it to their heads to prevent balding. They sat in 
the sun, or covered their hair with plastic caps overnight. To remove the 
crude,  they washed their  hair  (and hands)  with diesel.  Similarly,  many 
workers  took  jars  of  crude  to  parents  suffering  from  arthritis.  Those 
rumors, attributing medicinal powers to Amazon crude,  are not entirely 
surprising given its status as the harbinger of a great future for the nation 
and Texaco’s neglect of environmental and health concerns” (Kimerling 
2006: 437, based on interviews with company employees).
Subcontractors  to  Texaco used  to  dump unprocessed  oil  on  the  roads  in  order  to 
control  the  bothersome  dust  during  the  dry  season,  having  been  told  by  foreign 
workshop leaders that this practice is widespread in the U.S. as it also nourishes the 
brain and prevents  ageing.  The smell  of  crude welcomes everyone who travels to 
Coca,119 a major oil-producing centre in the northern Oriente.
The publication of environmental lawyer Judith Kimerling’s important study Amazon 
Crude (1991) awakened consciousness in Ecuador and abroad to the seriousness of the 
situation and coincided with the national and international preparations for the high-
profile  Earth  Summit,  the  1992  United  Nations  Conference  on  Environment  and 
Development  (UNCED),  which  declared  the  current  course  of  development 
119 Coca is officially called Puerto Francisco de Orellana, and is the province of Orellana to the  
North of what is now the province of Napo. The Napo River flows from near Tena to Coca and 
on to Iquitos in Peru where it meets the Amazon River. My fieldwork took place in all these 
locations.
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unsustainable. The elevation of the long-standing grievances of local communities to 
an  international  environmental  and  human  rights  concern  empowered  the  local 
population  and  Ecuadorian  NGOs,  and  it  is  since  that  time  that  environmental 
sensitivity  must  be  and has  at  least  been feigned by government  officials  and oil 
companies alike (cf. Kimerling 2006). As noted in Chapter 2, the Huaorani people 
have  been  decimated  as  a  result  of  the  oil  boom,  and are  now facing  extinction. 
Whether or not this increased lip-service paid to the environment and social justice 
will translate into actual, and meaningful changes on the ground, is yet to be seen. So 
far change has occurred mainly on paper and in discourse, including the constitutional 
changes of 1984 concerning the right of individuals to live in an environment “free 
from contamination”,  the  1998  recognition  of  extensive  group  and  environmental 
rights, and the surprising 2008 amendments of the rights of Pachamama120 (‘Mother 
Earth’). Yet, implementation of significant environmental rights remains incomplete at 
best, reflecting the serious gap between legal ideals on the one hand and social and 
political  realities  on  the  other  (Kimerling  1995;  2006).  Moreover,  “[t]he  average 
lifespan  of  an  Ecuadorian  constitution  is  about  a  decade”  (Wood  2009).  Indeed, 
Ecuador  has  had twenty constitutions  since  becoming a  republic  in  1830,  making 
lasting impacts dubitable. Constitutional law has been notoriously easy to manipulate 
or disregard. Throughout Ecuador’s history, the judiciary has neglected the impartial 
administration of justice, failing to enforce or promote the rule of law (Corral 1994; 
120 There  are  four explicit  ‘Rights  of  Nature’ in  the current  Ecuadorian  Constitution.  The first, 
Article 71, states that “Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right 
to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in 
evolution”. The Constitution can be found online, for example in the Political Database of the 
Americas  at  http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html.  Last  accessed 
29 November, 2009.
213
Kimerling 1995). Ecuadorian courts are generally seen as politicized, inefficient and 
corrupt,  and  the  majority  of  Ecuadorians  have  little  respect  for  the  judiciary 
(Kimerling 1995; 2006). 
The legacy of the ChevronTexaco pollution disaster is well known, and sometimes 
described as the ‘Amazonian Chernobyl’ (e.g. Kendall 2008). The class lawsuit is still 
ongoing, with about 30,000 local people claiming that eighteen million tonnes of oil 
and waste products were dumped into unlined pits over two decades, in defiance of 
international  guidelines.  This  has  led  to  a  catastrophic  degree  of  serious  health 
problems  and  fatalities  in  the  area  due  to  heavily  contaminated  groundwater 
(Kimerling 1995; 2006). 
As the disastrous consequences of an extremely irresponsible form of oil extraction 
have  been  highlighted,  bioprospecting  projects  are  portrayed  as  a  clean  and  just 
alternative to oil which will finally bring wealth to the people of the region. In 2003, 
after a badly executed consultation regarding oil exploration in the province of Napo 
which ended in a public outcry (Grefa 2005), the Napo was declared an ‘provincia 
ecológica’ by  popular  vote.  ‘Sustainable  development’ was  to  be  promoted,  and 
bioprospecting  projects,  such  as  ProBenefit,  fitted  this  new  provincial  aspiration. 
However, as I have argued and will argue more fully in Chapters 4 and 5, this latest 
form of capital expansion continues to destroy the subsistence possibilities and value 
practices  of  the  indigenous  Amazonian  population.  For  that  reason,  organised 
resistance has increasingly been directed at bioprospecting, too. In the next section I 
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turn to the political significance of several indigenous uprisings in Ecuador in order to 
complete this chapter’s account of the context in which my field work took place.
3.9 Indigenous uprisings.
CONAIE  coordinated  its  first  Indian  uprising  in  1990.  Massive  mobilisations 
paralysed the country for days on end, demanding amongst other things a solution to 
land  conflicts.  The  administration  of  president  Rodrigo  Borja  had  to  give  in  and 
endorsed a land acquisition programme coordinated by a Catholic NGO. Only two 
years later,  coinciding with the Quincentenary of Christopher Columbus’ arrival in 
America and the 500 Years of Resistance campaign, CONAIE sponsored the famous 
caminata – a 240-mile march of Amazonian Indians to the capital city of Quito in 
order  to  demand  the  recognition,  demarcation  and  titling  of  indigenous  territories 
(Becker  2008;  Zamosc  2004;  Whitten  2003).  In  1994  a  coalition  of  indigenous 
federations, including CONAIE, once again paralysed the country in protest against a 
proposed Law of Agrarian Modernisation, which would abolish communal property 
and privatise irrigation water. When the military refused to repress the uprising, the 
government  (this  time of  president  Sixto  Durán)  was forced  to  negotiate  with the 
Indian organisations  and to amend the bill.  In 1995, CONAIE together with trade 
unions and other urban organisations formed a popular front for the ‘no’ vote in a 
referendum designed to strengthen executive power and implement further neoliberal 
changes. Their mobilisations were once again successful. However, effective policy 
change did not result from CONAIE’s social mobilisations, which “proved adept at 
toppling governments but could not prevent the adoption of similar policies by their 
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successors” (Schaefer 2009: 410). CONAIE hence decided to launch a political party, 
the Pachakutik121 Movement of Plurinational Unity, shifting some of its strategic focus 
onto electoral campaigns. Pachakutik has served as a means for securing positions of 
local and regional power in areas where indigenous people make up a high proportion 
of the population.
When the president at the time, Abdalá Bucaram, announced his structural adjustment 
package in 1997, mobilisations again filled the streets of the country. The opposition 
in  congress used these protests  to remove Bucaram from his  post.  In  the process, 
CONAIE extracted the promise that the new president would convene a constituent 
assembly  to  rewrite  the  country’s  political  Constitution.  Pachakutik  obtained  10 
percent  of  the  seats  in  the  assembly,  and  its  delegates  pushed  through  several 
provisions and rights that gave indigenous peoples a certain amount of territorial self-
determination,  at  least  on paper.  The constitutional reform, unsurprisingly,  brought 
however no substantial policy changes, nor did it contain any provisions to deal with 
the neoliberal politics that were devastating the country’s social fabric (Schaefer 2009
).
Jamil Mahuad won the elections of 1998. The Ecuadorian economy plunged into its 
worst crisis since the 1930s (Zamosc 2004). Two decades of neoliberal experiments 
had left  most  Ecuadorians  in  greater  poverty than  ever  before,  while  debt  service 
consumed almost half of the total annual state budget. As global oil prices fell, and the 
coastal  banana plantations were devastated by the El Niño phenomenon, exporters 
121 Pachakutik means something akin to ‘time of resurgence’ in Kichwa.
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could not repay their loans and the banks plunged into crisis despite the government’s 
bailout programme. The crisis generated a massive flight of capital,  made possible 
through previous deregulation and the mobility of money. When it became clear that 
the country would not be able to repay its external debt, Mahuad tried to negotiate a 
deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Its conditions were: to dollarise the 
economy,  to  eliminate  subsidies  on  electricity,  petrol,  and gas,  to  privatise  public 
enterprises, to reform the tax structure and to abstain from bailing out the banks. This 
deal provoked popular protests and alienated bankers and large businesses (Zamosc 
2004).  Ecuador  was  shaken  by  further  mobilisations  with  increasingly  broad 
participation. In the final days of 1999, and during the first days of 2000, the protests  
became so intense that they culminated in a popular-military coup. The dollarisation 
of  the economy nonetheless  went  ahead,  but  the  rest  of  Mahuad’s  measures  were 
annulled. Vice president Gustavo Noboa headed the country until the next elections in 
2002, in which Lucio Gutierrez came to power through an improvised alliance with 
CONAIE and Pachakutik. However, his popular rhetoric soon gave way to a discourse 
of inevitable austerity measures and further neoliberal change. The indigenous and 
other social movements saw Gutierrez’s shift as betrayal, and the alliance with his 
party  broke  down  (Lucero  2008;  Macdonald  2002;  Zamosc  2004).  This  brought 
internal  divisions  within  the  indigenous  organisations  to  the  surface  –  several 
Amazonian federations continued to support Gutierrez, who was born in the Amazon 
region  and  had  pumped  some  money  through  his  clientelist  ties  into  some 
municipalities. Other, smaller confederations also made use of this time to exert their 
influence over and against CONAIE. CONAIE was unable to bring about the kind of 
mobilisations  it  had  roused  in  the  past,  and  it  became  evident  that  the  Indian 
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movement was in  crisis.  Moreover,  even though indigenous leaders  have,  through 
Pachakutik,  occupied  political  offices  in  Ecuador’s  National  Congress  and  state 
bureaucracy since the mid-1990s, this has been misinterpreted by many people outside 
of Ecuador as a sign of unprecedented indigenous political power. Yet, it is crucial to 
understand, as has been pointed out to me repeatedly during my time in Ecuador, and 
as Judith Kimerling summarises, that “[o]ccupation of ... public offices has not been 
accompanied  by meaningful  decision-making power or  the  empowerment  of  local 
communities.  On  the  contrary,  political  participation  through  political  parties  has 
weakened  –  and  dispersed  –  the  organized  indigenous  movement  by  shifting  the 
priorities  of  many  leaders  away  from the  needs  of  local  communities  (who  feel 
abandoned)  to  the  pursuit  of  public  office,  and  by  fomenting  corruption  and  the 
emergence  of  an  indigenous  political  elite  that  is  isolated  from  indigenous 
communities. At the same time, considerable external pressures have been applied by 
private  and public  actors  in  an effort  to  use and divide indigenous  organizations” 
(Kimerling 2006: note 58 at 433).
CONAIE’s move from “a politics of influence to a politics of power” (Zamosc 2004) 
has undeniably come with its own pitfalls. Leon Zamosc also suggests that some of 
the  power  of  the  indigenous  movement  in  Ecuador  derives  from the  fact  that  its 
demands have never been very radical. After all, 
“they  have  not  questioned  private  property,  the  class  structure,  or  the 
capitalist  organization  of  the  economy.  It  cannot  even be  said  that  the 
popular groups are trying to gain a larger slice of the national ‘pie’. In 
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essence … these are defensive struggles,  focused on preventing further 
deterioration of the situation of the weakest sectors” (2004: 144).
Gutierrez nonetheless did not complete his full term in office. He was ousted in early 
2005 when the military withdrew its support for Gutierrez after mainly middle class 
protests in Quito over his increasingly overt nepotism and corruption. Vice-president 
Alfredo Palacio saw the country to its next elections in 2006.
3.10 Afterword: Correa and the criminalisation of protest.
Rafael Correa, the ‘white’ and foreign-educated populist, became, after winning the 
2006 presidential elections, the first president whose policies seemed to lend some 
credibility to his declared anti-neoliberal socialism. Under his leadership, Ecuador has 
joined the ranks of Latin American countries who have taken the so-called ‘Left Turn’. 
Correa’s administration pursues a strategy the centrepiece of which is a strong central 
government with the ability to regulate and to set the parameters for markets, rather 
than  vice  versa.  As  such  it  aims  to  shift  the  country’s  trajectory  away  from the 
direction followed since the 1980s. Fundamental to this strategy is the recovery of the 
policy space that had been ceded to the private sector and to the international agencies 
and markets (Jameson 2008). Correa called for another Constitutional Assembly and 
the Constitution was once again rewritten in 2008 with the participation of a range of 
social  movements.  However,  as  political  scientist  Catherine Conaghan has  pointed 
out: 
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“During his first year in office, Correa turned himself and his presidency 
into the political system’s center of gravity. He is the leader and his is the 
office that defines the country’s agenda. Others can do little but follow or 
watch.  The  most  telling  measure  of  Correa’s  centrality  to  the  political 
system is how much rides on his desires and his vision of the future. With 
no meaningful opposition from the parties or civil society, and with the 
president’s  own  organization  more  an  electoral  movement  than  a 
governing party, Ecuador’s political development seemingly hinges solely 
on Rafael Correa: his personality, his ambitions, and his decisions about 
what kind of ‘left turn’ best suits the country. That one man’s intentions 
weigh so heavily in determining the trajectory of change is a worrisome 
condition  as  Ecuadorians  write  their  republic’s  twentieth  constitution” 
(Conaghan 2008: 59).
Particularly worrying, for example, is Correa’s intolerance towards protests around oil 
wells and other production structures. In November 2007, Correa declared a state of 
emergency in the Amazonian province of Orellana, following road blocks and protests 
in the oil-producing community of Dayuma. Local residents were voicing their anger 
at the government’s failed promises to deliver infrastructural improvements while they 
continued  to  suffer  social  and health  problems  due  to  oil  explorations.  The army 
violently repressed the protest, arresting 23 people including the governor of Orellana. 
This  incident  caused  an  outcry  in  the  country  and  beyond,  including  amongst 
members  of  Correa’s  own party.  A letter  of  solidarity with  environmental,  human 
rights and indigenous organisations was signed by many activists and intellectuals. It 
asserted  that  Correa’s  “promises  of  change  are  diluted  by  oil  interests”  (cited  in 
Denvir & Riofranco 2008). 
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It has been argued that Correa’s ‘zero tolerance’ stance is related to his project of 
constructing a new East-West trade axis between Brazil,  Ecuador,  China and other 
countries throughout Latin America and Asia. This geoeconomic realignment – which 
replaces  the  dominant  North-South  axis  of  trade  relations  – is  also  known as  the 
Multimodal Megaproject Manta-Manaus, referring to the Ecuadorian coastal port of 
Manta,  and the Brazilian Amazon port  of Manaus which will  be the project’s two 
central hubs (Denvir & Riofrancos 2008).
In this way, the signatories of the solidarity letter state that in Ecuador, there is “the 
possibility of realizing change in favour of the dispossessed and needy...What is at 
stake is whether we will have a sovereign country for all, or if we will just shift from 
North  American  hegemony  to  Chinese  and  Brazilian  hegemony,  from  Occidental 
[U.S.  oil  and  gas  company]  to  Petrobras  [Brazilian  state  oil  company]”  (cited  in 
Denvir & Riofranco 2008).
In  the  meantime,  CONAIE  has  changed  leadership  and  Marlon  Santi  from  the 
Amazonian Kichwa community of Sarayaku122 is its current president. Santi’s election 
represents  a  return  to  the  confederation’s  more  militant  roots,  as  well  as  a  total 
rejection of oil activity in indigenous territories. CONAIE has regained some of its 
strength  of  earlier  years.  To  what  extent  it  will  be  able  to  influence  the 
reconfigurations  of  trade  and  political  orientation  under  Correa  and  subsequent 
122 Sarayaku Runa are often called the Zapatistas  of the Amazon,  as  they have achieved semi-
autonomy and evicted oil companies from their territory.
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administrations of course remains to be seen. As a Sarayaku friend told me during the 
election campaign, “Correa will be great for the middle classes, for us he will be a 
disaster”. Indeed, Correa has labelled indigenous peoples as ‘infantile’ and he hopes 
“that  the  Leftist  radicals  who  do  not  believe  in  the  oil  companies,  the  mining 
companies, the market or the transnationals go away”123 (cited in Denvir 2008a). As 
Monica  Chuji,  a  Kichwa  activist  and  former  member  of  Correa’s  political  party 
worries: 
“[H]e  campaigned  with  a  strong environmentalist  discourse  … [But]  I 
began to see a continuation of the same old line and of the extractivist 
model ... In fact, there was a deeper radicalism: ‘here comes large scale 
mining, period. We'll continue with extracting oil, period.’ There wasn’t a 
discussion about a post-oil economy … The people mobilized in Dayuma 
and were repressed. There was a mobilization in Cuenca [city in the Andes
] against mining projects and the president got on the radio and said, ‘If 
twenty of these crazy ecologists are protesting, I'll call 20,000, or 200,000, 
residents to confront them.’ What is this? What sort of regime is this? This 
is socialism of the 21st century?” (cited in Denvir 2008b).
The Amazon region of Ecuador remains one of conflict.  The last year of my field 
work, 2008, was the National Year of Asphalt in Ecuador, paving the way for further 
warfare on subsistence.
123 Correa made this statement on his weekly radio programme on 7 June 2008.
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4 Negotiating  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing  in  Napo: 
misunderstandings, frictions and value clashes.
This  chapter  provides  an  ethnographic  account  of  the  German government-funded 
ProBenefit bioprospecting initiative of which I was a participant observer from March 
2006 until the end of its activities in the Amazon in May 2007. In particular, I discuss 
the  misunderstandings,  frictions  and  value  clashes  which  characterised  ProBenefit 
during  its  period  of  engagement  with  the  Kichwa  people  of  Amazonian  Ecuador 
represented by FONAKIN. As a volunteer and independent adviser to FONAKIN, I 
was able to work closely with ProBenefit’s indigenous participants and learned about 
their views through extended interactions which continued until after the project’s end. 
I argue that the problems ProBenefit had to face were rooted in ProBenefit’s structural 
inability to question some of its own fundamental assumptions regarding the value of 
traditional knowledge, the threats it faces, and the strategies of protection it requires. 
This inability had to do with the project’s time frame, the obligations to its funders, 
and  deep-seated  cultural  assumptions.  In  conjunction  with  a  failure  to  take  into 
account the historical power asymmetries which we discussed in Chapter 3 above, this 
structural inability hampered the smooth completion of the project and ultimately led 
to the (inadvertent) eclipsing of other understandings of what was at stake in terms of 
traditional knowledge protection – including those that were clearly voiced during the 
capacity building course which ProBenefit organised.  I conclude the chapter with a 
brief discussion of the way in which these alternative understandings were eclipsed 
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during the project’s activities. This leads us to the next chapter in which I illustrate 
and discuss such alternative visions in greater detail.
The present chapter should be understood as describing a situation in and through 
which  the  hegemonic  understanding  of  traditional  knowledge  protection  came  to 
manifest in practice. This is of course only one of many such (actual and possible) 
situations. However, as I have argued when discussing the methodological approach 
of critical ethnography in Chapter 1, it is only through an appreciation of the concrete 
details  of  such  situations  that  we  come  to  gain  an  understanding  of  what  (the 
hegemonic construction of) ‘traditional knowledge protection’ actually means.
4.1 Thick Bioprospecting in the Amazon: a win-win-win-win scenario?
Pharmaceutical biodiversity prospecting has been presented as a win-win-win project 
(Takeshita  2001),  through  which  new  important  treatments  for  diseases  can  be 
developed (win 1), while simultaneously promoting the conservation of biodiversity 
as a reservoir  of future genetic resources (win 2), as well  as compensating source 
country  collaborators  and  hence  stimulating  economic  activity  in  those,  often 
developing countries (win 3). ProBenefit (“PROcess-oriented development of a model 
for equitable  BENEFIT-sharing for the use of biological  resources  in  the Amazon 
Lowlands  of  Ecuador”),  a  project  funded  with  1.04  million  Euro  by the  German 
Ministry for Education and Research124, was presented as a win-win-win-win project 
124 This  funding  was  made  available  under  the  Ministry’s  biosphere  research  programme 
BioTEAM.
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which would additionally involve indigenous communities in the project realisation 
and execution. In this way, ProBenefit would respect and promote indigenous rights as 
well  as  contribute  to  capacity  building  of  indigenous  organisations.  Indigenous 
peoples’ participation would endow ProBenefit with a fourth ‘win’, further increasing 
the beneficial character of bioprospecting projects.
At  its  launch  in  January  2003,  ProBenefit  consisted  of  five  project  partners:  the 
Institute for Biodiversity-Network (an expert  association for biodiversity research), 
the Institute of International and European Law of the University of Göttingen, the 
Department  of  Plant  Ecology of  the University of  Göttingen,  Future Technologies 
Consulting  (the  consultancy  branch  of  the  Association  of  German  Engineers’ 
Technology Centre Ltd.), and the pharmaceutical company Dr. Willmar Schwabe Ltd. 
Later, and in order to fulfil its objectives of developing a model access and benefit 
sharing agreement, ProBenefit enlisted the Ecuadorian Ministry for Environment, and 
the  indigenous  federation  FONAKIN  (Federation  of  Organisations  of  the  Kichwa 
Nationality  of  the  Napo  region)  as  its  Ecuadorian  governmental  and  indigenous 
partners. It was individuals from the Institute of Biodiversity-Network that originally 
conceived of the idea to apply for funding for a project that would investigate the 
feasibility of fair and equitable Access and Benefit Sharing as outlined by the CBD, 
and more particularly its Bonn Guidelines. The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources  and  the  Fair  and  Equitable  Sharing  of  the  Benefits  Arising  from their 
Utilization was adopted by the CBD sixth Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2002. 
These voluntary guidelines are meant to assist governments and other stakeholders in 
developing  an  overall  access  and  benefit-sharing  strategy,  and  in  negotiating 
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contractual  arrangements  for  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing  (ABS).  Crucially,  they 
include the requirement to obtain prior informed consent from relevant indigenous and 
local  communities.  Partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that  the  guidelines  were 
developed at the first meeting of the Ad-hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing that took place in 2001 in the German city of 
Bonn, Germany is strongly committed to making ABS work. Support for a project 
such as ProBenefit from the German government was hence unsurprising.
A partnership with a private company was a requirement on part of the funders, and 
some of the big pharmaceutical corporations – Merck, Bayer, and others – were first 
approached, but declined “due to the reputational risks involved” as a ProBenefit team 
member explained to me. Dr. Willmar Schwabe Pharmaceuticals is what is called a 
medium-sized enterprise with 727 employees in its German headquarters, and about 
3700 employees worldwide as part of the Schwabe Group, comprising subsidiaries 
and joint ventures in eighteen countries. Schwabe produces phytomedicines, i.e. plant-
based medicines and health products since 1866, relying on a high-tech manufacturing 
process. Many of their products as well as manufacturing processes, such as special 
extraction methods, are protected by patents. Schwabe agreed to be part of ProBenefit 
not merely as a way to research new plants, but also in order to develop what could be 
marketed as ‘fair trade’ health products.125 ProBenefit was set to run for five years 
until the end of 2007 and was made up of two consecutive project phases:
125 I was told this in a conversation with the Schwabe representative who travelled to Ecuador with 
the ProBenefit team in March 2006.
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Phase  1:  Entry  into  a  model  agreement  with  all  actors  representing 
relevant interests in the spirit of the CBD on access to natural resources in 
a part of the Ecuadorian Amazon region.
Phase  2:  Ethno-botanical  and  pharmacological  investigations  for  the 
possible production of a plant extract with documented medicinal effect.
It was made very clear in all of ProBenefit’s publications that without the successful 
completion of phase one, the activities planned for phase two would not begin. In this 
way, ProBenefit was not merely a bioprospecting project, though it was of course also 
one.  ProBenefit  made  the  constraints  within  which  contemporary  bioprospecting 
endeavours  have  to  unfold  into  its  primary  objective:  its  aim was  to  “develop  a 
suitable procedure for equitable benefit-sharing for the use of biological resources and 
the associated indigenous knowledge”126, and not (or not chiefly) to develop the use 
itself,  as  is  the  case  with  other  bioprospecting  projects  (such  as  the  various 
incarnations  of  the ICGB127,  cf.  Berlin  et  al.  1999; Berlin  & Berlin  2004;  Greene 
126 This  aim  is  quoted  from  ProBenefit’s  website.  Available  at 
http://www.probenefit.de/index_en.html
127 The International Cooperative Biodiversity Group (ICBG) is a public grants program sponsored 
by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its goals are clearly oriented 
to the aims of the CBD: to search for potential new drugs through bioprospecting, to promote a 
sustainable  use  of  biodiversity,  and  to  foster  development  through  benefit  sharing  with 
developing countries – and the specific local communities involved if appropriate. Public-private 
sector partnerships are required by the ICBG grant protocols. One ICBG grant was implemented 
as  an  agreement  between  the  Aguaruna  of  the  Peruvian  Amazon,  Washington  University,  a 
Peruvian university and museum, and Searle and Company, a pharmaceutical sub-division of 
Monsanto. Other grants included funding for research by the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University,  Conservation International,  Missouri  Botanical  Gardens,  the pharmaceutical 
giant  Bristol-Myers  Squibb  and  a  pharmaceutical  company  in  Suriname;  research  by  the 
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2002; Hayden 2003a; 2005; Rosenthal & Katz 2004; Rosenthal 2006; or the InBio-
Merck agreement128, cf.  Martinez-Alier 2002). It is because of these (self-imposed) 
more-than-legal  parameters  that  I  like  to  call  ProBenefit  a  thick bioprospecting 
project, additionally encumbered with voluntary layers of obligations: “It is expressly 
stressed that all botanical or pharmaceutical investigations take second place to the 
superordinate  goal  of  first  creating  the  basis  for  transparent  and  participative 
agreement on the use of the biological resources”129. In order to develop said suitable  
procedure,  ProBenefit  intended  to  “explore  new  models  for  sustainable  use  of 
biodiversity  in  the  Ecuadorian  Amazon  region”130 in  line  with  the  guidelines 
developed through the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Even 
though the novelty of the envisioned models is arguably a mirage (after all, the idea 
was for a German pharmaceutical company to develop marketable products on the 
basis  of an Amazonian plant,  in  short,  the basic  model  was not  terribly new),  the 
exploratory nature of ProBenefit needs to be underlined. The ProBenefit project team 
went, in the words of one of its members, “cluelessly” to the Amazon. This is true 
insofar  as,  despite  extensive  prior  research  on  the  legal  framework governing  the 
particular two-country situation of the endeavour, the way in which this framework 
would mould (and the ways in which it would not mould) the activities on location 
University of Illinois at Chicago and institutions in Vietnam and Laos; and biodiversity research 
in Panama.
128 The 1991 agreement between the Costa Rican quasi-governmental  Instituto de Biodiversidad  
and the pharmaceutical giant Merck to exchange access to its inventories of plant samples for  
about 1 million dollars and the promise of royalties on ensuing profits from potential patents was 
heralded as a model at the time.
129 This quote is taken from the official objectives of the ProBenefit project, replicated online at 
http://www.probenefit.de/projekt/ziele/ziele_en.html
130 Quote available online at http://www.probenefit.de/index_en.html
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was completely unknown. There had not been a similar process in the region, and in 
fact there had been hardly any experience with thick bioprospecting projects – projects 
which made the creation of a participatory process of reaching an agreement their 
primary objective – anywhere in the world. The outcome of ProBenefit’s endeavours 
was hoped to be a model ABS procedure, “maybe the most ethical one world-wide”, 
as I was told by a ProBenefit team member.
After  a  couple  of  decades  of  ‘biopiracy’ scandals,  bioprospecting  initiatives  have 
acquired a sizeable, transnational audience keen to monitor and ready to decry their 
activities. Relatedly, such projects need to engage in some form of public relation: 
especially  given  the  public  interest  that  bioprospecting  has  accrued  by repeatedly 
upsetting  ethical  sensitivities,  bioprospecting  projects  need  to  and  do  present 
themselves publicly, on websites, printed matter, in meetings and conferences, in a 
particularly favourable light. This need for a particular kind of posturing, a particular 
kind of performance of legitimacy is of course not unique to bioprospecting. However, 
bioprospecting is one of those technoscientific endeavours hit by a rather bright and 
large spotlight.131 This heightened public visibility affects the practices that constitute 
bioprospecting  projects.  In  the  case  of  ProBenefit  the  constant  threat  of  biopiracy 
allegations  led  to  its  ethical  ‘thickness’,  and  influenced  all  of  its  decisions  and 
activities.  Constant  concern  regarding  the  ‘international  legitimacy’ of  its  actions 
interestingly  limited  the  ‘local  legitimacy’  it  was  able  to  achieve  amongst  its 
indigenous  public,  as  shall  become  clearer  in  due  course.  However  ‘clueless’ 
131 Genomics and the nanotechnologies are likely to get  even more airtime, but proteomics,  for 
example, does not (McNally forthcoming). 
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ProBenefit’s initital approach might have been, the project was of course nevertheless 
based on a series of assumptions.
“Expected benefits of the project:
1. A model agreement on the use of biological resources in harmony with the 
goals of the CBD and derivation of rules for future Access & Benefit-sharing 
projects,
2. Development of alternative sources of income by the discovery of new plant-
based pharmaceuticals,
3. Capacity-building and a contribution to rural development,
4. Transfer of technology and methods for the search for plants with potential 
medicinal effects,
5. Support in the upgrading and maintenance of indigenous knowledge,
6. Incentives for the protection and sustainable use of biodiversity.”132
As a project, ProBenefit was based on the belief that (sustainable) income-generating 
use of biodiversity would lead to its increased conservation, as long as local people 
partook  in  the  income  generated.  These  assumptions  underlie  the  discourses  that 
inform and  draw upon such  international  frameworks  as  the  CBD’s,  and  are  also 
explicitly espoused by the main driver behind ProBenefit, the Institute of Biodiversity 
Network.  There  are  two  interrelated  sides  to  this  hegemonic  construction  of  the 
economic  value  of  biodiversity  conservation.  On  the  one  hand,  biodiversity  is 
132 Expected benefits replicated online at http://www.probenefit.de/files/info_english.pdf
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increasingly capitalised. In Martin O’Connor’s terms, nature “formerly … treated as 
an external and exploitable domain is now redefined as itself a stock of capital” (1994: 
126). In this way, it needs to be conserved and regenerated as a reservoir of capital  
value,  rather  than  subjected  to  limitless  exploitation.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
conservation  of  biodiversity  is  itself  capitalised.  This  is  to  say  that  conservation 
activities  are  rhetorically  cast  as  feasible  only  with  adequate  financial  return. 
Economic value becomes the only reason for action of any kind. This is the ideology 
of homo oeconomicus which undergirds the discourse of sustainable development and 
orients the CBD. ProBenefit was constituted by the performance of activities that were 
meant to be, and were continuously represented as practical realizations of the CBD, 
as well as international and national guidelines and declarations of indigenous rights 
regarding their traditional knowledge133. It was firmly based on the assumptions that 
characterise the theoretical framework of the CBD. ProBenefit’s  inability to revise 
some of these assumptions in the light of its work with representatives of indigenous 
community organisations contributed to the conflicts which I recount below, and led to 
the  eclipsing  of  alternative  visions  and  understandings  that  were  raised  by  its 
indigenous participants. In this way, ProBenefit constituted an insidious imposition of 
a particular system of values. This imposition was not planned or intended, but rather 
an inevitable side effect of the project’s set up and constraints. Crucially for instance, 
ProBenefit team members were accountable to their funders, to whom they had of 
course certain contractual obligations,  such as reports on expenses and progress, a 
responsibility that impeded a more flexible approach to working with their indigenous 
133 Explicitly named were in particular Decision 391 of the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN, 
Andean Community of Nationas), ILO 169, and the Political Constitution of the Republic of  
Ecuador.
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partners, and hence contributed to the project’s ultimate failure. I illustrate this further 
in the rest of this chapter.
4.2 ProBenefit’s  Need  for  an  Indigenous  Partner,  and  its  Envisioned  
Challenges.
Cori  Hayden’s work on bioprospecting in  Mexico (e.g.  2003a;  2004) explores  the 
ways  in  which  a  variety  of  publics  (public  domains,  public  spheres,  public 
accountabilities)  get  produced  –  and  disassembled  again  –  in  and  through  the 
performances of bioprospecting. She examines the effects of such ‘public-izations’, 
especially in terms of the new forms of inclusions and exclusions that they forge, and 
points out that “these publics are crucial resources which prospecting participants and 
their critics invoke, materialize, and contest in their efforts to define the limits and 
obligations of contemporary resource appropriation” (Hayden 2004: 118). Particularly 
significant is the way in which the public (domain) is construed as a ‘safety zone’ for 
bioprospectors (Hayden 2003b). Desperate to avoid allegations of biopiracy, that is, of 
the illegitimate appropriation of community resources (interestingly construed as non-
public),  bioprospecting  participants  in  Hayden’s  ethnographic  study  attempted  to 
collect  plant  samples  for  screening  only  from sites  “safely  located  in  the  public 
domain” – such as from government land by the side of roads, and from urban markets 
(interestingly  construed  as  public).  Commercially  expedient  biodiversity  research 
takes  place  today  in  a  highly  volatile  political  and  regulatory  environment.  The 
distinction of publics from non-publics and the definition of their respective valencies 
are  thus  crucial  sites  of  contestation  in  this  field.  Hayden’s  contested  publics  of 
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bioprospecting  mediate  struggles  over  rights,  entitlements,  and  obligations,  in 
particular with regards to flows of resources – both biogenetic and financial. Hayden 
is interested in the way in which publicness gets inscribed into particular resources, 
spheres,  knowledges and social groups, and then erased from them again.  She has 
shown repeatedly how the attribute of publicness does a lot of work in the legitimating 
of bioprospecting and other corporate resource extraction, in the (re-)distribution of 
so-called benefits, and the managing of liabilities.
ProBenefit  was also  in  need of  a  particular  public.  After  all,  the norms and rules 
governing bioprospecting endeavours, such as ABS guidelines, specify processes of 
public engagement and consultation: scientific projects seeking access to biogenetic 
resources need to consult with the affected local ‘public’, or even obtain their prior 
informed consent and agree on benefit sharing mechanisms to remain in the realm of 
legality.  The attempt  to  evade this  public  engagement  and its  complications  is  of 
course what led the Mexican bioprospectors of Hayden’s study to seek out domains 
that could be understood to be public in a different way:  the affected local public 
could by way of their affectedness lay claim to the desired resources in such a way as 
to impede the prospecting activities to the point of shutdown.134 In order to circumvent 
public  engagement,  then,  engagement  of  public  domains was  sought,  and  in  that 
process the ‘affected local public’ was (re)envisioned as a quasi-private ‘community’ 
diametrically  opposed,  by  virtue  of  its  rights  to  its  knowledge  and  associated 
biogenetic resources, to the public domain (cf. Hayden 2004). 
134 That this potential shutdown is a real ‘risk’ has been shown in several other studies (e.g. Berlin 
& Berlin 2004; Greene 2002) and will be corroborated by the case of ProBenefit discussed here.
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From engagement,  via  consultation,  then  negotiation,  to  the  (possible)  agreement 
resulting in an Access and Benefit-Sharing Contract, ProBenefit needed to enlist the 
relevant  indigenous  public  to  participate  in  its  process.  Without  this  public’s 
participation, ProBenefit could not proceed, let alone achieve its objectives. In this 
way, ProBenefit’s existence and potential success was predicated on the availability 
and participation of this public. So, who was this relevant public ProBenefit aimed to 
engage with,  and where was it  to be found? Certain criteria were available at  the 
outset: to operate within the realms of legality, ProBenefit needed to consult with “the 
affected  local,  indigenous  or  afro-descendent  communities”135,  that  is,  the 
communities whose territories and knowledge the project intended to gain access to in 
order  to  enable  scientific  study  of  the  medicinal  properties  of  promising  plant 
candidates  with  a  view  to  the  potential  development  of  a  new  plant-based 
pharmaceutical  or  nutraceutical  product.  In  this  sense,  the  relevant  public  was  an 
instance of the liberal democratic vision of a public as “those affected” and hence 
subject  to  the  same  criticisms  and  complications,  such  as  what  affectedness  is 
constituted by and who can make such a decision (cf. Marres 2005; Archibugi 2003).
135 At the time, Ecuador had no explicit ABS regulations. However, CAN 391 (Art. 7), and the 
Ecuadorian Constitution (Art. 84) both stipulated that access to biogenetic resources and related 
traditional  knowledge  required  the  consultation  and  prior  informed  consent  of  the  affected 
indigenous, afro-descendent or local communities. When ProBenefit executed its study of the 
legal situation (see Woerrle 2005), the Ecuadorian Ministerio del Ambiente (Department of the 
Environment)  was  in  the  process  of  considering a draft  proposal  for  a  national  Access  and 
Benefit Sharing regulation (Propuesta de Reglamento de Acceso a Recursos Genéticos; on file) 
redacted by the  Grupo de Trabajo de Biodiversidad  (Working Group on Biodiversity), which 
reinforced  and  clarified  the  requirement  of  a  consulta  previa –  a  consultation  and  consent 
procedure – for any access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge sought. 
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Very early on in the process,  ProBenefit  made the  provisional decision to aim for 
bioprospecting in  the Sumaco Biosphere Reserve,  a  biologically very diverse area 
comprising  a  variety  of  different  ecosystems  at  different  altitudes  (from  lowland 
rainforest, through cloudforest to high altitude páramo grasslands) that was already 
under protection as UNESCO reserve since the year 2000 and is funded by the GtZ 
(German Technical Cooperation). It was thought that the local communities in the area 
were  already acquainted  with  foreign  research  and  development  programmes  and 
would  hence  be  favourably  inclined  to  ProBenefit’s  proposals.  When  part  of  the 
ProBenefit team headed out to Ecuador in early 2004, a year after the project had 
officially  started,  they  identified  a  total  of  37  organisations136 (from  government 
agencies to local indigenous associations) that were in turn provided with information 
about the project and its objectives. Reactions were divided, ranging from complete 
rejection  and  immediate  allegations  of  potential  biopiracy  (by  more  radical 
environmentalist NGOs) via concern (e.g. CONAIE) to open-mindedness and general 
interest  by  the  majority.  Research  into  the  legal  and  socio-historical  situation  of 
conducting public consultations in the region continued until December 2004137 when 
a  three-day  workshop  was  held  in  Archidona  with  the  participation  of  35 
representatives of indigenous or quasi-indigenous organisations,  30 of which came 
from the projected project locality. The workshop’s purpose was to discuss the legal 
136 17  of  these  organisations  could  be  classified  as  ‘indigenous’,  and  11  of  these  were  of  the  
projected research locality. My own experience confirms that this is quite an extensive selection 
of organisations active in the area. 
137 Most of this research was conducted from Germany, but the project team’s anthropologist also 
spent one month in Ecuador to conduct interviews on the matter.
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framework of and indigenous participation in the procedure of accessing biological 
resources  in  Ecuador.  This  workshop was  a  crucial  step  in  the  development  of  a 
participatory methodology for the public consultation process that ProBenefit needed 
to engage in. It was also the occasion for one particular line that was repeated to me 
several  times,  and over  which minor  conflicts  arose at  a  later  stage  of  the public 
engagement process.  ProBenefit’s  anthropologist  said at  some point:  “If  you don’t 
want to participate, then we will have to go somewhere else”. Even if this was meant 
as an assurance that no bioprospecting would take place in this area if people did not 
volunteer to participate (which is what he told me later), it is of course also impossible 
to  not  understand this  as  a  threat  in  the  sense of  ‘somebody else  will  participate 
somewhere else  and they will  then be possible benefit  recipients’.  The indigenous 
participants wondered and worried about this attitude until the very end of the project. 
Under the constant threat of biopiracy allegations, the German ProBenefit team, on the 
other  hand,  worried about  legitimacy,  transparency and accountability – especially 
when the conclusions of the initial workshop became clear: to obtain ‘ethical access’ 
to  biological  resources  for  research was  going  to  be  a  process  full  of  pitfalls, 
possibilities for conflict and complications. 
The recommendations with regard to the public consultation and obtaining of prior 
informed  consent  (compiled  by ProBenefit's  anthropologist  in  retrospect  and after 
further  discussions  with  indigenous  ‘experts’ and  other  individuals  present  at  the 
workshop) were as follows: In terms of obtaining authorization to access the land on 
which  scientific  investigations  were  to  be  conducted,  the  actual  land  owners 
(individuals and collectives such as communities and associations or cooperatives) 
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needed  to  be  consulted  and  their  permission  sought.  For  access  to  and  use  of 
traditional knowledge,  the affected indigenous peoples needed to be consulted and 
their  prior  informed consent  obtained.  Given that  there are  an estimated 60,000 – 
100,000 Kichwa living  in  the  Ecuadorian Amazon region (plus  some more  in  the 
adjacent  Peruvian  territory),  full  consultation  within  the  parameters  of  the  project 
seemed well-nigh impossible. It was hence proposed to form an indigenous working 
group  that  could  develop  an  ‘indigenous  framework’ for  basic  access  conditions. 
Extensive capacity-building for such a working group was considered indispensable, 
and  it  was  supposed  to  be  provided  by  independent,  and  ideally  indigenous 
professionals  with  expertise  in  the  subject  area.  The  consultation  based  on  the 
conditions  framed  by  the  indigenous  working  group  would  then  proceed  via  the 
mechanisms of the representative indigenous organisations, and especially federations, 
such as FONAKIN and others to ensure the greatest possible coverage. This would be 
made  more  problematic  if  the  knowledge  in  question  were  shared  amongst  other 
ethnic groups and possibly in other Amazonian countries. It was noted that before the 
consultation regarding consent, an information process was necessary, which would 
probably  have  to  take  the  form  of  at  least  several  successive  asambleas in  the 
communities  themselves  to  clarify  the  project  and  its  objectives,  enable  internal 
communication  and  support  opinion-forming  processes.  For  access  to  the  genetic  
resources, permission by the state (as legal proprietor of the genetic resources within 
its territory) needed to be solicited, and the affected peoples needed to be provided 
with information only (this was the juridical state of affairs in Ecuador at the time, 
based on CAN 391 and other  legal instruments).  For reasons of best  practice and 
safety,  ProBenefit  recommended obtaining consent  from the  affected  peoples  also. 
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There was concern that a veto by indigenous peoples would not be accepted by the 
Ecuadorian state and such a situation would lead to serious conflicts, especially if it 
was felt that a precedent had been set either way.
The more complicated aspects of the processes to obtain ‘ethical access’ had to do 
with contradictions in the theory.  On the one hand, the access conditions (such as 
research locality, definition of resources to be investigated, expected benefits to be 
shared,  benefit  recipients,  intellectual  property allocation,  etc.)  needed  to  be  clear 
before the actual consultation could meaningfully begin. On the other hand, however, 
they were only fully definable  after research had in fact begun. Moreover, even if 
access conditions could be defined in close cooperation with the affected indigenous 
peoples, and consent obtained based on a participatory consultation process, since the 
Ecuadorian state would only then consider authorizing the ABS agreement, conflicts 
might nonetheless flare if revisions were retrospectively required by the governmental 
authority.  The  solutions  proposed  as  routes  through  this  quagmire  were  either  to 
design a consultation and consent process that would take place in several phases, or 
to  draw up a  proposal  to  be voted  on that  contained different  scenarios  based  on 
divergences  in  initial  conditions  (e.g.  a  plant  with  widespread  use  might  require 
different definition of benefit recipients than a plant with highly localised habitat used 
only by a small portion of the population). Furthermore, it was proposed to accept 
only a decision (a consent) made by consensus, even though the prevalent method for 
decision-making in most general assemblies of federations such as FONAKIN was by 
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majority vote138. It was felt that this was necessary in order to pre-empt any conflicts 
and ensure the sustainability of the project. It was also recommended to ensure the 
collective decision was made and clear  before  any scientific research would begin. 
These  precautions  –  creation  of  an  indigenous  working  group,  an  extensive 
information campaign, consultation with indigenous communities over and above the 
legal  requirements,  and  consensus  decision-making  –  were  thought  to  legitimise 
ProBenefit’s  activities  and  create  a  ‘safe’ domain  within  which  the  project  could 
unfold.
After  further  discussions  in  May 2005,  FONAKIN became the official  indigenous 
counterpart of ProBenefit with contractual obligations to oversee the coordination of a 
delegation of indigenous representatives from various organisations (not all affiliated 
to FONAKIN). This delegation was to participate in a capacity building workshop 
series (6 4-day modules over 3 months), after which they would form an independent 
working group that would design and perform the actual activities constituting public 
consultation.139 I discuss the details of the aftermath of the capacity building course in 
Section 4.7. below. First, however, let me discuss what I believe to be the underlying 
138 Yet FONAKIN’s majority vote in practice looked much more like consensus decision-making. I 
return to this below.
139 It bears mentioning here maybe that it is ironic how usually public consultation is supposed to 
circumvent representative organisations (such as local governments, say) in order for it to be  
truly public. In the indigenous case in Ecuador, this point highlights a particular tension in the 
indigenous  movement.  It  is  unthinkable  for  an  outsider  to  do  anything  ‘legitimately’  in 
indigenous territory without approaching the overarching indigenous federations of the area first. 
At the same time, the grassroots feel very badly represented by these federations, which are said 
to be corrupt, and often run over decades by members of the same families. This might simply 
imply that there is no one indigenous public, in the same way as there is no unified national 
public sphere.
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problems of the entire endeavour in the following sections. Using examples from the 
capacity building course and other ProBenefit events, I comment on the disparity in 
expectations regarding the partnership, as well as on the way in which the relevance of 
equitable Access and Benefit Sharing to the lives of indigenous people was assumed 
and, ultimately, imposed rather than discovered as an actual priority of people. I also 
discuss how the messiness of real public participation conflicted with the requirements 
of public legitimation. I argue that the myth of a level playing field and what we might 
call  the  the  historical  ‘naivety’ of  the  ProBenefit  team members  is  likely to  have 
complicated  an  already  difficult  situation  and  troubled  an  incipient  ‘partnership’. 
These issues hark back to and are meant to illustrate some of the problems which I 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.,  regarding public participation in development 
and governance.
4.3 The Rocky Road of Partnership: on being unprepared.
After  the  capacity  building  workshop,  once  the  indigenous  working  group  was 
officially formed, and the German team had returned to Germany awaiting a proposal 
for continuation and plan for consultation, progress rapidly stalled. Communications 
between the two parties broke down for almost six months, then picked up but were 
mired by a series of misunderstandings. The project ended without any wider public 
consultation, nor any agreement being reached.
From  ProBenefit’s  point  of  view,  the  results  of  indigenous  participation  were 
disappointing.  No  dialogue  with  Schwabe  Pharmaceuticals  was  entered  into;  the 
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benefits  that  were  offered  by  the  company  (capacity  building,  working  group 
formation, travel possibility) were neither recognised as such, nor made sufficient use 
of. Moreover, the indigenous counterpart never elaborated any proposals for expected 
benefits,  nor  were any conditions  or  contractual  guidelines  articulated,  despite  the 
support available from ‘native experts’ (ProBenefit 2007). This outcome ran counter 
to ProBenefit’s expectations. The project had assumed that participation would work 
due to the strong political organisation of indigenous communities in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon,  in  which  the  structures  for  consultation  and  negotiation  were  in  place. 
Moreover, it had been assumed that whoever wants to participate in the project will 
also actively collaborate, and that signing an agreement (e.g. the agreement between 
FONAKIN and ProBenefit)  would mean that  the process  is  being taken seriously. 
Also,  ProBenefit  had been aware of the scandalous consultation carried out by oil 
companies in the Napo province in 2003, and therefore assumed that as long as the 
planning and realisation of a public consultation was participatory, acceptance of the 
process would be high and co-responsibility of all project partners would be assured 
(ProBenefit 2007).
In the closing workshop that took place in Quito in October 2007, and in which 22 
participants from 17 organisations took part, ProBenefit presented the results and its 
analysis  of  the  process.  It  ought  to  be  mentioned  that  this  workshop  primarily 
addressed governmental and non-governmental organisations working on ABS issues, 
and  only  two  indigenous  delegates  attended,  representing  FONAKIN  and  the 
governmental  Indigenous  Development  Council  (CODENPE).  ProBenefit’s 
conclusions,  both presented and further  participatively elaborated  in  the  workshop 
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centred on different versions of one main point:  co-responsibility. It was maintained 
that without all actors actively and responsibly performing their role in the process, 
ABS  negotiations  and  agreements  are  bound  to  fail.  The  need  for  the  risk  of 
involvement  to  be  calculable  for  the  company  was  underlined,  as  otherwise 
engagement would be invariably deemed too costly and unsafe. Without any kind of 
investment, however small, on the part of the participating indigenous organisations, 
any company would  find  it  difficult  to  place  confidence  in  (the  goodwill  of)  the 
indigenous  partner.  Moreover,  it  was  concluded  that  ABS cannot  be  developed  if 
knowledge holders cannot define their expectations of benefits and propose guidelines 
for their sharing. ProBenefit’s final report (2007) states: “property obliges”, thereby 
implying that now that indigenous peoples have been afforded property rights in their 
knowledge, they also have to strengthen their  organisations so that they can make 
proper proposals for benefit sharing.  This, in my view, twists beyond all recognition 
the  rationale  behind  the  demands  for  collective  rights  in  their  knowledge  that 
indigenous movements have insisted upon. The main concern of indigenous peoples 
has always  been the defence of  their  territories and self-determination;  facilitating 
legal access, on the other hand, is primarily in the interest of scientists and companies
140. Indigenous peoples’ claims for rights in their knowledge are firstly a strategy to 
bolster territorial self-determination; the fact that such rights might enable them to 
receive benefits or compensation for access provided is only a side-effect.
140 This point was also made during ProBenefit’s closing workshop by the Ecuadorian indigenous 
lawyer Rodrigo de la Cruz.
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Nonetheless, ProBenefit’s position was clear: ABS processes require ‘strong partners’ 
with  the  education,  understanding  and  capacities  necessary  for  the  task  at  hand. 
Indigenous organisations need to be prepared enough to engage in negotiations with 
companies and to conduct consultations with their base communities; to this end their 
ABS  expertise  needs  to  be  strengthened,  as  well  as  their  management  skills  and 
strategy  development.  In  the  ProBenefit  case,  FONAKIN  was  simply  not  strong 
enough a partner (ProBenefit 2007; Krück 2008). However, turning these conclusions 
around,  we might  reasonably ask whether  ProBenefit  was prepared enough for its 
engagement with the Napo Runa. 
To  be  legitimate,  ProBenefit  needed  to  ensure  maximum  transparency  and 
participation,  yet  time  and  financial  constraints,  including  lack  of  continuous 
involvement  to  more  fully  get  to  know the  working conditions  of  the  indigenous 
counterpart, as well as their motivations for participation or their most pressing other 
concerns, meant that ProBenefit dictated much more what participation meant than 
they were able to acknowledge. Legitimate participation could only occur within a 
framework  of  dialogic  rationality,  yet  the  colonial  nature  of  this  framework  was 
disregarded. Such disregard was enhanced or even enabled by the relative cultural 
hybridity, or so-called acculturation of the Napo Runa that made it easy to overlook 
the sometimes very different cultural understandings that animate their world view 
and lifeways. This cultural hybridity also meant that many of the Napo Runa involved 
wanted  to  manage  and  excel  in  this  framework,  yet  struggled  to  do  so  and 
simultaneously resisted its more exigent demands. It is amongst other things this kind 
of contradiction – between the desire for Euro-American development and economic 
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possibilities  on  the  one  hand,  and  suspicion  of  and  resistance  to  Euro-American 
development interventions and corporate organisations on the other – that ProBenefit 
insisted needed to be ‘dissolved’ (by the indigenous organisations themselves) before 
any serious work on such issues as access and benefit sharing would be feasible. The 
indigenous  organisations,  it  was  concluded  by the  ProBenefit  team in  its  closing 
workshop, needed to define and clarify whether they were inclined to allow access to 
their resources and knowledge or not, otherwise any engagement process would be 
futile.  “Where  not  responsibility  and coherence,  but  this  ‘over-emotional’ mindset 
characterises the interaction, an ABS agreement will be impossible” (ProBenefit 2007
). Examples of what this supposedly ‘over-emotional’ mindset looked like in practice 
are to follow.
4.4 Contriving Relevance.
Even though the communities ‘affected’ by bioprospecting are arguably much less 
‘affected’ – or in importantly different ways – than those affected by, say, prospecting 
for  oil  or  other  subsoil  resources,  simply  due  to  the  difference  in  impact  of  the 
respective activities to a community’s life (compare oil wells with plant sampling), it 
seems nonetheless plausible141 that the affected communities would be those in whose 
territories or vicinity the proposed research activities would take place. This point on 
141 Note here that this need not be plausible at all: one only has to remember the Mexican ICBG 
case where benefit recipients – the relevant public – were associations and other groups that  
were in fact  completely disconnected from the sample gathering which took place in  urban 
markets (Hayden 2003a; 2004).
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affectedness is important because it illustrates the contingency of the significance of 
public engagement in this case. Affectedness and relevance need much more political 
work to be established in the context of bioprospecting: people drinking from polluted 
rivers, birthing malformed children, dying of cancer, and losing their foodstuffs to 
pools of crude oil are much more radically, directly affected by the activities of the oil 
industry than people whose affectedness by the pharmaceutical industry is contingent 
on the political construction of their property relations to certain plants and of their 
knowledge as commodifiable. Why all this laborious constructing of affectedness? To 
construe indigenous peoples as affected by bioprospecting (due to their rights to their 
knowledge) offered itself as a useful tool to frame certain economic injustices, and 
was  hence  advanced  by  non-governmental  organisations  pushing  the  indigenous 
cause. At the same time, however, this construal insidiously supports the view that 
people’s  interests  are  primarily  defined economically,  and in  terms  of  property.  It 
downplays the possibility that people might actually not care about a pharmaceutical 
corporation elsewhere holding a patent on an active ingredient of a plant of ancient 
use. Yet this attitude might be more widespread than expected. Indeed, I have found 
that  the  relevance  of  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  as  protection  from 
misappropriation had to be actively ‘created’ for people to conceive of it as a threat 
relevant to their lives.
During the preliminary workshops and the follow-up discussions with FONAKIN, it 
was  decided that  participants  of  the  capacity  building  course  had to  fulfil  certain 
criteria to be considered as candidates for the working group in formation. As it turned 
out later, of the 25 participants, only a small minority could claim to unequivocally fit  
245
all the criteria. It was FONAKIN’s responsibility to ensure delegates were of the ‘right 
kind’142.  At  least  50%  of  the  participants  were  required  to  have  “affinity  with 
traditional medicine”, and gender balance was aimed for. Even though FONAKIN had 
a say in the definition of the selection criteria, it was impossible to find many suitable 
candidates under these conditions. According to the selection criteria, the participants 
should:
1. Belong to the Kichwa people of lowland Ecuador.
2. Speak both Spanish and Kichwa.
3. Have a certain level of formal education (at least primary school).
4. Fulfil  at  least  two of the following criteria:  (i)  experience with projects  of 
sustainable  or  community  development;  (ii)  leadership  experience  in  an 
indigenous federation or similar; (iii) affinity with traditional medicine (be a 
shaman, midwife, healer, health promoter, or similar).
5. Have sufficient time available to participate in all the modules of the course 
and later to continue work as part of the indigenous working group. 
6. Submit a letter of support of the delegating organisation, and a letter of support 
of one’s home community.
The difficulty in finding relevant delegates conforming to these criteria was due to the 
fact  that  someone  with  formal  education,  as  well  as  leadership  experience  and 
knowledge of traditional medicine would be unlikely to have the time or the interest to 
142 This responsibility was set out in the agreement signed in May 2005 between ProBenefit and 
FONAKIN.
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become part of the working group. After all, such combination of skills is not that 
common among Napo Runa and employment or otherwise remunerated activity would 
be  open to  someone  with  such experience  elsewhere.  Participants  of  the  capacity 
building course repeatedly highlighted that their  time away from home and family 
without pay was difficult to justify. Remuneration was a conflict point that continued 
throughout  the  duration  of  the  project  and  affected  German-indigenous  relations 
during the whole of the capacity building course as well  as in  the aftermath.  The 
indigenous participants insisted that it was important they should get paid for their 
absence from home. The German team members explained again and again why this 
was impossible, how they needed to be careful to not be seen to ‘buy’ indigenous 
allegiance, how the whole course was already a major expense (25,000 US$), and how 
the participants were learning something that could be useful for them in the future143. 
From the German perspective, the capacity building course was a good in and of itself, 
and the training provided would serve participants even outside of the project itself. 
From the indigenous delegate’s point of view, participation in the capacity building 
course  meant  absence  from home  without  pay  and  without  clear  benefits  for  the 
future. Would they be employed through the project afterwards? Would the course 
prepare  them  for  managing  potential  conflicts  which  may  arise  with  regard  to 
ProBenefit? Was ProBenefit  trying to manipulate them? These were questions that 
occupied many delegates from the beginning. Their concerns were not alleviated as 
the course progressed.
143 While the fear  of  being seen to  ‘buy’ allegiance is understandable,  this  is  a  typical  case of 
development worker- indigenous peoples interaction involving people who get paid asking other 
people who do not get paid to give up economically (in its broadest sense) useful time.
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That only a fraction of the course participants did indeed fulfil all the selection criteria 
raised  grave  concerns  about  ‘proper  process’,  representativeness,  legitimacy  and 
transparency amongst  the  German  team members.  Worse  even,  at  the  end  of  the 
course, it also turned out that two signatures had been falsified, and hence two course 
participants were not actually the representatives of the organisations that they had 
claimed they were. One of the signatures had been falsified by a young man who had 
simply  wanted  his  cousin  to  also  be  part  of  the  course  “to  be  able  to  share  the 
experience”. The other signature was interestingly falsified by one of the main leaders 
of  FONAKIN.  The  ‘fake’  delegate  purportedly  represented  Salud  Indígena,  the 
governmental  health  organisation  providing  services  in  indigenous  communities, 
staffed mainly by indigenous people themselves. The leader of FONAKIN had close 
connections to Salud Indígena, but wanted a close ally to participate in the course who 
was not a member. The exasperation of the German team was unsurprising, and these 
incidences are likely to  have led to  ProBenefit’s  conclusion that  “decision-making 
is ... often intransparent [sic] and precarious” and that indigenous organisations ought 
to “strengthen the stability, transparency and accountability of organization structures 
to become more reliable for conceivable ABS partners” (Krück 2008).
The first few sessions of the capacity building course were characterised by a lot of 
mobile phone use, joking and flirting on the part of the indigenous participants, who 
seemed to make use of the setting for what the Germans thought of as “disturbing” 
sociability. In the evenings, several of the male participants would indulge in alcoholic 
beverages to the point of getting severely intoxicated together with the people living 
in the community in the vicinity of the workshop venue, which led to a series of 
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absences during the morning sessions. It was hence reiterated again and again that this 
course was “important”, and that the participants had tasks to fulfil “on behalf of all  
their communities” and, in fact, “their whole people”. It was also during these first 
sessions in particular, that it  was repeated how unique ProBenefit was, and what a 
great opportunity it would be for the Kichwa people, all indigenous nationalities, and 
Ecuador as a whole, if the participants made the best of this course. Certain “ground 
rules”  were  then  participatively elaborated,  mobile  phone use  banned,  and greater 
attention pleaded for. The indigenous representatives themselves came up with these 
rules when the task was presented, and over the three months a particular project ethos 
came to characterise interactions, with participants disciplining each other if necessary 
to  pay  attention,  participate,  and  turn  up  on  time  for  the  morning  sessions.  The 
relevance  (of  ProBenefit,  of  commercialisation  and  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge) to Napo Runa lives was assumed and continuously performed (through 
reiterations by the German team in particular, but not only, also by me for example, as 
well  as  increasingly  working  group  members  themselves).  The  performance  of 
irrelevance, however, was never taken as a legitimate expression of one’s opinion or 
standpoint. In this way, forms of non-participation, such as when participants chatted 
and giggled amongst themselves about their private lives during the capacity building 
course, or when nobody turned up to working group meetings to design a consultation 
process, were not interpreted as pointing towards potential flaws in the project, but as 
indications of the incapacity of the participating indigenous organisations. 
249
4.5 Prescribed Participation: conflicts of autonomy and guidance.
Participative methods almost invariably increase group cohesion,  and can trigger a 
feeling of co-ownership of the group process. Yet, such niceties can be deceptive: 
while  authority  is  being  decentralised  through  participative  methods,  certain 
unquestioned  norms,  values  and  power  structures  are  easily  internalised.  The 
‘identification with’ and ‘co-ownership of’ projects that use participative methods are 
often effective in producing successful outcomes in terms of project implementation. 
However,  as discussed in Chapter 2, participation does not in and of itself  lead to 
emancipatory or empowering results (cf. Cooke & Kothari 2001). Indeed, an emphasis 
on  the  micro-level  of  intervention  (participatory,  decentralised,  horizontal  project 
activities and decision-making processes)  can obscure and sustain broader,  macro-
level  inequalities  and  injustices  (geo-political  asymmetries,  institutional  racism, 
gender inequalities, global colonial relations). On a Foucauldian view, participation 
can be a technique through which existing power relations express themselves in new 
ways – through the now self-disciplining participants.
Participation  in  ProBenefit  formed  the  delegates’ understanding  of  the  issues  of 
traditional knowledge, including their understanding of their own role and task in the 
protection of traditional knowledge, in a terms of a particular ‘ProBenefit-ethos’, yet 
not successfully, that is, lastingly or entirely so. Despite the insistence on an (ultra) 
transparent and (highly) participatory approach, ultimately the most vital aspects of 
the process were still defined by ProBenefit. The process still unfolded on their terms 
(partly  to  counter  corrupt  tendencies  of  indigenous  organisations),  which  were 
basically terms of a particular understanding of legitimation (one infused with images 
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of  openness,  dialogue,  transparency,  rationality,  etc.,  all  to  be  found  in  the 
conventional  ideas  about  the  public  sphere;  see,  e.g.  Fraser  1997).  While  it  was 
possible for indigenous participants to insist on a neutral working group to be formed 
(which fits with the imaginary of ethical legitimation of participatory approaches, and 
also would overcome the logistical difficulties of consulting directly with 60,000 – 
100,000 people living in more or less remote rainforest locations), it was not possible 
to  extend  the  project  time  frame  or  to  mess  up  the  criteria  of  transparency  and 
representative participation.  It  was also impossible  to  ask for clearly defined aims 
(exact locality, definition of minimum benefits to be expected) as that would have pre-
empted the participatory process – as envisioned by ProBenefit. In the end however, as 
we shall see in subsequent sections, when the indigenous working group was offered 
more ‘definition’ (in terms of a draft ABS proposal), they were scared and outraged, 
again highlighting the contradictory expectations held on both sides.  However,  the 
communication failure that led to the misunderstandings  and conflicts  at  that  time 
clearly also played a significant role in this rejection.
In this case, it seems that the vicissitudes and messiness of real public participation 
conflicted with the requirements of public legitimation. The former happens with real 
people, the latter with (more) ideal members of civil society. In our case the problem 
is  that  the ideal  version  requires  people to  have  a  certain  amount  of  education,  a 
certain robustness of interests in the issue, a sense of civic duty beyond the immediate 
collective unit or some other real motivation, a certain general mobility, faith in the 
participatory process.  These  attributes  were  not  wide-spread amongst  the  working 
group members. Neglect, wilful delay, sabotage are all “weapons of the weak” (Scott 
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1985),  often  used  by the  subaltern  to  exert  a  form of  power  over  the  processes 
affecting their  lives.  The question is,  of course,  why this  should not  be seen as a 
‘legitimate’ form of expressing one’s attitude or (unarticulated) opinion. Could it not 
be that if the primary concern of indigenous communities is their struggle for self-
determination over their territories, that neglecting or even sabotaging projects such as 
ProBenefit  is  the ‘best’ or  most  easily available  way to exert  some power in  this 
regard?  Is  this  not  a  form  of  participation,  too?  After  all,  stopping things  from 
happening might in fact necessitate delaying tactics.
4.6 The Myth of a Level Playing Field.
The  niceties  of  participation  hid  the  deeper  conflicts  at  the  heart  of  ProBenefit, 
conflicts which harked back to colonial relationships with a history of 500 years, and 
which  manifested  themselves  as  seemingly  unrelated  frictions  or  complications 
throughout the project duration. It was difficult for the German team to understand 
and accept the suspicions with which they were faced, despite the transparent and 
participatory process which they had worked hard to achieve. As one team member 
remarked: “It is always the same. Every time we go over and over the same issues, 
that we are not here to steal anyone’s knowledge. That if we were, we could have long 
done so! That after all, FONAKIN and other organisations themselves decided on this 
particular process. It is quite exhausting.” For the indigenous delegates their worries 
were legitimate. As one participant put it: “They [the ProBenefit team] have not come 
here for charity! This is a business proposal. They think they will make some money. 
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But how are we to understand what is going on?!” – “First the white foreigners came 
to steal outright, now they come to make business. What is the difference?”
During the evaluation and feedback session of the ‘Planning Workshop’ (in which the 
working group was officially formed and its tasks were elaborated), many questions 
were asked regarding the expenses of the project so far. 25,000 US$ had been spent by 
Schwabe Pharmaceuticals Ltd. to fund the capacity building workshop, and this did 
not include the salaries of the ProBenefit team members. Everybody seemed silently 
impressed. Soon thereafter a discussion arose about the proposed 10 US$ daily salary 
for members of the working group. “We earn more as farm workers when we get hired 
with machete, or when we go to town with our produce” complained someone, and 
others nodded their heads. ProBenefit’s anthropologist explained: “We have analysed 
the [2003] public consultation by the oil companies [that took place in the region and 
turned into a complete scandal], and the oil company paid the indigenous facilitators 
of the consultation very well and so there were lots of accusations that people had 
been ‘bought’. To avoid such a situation, we decided together with FONAKIN to pay 
the  working  group  the  same  salary  that  indigenous  health  promoters  working  in 
communities get, and that is 10 US$.” Another German team member added: “And if 
we paid a lot more, there is the risk that you would only participate for the money’s 
sake! Of course you could ask the company to pay a lot more, but then they might 
well refuse to continue the project” – “And remember” the anthropologist continued 
“you do not need to live off this salary only. Most of you will need to work only two  
or three days per week on the project.”
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Discussions over remuneration and the general asymmetry of the salaries continued 
after the meeting in smaller groups, and in Kichwa. I was later told that none of the 
delegates ever thought it was fair. They understood the work of the working group to 
be  work  for the  company and  for ProBenefit,  and  they  knew only  too  well  that 
Europeans generally earn more than US$ 10 per day.  “It’s different to be a health 
promoter” explained a middle-aged woman and mother of six to me “you are doing 
something for your community, people appreciate that you visit, they might provide 
you with some food, too, and you learn important things about illnesses, which are 
very  useful  when  someone  in  your  family  gets  ill.”  The  work  of  the  ProBenefit 
working  group  was  never  considered  on  similar  terms.  On  the  contrary,  it  was 
generally  viewed  as  risky,  potentially  creating  conflicts  and  upsetting  people. 
Nonetheless,  as  long as  the  working group existed,  some of  the  more  committed 
members repeated phrases which had been used during the capacity building course: 
“This  work  is  very  important.”  –  “Our  knowledge  is  our  intellectual  property, 
someone needs to make sure everyone in every community understands that.” - “We 
need to protect our knowledge, we should take this responsibility serious, and maybe 
we get  some benefits  from the  company Schwabe.”  This  changed again  once  the 
project had come to an end, and the working group dissolved.
During its closing workshop, ProBenefit emphasised that a sense of mistrust rather 
than  pro-active  dialogue  suffused  the  project.  It  was  argued  that  remaining  in  a 
position of mistrust even when goodwill is being professed and even when juridical 
mechanisms  are  in  place  to  ensure  the  respect  for  indigenous  rights,  cannot  but 
complicate intercultural  communication.  Relatedly,  it  claimed, to blame others and 
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take on the role of the victim impedes the recognition that cooperation with project 
partners could lead to  development,  commercialisation and modern exploitation of 
biological resources and traditional knowledge. When such an emotionally animated 
attitude  overrides  responsibility  and  coherence  in  dialogue,  an  ABS  process  and 
agreement will be impossible. The process would simply become too unreliable and 
economically risky (ProBenefit 2007).
It is interesting how readily it was assumed that a partnership could be constructed 
simply through a transparent and participatory process. That the expenses were paid 
by ProBenefit (or directly by the company) seemed to be taken as the (only) necessary 
levelling  of  the  playing  field.  Trust  was  then  assumed  to  be  only  a  matter  of 
transparent dialogue. However, the power asymmetry of the whole endeavour could 
not simply be readjusted through a participatory consultative process. The economic 
injustice ethical bioprospecting professes to redress has, as we all know, a formidably 
bloody and brutal history of over 500 years. To leave completely unaddressed the fact 
that,  from  a  certain  perspective,  the  phenomenon  of  ProBenefit  looks  like:  ‘big 
company with masses of money announces its imminent arrival and shoos everyone 
about to enable its  operations, offering small  presents to a select few in return’ is 
bound to be an unconvincing approach to build trust  and create  partnerships  with 
indigenous Amazonians. This approach is not specific to ProBenefit, but extends to 
other experiences of working with indigenous peoples: the historical context is rarely 
taken  properly  into  account  and  a  familiarity  with  the  situation  ‘on  the  ground’, 
especially in terms of people’s perspectives being informed by often brutal historical 
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realities, is often lacking.144 The repeated comments by more than one ProBenefit team 
member referring to the “unbelievable patience” and “goodwill” of and “great risks 
taken” by the participating pharmaceutical company Schwabe indicate the belief on 
the part of the project team that the interaction was occurring on a relatively level 
playing  field.  However,  an  expense  of  about  25,000  US$  in  2006  (Schwabe 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. paid for the capacity building course), given net sales of 490 
million  Euro  in  2007  (and  Research  and  Development  expenses  of  27  million 
worldwide in the same year) simply does not back this view.
4.7 Friction and Failure.
What follows is a description of the key moments that defined the ProBenefit process 
after the completion of the capacity building course. This should illustrate the ways in 
which the complications and ultimate failure of ProBenefit (ProBenefit came to an end 
before Phase 1 had been completed) found their roots in the contradictory expectations 
held on both the German and the indigenous side. I maintain that these expectations in 
part result from each side’s respective location in a historical, colonial relationship 
that extends far beyond the particular here and now of ProBenefit.
144 A parallel lack of consideration of historical context is noted by Paul Oldham and Oscar Forero 
in their work with Mapuche in Chile (personal communication).
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4.7.1 Asamblea Ordinaria.
FONAKIN’s Asamblea Ordinaria is something akin to a Annual General Meeting. It 
usually lasts three to four days and is attended by both post-holding (i.e. leaders or 
directors,  dirigentes)  and  non-post-holding  members  of  FONAKIN’s  ‘base 
communities’  (that  is,  all  the  communities  and  associations  that  make  up  the 
federation). The decisions taken at the Asamblea overrule those taken by the Council 
(Consejo), whose members usually receive a wage (when there is money available) 
and  are  responsible  for  the  day-to-day running  of  the  organisation.  Decisions  are 
usually taken by majority vote, and even though everyone can participate in the very 
long discussions that precede any decision-making, communities usually have only 
one vote  each.  I  say ‘usually’,  because  it  does  not  take much involvement  in  the 
indigenous movement in Ecuador to realise that the closer the organisation to its base 
communities,  the  more  negotiable  its  rules.  The  legitimacy  and  bindingness  of  a 
decision taken is not so much based on the exactitude with which a decision-making 
procedure was followed (the exact number of votes, say), but rather on a general sense 
that it had been preceded by proper discussion and that the decision finally taken was 
undeniably the majority’s opinion. This is in line with Schaefer’s understanding of 
Andean  and  Amazonian  community  politics  as  “a  shared  process  of  deliberate 
initiative through which the community decides on how to organise the joint process 
of economic, social and cultural (re)production”(2009: 401).145
145 But see Perreault 2002, and Woerrle 2005 for the view that majority vote has replaced consensus 
decision-making in Amazonian Kichwa communities and organisation.
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At the Asamblea Ordinaria of 2006, which took place on May 25 – 27 in the remote, 
but  road-accessible  community  of  Ñukanchik  Allpa  de  Kanambu,  ProBenefit  was 
presented  by  its  anthropologist  to  all  the  assembled  by  means  of  a  powerpoint 
projection  onto  one  of  only  two  walls  of  the  school  building.  The  project,  and 
FONAKIN’s involvement in it,  was discussed late at  night as part of the  mesa de  
discusión (thematic  discussion  table)  on  natural  resources  and biodiversity.  A few 
members of the working group were at the table to express their opinions and provide 
some  feedback  from  the  capacity  building  course.  They  struck  me  as  a  little 
intimidated.  Some  of  the  long-standing  leaders  of  FONAKIN  and  its  base 
organisations,  mainly  older  men  who  visibly  wielded  some  power  during  the 
discussions,  were  very  suspicious  of  ProBenefit,  a  project  that  Rosa  Alvarado, 
FONAKIN’s president had endorsed, however carefully, with consent of the Council 
only. This was the first time it was being debated in an Asamblea. “We have learned a 
lot, but we need to learn more” explained someone from the working group, and tried 
to justify the group’s function: “The protection of our knowledge is very important” - 
“Yes” said someone else “the working group can help everyone understand this.” The 
anthropologist, in the meantime, had gone to bed. “He never lets us finish what we 
have to say, he cuts us off” said one of the young women about him. “He is the one  
who said the company would go elsewhere if we don’t want to participate” pointed 
out  someone  else.  Everybody  started  talking  about  the  ways  of  the  tall  German 
anthropologist, whose experience of working with traditional healers in the area had 
made  him  move  more  confidently,  and  maybe  less  carefully,  among  the  Kichwa 
people than any of the other ProBenefit team members. “He has no respect” - “He is 
manipulative”. I was amazed at the force with which these impressions were suddenly 
258
communicated. Soon thereafter, it was decided to insist that the anthropologist leave 
the project  completely for any collaboration to continue.  “Wow!” I  wrote into my 
notebook.  “The  irony!  He  was  the  one  employed  to  ensure  the  cultural  
appropriateness,  sensitivity  etc.  of  ProB! Surely  this  is  a  prime case  of  using the  
weapons of the weak!? He’s been turned into a real scapegoat! He needed to be killed  
so that the old, powerful sceptics wouldn’t tear the whole project apart!?” This initial 
feeling  was  later  substantiated  further  when  several  people  told  me  that  they 
retrospectively felt  a little  guilty about this  incident:  “He wasn’t  really so bad”,  a 
comment  which  could  indicate  that  blaming  him fulfilled  some other  function.  A 
confident woman explained later that “he was very difficult, but all we wanted is that 
he change his ways, but it was so late at night, and all wanted to get the discussion 
over with, so the leaders (dirigentes) kicked him out and that was that”.  Apart from 
this  decision,  the  following  article  was  included  in  the  resolutions  taken  at  the 
Asamblea:
Art. 19. That in order to avoid any risks to the natural and cultural heritage 
of our Kichwa nationality of Napo with respect to the ProBenefit project, 
its  process  be  evaluated  after  the  socialisation  phase  (etapa  de 
socialización) at the base community level, so that the Extended Council 
(Consejo  Ampliado),  Assembly  (Asamblea)  or  Congress  (Congreso)  of 
FONAKIN may decide on the continuation of its subsequent phases, such 
as  the  prior  public  consultation  (consulta  previa)  and  the  proposal  for 
negotiation.146
146 In  Spanish:  Art. 19. Que con la finalidad de precautelar el patrimonio natural y cultural de  
nuestra nacionalidad Kichwa del Napo con respecto al proyecto ProBenefit, luego de la etapa  
de socialización a nivel de las comunidades de base, se evalúe su proceso para que en Consejo  
Ampliado, Asamblea o Congreso de FONAKIN, se decida la continuación de las siguientes  
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This resolution was crucial as it determined certain requirements for the continuation 
of ProBenefit, namely a process of ‘socialisation’ at the community level (which was 
understood as an information campaign, where the project would be made known to 
and  discussed  in  FONAKIN’s  base  communities),  followed  by an  evaluation  and 
subsequent decision regarding any further activities by one of FONAKIN’s decision-
making authorities (all of which are collective gatherings). In other words, without a 
phase of community level ‘socialisation’, there was no mandate, not for the working 
group nor for anybody else, to continue the ProBenefit process. 
4.7.2 Interim.
I left Ecuador for five months straight after the  Asamblea Ordinaria. I later learned 
that  the  working  group  found  it  difficult  to  accomplish  the  tasks  that  they  had 
participated in setting for themselves during the planning meeting. “Only five or six 
people turned up for the first meeting. We didn’t know where the money for the travel 
would come from”, I was told by one of the more enthusiastic members. ProBenefit 
had committed to paying travel and other expenses for the first meeting. After that, the 
working group had to arrange for expenses to be paid by the company. However, to be 
reimbursed, expenditure needed to be documented, and the documentation sent off to 
the relevant person. The effort required to accomplish this task did not seem to match 
the benefits  that being part  of the working group might have ultimately provided. 
Francisco, the elected coordinator and most committed member, explained: “If you 
etapas, como la consulta previa y propuesta de negociación.
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have to spend several hours at a street corner trying to sell some plantains to get hold 
of the coins you need to get back home, you think a lot  before a trip into town.” 
Money – coins and bills – is not something that is always available in an indigenous 
household. It is usually possible to borrow a few coins from some neighbour or the 
community shop keeper,  but  without  a  sure way of  returning them or  some other 
favours relatively soon, even that possibility can fade. Others commented: “I don’t 
have many clothes [nice clothes to go to town in], and when they are all dirty, I need 
to wash them first. Sometimes that means that I don’t go at all.” – “We were supposed 
to send the information to ProBenefit by email, but nobody [that turned up at the first 
independent working group meeting] knows how to use email, and it also costs money 
to use email in the cabinas [phone and internet shop]” - “They said that the company 
will maybe pay ten dollars to each per day of work, but that is not a lot and we don’t 
know how they are going to send the money [to us].”
Nonetheless, the working group managed to meet up three times, in varying, always 
small  sizes.  The members  present  decided they should just  go ahead despite  their 
reduced number and start to write a work plan with budget that they could send to 
ProBenefit.  So  Francisco,  the  coordinator  of  the  working  group,  and  Jefferson, 
FONAKIN’s “director of education” (dirigente de educación) who had a university 
degree (licenciatura), started drafting a proposal asking for a utopian 450,000 US$ for 
the socialisation of ProBenefit to the communities. Jefferson later told me, he had “no 
clue” what he was doing, as he did not fully understand the project. While not having 
been part of the capacity building course, Jefferson had the formal writing skills that 
nobody in the working group had. Their third meeting was interrupted by the allegedly 
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very drunk vice-president of FONAKIN who prohibited any communication between 
the working group and ProBenefit  without prior presidential  approval, an approval 
which  at  the  time  was  impossible  as  Rosa,  the  president,  was  running  for  local 
government and away on her election campaign. The working group did not meet 
again after this incident until I returned to Ecuador in November 2006.147
Once I  was present,  the  working group suddenly worked again.  I  understand this 
change in dynamic to be related to three hitherto unmet needs which I was able to 
fulfil.  Firstly,  I  was  able  to  provide  vital  support  for  the  accomplishments  of 
seemingly minor tasks, especially those that involved expense. I provided the 50 cents 
needed for a bus ticket or phone call, I could help with anything that involved writing, 
especially on a computer, and I could offer training in web browser and email use. 
While an email account had been opened for the working group coordinator, Francisco 
did not actually know how to access nor make use of it.  Maybe in order to avoid 
embarrassment,  he  never  mentioned this  to  the  ProBenefit  team,  who presumably 
never thought to ask. Secondly, I was able to devote most of my time, energy and 
initiative to the pushing forward of the working group. Nobody else had been able to 
commit to that extent before. Thirdly, the working group needed somebody with the 
social  position and articulacy necessary to  make certain demands on FONAKIN’s 
147 While  projects  can  seem  to  proceed  frustratingly  slow  when  working  with  the  indigenous 
movement in the Amazon, this is usually not the case when funding, even if limited, is made 
available upfront. This is illustrated by the fact that four members of the working group were 
invited a couple of months after their last meeting to participate in the running of a workshop on  
the protection of traditional knowledge and intellectual property in three different communities,  
the money for which had been secured from the NGO Global Green Grants by an indigenous 
ally of FONAKIN. It was a successful event.
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leaders, in order to ‘get things done’, or at least not hinder the process. It seemed that  
as a friendly, white outsider, I had more chance than the working group members to do 
so.
4.7.3 Proposal for a ‘Socialisation’ Process.
Though the working group remained reduced in size, we (I was adopted as a kind of 
facilitator) collectively drafted a proposal for the ‘socialisation’ of ProBenefit. It was 
based on the extensive notes that I took during our meetings where we discussed all 
aspects of the task at hand, such as why is socialisation necessary, what is it intended 
to achieve, how can it realistically be accomplished, who needs to be involved, how 
much time and money is needed, etc. While, upon request, I wrote the draft (a pretty 
common role to play for a researcher in an indigenous setting), it went through several 
revisions with input from both within and without the working group. On December 
28,  everyone agreed it  was  ready to be  sent  to  the  German ProBenefit  team, and 
Francisco, by now trained in email use, did so electronically.
The working group asked for a total of 107,000 US$ over 14 months to complete the 
socialisation process in about 300 communities.148 I had warned the group repeatedly 
that it  was unlikely that the proposal would be accepted as it was very late in the 
overall  process  (ProBenefit’s  funding  would  run  out  in  November  2007,  several 
148 About two thirds of the budget was meant for salaries, and the rest for office rental, overheads,  
and workshop expenses. 25 US$ pay per day were requested per person as opposed to the 10 
US$  that  ProBenefit  suggested.  This  was  justified  by  reference  to  examples  of  other 
development projects and the additional benefits that accrue to the health promoter work on 
which the sum of 10 US$ was based.
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months before the end of the proposed socialisation phase), and the funding requested 
was likely to be much higher than ProBenefit and the company would have expected. 
Nonetheless, everyone wanted to go ahead “for the learning experience”. Moreover, 
apart from the fact that it had been decided in the Asamblea Ordinaria that ProBenefit 
could continue only after a socialisation phase, such a phase was also considered of 
utmost importance by all working group members due to the politically sensitive issue 
of  the  commercialisation  of  traditional  knowledge.  The  proposal  stated  that 
socialisation “does not only include the presentation and clarification of the project to 
the base communities, but also the collection and discussion of whatever worry, doubt, 
or question that might be raised by the members of the communities, so that such 
feedback can be included in the deliberation with regard to a possible negotiation with 
the company and the State.”
Francisco, whom I had supplied with 3US$ to ease his journeys into town to check his  
email  account  for  possible  replies,  did  so  every  day  or  two,  and  informed  me 
frequently in  distress  that  there  was  “still  no  answer”.  I  explained that  offices  in 
Germany were probably closed for at least a week over the winter holidays.
4.7.4 A first response.
On January 12, Silke, a German who lived permanently in Ecuador and had been hired 
by the ProBenefit team as a local contact point, turned up in Tena and met with the 
working group. She explained that the German team had received the proposal but 
how they were  surprised  that  it  was  not  a  plan  for  a  process  of  negotiation  and 
consultation,  but  one for  socialisation.  “The socialisation was supposed to  happen 
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during  the  capacity  building  course  last  year,  you  were  all  supposed  to  discuss 
ProBenefit in your communities.” She emphasised that there was simply no time left 
for a socialisation process, and that the German team suggested drafting a proposal for 
negotiation themselves,  which the working group could then discuss  and realise  a 
consultation  process  for.  All  members  of  the  working  group expressed  shock  and 
upset.  They felt  “pressurised” and “scared”.  Somebody said: “the communities are 
already criticizing  us  now, saying that  we are  making a  profit  from their  plants”. 
Francisco explained that “without a process of socialisation, nobody will understand 
whether  to  say  yes  or  no  in  the  consultation”.  And  Carlos,  one  of  the  younger 
members educated to degree level, was clear “this is too fast for us”. Temporality in 
indigenous communities does not necessarily comply with European project cycles 
and deadlines. 
Silke suggested organising a meeting – which one of the German team members might 
be able to attend, after all she was only a kind of go-between and could not take any 
decisions  on  behalf  of  ProBenefit.  The  discussions  went  on  after  Silke  had  left. 
Everybody asked me  for  my opinion in  a  way that  made me feel  uncomfortable. 
“Please, what should we do?” they asked, “please”. I worried about undue influence, 
and my role in this process. Would my opinion shape theirs in a problematic way? 
How  open  should  I  be  about  my  criticisms  of  the  endeavour  to  commercialise 
biodiversity and traditional knowledge, pharmaceutical companies, the whole global 
political economy, the values and norms of European modernity? How justified were 
these criticisms in the first place, given the very real and acute need for money among 
Amazonian peoples? “You need to decide how important it is to you to work with this  
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company” I said. “Remember that they cannot promise anything in terms of money or 
other  benefits  to  come out  of  the  process,  because  they themselves  do  not  know 
whether they will find any plant that can be commercialised, but of course some of 
you  are  likely  to  receive  a  salary,  at  least  temporarily,  while  you  work  on  the 
consultation, and maybe during the research phase?” I scrambled for words “I worry 
about drawing up a contract too fast, because a contract can set a precedent – does 
everybody know what a precedent is?” No, so I explained what a precedent is with 
many short words. The problem I saw with Access and Benefit Sharing contracts was 
the  way  that  they  can  end  up  undermining,  for  example,  discussions  at  the  UN 
Indigenous Forum on collective rights to traditional knowledge. To express such rights 
as the right to give or deny consent to an ABS contract is just one, and a very narrow, 
version of what such rights might look like. In order for indigenous peoples’ rights to 
be a sharp, emancipatory weapon, care needs to be taken that the particular ways in 
which they get realised are not simply diluted versions of what they could have stood 
for. To perform the right of self-determination as a right to a mere veto is a particularly 
impoverished version of the possible.
4.7.5 Declaration.
Based on the worries that the working group had, the resolutions taken at FONAKIN’s 
Asamblea, and some further reflections on the importance of a process of socialisation 
in which ‘the affected’ Kichwa communities could be directly (and not just by proxy) 
involved,  the  working  group  wrote  a  ‘declaration’ with  my  help,  explaining  to 
ProBenefit, to FONAKIN’s Council members, and members of other organisations, 
the reasons and need for a socialisation phase. In this declaration it was made clear 
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that it was impossible to move into a phase of negotiation regarding an agreement 
with  the  company  without  a  prior  period  of  socialisation,  through  which  all 
communities  would  be  made  aware  of  ProBenefit  and  the  issues  involved  in  a 
negotiation with Schwabe Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
The  declaration  was  presented  at  the  extraordinary  meeting  which  took  place  on 
January 23, and to which the German team had been invited but at which they could 
not be present. During the meeting, Alexis, one of the working group members who 
had mostly shown a lot  of enthusiasm for the project,  emphasised to the gathered 
organisation  leaders:  “We  have  not  been  ‘capacitated’ but  taught  to  be  corporate 
negotiators”. Rosa, an elderly, barely literate midwife with extensive knowledge of 
healing plants complained: “They [white foreigners] have always said we are stupid, 
now they suddenly want our knowledge, but they do not want to wait until we have 
made  our  own  decisions,  in  our  own  way”.  This  disparity  in  expectations  about 
participation and deliberation in decision-making was a key obstacle to a successful 
collaboration. 
The time frame of ProBenefit, and the speed at which things were supposed to happen, 
constituted another worrying point: “They complain we are so slow, they don’t respect 
[us], they only put pressure so we sign the contract”. The risks of the project were 
repeatedly  highlighted,  above  all  the  potential  conflict  with  other  federations 
“Everyone thinks we are selling our plants for our own profit.” This was understood as 
one of the crucial reasons for insisting on the need for socialisation. General mistrust 
of companies and development organisations  suffused the atmosphere: “They only 
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steal anyway, when have they not robbed us?!” - “They think we are stupid, how can 
we trust them?!” Nonetheless, self-criticism was also raised “We didn’t  manage to 
meet up regularly” - “We didn’t know what to do next, we never had an [instruction] 
manual so we could understand how to continue” - and, referring to the drunken vice-
president: “We all know whose fault it is that communication with Germany broke 
up”. The lack of funds was also lamented: “We could not inform all members of the 
working group because there was no money to send [radio] messages through all the 
necessary [radio] stations”. On the basis of these sentiments, the text of the declaration 
was discussed and revised, then sent to Germany by email the same day.
The working group received a response to the declaration while I was away for a 
month in the form of another visit by Silke. “They always use her as an intermediary,  
it does not seem right” wrote Francisco in an email to me. “They want to know who 
wrote the declaration and who was present at the meeting [of January 23] ... and they 
congratulate us for the declaration but say it would have been good to send it after the 
capacity building course, that now it is very late... they say there is no order in the 
project”.  The working group received a  formal (email)  response by ProBenefit  on 
February 12, reiterating the congratulations, and lamenting the lack of communication 
during six months prior to receipt of the socialisation proposal. The email made clear 
that the ProBenefit team accepted the rejection of the suggestion to collaboratively 
draft an Access and Benefit Sharing contract, but due to the limited time remaining 
could not see how the process could continue. ProBenefit hence invited the working 
group to participate in an evaluation workshop sometime at the end of March.
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4.7.6 Evaluation workshop.
During  the  evaluation  workshop it  became obvious  that  ProBenefit  had  taken the 
declaration  to  mean  a  rejection  of  all  possible  interaction  between  the  working 
group/FONAKIN  and  ProBenefit  unless  ProBenefit  agreed  to  fund  a  process  of 
socialisation.  I  was  told  by several  German  team members  that  they were  “quite 
surprised, shocked even” by the declaration, that they had not even had the time to 
meet to properly discuss the proposal for a socialisation phase, when suddenly the 
declaration arrived. It transpired that Silke’s visit and the information she had passed 
on to the working group in mid-January was not meant to be an ‘official response’ to 
the proposal. After several months of silence, the working group seemed suddenly to 
respond too quickly,  even by German standards.  A fair  amount  of  annoyance and 
frustration was also expressed by German team members: “What the hell were they 
going to ‘socialise’? Everyone in the communities would have asked them anyway 
what the company was promising, how much money or what else exactly they could 
expect to receive in return for their collaboration. Without a draft contract what could 
they have talked about?”
“It's true”, I wrote into my notebook, reflecting on the conversation I had had, “most 
people [in the communities] would want to know exactly how much money they would  
get for signing the contract. But isn’t that exactly the problem? Everyone seems to  
stop thinking when there is some promise of money at the horizon. Wouldn’t it have  
been much better to be able to respond: we don’t know what we can expect,  let’s  
rather think about whether we want to participate in their research at all, whether we  
want them to take away any of our plants, who do we think has the right to make such  
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decisions? What problems will there be? Let’s look at other peoples’ experiences, and  
all the conflicts they’ve had even though they were promised some money.”
From the working group’s point of view, the ProBenefit project had always been an 
ambiguous undertaking. Convinced by the capacity building course that the protection 
of  indigenous  knowledge  from  misappropriation  ought  to  be  one  of  their 
organisations’ key priorities, they held that the ProBenefit process might offer them 
the opportunity to raise awareness about the importance of this issue. Yet many of 
them felt that they had somehow been ‘pushed’ to struggle for this cause, when their 
own personal dreams and ambitions lay perhaps elsewhere. The relevance of the work 
they were supposed to do as the ProBenefit working group remained mainly someone 
else’s: “The company wants us to make all these decisions. We never asked for the 
company to come here! At least we should be able to make our decisions in our own 
way.” ProBenefit was too tied up with a company’s agenda, however benign, to not be 
seen as  a  risky engagement.  And while  Napo Runa had been accustomed to  hire 
themselves out to companies for decades, they had also the experience of 500 years of 
shifting forms of colonial relations which they were very experienced at sabotaging, 
resisting or turning to their own advantage.
From the German team’s point of view, ProBenefit had been a difficult process in 
which to balance often opposing interests and different cultures. “Schwabe does not 
understand how it can take so long to draw up a draft ABS agreement. They see this 
project  as a  risky economic investment  and waste  of  time.  We have to  constantly 
persuade them to be patient and stick with it. And the working group and FONAKIN 
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just  don’t  understand  what  it’s  like.  I  think  they  see  the  company  as  a  Geldkuh 
[money-producing cow].” The German team members whom I met were all passionate 
about biodiversity conservation and the possibility for win-win scenarios through fair 
and equitable Access and Benefit Sharing agreements in the spirit of the CBD. In this 
sense, the suspicion and lack of apparent enthusiasm of the indigenous participants 
was disappointing: “They are making a great opportunity look like a threat.”
4.7.7 Carta de Aclaración: Clarifying Letter.
Upon  my  suggestion,  the  working  group  decided  to  write  a  clarifying  letter  to 
ProBenefit after the evaluation workshop. The letter clarified that there had been a 
misunderstanding during the meeting with Silke in January, which left the working 
group under the impression that the German team wanted to push them into premature 
negotiations of a contract draft. Nonetheless, the group insisted that it was impossible 
to negotiate an ABS agreement without a period of socialisation, but that they never 
intended to preclude any further work with ProBenefit or involvement in activities that 
did not include such negotiation. The letter also listed a series of important areas in 
which capacity building was still needed, and for which the working group invited 
support. Moreover, it clarified that as far as the group was concerned, negotiation of a 
draft agreement would involve a certain commitment to a real agreement in the future, 
and that they could under no circumstances make such a commitment at this stage 
(before a socialisation process). However, they would be happy to exchange views and 
expectations with ProBenefit and the company regarding the potential benefits to be 




The response that the working group received a month and a half after having sent the 
clarifying letter stated that all the proposals made by the working group (especially 
those clarified in the last letter) were very much in line with the ideas ProBenefit had 
of an interaction with the working group. Everybody present when the letter was read 
out  seemed  very  confused.  “Why  do  they  say  now that  they  always  wanted  a 
socialisation phase?” Unfortunately,  the letter  continued, there was now simply no 
more time left for any further activities at the local level, as ProBenefit was entering 
its last phase during which its final report needed to be redacted, and funds had run 
out. Everyone grumbled in Kichwa, then agreed: “it’s better that it’s over!”
We still met several times, to discuss possibilities for an independent working group 
on biodiversity and traditional knowledge, and I wrote some funding applications to 
this end. But as time went on, hope and interest dwindled. I continued to be in touch 
with the most active members, in different, though thematically related settings.
4.8 Eclipsing Other Visions.
The problems ProBenefit had to face were rooted in ProBenefit’s structural inability to 
question some of its own fundamental assumptions regarding the value of traditional 
knowledge, the threats  it  faces,  and the most adequate strategies of protection.  Its 
‘CBD assumptions’ eclipsed other possible ways of understanding what was at stake. 
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In  many  ways,  this  might  have  been  a  problem of  ‘late’ participation.  After  all, 
communication with indigenous organisations only began once the project had been 
conceived and was under way. Despite its willingness to delegate authority and of 
course responsibility regarding the consultation and negotiation process, the project 
was never meant to be a project primarily  for  indigenous peoples. Neither was it a 
project for Schwabe Pharmaceuticals; rather it was a knowledge-producing initiative 
informing  the  processes  of  the  CBD,  and  the  wider  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing 
‘community’.  In  this  way,  the relevance of  the aims and objectives  of  ProBenefit 
remained unexamined, and it remained a classic case of ‘them’ participating in ‘our’ 
project (Cooke & Kothari 2001). 
The capacity-building course was pedagogically progressive, interactive, making use 
of a variety of participatory methods and involving workshop facilitators experienced 
in  popular  education  techniques.  The  themes  covered  were  all  at  least  marginally 
relevant to the envisioned tasks of the working group149 and time was usually taken to 
149 The  themes  covered  were:  Module  1:  Basic  concepts  of  Western  botany:  plant,  cell,  gene, 
biodiversity; Introduction to company Schwabe and its work; Botanical classification and setting 
up  a  herbarium.  Module  2:  Introduction  to  the  development  of  new  phytopharmaceutical 
products; Commercialization of phytopharmaceutical products; Legal requirements for trade in 
medicinal plants and products. Module 3: Bioprospecting – previous experiences in Ecuador; 
National  and  international  legal  framework  for  access  to  genetic  resources  and  associated 
traditional  knowledge; Introduction to intellectual  property rights;  Intellectual  property rights 
and traditional knowledge; Mechanisms for the protection of traditional knowledge. Module 4: 
Commercial  use  of  medicinal  plants  and  sustainable  development:  risks  and  opportunities; 
Facilitation  methods  and  presentation  techniques.  Module  5:  Negotiation  and  conflict 
management;  Consulta  previa  –  Proposals  for  and  legislation  regulating  consultation  in 
indigenous territories in Ecuador; Facilitation methods and presentation techniques. Module 6: 
Equitable Benefit-Sharing; Legal contracts; Course evaluation.
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allow  for  discussion  in  Kichwa  when  some  of  the  older  participants  asked  for 
clarification. However, as the course unfolded, I could not help but notice that the 
‘risks of commercialization’ presented were limited to the overharvesting of rare wild 
species and the environmentally negative impacts of industrial monoculture. Social 
conflicts  that might  arise  between and within communities and organisations were 
highlighted at  various  points  but  always  put  down to illegitimate  access  or  unfair 
benefit  allocation  which  the  participatory  process  ProBenefit  had  initiated  was 
supposed to ensure avoidance of. The possibility of conflicts over values other than 
economic ones was ignored, despite constituting a real worry for the leadership of 
FONAKIN as  well  as  several  of  the  delegates.  The  indigenous  movement  is  not 
homogeneous  with  regard  to  its  opinions,  ambitions  and  strategies,  and  not  all 
indigenous organisations condoned FONAKIN’s involvement with ProBenefit, some 
simply  because  of  their  conviction  that  traditional  knowledge  is  not  for  sale  to 
pharmaceutical companies.
What  does  the  ProBenefit  experience  tell  us  about  the  failure  of  bioprospecting 
contracts  more  generally?  From  a critical  ethnography  perspective,  the  failure  of 
bioprospecting  contracts  has  of  course to  be  explored  on  a  case  by  case  basis. 
Nonetheless,  certain  key  aspects  seem  to  be  common  to  many  bioprospecting 
endeavours. It is important to note, however, that we do not hear  very often  about 
‘failed’ projects,  more common are reports  of conflicts  and problems arising from 
already signed contracts (e.g., Hayden 2003; Greene 2004; Gal 2005; Vermeylen 2007
).
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In these cases, we can identify in particular three key points of conflict regarding the 
issue of legitimacy. One, there is usually a dispute or at least an unclarity about who 
the legitimate contracting parties are.  FONAKIN was chosen (and postured as) the 
appropriate  representative  of  the  Amazonian  Kichwa  people  of  Napo.  However, 
FONAKIN is merely the largest and longest established of a whole series of Kichwa 
federations in the area, many of which were criticising FONAKIN’s involvement with 
ProBenefit. Two, there is still today a distinct lack of concrete national legislation as 
to  how to implement  or enforce  ABS contracts,  and hence there is a scope for quite 
different interpretations of how to legitimately realise international guidelines on local 
ground.  Three,  bioprospecting  endeavours  have  so  far  unfailingly raised  different, 
indeed  conflicting  expectations  as  to  process  and  outcome  on  parts  of  all  parties 
involved (including inflated expectations of financial gain on part of  the  indigenous 
communities).  As I have illustrated in this chapter, such conflicting expectations are 
often due to very different historical and cultural standpoints.
What is more, however, bioprospecting transforms “common heritage into a stream of 
compensation”  (Brush  1999:  538).  Monopoly  privileges  that  one  group of  people 
(community, or organisation) can gain through an ABS agreement imply that other 
groups – who share the same knowledge and resources – are excluded from such gain. 
In this way, the tension bioprospecting causes is the same kind of tension which most 
processes of privatisation (of something which was hitherto held in common) cause. 
Indigenous groups hence often occupy the ambivalent position of protesting  against 
the exclusive appropriation of their knowledge and resources while at the same time 
seeking clearly defined  rights  and a  better  negotiating  position  for  bioprospecting 
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contracts.150 This  ambivalence in  itself  means that  ABS negotiations take place on 
shaky ground. The ultimate failure of such negotiations or the conflicts which a signed 
agreement provokes are thus unsurprising. The dynamics and processes which lead to 
such failure or conflict require the kind of detailed attention to the actualities of a 
situation as I have aimed to provide in the present account of the ProBenefit case.
Berlin and Berlin (2004) argue with respect to the Maya-ICBG bioprospecting project 
that it failed due to the interference of non-governmental organisations which “took 
away” local community autonomy from indigenous communities that had agreed to 
participate in the international drug discovery and conservation project. Berlin and 
Berlin argue that the NGOs agenda to discredit sustainable development projects as 
colonialist impositions thus disempowered the indigenous communities to determine 
their own development priorities. While it can certainly not be denied that indigenous 
organisations’ and other NGOs’ wilful stalling of bioprospecting processes and ABS 
negotiations can lead to their failure or premature conclusion, an important question is 
why such  stalling  is  aimed  at.  Not  always  can  the  agendas  of  non-governmental 
organisations  be  dismissed  as  knee-jerk  reactions  based  on  unreflected  political 
ideologies. The pragmatics of life under capitalism – i.e. the near inevitability of the 
money economy, the urgency of having to find sustainable ways to conserve natural 
resources within the dominant paradigm of market valuation –  might make it more 
difficult  to  take a  principled stance against the expansion of capitalist  relations of 
production,  however,  doing so cannot and should not be discredited as blinded by 
ideology.  Whatever  ulterior  motives  the  NGOs  in  the  ICBG-Maya  case  (a  local 
150 This is reminiscent of E. P. Thompson’s notion of “enclosure from within” (Thompson 1991).
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healers’ association and the well-known Canadian campaign group RAFI, now ETC 
Group) might have had, they have also based their actions on a considered perspective 
of bioprospecting as colonial and capital expansion, which I have aimed to back up 
through my analysis of the details of the ProBenefit case.  It is  because Access and 
Benefit Sharing is not simply the solution to the four-fold conundrum of conservation, 
innovation, development and indigenous people’s rights, but rather a very particular, 
market-based  solution  that  it  generates  so  much  dissent  and  dissonance  amongst 
different  local,  national  and  international  groups  and  interests.  As  long  as 
commodification  and other  forms  of  market  expansion continue  to  affect  people’s 
lives in ways that conflict with the non-market values they hold, their manifestations 
(such as bioprospecting projects and ABS agreements) will continue to produce social 
tension, disagreement and struggle.
In the next and last chapter of this thesis, I address the variety of views on traditional 
knowledge, its value and need for protection that I was confronted with during my 
fieldwork. This will show that the protection of traditional knowledge is understood, 
imagined and discursively employed by its ‘holders’ in ways that are very different to 
the dominant discourse of protection which runs through Access and Benefit Sharing 
endeavours.  The  diversity  of  values  which  can  get  sidelined  or  eclipsed  during 
projects such as ProBenefit thus becomes visible.
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5 The Hidden Variety of Protection: Napo Runa stories of what is at 
stake.
In this chapter, I present and discuss a series of conversations and events at which 
traditional  knowledge  protection  figured  in  ways  very  different  to  its  hegemonic 
construal as intellectual property protection. ‘Protection of traditional knowledge’ is 
understood and used by the people whom I met in the Amazon in ways and to ends 
that sometimes overlap with, yet in many ways differ from the schemes and objectives 
pursued by ProBenefit, and other Access and Benefit Sharing endeavours. In Section 
5.2. I present a number of interactions which took place during the capacity-building 
course of ProBenefit and which highlight the ways in which dominant understandings 
of  traditional  knowledge,  and  the  issue  of  its  protection  were  perpetuated,  while 
alternative understandings of what was at stake were disregarded and subdued. As we 
shall  see  in  Section  5.3,  Napo  Runa  ‘knowledge  holders’ interpret  the  notion  of 
traditional  knowledge  as  sometimes  meaning  spiritual  power,  or  ethical  conduct; 
sometimes  traditional  knowledge  is  used  to  refer  to  the  increasingly  irrelevant 
lifeways  of the older  generation and an intimate acquaintance with the landscape; 
sometimes traditional knowledge even acts as a proxy for the value of Napo Runa 
culture as a whole. 
I argue that the dominant discourse of protection – the one developed and employed in 
national and international policy making settings and which animates projects such as 
ProBenefit  –  colonises  our  understanding of  what  is  at  stake  in  the  protection  of 
traditional  knowledge,  and  perpetuates  background  assumptions  ultimately 
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instrumental to the continued expansion of capital. More specifically, I argue that the 
focus on the threat of misappropriation (i.e. on a kind of theft) obscures the way in 
which traditional knowledge is also threatened by loss and erosion. Borrowing from 
Joan Martinez-Alier (2002), I conclude that the struggle surrounding the protection of 
traditional knowledge is not only a struggle regarding access over resources, but also a 
struggle over meanings and values. I urge that the idioms in which these struggles are 
carried out continue to (or begin to) transcend the language of market valuation, in 
order to keep alive the plurality of values through which people make sense of and 
give meaning to their worlds.
To begin with, however, let me clarify the obvious, yet crucial point that the solutions 
we develop depend on the problems we perceive.  The way in which we construe 
traditional knowledge, and the threats which it faces will hence determine the kind of 
protection  which  we  develop  and  perform.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the  hegemonic 
construction of traditional knowledge protection colonises people’s understanding of 
what is at stake. 
5.1 Protection, Value, Threat.
The notion of ‘protection’, whichever way we may turn it, implies a possibility of 
threat or harm, and the normative element of inclining to avert it. We make sense of 
notions  of  protection  in  relationship  to  ideas  of  the  value  of  whatever  is  to  be 
protected,  and the threat  with which it  is  (potentially)  faced.  Consider  “seat  belts  
protect the driver and passengers of a vehicle”: we infer that people are usually likely 
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to value their lives and that life-threatening situations can occur during participation in 
traffic.  “Protect  your  skin from UV rays”: we come to understand that  prolonged 
exposure to UV rays may damage our skin, a part of our physical organism we do or 
ought to care for. “The mollusc’s only protection is its shell”: we know that most life 
forms will tend to develop means to survive the predatory attacks they are likely to be 
subject  to.  And  while  bubble  wrap  might  protect  a  precious  bowl  on  its  journey 
through the mailing system, it is unlikely that sunscreen, safety belts or a shell from 
the beach will.
In devising strategies of protection, we need to take into account what exactly needs to 
be  protected  from what.  And since  any strategy of  protection  sets  out  to  achieve 
certain  objectives,  but,  obviously,  not  others,  articulating  the  objectives  for  the 
protection of traditional knowledge is  a crucial  aspect in  considering which forms 
such protection might take. Conversely, a particular strategy of protection can tell us 
what is being valued about whatever is being protected, and what the threats from 
which it needs to be protected are perceived to be. As I have explained in the previous 
chapters, existing schemes of protection of traditional knowledge set out to achieve 
either  the  prevention  of  misappropriation  and  misuse  (that  is,  the  prevention  of 
unapproved appropriation and subsequent commercial exploitation, e.g. ‘biopiracy’), 
or the prevention of erosion and loss of traditional knowledge. Unsurprisingly, most 
international effort is put into protection from misappropriation and misuse151, such as 
151 Only the protection of traditional knowledge as a cultural heritage really addresses the issue of 
preventing  its  erosion  and  loss.  But  even  the  UN  Convention  for  the  Safeguarding  of  the  
Intangible Cultural Heritage is not unproblematic with regards to the mechanisms of protection 
it proposes, as we have seen in Chapter 2.
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through  (quasi-)intellectual  property  protection,  or  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing 
agreements.  I  say  unsurprisingly  because  such  mechanisms  of  protection  legalise 
access  to  and  facilitate  commercialization  of  traditional  knowledge  –  which  is 
important in a climate in which biopiracy scandals are very bad for the health of a  
corporation’s public image, and therefore its  bottom-line.  As should be obvious,  a 
protective system based on an understanding of protection as primarily the capacity to 
exclude the unauthorised use by third parties will look very different from an approach 
which regards protection as an instrument to preserve traditional knowledge from uses 
that  may erode it  or negatively affect the life  or culture of the communities from 
which it springs (cf. Correa 2001). In the latter case, protection would imply active 
involvement in creating positive measures to support and enhance the livelihood and 
cultures of communities;  in the former,  the main role of protection is to establish, 
administer and enforce rules of access and use. 
Most often,  the predicament of traditional knowledge is  presented as an economic 
problem and the sharing of benefits (in whichever particular shape) as its fundamental 
solution. As we have seen in the last chapter, this was also the view underlying the 
rationale, objectives and approach of the ProBenefit project. Traditional knowledge 
was  understood  as  threatened  by  potentially  unfair  appropriation  through  private 
interests, as well as by increasing loss within communities as these underwent rapid 
changes in lifestyle. A fair and equitable Access and Benefit Sharing contract with a 
pharmaceutical  company was promoted as  an ideal  solution:  any appropriation by 
outsiders would occur under strict conditions, consented to by the legitimate owners 
of the knowledge in question – the threat of misappropriation would hence be averted 
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through ethical appropriation; moreover, the economic benefits gained from such an 
ABS  contract  would  valorise  traditional  knowledge  within  the  communities,  and 
especially amongst the younger generation, leading to a renewed interest to maintain 
and transmit it. In this way of course, the value of traditional knowledge is cast solely 
in market terms, at the same time as human motivation is reduced to the function of an 
economic  cost-benefit  analysis.  Other  ways  of  understanding  what  is  at  stake  are 
eclipsed by this hegemonic construction of knowledge, its value, threats and means of 
protection.
In this context, it is interesting to note that many NGOs and other indigenous peoples’ 
allies or activists continue to perpetuate the discourse of property/theft with regards to 
traditional  knowledge.  It  says  on  the  website  of  the  Coalition  Against  Biopiracy: 
“Biopiracy is theft!”, thereby not only construing traditional knowledge as a form of 
private property, which is in itself a questionable move, but also conflating the two 
objectives  of  protection.  Patenting  something  that  finds  its  origin  in  traditional 
knowledge (i.e.  misappropriation)  does  not  make the knowledge disappear  from a 
community’s life the same way that stealing a tangible object does. Its very noticeable 
and  locally  lamented  disappearance  is  due  to  processes  of  modernisation, 
development, proletarianisation, destruction of forests and other ecosystems, and not 
due to processes of misappropriation and misuse. In this way, the ‘biopiracy is theft’ 
discourse  has  done  an  unfortunate  lot  for  the  conflation  of  the  two objectives  of 
protection. It would be surprising if it had not contributed to the dominant attitude that 
preventing misappropriation and misuse will also prevent erosion and loss.
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In  what  follows,  I  examine  the  concerns  of  some  of  the  so-called  traditional 
knowledge holders with whom I worked, and from whom I learned in the Amazon. 
Their  concerns,  I  believe,  speak of a variety of ways in which their  knowledge is 
understood  to  be  ‘threatened’,  what  is  being  valued  about  it,  why it  ought  to  be 
‘protected’ and how such protection would best be achieved. Their concerns also bring 
to light a variety of different meanings of ‘knowledge’ itself. In the next section, I 
present a number of interactions which took place during the capacity-building course 
of ProBenefit  and which highlight  the ways in  which dominant  understandings  of 
traditional  knowledge,  the  issue  of  protection,  and  its  difference  to  scientific 
knowledge, were perpetuated, while alternative understandings of what was at stake 
were disregarded and subdued. This is meant to show that ProBenefit,  despite best 
intentions, imposed a value system and world view on its indigenous participants. The 
ProBenefit team and most of the teachers and facilitators it hired for the course were 
unable to see or consider these alternative understandings, a point which contributed 
to the strong sense of asymmetry felt by the Kichwa participants, underlining their 
historical sense of injustice.
5.2 Notes from a Capacity Building Course.
The premises  of  AMUPAKIN (Asociación de  Mujeres  Parteras  Kichwas  del  Alto  
Napo,152 see Fig. 4 below) are located on the outskirts of the community of Sábata, a 
typical  near-urban  indigenous  settlement  of  wooden  shacks  and  houses  circling  a 
152 Association of Traditional Kichwa Midwives of the higher Napo region
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football field. A big, yellow concrete arch and iron gate mark the entrance. Behind it 
appear several new-looking concrete buildings: the main health centre, a conference 
venue, a laboratory for the production of shampoos and natural medicines, and three 
cabañas, the mosquito-netted accommodation for visitors. Tucked away beyond view 
is  a  wooden ramshackle hut  with tin  roof,  an open fireplace and a  gas  stove:  the 
kitchen. All is set amongst overgrown flower beds, herb and vegetable gardens and 
surrounded by what are, by Amazonian standards, small trees. The construction of the 
“House for Life” (casa para la vida), as AMUPAKIN’s premises are known as, began 
in 2001 with the financial support of the Spanish Red Cross that has left its mark in 
the form of a metal plaque on a concrete rock-imitating mound which everyone who 
enters passes. The “indigenous” and “traditional” mingle here with the “modern” and 
“exogenous” apparently unproblematically. As two midwives walk barefoot and with 
machetes and medicinal barks in their shigras (carrier nets made from tree fibres) over 
tiled floors through whitewashed halls and past a computer to the cobbled-together 
kitchen out back in order to prepare a remedy against headache, the co-location of 
high-  and  low-tech  artefacts  in  time  and  space  seems  a  completely  unsurprising 
manifestation of a post-colonial, globalising world. The women of AMUPAKIN move 
confidently in this setting, it is their “own place now”, as is being emphasised to me at 
various points. Yet this setting also easily obscures an asymmetry: the simultaneity of 
barefootedness, computers, barks and concrete does of course not necessarily bespeak 
their  symmetry in terms of influence on and meaning for people’s lives.  Living in 
contemporary Amazonia is  characterised by a  multitude  of  struggles,  for  survival, 
purpose,  dignity,  enjoyment,  for  the  continuing  relevance  of  indigenous 
understandings and practices, and for what constitutes all of these, and thereby a good 
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life (Overing & Passes 2000). New needs and desires replace the old, yet not without 
conflict. The first impression of AMUPAKIN does not yet reveal the friction between 
shigras,  barks and  dry,  hardened  feet  on  the  one  hand,  and  tiled  floors,  digital 
machines, and institutional plaques on the other.
Figure 4: AMUPAKIN cosmetics laboratory, Archidona 2008.
On a hot and sunny Thursday morning in March 2006, a group of people started to 
gather  in  the  conference  building.  The room was bright,  the  ceiling  high  and the 
windows big.  The  floor  had been swept,  and  heavy,  light-coloured  and lacquered 
tables and chairs form a U-shape,  opening onto a whiteboard and flipchart.  A few 
white people, whom I knew to be German, were busy with papers and boxes, and a 
very  European-looking  Ecuadorian  woman  was  talking  to  one  of  the  midwives. 
285
Everyone else, about twenty people all Kichwa but me, stood or sat quietly about. 
Soon, a desk was set up and topped with papers and a laptop. One by one the course 
participants were called up to the desk. Each one received a schedule, a pen, and a 
notebook, and was clearly explained to stay on site for the full  four days of each 
course  module,  and  that  they  were  from  this  point  on  accountable  to  their 
organisations as delegates and that they could not be replaced by anyone else at any 
point. Everyone signed their names on a register, then took a seat along the U-shape,  
and the introductory session of the first module began.
My  own  presence  was  warranted  as  a  volunteer  and  independent  adviser  to 
FONAKIN. Rosa Alvarado,  FONAKIN’s president  at  the time,  had welcomed me 
warmly into the organisation just a few weeks earlier. There had been foreign PhD 
student  collaborators  before.  Everyone  seemed  generally  happy to  have  me  hang 
around their concrete office building in which Amazonian mould is winning its battle 
with  industrial  wall  paint.  During  my  various  stays,  I  fixed  printers,  set  up  fax 
machines,  solved  computer  problems,  corrected  spelling  mistakes,  transformed 
handwritten notes into PowerPoint presentations, and showed my European face to 
visitors.  I  also  wrote  some  funding  proposals,  and  a  few  position  papers  for 
FONAKIN.  “None  of  us  knows  anything  about  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge and intellectual property. It’s a new issue and politically very controversial. 
We have been severely criticised by other [indigenous] organisations just for signing 
the contract with ProBenefit. It is good that you are here, I want you to follow the 
whole process, and make sure that nothing goes wrong” Rosa said to me shortly after I 
had arrived. “I wonder what ‘wrong’ means in this context”, I wrote into my notebook 
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that day. It transpired over time that FONAKIN, like all other organisations, had to 
constantly negotiate its (various) role(s) with regard to its members, the Ecuadorian 
indigenous movement as  a  whole,  the Ecuadorian state,  national  and international 
funders and project partners. Things could hence ‘go wrong’ in a variety of ways, a 
damaged  reputation  within  the  indigenous  movement  and  discontent  amongst  its 
members being amongst the  very wrong. As a primarily representative organisation, 
FONAKIN’s  legitimate  authority  depended  on  good  relations  with  its  base 
communities, as well as other federations.
The first  evening,  after  dinner,  a party was organised to  celebrate  the start  of the 
course. Several women briefly danced to some contemporary Kichwa music, one of 
the German facilitators got most people involved in some Bavarian Yodel exercises 
and  dancing,  and  one  of  the  older  men  crudely  dramatised  a  shamanic  healing 
ceremony  which  the  Bavarian  then  had  to  imitate.  Everyone  seemed  thoroughly 
amused. Florinda, one of the oldest midwives, ended the evening with a song about 
her  grandfather’s  life  and a  call  to  all  indigenous organisations that  they may not 
forget that Napo Runa life really is in the forest. The song struck my European ears as 
more of a weeping. It  was made up on the spot,  which is a sign for a competent 
Kichwa singer: the ability to perform there and then moving, melodic poetry full of 
“old words that our grandparents used”. “Do you hear?” I was asked by a young man 
next to me “she knows a lot of traditional knowledge”. “Yes” said another “she gives 
advice of how to live well, she reminds us what is important, she knows a lot”. This 
was my first direct encounter with a perspective on traditional knowledge as ethical 
rather than more purely empirical in kind. All day long we had been talking about 
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traditional medicines, and how valuable this information about biological resources 
was for the whole of humankind, and how the elderly were like libraries, full of such 
important information. Yet Florinda was singing about being a bird, a toucan woman, 
about being full of yearning for her people to return to the forest. Her performance 
was proof of her ‘traditional knowledge’, which in this context meant a connection to 
and understanding of particular  values rather than  data sets. Such knowledge is of 
course uninteresting as far as pharmacological research is concerned. Yet it was of 
obvious concern to Florinda and others  around her.  Protection of such knowledge 
would look very different to fair and equitable ABS arrangements.
The following two days were spent learning about cells, genes and biodiversity. At 
one point, the husband of one of the midwives commented: “But the properties of 
plants can change! Their medicinal powers can become stronger or weaker when they 
get relocated or cultivated or tended to. Also, different properties of the same plant are 
more or less prevalent at different times. That’s why we time the harvest. Sometimes it 
is  better  to  harvest  at  night  or  during  full  moon,  sometimes  not.”  -  “Yes”  said 
somebody else “and also plants don’t heal if you do not have a spiritual connection 
with them.” Others nod. “Aha” said the facilitator, and continued to explain genetic 
inheritance while ignoring this traditional understanding of medicinal properties. A 
few PowerPoint slides later, the difference between biological and genetic resources 
was being defined. “This is a very important distinction” emphasised the facilitator. A 
genetic resource is the genetic information contained in any part of a living organism, 
however small, while a  biological resource  is the whole of a living organism, or at 
least a significant part of it. The CBD deliberately refers to genetic resources only. 
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“You need to understand that access to genetic resources is not the same as access to 
biological resources. If the genetic information contained within a living organism is 
being scientifically or commercially used,  we have to talk about access to genetic 
resources. However, if it is a whole plant, or a part of it, such as its sap, that is being 
used  scientifically  or  commercially  we  are  talking  about  access  to  biological 
resources. The company Schwabe that would like to do some bioprospecting in the 
area is seeking access to the biological and not the genetic resources.” - “Indeed, we 
are  not  interested  in  patenting  genes”  agreed  the  German  representative  of  the 
pharmaceutical company who was present. “So, we can do away with myths now” 
explained the facilitator,  “bioprospecting is  not  always  bad!  As long as it  is  done 
legally  and  with  the  consent  of  the  communities,  it  could  be  a  good  thing. 
Bioprospecting  is  not  biopiracy.”  -  “Shamans  have  also  always  done  types  of 
bioprospecting” added one of the German team members, “in fact, they are like little 
companies, for you also have to pay them when they provide their services.” 
I  am recounting  this  particular  exchange about  biopiracy to  illustrate  how simple 
answers often foreclosed serious discussion about contested issues during the capacity 
building  course.  Time,  of  course,  was  limited,  and  since  a  lot  of  subjects  were 
supposed to be covered, lengthy discussion often needed to be cut short. In this case, 
however,  one  of  the  most  crucial  questions  of  the  whole  endeavour  –  when  is 
bioprospecting legitimate? – was being brushed aside with simplistic explanations. 
This meant that participants often failed to receive the kind of information that  is 
necessary in order to form an opinion about complex matters. In a not-yet submitted 
doctoral  dissertation,  Jodie  Chapell  argues,  for  example,  that  there  are  many 
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biopiracies,  and  that  the  patenting  of  genetic  materials  only  constitutes  one  such 
piracy. Moreover, patents on entire plants can be held in the United States under the 
U.S. Plant Patent Act of 1930, and indeed such a patent was granted to Loren Miller in 
the highly controversial ayahuasca patent case, which involved a protest by the Cofán 
people of the Ecuadorian Amazon (Fecteau 2001; Moghaddam & Guinsburg 2003; 
Dorsey  2004;  Schuler  2004;  Shiva  2007).  Moreover,  Schwabe  Pharmaceuticals 
patents all its products. While these patents are not for actual plant varieties, they are 
usually for plant extracts based on biological materials and not genetic information.
A similar  incident  concerned trade  in  plants  and knowledge.  While  the  facilitator 
explained  the  concept  of  agrobiodiversity,  an  inflatable  globe  was  being  passed 
around. She asked: “Did you know that plantains and bananas originally come from 
Africa?” – “No! They come from here. They are our comida típica [traditional food]” 
was the united response – “No, no. They are from Africa. You see, different cultures 
have always exchanged and traded things and knowledge.” Based on this information, 
we then stuck pictures of different plants and foodstuffs on the globe corresponding to 
their place of origin. Again this example illustrates how complex issues were being 
obfuscated by simple answers. While it is undeniable that different social groups have 
always exchanged material objects and knowledge, the modes of such exchange vary 
widely. The plantains and bananas which actually originated in South Asia and not in 
Africa (Simmonds & Shepherd 1955; Harlan 1971; Zeller 2005), for example, reached 
South America as part of the colonial trade system which moved slaves and exotic 
products  in  various  directions  across  the  Atlantic,  and  decimated  indigenous 
populations  (as  discussed  in  Chapter  2).  The  rhetoric  of  ‘people  have  always 
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exchanged things, why stop now?’ does not take account of the historical and political 
context in which such exchange is taking place and by which it is determined. Instead 
of  more  in-depth  discussion  of  such  issues,  we  engaged  in  a  little  trust-building 
exercise to activate the mind through a little bit  of movement:  everyone formed a 
circle, and one person with blindfolded eyes stepped in the middle. He or she was 
pushed around and caught as she fell and stumbled from one side to the other. Such 
dínamicas as they are called, were used often during the course. A useful method to 
enhance concentration, learning effectiveness and group cohesion, the deployment of 
such exercises ultimately serves those in whose interest the course content is.
Later the same day, the delegate from Schwabe Pharmaceuticals passed around little 
sealed plastic  bags.  The first  one contained whole dried gingko biloba leaves,  the 
second one powdered gingko biloba leaves, the third one a gingko biloba leaf extract, 
a very fine, yellow-brown powder, and the fourth one a handful of coated tablets, red-
brown in colour. He also passed around the very same tablets in their shiny product 
packaging, including the package insert. The package read TEBONIN®. The 27-step 
manufacturing extraction process is patented internationally, and so is the extract EGb 
761® itself. Nobody mentioned that at the time, I found it out later on the internet. 
Dazzled by the sparkling products that can be made out of some leaves, the course 
participants asked many questions: “What is it for?” – “Where do the leaves grow?” – 
“How do you  make the  extract?”  The German delegate  explained how a  difficult 
extraction process is required, involving a lot of the state-of-the-art technology that his 
company owns. “Would the extraction process happen here in Napo, or would it all be 
in the labs in Germany?” asked someone. “This is not clear yet” answered the German 
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delegate, “If a trustworthy, reliable counterpart can be found here that has the relevant 
capability  for  extraction,  then  yes,  it’s  a  possibility  that  it  could  happen here.”  – 
“Mixing and exchanging our knowledge with Western science is fine, but my worry is 
that the company will have all of the lucrative benefits and the local organisations are 
left with nothing, no money and no knowledge, especially for the future and for the 
children. One hope is that the company would move all of the production process over 
here.” – “Well, yes, there are unclarities about the laws and potential partners, but it is 
not impossible. There always is the possibility of creating a multinational company if 
we find the right counterpart” explained the German delegate. I am later told by a few 
course participants that this incident made them feel uncomfortable: “He could not 
answer our questions” – “They are making empty promises! And who will eat the pills 
they make? White people.”  – “When he talks of making a company here,  I  don’t 
believe it’s any of us that he will employ. They will get people from Quito.”
“So where does traditional knowledge come from? How is it established?” asked the 
delegate from the German pharmaceutical company, sweating visibly, his naked legs 
covered in insect bites. His PowerPoint slides were in English, and hardly visible on 
the wall of the bright workshop centre, so he waited patiently for the translation of his 
question and the ensuing discussion in Spanish and Kichwa to end, wiping his brow. 
This question was more engaging than the previous ones. Everyone started speaking at 
once: “The plants tell us.” – “Yes, the plant spirits talk.” – “When somebody in the 
family is ill, it’s the plants that will tell us how to prepare them and make medicines 
from them.” – “The  yachakuna [traditional healers, shamans] speak regularly to the 
plants, so they know.” – “When I was a little boy, and my mother was very ill, one day 
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this plant – it grows here outside in the garden, I can show you – this plant came and it  
was laughing and dancing around in the house and we were a little scared but it told us 
to boil it and prepare a tea and then it left, so we found it again and made a tea and 
soon my mother was feeling better.” The translator hesitated at first, then explained 
the  answers  of  the  Kichwa workshop  participants  to  the  pharmaceutical  delegate. 
“Well,”  said  the  delegate  after  a  little  confused  pause,  “okay,  yes,  but  traditional 
knowledge  comes  from  ...”  he  paused  again  as  he  flicked  the  remote  control  to 
populate his slide with prepared answers that fly across the screen in swoops before 
settling  down  as  bullet  points.  “Well,”  he  commented  the  slide,  “it  comes  from 
accidents and coincidences, from one’s own experience and self-testing, from hearsay, 
from knowledge exchange and from literature.” The translator translated and everyone 
remained quiet. Shortly after, the elderly midwife sitting next to me started to whisper 
angrily with  a  young man who nodded back at  her.  The pharmaceutical  delegate, 
however, continued his PowerPoint presentation.
The inability on the German side to acknowledge or even register this very different 
understanding  of  the  origin  of  traditional  knowledge,  which  constitutes  a  central 
aspect of Napo Runa cosmovision153, was lamentable. It maintained the gap between 
the two sides, and prevented a deeper understanding and exploration of the issues at 
hand. 
153 Cosmovision is the preferred term amongst indigenous peoples and rights activists, replacing the 
more European cosmology or myth.
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In the literature documenting, explaining or analysing the legal guidelines referring to 
‘traditional  knowledge’,  traditional  knowledge  is  usually  defined  as  “knowledge, 
innovations, and practices of indigenous peoples and local communities” (from CBD 
Art 8j), and often described as “inter-generational and orally transmitted” (e.g. Posey 
2002; Howell 2004; see also the Bellagio Declaration154). Its origin is hence located in 
the distant past, embedded in the ancestral practices of indigenous communities. The 
emphatic  concern  with  origin  in  most  contemporary  dealings  with  traditional 
knowledge must have to do with the importance of origin to intellectual property law. 
Intellectual property protection is dependent on the origin of the intellectual work to 
be clearly traceable to a particular juridical person, such as Ulysses to James Joyce or 
Windows Vista to Microsoft. The assumptions underlying such originary ideology are 
tenuous, and an exploration of its ideological connections to creationism and doctrines 
of free will promises to be interesting at least. Unfortunately there is no scope for such 
an exploration here. Suffice here the flagging up of ‘origin’ as a significant discursive 
device in the performances of intellectual property protection and contestation. In this 
context, what would it mean for knowledge to originate in one’s relationship with a 
plant spirit? I realise that entertaining such an idea will be rather difficult for most 
readers. Nonetheless, such ways of speaking about and understanding aspects of the 
world encode particular attitudes and values. For example, this view of knowledge 
speaks  of  an  intimate  relationship  between  people  and  plants.  It  speaks  of  an 
understanding of plants as teachers and helpers. It speaks of the necessity to foster 
154 A group of lawyers, academics and activists drafted and signed this declaration during the 1993 
Rockefeller Conference ‘Cultural Agency/Cultural Authority: Politics and Poetics of Intellectual 
Property  in  the  Post-Colonial  Era’.  It  can  be  accessed  online  at 
http://www.case.edu/affil/sce/BellagioDec.html.
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good relations and to learn to listen to what plant spirits may say. “Plant spirits talk a 
lot” an old female  healer told me while weaving a  shigra.  “The problem is,  most 
people don’t know how to listen. They run past the little plant on their way into town. 
They miss the whisper of their name. ‘Nina, Nina’ it will call you ‘Nina wait and 
listen  what  I  have  to  tell  you’”. These  understandings,  visions  and  values  are,  I 
maintain, what ‘traditional knowledge’ – the knowledge of the Other – really has to 
contribute to  the contemporary world.  Another  remedy for high blood pressure or 
obesity  is  merely  a  contribution  to  the  wallets  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry. 
Indigenous activists participating in high-level fora such as the CBD can sharpen their 
teeth by insisting that what is at stake in the context of the protection of traditional 
knowledge are lifeways, values and practices to which the hegemonic constructions of 
common sense are blind and indeed antithetical.
5.3 Rainforest concerns.
In this section, I present a series of conversations and encounters which I was part of 
outside  of  the  ProBenefit  setting.  These  make  even  clearer  that  projects  such  as 
ProBenefit,  and the discourses which they introduce and perpetuate, veil the plural 
understandings and valuations of knowledge and people’s concerns in this regard. 
5.3.1 Wizards and Fighter Jets.
“How do you protect  your  knowledge?” I  asked a middle-aged  yachak [‘one who 
knows’,  plural  yachakuna],  a  traditional  Kichwa  healer,  wizard  and  community 
295
adviser, as we were preparing a large amount of ayahuasca brew, the hallucinogenic 
drink ‘that makes you see’, and ultimately, ‘know and heal’. “You need to be strong to 
protect yourself” he answered, pressing the vine and leaves deeper into the boiling 
water  with  a  wooden  stick.  “You  need  a  lot  of  energy,  sinzhi [force,  strength, 
especially  spiritual  in  kind],  to  protect  yourself  from  attacks.  Your  enemies  will 
always try to attack, make you ill or eradicate you completely. It is dangerous to be a 
yachak. That is why many are secret. But only a very powerful  brujo [Spanish for 
warlock/male witch, referring to yachakuna who practice black magic, harming others
] can get past my defences. I have many secrets, including a whole fleet of fighter jets, 
spiritually, that protect me. Sometimes I just use a mirror”, he laughed “and send the 
misdeed  back  to  the  one  who sent  it”.  “So,  by protecting  yourself  from spiritual 
attacks, you protect your knowledge?” Domingo looked at me with the indulgent pity 
reserved for the stupid. I tried again: “I mean, what happens to your knowledge when 
you  get  attacked?  Does  it  disappear?”  -  “Your  power  disappears.  When  you  get 
attacked and you cannot protect yourself, you become weak. Maybe you get ill, maybe 
you die.” - “But if you get ill, and then recover, you will still have your knowledge?” I 
insisted, starting to be unsure about whether I was making any sense. What was this 
thing I called knowledge? “Will you still know which plants to use to heal someone, 
for example, or will you forget such things?” - “It’s not enough to know which plants 
heal. You need to have the knowledge to  make them heal. That’s why we diet155. It 
155 A yachak’s diet refers to the abstention from certain foods, as well as activities, during certain 
periods. In particular, after drinking ayahuasca, salt, chilli, alcohol and fatty meats, such as pork 
should  be  avoided.  Someone  who  is  learning  to  heal  is  expected  to  abstain  from  sexual 
intercourse for several months at a time. There are times when one should not touch any object 
that might be either too cold or too hot.
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gives us sinzhi.” He paused. “When they attacked my uncle, a very good yachak, and 
he got very ill,  when he then recovered,  he could not  understand the [ayahuasca] 
visions. He could see, but he could not interpret them. For a long time he was no use 
as a healer. And he could not see the future very well. Not even the tobacco helped 
him. They took his power.”
It  was through conversations such as this  one that I  realised that for many of the 
people whom I met and worked with in the Amazon, spiritual power and valuable 
knowledge  were  so  closely  linked  as  to  practically  be  the  same  thing.  Such 
power/knowledge is understood to be in danger of attack and even destruction from 
the  negative  energies  of  certain  people,  places  and  spirits  that  intentionally  or 
unintentionally affect its holder. A ‘powerful’ yachak ‘knows’ not only in the sense of 
having access to a vast internal repertoire of information about such phenomena in the 
world as plants, animals, landscapes, diseases, spiritual energies, and the ways these 
relate to one another, but also in the sense of (what we might call) her or his power of 
intuition being highly accurate. (“You’ve had a bad dream” said Ana to me unfailingly 
when I had had one, and I never met her early in the morning when my tensed body 
could have still  betrayed a nightmare.) This is not so much  knowledge held,  as an 
ability to know. It is a particular form of perceptiveness, which, I was told, is a skill 
not unlike “a skill to play the piano”. You can learn it, but “you will probably learn it 
better if you have the talent and the desire”.
This ability to ‘know’ things that were seemingly imperceivable became more and 
more a feature of ordinary reality, the longer I spent time with traditional healers from 
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the forest. Some people are able to know surprising details about others in a (for want 
of a better word) intuitive way, as if they had been told, or as if there were conclusive 
clues in someone’s body language, or gaze or particular scent. A visiting colleague, 
who had been suffering from recurring lower back problems for five years, and who 
did not speak Spanish, so did not articulate her complaints to anybody but me, was  
told by two different yachakuna on different occasions that she had blue light pouring 
out of her kidney, a spiritual injury that must have been provoked by a desert spirit in 
a far away country. Neither of these yachakuna had ever been in a desert, nor had they 
been told either about my colleague’s back pain, or its sudden origin during a trek 
through Botswana’s drylands. The healer’s knowledge in this context is thus more like 
the capacity to see or hear (in the very moment of ocular or auricular perception) than 
the  capacity  to  recall  or  remember  (memorised  past  experience  and  ‘stored’ 
information). ‘I know’ in this sense would have to be understood rather as a statement 
akin to ‘I see’ than to ‘I have mental access to certain (more or less corroborated) 
information about something’. This distinction is not exactly the same as the standard 
distinction  in  epistemology  between  knowing-that  and  knowing-how-to,  made 
prominent particularly by Gilbert Ryle (1949). The standard view holds that to know 
how to do something, one does not need to know that  something is the case. In this 
view, knowing-how-to is irreducible to any form of knowing-that. For example, to 
know how to ride a bicycle  is  a state  of being different  from and independent of 
knowing that holding one’s balance is dependent on certain laws of physics. Whether 
or not this standard view is analytically correct,156 the healer’s knowledge I am trying 
156 Amongst analytical philosophers there is a long-standing debate whether this standard view is 
correct (e.g. Snowdon 2003). Some (so-called intellectualists) hold that certain knowing-thats 
are always necessary for any knowing-how-to, whereas others (anti-intellectualists) insist that 
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to point at might be a knowing-that (someone has had a bad dream, or has a strange 
injury, or has unwittingly eaten a magical flower) which is based on a knowing-how-
to (‘read’ or ‘perceive’ apparently imperceivable signs with regard to, for example, 
other people). It is a kind of knowledge that is based on real-time perception (like 
vision or sound), that might of course be mistaken, but not necessarily more often than 
people misinterpret what they see or hear. 
For the purposes of this chapter, it suffices to remember that what exactly knowledge 
is, what it does, what it means, and what people value about it, does not become clear  
simply by invoking the term. What it might be threatened by, and what protecting it 
would involve, is hence even less obvious. For Domingo, at least in the context of our 
conversation above, protecting his medicinal knowledge meant to summon spiritual 
fighter jets, to practice his diets, and to generally take care of his different powers and 
energies. As we have seen, the discussions in international policy making fora revolve 
around very different  ideas  of  protection  for  traditional  knowledge.  Is  Domingo’s 
understanding  of  protection  irrelevant  to  these  discussions?  Do  his  protective 
strategies fail to address more pressing issues of traditional knowledge? By whose 
standards? Who decides?
5.3.2 Diets and Charlatans.
My conversation with Domingo does of course not take into account the wider context 
in  which  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge,  as  a  necessity  and  cause,  has 
knowing-how-to do certain things is always at the basis of any knowing-that (cf. Fantl 2008).
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developed.  As  I  have  tried  to  show  in  the  Chapter  2,  the  concept  of  traditional 
knowledge  and  the  need  for  its  protection  emerged  especially  in  relation  to 
developments  and  conflicts  in  the  fields  of  nature  conservation,  and  the  wider 
biogenetic  resource politics  of  the  late  20th century.  When I  was asking Domingo 
about how to best protect one’s traditional knowledge, I did leave the context within 
which I was posing the question as open as possible; in particular, I did not provide 
much indication of which threats to this knowledge I was envisioning. This of course 
means that the particular meaning of my question was in many ways up for grabs. 
Domingo interpreted it, as people usually do, according to what seemed to him the 
most  likely way it  was  intended.  Given that  generally  most  of  our  conversations 
concerned  shamanic  practices,  healing  ceremonies,  and  ayahuasca visions,  and 
considering that we were sitting by a fire and a five gallon cooking pot holding the 
ingredients that were to turn into one of the most psychoactive substances known to 
humankind, it is maybe not surprising that he thought of spiritual abilities and attacks, 
healing  and  illness,  the  responsibilities  and  dangers  of  being  a  yachak,  and  the 
intensity of the visual (‘knowing’) experience of an ayahuasca trance as the backdrop 
to my question, in relation to which the latter made the particular kind of sense that he 
took it to make.
In the company of members of ASHIN (Association of Indigenous Shamans of Napo), 
of which Domingo was president at the time, he could also speak very differently of 
the protection of traditional knowledge: “There are fewer and fewer good shamans. 
The old ones, many have died. Young people don’t want to learn and they break their 
diets. There are too many that call themselves  yachak, and they go to the cities and 
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they ask 500 dollars for a healing, and they don’t know anything, they cannot heal and 
they give us a bad name. There is no control. That is why our organisation has made 
identification cards. See here [showing his laminated picture card]. We all carry them. 
They are recognised by the ministry. We are a legalised organisation, recognised by 
ministerial accord. We test all our members. Every member has to prove that they can 
heal. We go in a group, and we watch each raise [levantar] an ill person. If they get up 
at the end of the night, if they get better, then we can be sure. I have denied identity 
cards to some people, cousins of mine even, of whom I knew that they don’t know 
anything, they just sing for the tourists. We have to work together, we have to unite  
and work collectively. We have to teach well, so that the young ones learn properly 
and do no harm [black magic], otherwise our medicine will die. Otherwise we will kill 
each other in envy and competition amongst ourselves. There is so much envy. And to 
make lots of money fast, we will break the diets, and forget the forest and what our 
grandparents told us.”
Protection of knowledge figures in this little speech as the collective adherence to a 
particular  ethical  code  of  practice,  the  respect  for  traditional  norms  and  ancestral 
advice,  as  well  as  the  use  of  certain  techniques  that  the  modern  world  affords 
(photographs,  seals,  lamination,  institutionalisation) in order to create a framework 
within which Kichwa shamanic knowledge and practice remain unimpeded by bad 
reputation, failure to transmit properly to the next generation, and mutual (intra-group) 
competition. 
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Through such organisations  as  ASHIN (the  first  legal  association  of  shamans and 
traditional healers in Ecuador, founded in 1994, legalised in 1997), common concerns 
and the potential for collective solutions are being explored, articulated and worked 
towards.  Like  all  social  movement  and  civil  society  organisations,  they  provide 
platforms  for  voluntary association  according  to  shared  predicaments,  and for  the 
forming of opinion about and strategies for social change. Traditional knowledge, its 
threats  and  the  means  of  its  protection  are  framed  in  this  context  as  collective 
concerns, affecting each practitioner in her or his work, impinging upon the reputation 
and viability of the ‘profession’ or ‘tradition’ as a whole. The value of knowledge is 
here  closely  linked  to  the  responsibility,  individual  and  collective,  to  acquire  it 
properly (observing traditional diets), and to use it properly (for healing, not for black 
magic or harm, nor for inflated personal gain).  The greatest threat that knowledge 
seems to face on this  account  is  perversion through improper  conduct.  Abstention 
from sex, alcohol and certain foods is considered an important part of a yachak’s so-
called ‘diet’, especially when still in apprenticeship. Misconduct, mostly related to the 
breaking of one’s diet,  is said to lead to a loss of power/knowledge, perversion of 
character  and  the  practising  of  black  magic,  usually  culminating  in  (spiritually) 
injuring  other  people,  and  even  madness.  Protecting  shamanic  knowledge  from 
perversion or distortion is thus about – collectively – ensuring right acquisition and 
right use. And for the leaders of ASHIN, most often represented by Domingo due to 
his articulateness, this was best done through a certain amount of institutionalisation 
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and the development of a common discourse based on traditional precepts and ethics.
157 
5.3.3 Relevant Acquaintances.
The theme of loss and survival of knowledge, tradition, and practices over generations 
ran through many conversations and encounters during my fieldwork, and not only in 
the context of shamanic healing. That the younger generation was not interested in the 
old  customs,  lore,  and  bushcraft,  and  that  too  many of  them did  not  even  speak 
Kichwa was a pervasive complaint. “Young people don’t realise, they don’t care much 
about the plants. They walk elsewhere, they don’t see the plants, and so they don’t ask 
about them. Maybe ten, twenty plants they know by name, nothing more. And what 
they are good for, I don’t know, how could they know!?” Some of the younger people 
I met instinctively positioned themselves in relation to this complaint: “All my friends 
have moved to the city. They have employment. But they forget how to walk in the 
forest.  I  prefer  to be here,  I  like to listen to my grandmother.  She knows how to 
interpret dreams very well. I work with her on the chagra [horticultural plot] and she 
teaches me about the plants. The plants heal. I want to learn more, so that when she 
dies, I can teach my children and grandchildren.” - “I liked very much living in Quito 
157 Such  processes  of  collective  identity  formation  of  course  also  produce  dynamics  of 
inclusion/exclusion and involve the normative policing of boundaries – who is a ‘real’ yachak, 
who is an impostor, who knows and who does not, who is in and who is out – which have a lot  
to do with validation of knowledge. In this case: whose healing knowledge is valid, and who 
makes these decisions? ASHIN’s accepted members tested new members, which runs both the 
risk of  bias  and has  the advantage  of grassroots agreement rather  than compliance to  some 
external standard.
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[Ecuador’s capital]. We had a lot of fun. It opened my mind. But when my son was 
two, his father left me, so I came back to be with my family here […] I see our culture  
differently now, I am happy here, but I feel a lot of pain to see it disappear. All that my 
grandparents knew is getting lost. That’s why I am learning Kichwa now and that’s 
why I go to the dance group [group performing folkloric dance].” - “They say all that 
our grandparents knew is getting lost. It is true. But I cannot change that. To improve 
[my family’s situation], I need to study and earn some dough. That’s why I live in the  
city […] It is sad, but in my community there is not much forest left. So what use is it 
to know the plants!?”
Traditional knowledge (‘what our grandparents told us’ was the often used idiom) in 
this  context  is  understood  as  getting  lost  due  to  decreasing  uptake  by  the  next 
generation, slowly dying with the elders. The indigenous youth is seen, and sees itself, 
as  largely  uninterested  in  the  ‘life  of  the  forest’.  What  was  dubbed  on  several 
occasions as the ‘wants and needs of the city’, the (new) desires and requirements that 
life in or near the cities provoked, meant that for many, the everyday had to be so 
configured as to allow for time and energies to be directed towards the provision of 
money, and the creation and maintenance of those relationships which facilitated the 
acquisition  of  objects  of  desire,  the  use  of  the  services  on  offer  and  general 
participation in the network of urban social relations. Since the more time one spends 
walking in the city, learning about its delights and treacheries, the less time one spends 
walking in the forest, learning about the same, it is unsurprising that one’s knowledge 
of the forest does not only remain limited, but it also becomes increasingly irrelevant 
to acquire it in the first place.
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This tension of new ways of life eclipsing older ones, and the ambivalent feelings that 
such  changes  arouse  are  probably  ubiquitous  to  human  history.  The  struggle  to 
maintain a certain amount of permanence in the face of ever-present change, mortality 
and fading memory might be a contender for a universal attribute of human societies if 
ever there was one (cf. Weiner 1992). However, this does not make loss of traditional 
knowledge,  customs,  and practices  something to  be  simply shrugged off  as  some 
‘natural’ occurrence,  or  the  sorrows  it  causes  as  stubborn  nostalgia.  The  specific 
circumstances  of  loss  and  change  will  always  be  particular.  They can  be  violent, 
disruptive  and  disorientating,  or  creeping,  uniting  and  inspiring;  they  can  be 
emancipatory or disempowering, sensitising or dulling down. They can be all or some 
of these things.  Struggling to  influence,  and to  participate  in  the shaping of  these 
circumstances is a central aspect of collective self-determination.
The theme of loss and disappearance of traditional knowledge in the conversations 
during my fieldwork struck me as a kind of coat-hanger upon which people would 
hang their laments and grief about unwelcome changes to their collective lives – those 
perceived as too rapid, too asymmetric, and too destructive. The question of how to 
prevent this  loss – or how to create a more positive kind of change? – left  many 
feeling mystified and powerless, and some in tears. Of course, grandchildren could 
listen to their grandparents, teenagers could re-learn their mother tongue after having 
abandoned it in racism-suffused schools, and parents could take their children into the 
forest to gather ornamental seeds for use in handicrafts, and point out a few plants and 
tell their stories on the way. But in the face of oil spills, toxic rivers, disappearing 
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species, and the cash barrier to participation in much of contemporary life, even in the 
Amazon,  and  in  the  face  of  all  other  manifestations  of  “Euro-American 
developmentalism”  (Whitten  2003:  xi),  the  question  of  the  relevance of  ‘the  old 
knowledge’ looms large.
On one occasion, I asked Maria, an elderly healer and midwife who played a key role 
in the establishment of AMUPAKIN (Association of traditional Kichwa midwives of 
Napo),  what  she  thought  about  books  and  other  ways  of  documenting  herbal 
knowledge, so that her great-great-grandchildren would be able to learn about what 
she once knew. “My little girl” she said, “the knowledge is in the plants themselves. 
Write the books! Read the books! When the plants go, the knowledge goes as well. Do 
what  you like.”  -  “What  about  botanical  gardens,  then?” I  wondered.  After  all,  a 
medicinal plant garden was one of AMUPAKIN’s long term aims. Maybe this would 
be a way to carry some knowledge into the future. “Yes, yes” Maria did not sound 
convinced. “The problem is, many plants cannot be cultivated. They grow weak, and 
they don’t heal. It’s the wild ones that have the power […] And the knowledge of the 
forest does not grow in a garden. And the lakes, and the rivers, and the hills, and the 
waterfalls! This knowledge cannot be known in the books.” Domingo confirmed this 
understanding:  “Every  powerful  place  gives  us  knowledge.  I  have  got  a  lot  of 
knowledge  from  the  lakes  […]  There  are  powerful  places  with  much  energy 
everywhere in the forest, special places. My grandfather took me to some of them. 
Every healer has knowledge from these places, from rivers, from waterfalls, from big 
rocks, from the hills. But now […] The contamination finishes these places. You go to 
them and there is no energy. I have analysed a lot, and it seems to me that the energies  
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run downstream, down from the waterfalls and the hills and down the rivers, they pass 
by [Iquitos,  Peru] and Brazil,  and into the oceans.  There where the contamination 
arrives, the energies disappear. In a short time, all that is left for us is to go to the 
oceans to find the energies in the sea. Otherwise, all that knowledge will be lost.”158 (I 
did  not  have  the  heart  to  tell  him  that  the  oceans  were  themselves  by  now  so 
contaminated and over-exploited that ninety percent of the world’s biggest fish had 
already vanished159.)
The  knowledge  valuable  to  these  speakers  is  not  replicable  in  books  or  other 
documentation.  It  rather speaks of an unmediated connection to certain places and 
plants.  It  is  a knowledge by  acquaintance rather than a knowledge by  description 
(Russell’s distinction, 1911, following Grote 1865, Helmholtz 1868, and James 1890
160); it is through acquaintance with things that their particular powers – or energies – 
get imparted, a process that creates knowledge. Because such knowledge only comes 
158 See also Kimerling 2006:  466-467 for  an account  of  Huaorani  beliefs  in  the weakening  of 
healing powers due to environmental contamination.
159 According to a 2003 study of  Nature. Worse things have happened to the oceans, but this was 
one of the numbers I had available in my memory as I was scribbling in my notebook.
160 William James explained the distinction between what he saw two fundamentally different kinds 
of knowledge as follows: “I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very 
little about, except their presence in the places where I have met them. I know the color blue 
when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my finger  
through it;  a  second of  time,  when I  feel  it  pass;  an  effort  of  attention  when I  make it;  a 
difference between two things when I notice it; but about the inner nature of these facts or what  
makes them what they are, I can say nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to  
any one who has not already made it himself I cannot describe them, make a blind man guess  
what blue is like, define to a child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance  
is just what it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friends, Go to  
certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come” (1890: 221).
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into being through experiencing a particular place or object, through interaction and 
contact, a book could never transmit it. Acquaintance with a book about the Amazon, 
its paper, ink, and glue, is on this account  knowing the book, and not  knowing the 
Amazon. (This distinction, although hidden by the equivocal character of the English 
word to know, is made in many languages, such as in Latin noscere and scire, German 
kennen and wissen, Spanish conocer and saber, and French connaître and savoir.) 
The  only  way to  ‘protect’ this  particular  knowledge,  in  the  sense  of  ensuring  its 
continued  existence  throughout  the  change  of  generations,  is  to  enable  people’s 
acquaintance with these places and plants and other objects of value.  The primary 
threat to such knowledge is the disappearance of those objects through the interaction 
with which it is created. The deterioration of the value of these objects (through their 
contamination and domestication,  for example) will  also diminish the value of the 
knowledge they can impart, and thereby constitute a kind of threat to be prevented. 
Another threat is irrelevance. Even if valuable places and plants continue existing, if 
the role which they play in people’s lives is eroded, acquaintance with them becomes 
meaningless. It is hence not just the continued existence of the places and plants, but 
the meaningful relationships which peoples maintain with them that is of importance 
in this context. As such, ways of life that integrate relationships to such objects of 
value ensure the relevance of this kind of knowledge, a prerequisite for any form of 
protection to make sense at all. This raises the question, however, whether payments 
through  bioprospecting  contracts  might  be  a  way  to  overcome  the  increasing 
irrelevance of ‘traditional knowledge’ to most people’s lives. After all, if the ‘life of 
the city’ takes people away from the forest and older forms of livelihood, then maybe 
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it is as part of the ‘life of the city’ that the relevance of traditional knowledge must 
now  be  revived.  The  ProBenefit  initiative  was  based  on  a  version  of  this  view: 
economic benefits will  provide the best, and indeed the only kind of incentive for 
people to value and preserve their traditional knowledge in a changing world. The 
problem with this perspective is that the ‘value’ and ‘relevance’ which knowledge of 
and acquaintance with plants and other things then carries, would be determined by its 
economic content. The ‘power’ or ‘energy’ which things are understood to impart is 
likely to get lost when the main point for getting to know them is the fact that money 
can be made from such acquaintance. 
5.3.4 Patently Recognised.
In April 2007, ASHIN was approached by the director of the teaching module and 
research cluster on ‘Genetic Resources and Ancestral Knowledge’ of the  Pontificia  
Universidad  Católica,  and  enrolled  in  a  project  on  the  protection  of  ancestral 
knowledge that was meant to provide legal recognition to ASHIN for its members’ 
knowledge  about  medicinal  plants  in  return  for  a  set  of  arrangements  regarding 
student research opportunities and a botanical garden maintained by ASHIN as an in  
situ herbal collection for the university. Through the process of engagement with this 
project,  and  with  the  students  and  staff  members  of  the  university,  Domingo’s 
understanding and use of the idea of protecting traditional knowledge developed new 
facets:  “The  foreign  pharmaceutical  companies  come  here  and  they  steal  our 
knowledge. We need to get our own patent, so that they know that it is we who are the  
owner, so that they cannot just take it away from us as they have always done with 
everything that is ours.”
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So, theft as threat and patents as protection? I asked who exactly would be the patent 
holder,  and  when  “ASHIN”  was  the  answer,  raised  the  problem  of  authoritative 
representation of a whole people. Why ASHIN? On whose mandate could they claim 
ownership of traditional  Kichwa plant  medicines? What would those healers think 
who  were  by  choice  not  affiliated  to  ASHIN?  What  would  other  associations  of 
shamans  do  when  they  heard  ASHIN  had  such  a  patent?  Domingo  stated  in  a 
defensive tone that they would of course hold the patent “on behalf of the whole of the 
Kichwa people”, but that it might indeed create tensions, and that they would have to 
think about how best to go about this. He would call for a meeting with all the leaders  
of the various Kichwa federations of the lowlands. He had already thought about that, 
in fact. I also explained that patents were only granted for 20 years, and that the costs 
of filing, monitoring and enforcing a patent application could be enormous.  While 
applying for a patent costs usually just a few hundred dollars, lawyer’s fees easily 
extend into tens of thousands of US dollars. Moreover, in order to prevent others from 
copying one’s invention, it is necessary to file applications in several countries: “A 
rule of thumb is that it will cost approximately US$100,000 to adequately protect an 
invention internationally” (Carolan 2009: 6). And this would not be the end of one’s 
expenses.  Monitoring  patent  infringements  is  time-consuming  and  expensive.  The 
biotechnology giant Monsanto is said to have an annual budget of US$10 million to 
police infringement (Kimbrell and Mendelson 2004: 4). Lastly, for patents to be useful 
‘protection’ in cases of conflict, they would also have to be enforced in court. The 
American Intellectual Property Law Association has estimated that in 2000 alone, US-
based companies spent $4 billion on patent litigation (AIPLA 2001).
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Even though I  did  not  flood him with  exact  numbers  and references  at  the  time, 
Domingo remained quiet. He leafed pensively through his leather-bound diary with 
the gold imprint ‘2002’. To be in possession of a diary, no matter from which year, 
seemed to be a way to signal worldly importance and know-how, I had noted in my 
dealings with male leaders of the indigenous movement,  and I  was hoping at  that 
moment that  I  had not  unsettled  his  feelings,  or  upset  his  self-esteem. It  was not 
always easy for many of the male leaders of indigenous organisations to consider the 
advice or opinions of a relatively young, childless woman like me. (That was one of 
the ways in which the Amazon and its people resembled most other places and their 
inhabitants that I have come to know in my life time.) The point was that the director 
of the University programme had suggested to Domingo they make a list of the main 
plants known and used by members of ASHIN, and have this list attested by the public 
notary as  a  way to  certify ownership until  effective legislation with  regard to  the 
protection  of  traditional  knowledge  was  passed  nationally.  The  idea  struck me  as 
dubious – after all, what a notary attests is the authenticity of a document, and not of 
intellectual property claims – but Domingo had put a lot of hope in this ‘patent’. “With 
the notarised list, we can show the proof that this is our knowledge. Nobody can come 
and say we don’t know anything. With the help of the University we can build the 
clinic of natural medicine, finally. Then we can practice our medicine, and defend our 
knowledge. Step by step they realise what we know.”
Domingo expanded on “the proof that this is our knowledge” by adding that “nobody 
can  say  we  don’t  know  anything.”  The  racist  stereotype  still  pervading  most  of 
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Ecuador is of course that indigenous people are generally backward and ignorant, a 
perspective which most of the indigenous people whom I got to know would position 
themselves against at one point or another. Recognition for their knowledge, for the 
fact  that  they  knew  something,  and  for  the  fact  that  they  knew things  that  were 
particular, special, and indeed characteristic of their particular existence, history and 
culture, was a desire expressed many times. The term ‘our knowledge’ was often used, 
it seemed to me, to express relations of identity rather than a claim to the right to 
dispose of such knowledge at one’s will (which is the dominant interpretation of the 
rights that private property relations entail). 
What is important to note here is the sense in which the possessive pronoun (‘our’) 
can imply a notion of property as characteristic as well as ownership (the difference is 
made clearer in German, in the difference between the words Eigenschaft – property, 
characteristics – and  Eigentum –  property, ownership). To find ways to ‘prove’ that 
‘this knowledge is ours’ was, I believe, a way to insist on the value of (in this case) 
Kichwa identity, at least as much as it might have also been a way to lay claim to 
some of the rights that ownership confers. The struggle for recognition of one’s value, 
including the value of one’s ideas, one’s understanding and one’s creativity – one’s 
knowledge,  that  is  –  especially in  the  face of  discrimination,  marginalisation,  and 
exclusion, easily takes on a significance that is more fundamental than the struggle for 
protection.
Highlighting the value of traditional knowledge is a major part of making the case for 
its  protection.  To call  for  the  protection  of  something always  entails  an  (implicit) 
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claim about its value. Similarly, it cannot be ignored that the struggle for recognition 
might  be  the  main  driver  behind  calls  for  protection,  that  establishing  protective 
strategies  and  putting  them  in  place  might  be  perceived  as  ways  of  signalling 
recognition,  as  ways  of  manifesting  recognition  in  the  world,  and  that  hence 
recognition is  what  protection is  mainly about.  After  all,  recognition is  something 
largely intangible, and (inter-)subjective. It is hardly enough to state one’s recognition 
of something (‘I think you are clever’ or ‘I value your intellect’), unless it also reveals 
itself  in  the  world,  in  one’s  behaviour  (such  as  in  my asking  you  for  advice,  or 
consulting you about certain subjects, promoting you if  I am your boss, or maybe 
applauding at the end of a speech you hold). Of course such manifestations (especially 
applause) can also feign a recognition, which really does not exist (I might ask for 
your advice just to make you feel valued, and maybe lend me some money somewhere 
down the line, and in fact, I might never act on your advice). However, for recognition 
to become  real for someone, it needs to show itself in the world, it needs to leave 
signs  and  make  marks  that  can  be  perceived.  Passing  legislation  that  protects 
traditional knowledge (in whichever particular sense of protection) can be, or seem 
like,  a sign of recognition of its value. Yet this recognition could also manifest  in 
alternative ways, and so we have to ask whether the legal protection of traditional 
knowledge constitutes the desired recognition and also what kind of value it actually 
recognises. 
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5.4 The Focus on Theft.
Inherent in Domingo’s ideas about patents, however, was also the understanding that 
certain injustices (‘stealing our knowledge’) were being perpetrated by, for example, 
pharmaceutical companies, which a patent might prevent. This view that traditional 
knowledge  is  threatened  by,  and  hence  needs  to  be  protected  from  unapproved 
appropriation and subsequent  commercial  exploitation animates  and dominates  the 
debates in international policy making fora concerned with traditional knowledge. As 
I have argued, in most of the literature and activity concerned with ‘the protection of 
traditional  knowledge’,  protection  is  understood  as  referring  to  strategies  and 
measures  that  prevent  the  unapproved  appropriation  and  subsequent  commercial 
exploitation  of  traditional  knowledge.  Where  the  threat  of  its  erosion  and  loss  is 
recognized, it is rarely treated on its own terms, but rather in conjunction with the 
threat of misappropriation and economic injustice, leading thus to recommendations 
for protection that construe and institute traditional knowledge as intellectual property 
of the respective indigenous community. This is an interesting phenomenon given that 
intellectual  property  rights  –  despite  their  unprecedented  economical  and  political 
significance in the current so-called ‘knowledge-based economy’ – have never been 
more controversial (Dutfield 2003).
However, as already argued in Chapter 2, the vast majority of critical commentary is 
directed at the causes and effects of the current and globalising form of intellectual 
property protection, and only very few voices, if any, question such principles as are, 
for example, encoded in Article 15.1.3. of the United Nation’s International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This states that “The States Parties to the 
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present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production 
of which he is the author.” Authorship in this broad sense has to do with genesis and 
creation, and the labour necessary to bring things to fruition, all of which are usually 
understood  as  creating  special  moral  relations  between  the  subject  and  object  of 
authorship or other productive labour, more precisely, special property relations. This 
view of  property as  the right  of  authors  and creators  harks  back to  John Locke’s 
ruminations  on  property.  In  his  Second  Treatise  on  Government,  John  Locke 
maintained that even though God gave the world to all humanity in common, persons 
own themselves and therefore their own labour. “Whatsoever ... [a man] removes out 
of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with” 
(1690: Chapter V, Sec. 27161), and hence it becomes his property. Locke’s are some of 
the better known early thoughts on property as a natural right of persons, but it is of 
course in particular through the string of modern declarations of rights that property 
came to be instituted as a natural, inherent and inalienable right of human beings162.
161 Locke’s  Second  Treatise  of  Government  is  available  online  at 
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm;  and  the  Section  in  question  is  available  at 
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr05.htm. Last Accessed 12 March 2010.
162 As a reminder, let me cite here the following: The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), Article  
I: “That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of 
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest 
their  posterity;  namely,  the  enjoyment  of  life  and  liberty,  with  the  means  of  acquiring  and 
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety”; The French Declaration 
of Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), Article II: “The goal of any political association is the 
conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property,  
safety and resistance against oppression”; The U.S. Bill of Rights’ Fifth Amendment: “No person 
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation”.
315
In the context of intellectual property, this aspect, the special moral relation between 
creation  and  creator,  is  rarely  called  into  question.  This  must  be  due  to  its  deep 
rootedness  in  modern  conceptions  of  ‘tangible’ property  that  have  become  nigh 
impossible to criticize. Even James Boyle, famous for his attack on the myth of the 
‘romantic author or lone inventor’ that underlies most justifications for intellectual 
property protection, questions intellectual property relations not because he does not 
accept the moral force of authorship or creation, but because he sees contemporary 
intellectual  property  rights  protecting  creations  that  are  very  rarely  those  of  a 
‘romantic  author  or  lone  inventor’ (Boyle  1996).  Whatever  the  reasons  for  this 
unquestioned  link  may  be,  in  the  case  of  traditional  knowledge,  authorship  and 
property are  crucial  vehicles in  contesting the current distribution of the power to 
control the dominant flow of economic and extra-economic benefits resulting from its 
use.  Without  the  concept  of  authorship  and  its  concurrent  property  relations,  the 
critique of the dominant treatment of the issue of protecting traditional knowledge, as 
it stands at the moment in theory and action, would be very thin indeed. For the time 
being,  then,  calling  for  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  is  almost  always 
calling for  a  more  coherent  application  of  intellectual  property rights  norms.  It  is 
insisting on the enjoyment of intellectual property as a universal human right, and 
implying the potential of diversity in its realisation.
It  is  in  this  way  that  I  understand  the  discourse  of  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge to be a colonising discourse. It is colonising in the sense that it installs a 
particular meaning of its key terms, thereby invading, taking over, and settling the 
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understanding of these terms. This discourse is colonising in the sense that it  only 
articulates  one  particular  way  of  understanding  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge, even though we have seen that talk of protection of traditional knowledge 
provokes a variety of concerns for people and in turn is used to frame and formulate 
these.163 Some of these alternate understandings of what the protection of traditional 
knowledge means and what is at stake in its realisation are not simply different to, but 
in fact conflict with the colonising discourse of intellectual property and ‘theft’, in that 
they challenge some of its fundamental assumptions. When ‘taken seriously’ – that is, 
when we start to sincerely explore their implications – these challenges might force us 
to  revise  deeply  ingrained  ways  of  understanding  such  fundamental  notions  as 
property  and  knowledge,  with  radical  consequences  for  contemporary  social 
organisation in so-called knowledge-based capitalism.
Joan Martinez-Alier (2002) has argued that ecological distribution conflicts are often 
fought in idioms other than market valuation, making use of notions of “the ecological 
value of ecosystems, the respect for sacredness, the urgency of livelihood, the dignity 
of human life, the demand for environmental security, the need for food security, the 
defence of cultural identity, of old languages and of indigenous territorial rights, the 
aesthetic  value  of  landscapes,  the  injustice  of  exceeding one’s  own environmental 
space, the challenge to the caste system, and the value of human rights” (Martinez-
Alier 2002: 150). In this way, the struggle surrounding the protection of traditional 
163 Arturo Escobar (1995) describes the expansion of the discourse of sustainable development as 
the  semiotic  conquest  of  nature  by  capital  relations.  Through  bioprospecting  this  semiotic 
conquest is extended into the realm of indigenous and peasant peoples’ knowledge, practices and 
seeds (Brush 1999).
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knowledge is not only a struggle regarding access over resources, but also a struggle 
over meanings and values: “in field or factory,  ghetto or grazing ground, struggles 
over  resources,  even  when they have  tangible  material  origins,  have  always  been 
struggles over meanings” (Guha & Martinez-Alier 1997: 13). However, the problem is 
that often the voices that are most clearly heard and whose concerns are taken most 
seriously are those who couch their demands in a language of valuation that resonates 
with the ultimate decision-makers. While it can be strategically wise to encode one’s 
message in terms of the dominant economic discourse in order to be heard, this also 
runs  the risk of diluting one’s  original  grievances  and visions for  alternatives and 
social change.
Domingo’s sudden conviction that a ‘patent’ would be the solution to the wide variety 
of issues that he had himself previously framed in and expressed through the idea of 
the protection of traditional  knowledge leads  me to the following two interrelated 
points in conclusion to this chapter. First, the attraction of ‘private property’ is not to  
be  underestimated.  I  have  indicated  in  Chapter  2  how  private  configurations  of 
ownership  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production.  Their  appeal  to 
individuals and defined groups is possibly the most powerful engine of the circuit of 
capital.  Second,  Domingo’s  conviction  involved  him  and  other  members  of  his 
association losing sight of the ways in which some of their concerns would not be 
addressed at all by the spurious promise of a notarised list  as proof of knowledge 
ownership. Once the promise of private property appears on the horizon, alternative 
concerns and values seem to fade in its light. For these reasons, this thesis is also an 
appeal  to  the  indigenous  movements  of  Ecuadorian  Amazonia  and  beyond  to  not 
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overplay the ‘discourse of theft’, which drowns other ways of explaining what is at 
stake and other ways of demanding change. The larger and more varied vocabularies 
of protest become, the more discursive possibilities there will also be to illustrate the 
fact that values are largely irreducible to, and sometimes even incommensurable with 
one  another,  hence  illuminating  what  John  O’Neill  (1993)  calls  the  “weak 
comparability of values”. That is to say that the more ways we find to express the 
plurality of values which exist in the human world, the easier it will be to dispute that 
a singular (monetary) value can make commensurable the many goods and bads which 
affect people’s lives as well as the more-than-human world. 
This point also addresses Bernard William’s call: ‘‘There is great pressure for research 
into techniques to make larger ranges of social value commensurable. Some of the 
effort should rather be devoted to learning—or learning again, perhaps— how to think 
intelligently about conflicts of value which are incommensurable’’ (Williams 1972: 
103).  
As contributors to the scholarship of ecological economics have repeatedly pointed 
out,  while  incommensurability,  or  the  absence  of  a  common unit  of  measurement 
across plural values, entails the rejection of monetary (or any other) reductionism, it 
does not imply incomparability (O’Neill 1993; Martinez-Alier 1995; Martinez-Alier, 
Munda & O’Neill 1998). It allows for the comparison of different options, however 
such comparison has to take place without recourse to  a single type of value. This 
means  that  irreducible  value  conflict  is  unavoidable,  but  that  even  under  such 
conditions of value conflict, choices can be made by employing practical judgement 
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and intelligent discussion. This is what O’Neill has called the weak comparability of 
values (O’Neill 1993).
Pointing out the irreducible incommensurability  of values  has long been part of the 
tradition of ecological economics. As far back as 1919, Otto Neurath wrote: 
“The question might arise, should one protect coal mines or put greater 
strain on people? The answer depends for example on whether one thinks 
that hydro-electric power may be sufficiently developed or that solar heat 
might  come to  be  better  used,  etc.  If  one believes  the  latter,  one  may 
‘spend’ coal more freely and will hardly waste human effort where coal 
can be used. If however one is afraid that if one generation uses too much 
coal  thousands  will  freeze  to  death  in  the  future,  one  might  use  more 
human power and save coal. Such and many other non-technical matters 
determine the choice of a technically calculable plan . . . we can see no 
possibility of reducing the production plan to some kind of unit and then 
comparing the various plans in terms of such units” (Neurath 1973: 263).
The institutional economist Karl William Kapp concurred:
‘‘To place  a  monetary value  on  and apply a  discount  rate  (which?)  to 
future utilities or disutilities in order to express their present capitalised 
value may give us a precise monetary calculation, but it does not get us 
out of the dilemma of a choice and the fact that we take a risk with human 
health and survival. For this reason, I am inclined to consider the attempt 
at measuring social costs and social benefits simply in terms of monetary 
or market values as doomed to failure.  Social  costs and social  benefits 
have  to  be considered  as  extra-market  phenomena;  they are  borne and 
accrue  to  society  as  a  whole;  they  are  heterogeneous  and  cannot  be 
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compared quantitatively among themselves and with each other, not even 
in principle” (Kapp 1983: 49).
Because it is impossible to know how to give present values to future, uncertain and 
irreversible  contingencies,  and  because  such  values  depend  on  the  allocation  of 
property rights and the distribution of income even now, the economy lacks a common 
standard of measurement (Martinez-Alier 1995). It is for this reason that ecological 
economists  such  as  Joan  Martinez-Alier  champion  the  importance  of  diverse 
environmental and social movements, which give voice to the diversity of values that 
need to be taken into account as human beings are making decisions of increasingly 
global effect.
As this chapter has illustrated, the value of traditional knowledge, and its concomitant 
understanding of threat and need for protection,  can take a variety of forms all of 
which express real concerns of people. The discourse and practice of such initiatives 
as  ProBenefit  has  the  effect  of  silencing  the  diversity  of  values  and  making  the 
protection of traditional knowledge commensurable with the global market economy. 
Yet without the legal, political, economic, cultural and philosophical recognition of the 
values  of  indigenous  people,  and  without  the  value  conflicts  arising  from  such 
recognition, the protection of traditional knowledge rings hollow at best.
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6 Conclusion.
In  this  thesis  we have  seen  that  the  war  against  subsistence  which  capital  wages 
destroys the conditions in which traditional knowledge is created, used, and reworked, 
and thereby the context in which it is directly meaningful and relevant to people’s 
lives.  Bioprospecting  endeavours  and  the  Access  and  Benefit  Sharing  agreements 
which they require constitute, no matter how fair and equitable, one of the ways in 
which the expansion of  capital  manifests  today.  Paradoxically,  Access and Benefit 
Sharing agreements are also promoted and implemented as one of the key mechanisms 
for the protection of traditional knowledge. It is in this way that I have argued that this 
hegemonic construction of the  protection of traditional knowledge contributes to the 
destruction of the very foundations of traditional knowledge. For it is in the domain of 
autonomous subsistence that traditional knowledge is developed, made meaningful, 
used,  and  changed.  The  domain  of  subsistence  consists  of  the  practices  of  self-
provisioning through which the everyday needs of people are fulfilled, and through 
which their  desires  are  shaped and addressed.  It  consists  of the everyday lives  of 
people and their interactions with each other and the environments they inhabit which 
are not characterised by market exchange nor market rationalities and values. As the 
dominant form of traditional knowledge protection contributes to the expansion of 
capital, it also contributes to the destruction of the conditions of the very existence of 
traditional knowledge.
To make this  argument  has  been one  of  the  key ways  in  which  I  have  aimed to 
contribute  to  a  destabilisation  of  the  hegemonic  construction  of  the  protection  of 
traditional knowledge as a form of intellectual property protection. In order to make 
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my case, I have provided some theoretical tools in Chapter 1. I have discussed the war 
against subsistence as an integral aspect of capital and its expansion. I have discussed 
the  autonomist  Marxist  notion  of  capital  as  value  practice,  and  the  concomitant 
understanding that  alternative  value practices  constitute  an ‘outside’ of  capitalism; 
subsistence practices of indigenous and peasant peoples thus create and re-create this 
outside,  constituting  a  domain  into  which  capital  seeks  to  expand.  I  have  also 
discussed Polanyi’s  notion of  the double movement of capitalism,  and the way in 
which movements for market expansion are constrained by countermovements aimed 
at  protecting  social  and  environmental  interests  against  the  ravages  of  unfettered 
accumulation.
Chapter 2 has fulfilled two functions. Firstly, it served to illustrate the way in which 
the double movement dynamic manifests in different contexts. This has shown how 
the ‘countermovements’ to market expansion are not always bottom-up movements of 
resistance, but rather constitute a confluence of reactions from different social strata to 
the  socially  (and  environmentally)  detrimental  effects  of  capital  and  colonial 
expansion,  which simultaneously challenges and contests as well as reproduces and 
legitimises the latter. What is more, it  has illustrated the way in which the double 
movement  dynamic  can  come  to  collapse  into  a  singular  movement  of  market 
expansion  which  has  already  incorporated  –  and  thereby  disarmed  –  its 
countermovements; I have argued that this is the case in the context of sustainable as 
well as participatory development. Secondly, Chapter 2 also served to  illustrate the 
histories  of  political  struggle  which  constitute  the  five  fields  without  which  the 
protection of traditional knowledge would not be an international imperative with the 
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particular shape which it has today. I have argued that the fields of (i) International 
Law and the Politics of Indigeneity, (ii) Conservation of Biological Resources, (iii) 
Intellectual  Property,  (iv)  Safeguarding  of  Cultural  Heritage,  and  (v)  Public 
Participation  in  Development  and Governance  together  constitute  the  genealogical 
origins of traditional knowledge protection as a form of property protection. Such a 
historical  view  serves  to  further  destabilise  the  hegemonic  understanding  of  the 
protection of traditional knowledge by placing it  in a context of political  struggle, 
making visible the way in which the protection of traditional knowledge is itself a 
field of struggle characterised by the double movement.
Approaching  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  from  a  critical  perspective, 
which  aims  to  take  into  account  the  views  of  the  so-called  knowledge-holders 
themselves, requires a historical perspective which identifies bioprospecting as one of 
a wider set of activities impinging on indigenous peoples’ lives. In Chapter 3 I have 
provided the  background for  such a  historical  perspective  by outlining  a  political 
economy of extraction and colonisation in the Ecuadorian Amazon. From the time of 
the  Conquest  via  the  rubber  boom to  mass  colonisation  and  oil  exploitation,  the 
indigenous  inhabitants  of  the  Napo region have  experienced a  variety of  ways  in 
which  their  labour,  skills  and  knowledge  have  been  used  in  order  to  serve  other 
people’s ends and to further those people’s profit at the Napo Runa’s expense. It was 
this historical context which the ProBenefit project entered in 2004. Yet the project’s 
design and execution did not seem to take this context into account.
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In Chapter  4,  I  have illustrated how I  understand the failure  to  take into account 
historical  power  asymmetries  to  have  hampered  the  ProBenefit  project’s  smooth 
completion.  As  we  have  seen,  indigenous  participation  stalled  and  made  timely 
negotiation of an ABS proposal impossible; in the end, neither consent to nor a clear 
rejection of bioprospecting in Napo was obtained.  I  have argued that some of the 
problems  ProBenefit  had  to  face  were  moreover  rooted  in  ProBenefit’s  structural 
inability to question some of its own fundamental assumptions regarding the value of 
traditional knowledge, the threats which it faces, and the most adequate strategies of 
protection. This inability – to do with project time frame, obligations to funders, and 
deep-seated cultural  assumptions  – also led to  the (inadvertent)  eclipsing  of  other 
understandings  of  what  was  at  stake,  even  those  that  were  clearly  voiced  during 
ProBenefit’s capacity building course. Chapter 4 thus detailed a situation in which the 
hegemonic understanding of traditional knowledge protection manifested in practice.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I have presented and discussed a series of conversations and 
events at which traditional knowledge protection figured in ways very different to its 
hegemonic construal as intellectual property protection. By showing how the notion of 
traditional knowledge is interpreted in a variety of ways by its Napo Runa ‘holders’ – 
e.g. sometimes meaning spiritual power and ethical conduct, sometimes referring to 
the  increasingly  irrelevant  lifeways  of  the  older  generation  and  its  intimate 
acquaintance with the landscape, sometimes acting as a proxy for the value of Napo 
Runa  culture  as  a  whole  –  we  have  been  able  to  see  how the  question  of  what 
traditional  knowledge  is  threatened  by and how it  is  best  protected  gains  a  fresh 
importance when the views of indigenous people are taken seriously. I have argued 
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that,  by contrast,  the  dominant  discourse  of  protection  –  the  one  which  animates 
projects such as ProBenefit – colonises our understanding of what is at stake in the 
protection  of  traditional  knowledge,  and  perpetuates  background  assumptions 
ultimately instrumental to the continued expansion of capital.
This  thesis  has  exemplified  a  methodological  approach  which  combines  political 
economy analyses with ethnographic research in a synergetic way so as to make sense 
of the relationship between global processes on the one hand, and situated events, 
embodied practices, and lived subjectivities on the other. Choosing this approach of 
‘critical  ethnography’ has meant  being able to  eschew conceptualising capital  as a 
quasi-autonomous  global  force,  the  dynamic  action  of  which  unilaterally  affects 
passive  localities  and  impotent  people.  Instead,  I  was  able  to  proceed  from  an 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  capital  as  force  and  its  concrete 
manifestations in material actualities as one of co-constitution and co-production. In 
this  way,  it  was  possible  to  understand the  ProBenefit  experience  (as  well  as  the 
historical material of Chapter 2) not just as shaped by processes of capital expansion 
(and its countermovements),  but as simultaneously shaping  what capital  expansion 
(and its countermovements) actually means in the context of traditional knowledge 
protection through Access and Benefit Sharing agreements.
Where do these chapters and their discussions leave us? In order to conclude, let me 
clarify three related points, which I believe this thesis yields and which also indicate 
future research areas to be explored in more depth than this thesis’ scope has allowed.
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First,  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  (in  its  hegemonic  construction  as 
intellectual property protection through ABS agreements) has to be understood as a 
form of capital expansion in at least four interrelated ways. 
One, it facilitates the commodification of the hitherto non-commodified domain of 
traditional  knowledge.  It  does  so  by  allocating  capitalist  property  rights  over 
traditional knowledge (that is it offers control over access to traditional knowledge 
and rights to the economic benefits that accrue from its use). While it does so in an 
apparently  just  way  –  namely  by  nominally  granting  such  rights  to  historically 
disadvantaged indigenous and peasant peoples – such allocation nonetheless serves 
capital  accumulation  as  a  whole.  For  without  clear  property  rights  –  which  are 
protected by the force of law and the state,  and which can be transferred through 
contracts – there would be no market exchange, nor any way to accumulate profit 
(Berle & Means 1932; De Soto 2000). Moreover, in this way traditional knowledge 
holders  are  included into  the  global  economy as  market  actors,  also  an  aspect  of 
capital expansion. 
Two, through the practices which constitute the protection of traditional knowledge 
(such  as  the  negotiations  of  ProBenefit)  economic  measurements  and  valuations 
extend  into  hitherto  non-commercial  areas  of  decision-making.  As  the  voices  of 
Chapter  5  have illustrated,  traditional  knowledge is,  for  its  ‘holders’,  much less  a 
matter of profitability and rather one of ethical conduct and cultural values. Projects 
such  as  ProBenefit  introduce  capital  valuations  (e.g.  cost-benefit,  profit-loss 
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calculations)  into an  area of  life  which  had theretofore been oriented  by different 
values. 
Three,  in  practice,  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge as  intellectual  property 
protection through Access and Benefit Sharing agreements is resistant to the influence 
of alternative views and values. We saw this in Chapters 4 and 5 when discussing the 
insidious  ways  in  which  ProBenefit  did  not  respond  to  expressions  of  alternative 
cosmovisions, expectations or understandings. In this  way, ProBenefit  protected its 
core values from erosion. 
Four,  being  hegemonic,  the  hegemonic  form  of  traditional  knowledge  protection 
imposes its own assumptions and value system onto alternative understandings. Core 
(capitalist) conceptions regarding knowledge as property and property in general are 
thereby perpetuated, strengthened and introduced into areas hitherto free from or less 
oriented by these conceptions. This is the way in which the dominant discourse of 
protection colonises our understanding of what is at stake, eclipsing the alternative 
visions which exist. 
These four ways in which the protection of traditional knowledge has to be understood 
as a form of capital expansion parallel the four ways – which have been identified by 
Jessop (2001; 2008) and which I introduced in Chapter 1 – in which capital can come 
to dominate society: (i) through commodification of hitherto non-commodified areas 
of  life;  (ii)  through  the  extension  of  economic  measurements  to  hitherto  non-
commercial areas of decision-making; (iii)  through its systemic capacity to protect 
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itself  from the  influence  of  other  systems  with  which  it  interacts  and co-evolves, 
therefore reducing the possibility of its distinctive operational codes to be eroded; (iv) 
through its systemic capacity to induce, provoke or force other institutional orders to 
operate according to its logic, thus consolidating the market mechanism through time 
and space.
The second point which I would like to make in conclusion to this thesis flows from 
the  observation  that  the  double  movement  of  market  expansion  and 
countermovements  is  a  key  mechanism  undergirding  the  continuous  survival  of 
capital.  To observe,  study and try to understand the double movement is hence of 
pivotal importance for those countermovements which aim to undermine capital rather 
than tie back into its homeostatic self-preservation loops of incorporating dissent by 
means  of  a  less  unfettered  and  more  constrained  expansion.  This  is  especially 
important as ‘sustainable development’ and ‘public participation in development and 
governance’ have become hegemonic in most contexts. Once a countermovement’s 
discourse has become coopted and reworked to capital’s ends, such as is the case with 
sustainable and participatory development, its contestation becomes difficult. I have 
argued that in these cases we might say that the double movement has collapsed into a 
singular  movement  of  restrained  expansion,  which  is  more  resistant  to  counter-
hegemonic attack.
This leads us to my third and final point in this conclusion. In light of the double 
movement, and in particular its ‘collapse’ or unification, it is reasonable to argue that 
non-participation (e.g. as practised by participants at the capacity-building course of 
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ProBenefit)  embodies  the  potential  for  resistance,  whereas  participation,  however 
critical, easily turns into a form of surrender. As hope for the potential of radical, ‘non-
reformist reform’ in countermovements dwindles, the autonomous Marxist idea of the 
outside of capital becomes crucial. For non-participation, of course, does not mean 
doing nothing. On the contrary, in the context of the Napo Runa of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon, it means to protect, support and hence sustain practices of subsistence, it 
means continuing to live with the forest and its plant spirits and other inhabitants in 
ways  that  are  reproductive  of  the  values  and  beliefs  that  underpin  Napo  Runa 
knowledge systems. In brief, non-participation refers to living a life and engaging in 
value practices which create and re-create the ‘outside’ of capital.
Alternative valuations are an important, indeed maybe the main resistance to capital. 
From the point of view of resistance, it is hence crucial to foster such valuations, the  
conditions in which they develop and through which they become meaningful. It is 
also crucial to promote them and carry out struggles and frame demands in idioms that 
transcend the language of market valuation (‘capital’s measure’). Joan Martinez-Alier 
(2002) has shown how many social movements already use such alternative valuations 
to frame their grievances. It is increasingly important, however, to practice them. The 
alterglobalisation insistence that ‘other worlds are possible’ (e.g. Juris 2005) bears a 
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